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Abstract 
 
 
          This thesis explores the life and context of Kesselring the last living 
German Field Marshal. It examines his background, military experience 
during the Great War, his involvement in the Freikorps, in order to understand 
what moulded his attitudes. Kesselring's role in the clandestine re-organisation 
of the German war machine is studied; his role in the development of the 
Blitzkrieg; the growth of the Luftwaffe is looked at along with his command 
of Air Fleets from Poland to Barbarossa. His appointment to Southern 
Command is explored indicating his limited authority. His command in North 
Africa and Italy is examined to ascertain whether he deserved the accolade of 
being one of the finest defence generals of the war; the thesis suggests that the 
Allies found this an expedient description of him which in turn masked their 
own inadequacies. During the final months on the Western Front, the thesis 
asks why he fought so ruthlessly to the bitter end. 
 
          His imprisonment and trial are examined from the legal and 
historical/political point of view, and the contentions which arose regarding 
his early release. The thesis will confirm that Kesselring was guilty of war 
crimes, and offers new evidence that he was aware of his guilt, and explains 
why he committed perjury. His postwar activities are explored, and illustrate 
that he failed to come to terms with the new West Germany. During and after 
the war Kesselring was frequently regarded as a non-party, decent man 
considered by some a possible candidate for the presidency of West Germany. 
This thesis challenges these long held views; he simply stayed in the limelight 
for a brief time due to the politics of the Cold War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
Contents   
 
Abstract                                                                                                           2 
 
Acknowledgements                                                                                         7 
 
Abbreviations                                                                                                   8 
 
Photographs of Kesselring                                                                              9 
 
Maps                                                                                                               10 
Preface                                                                                                            14 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Introduction                                                                                                   15 
Why this Thesis …p.15 
Current Research…p. 16 
Context of General Consensus…p.17 
Kesselring’s background…p.18 
Context as Military Commander…p.21 
The Context of Guilt…p.25 
Context of Postwar Politics…p.28 
 
                                                                         
Chapter 1:   Early Life (1885-1922)                                                                32 
Early Influences…p.32 
World War I…p.41 
World War I Aftermath 1918-22…p.48 
 
 
Chapter 2:   The Reichswehr (1922-1937)                                                       55 
Introduction…p.55 
Versailles Reaction…p.56 
Clandestine Activity…p.58 
Seeckt, Politics and Blitzkrieg…p.60 
Planning War…p.65 
Arrival of Hitler…p.67 
Emergence of the Luftwaffe…p.71 
 
                                                                
Chapter 3:   Luftwaffe Command (1937-1941)                                              81 
Introduction…p.81                                                         
Kesselring’s claimed ignorance of Aggressive War…p.82 
Strategic Bombing…p.86 
Poland …p.90 
Western Europe …p.92 
Battle of Britain…p.95 
Barbarossa…p.101 
Did Kesselring know of the Atrocities?...p.106 
 
 
4
         
Chapter 4:   Southern Command (1941-1943 (45))                                      110 
Introduction…p.110 
Backdrop to Italy ...p.111 
The Appointment…p.112 
Kesselring’s Views of Italian situation…p.114 
Military situation and Intelligence Failure…p.116 
Rommel…p.118 
Malta…p.120 
North Africa – Supply Problems…p.123 
Torch and understanding France…p.125 
Defence in Africa…p.128 
The Opposition…p.130 
Defeat…p.132 
A Clean War…p.133 
Concluding Notes…p.135 
 
 
Chapter 5:   Sicily to Salerno (1943)                                                          138 
Introduction…p.138                                                                                          
The Nature of Kesselring’s Command…p.139 
Kesselring and the Italians…p.145 
Kesselring Master of Defence...p.155 
 
 
Chapter 6:   Italy (1943-1944)                                                                     167 
Introduction…p.167 
The Backdrop…p.168 
Kesselring’s Command and the SS…p.169 
Military Intelligence…p.172 
The Policy of Plunder…p.173 
The Four Battles – Bari…p.176 
                              Gustav Line/Monte Cassino…p.177 
                              Anzio…p.184 
                              Rome…p.188 
Conclusion to Mediterranean Campaigns…p.191 
 
 
Chapter 7:   North Italy and Partisan War (1944-1945)                        19 
Introduction…p.194                                               
Kesselring’s Loyalty…p.194  
Retreat North…p.195 
Introduction to Partisan War…p.197 
Partisan or Terrorist…p.197 
International Laws and Attitudes…p.198 
The Italian Partisan…p.200 
The Allies and the Partisans…p.204 
Kesselring’s reactions to Partisans…p.206 
 
 
 
 
5
 
Chapter 8:   Commander to Prisoner (1945-1947)                                    215 
Introduction…p.215                                                     
Western Command…p.215 
Surrender and Prison…p.225 
Did Kesselring know?...p.226 
Early Interrogations and Victor’s justice…p.231 
Kesselring’s Charm…233 
 
 
Chapter 9:   The Trial (1947)                                                                  235 
Introduction…p.235 
Authority, Nature, Legal Issues and Venue of Trial…p.235 
Nuremberg and Subsequent Proceedings…p.235 
The Legal Issues…p237 
Competency of Officials…p.238 
Siegerjustiz, Victor's Justice…p.239 
Not all Culprits Indicted…p.241 
Trial in Italy…p.241 
Prosecution and Defence on the First Charge…p.243 
Charge of Ardeatine Massacre…p.243 
Defence – the Alibi…p.244 
Defence – Hitler ordered SD…p.245 
Defence – Was Kesselring humane?...p.246 
Prosecution and Defence of the Second Charge…p.248 
Prosecution Evidence…p.248 
Defence – not the Wehrmacht…p.250 
Defence – Legality of Hostages/Reprisals…p.251 
Defence –Illegality of Partisans…p.255 
Defence – Kesselring, Saviour of Italian Culture…p.255 
Perjury…p.259 
Raiber’s case…p.260 
Verdict in Court…p.262 
Trial in long term context…p.263 
 
Chapter 10: Prison (1947-1952)                                                                    266 
Introduction…p.266  
Commutation of Death Sentence…p.266 
Life in Prison…p.269 
The Politics of Release –Introduction…p.271 
Entnazifizierung, de-Nazification…p.273 
Kesselring’s Lobby Group…p.275 
Kesselring’s British Lobby…p.275 
German Reaction…p.279 
Into the Political Forum…p.281 
Cold War and Politics of Memory…p.283 
Resolution…p.285 
 
 
 
 
6
Chapter 11: Post Prison Politics (1952-1960)                                             288 
Introduction…p.288 
Germany post-1945…p.289 
Rearmament Issue…p.294 
Veteran Associations…p.295 
Kesselring Misjudges the Times…p.299 
Returning Criminal POWs…p.301 
Kesselring’s Failure…p.304 
 
Concluding Remarks                                                                                 306 
Introduction….p.306                                                                                  
Kesselring, A National Product…p.307 
Kesselring prepared for War…p.308 
Kesselring supported an Iniquitous Regime…p.309 
Kesselring knew war was planned…p.310 
Kesselring’s ruthless tactical bombing…p.311 
Kesselring as Luftwaffe Commander…p.311 
Kesselring as Commander in Chief South…p.312 
Kesselring’s failure with Rommel and Malta…p.314 
Kesselring’s failure in North Africa…p.315 
Kesselring the Master of Defence…p.316 
Kesselring was Ruthless…p.317 
Kesselring becomes Politics…p.318 
 
 
Appendices                                                                                                 325 
1. Sea Lion…p.320 
2. Kesselring’s orders ref Partisans…p.328 
3. Kesselring’s orders ref Partisans…p.323 
4. Subordinate’s orders ref Partisans…p.334 
5. Rules of Land Warfare USA…p.325 
6. Trial Transcript ref Hostage/Reprisals…p.327 
7. Raid on Bari…p.331 
8. Perceptive 1919 Versailles Cartoon…p.336 
9. The Führerbefehl, 18th October 1942…p.337 
10. Kesselring’s Instructions for Italy…p.339 
                           
Bibliography                                                                                                348 
Primary Sources…p340 
Biographies, Speeches, Diaries…p343 
Published works…p.347 
Pamphlets, Magazines, Articles…p.354 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
  Acknowledgments  
 
 
 
 
 I would like to thank Dr Richard Maguire for having the courage to take on 
an OAP studying a subject not to everyone's interest, and for having the 
patience to stay with me as I changed my mind every time new evidence 
surfaced, as well as the persistence to make me think about what I was 
actually trying to say. I have appreciated his tough application of criticism. I 
am very grateful to the kind help of the UEA library staff and those in the 
National Archives at Kew. I have made many contacts during this research 
with historians overseas, and am especially grateful for the various 
discussions with Pier Paolo Battistelli in Rome. I am indebted to my wife and 
sister for encouraging me to continue my studies, and my wife in particular 
for accompanying me on research trips and helping check my English. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
 
BA-MA        Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg 
BA-BL           Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde 
BHMK           Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, München 
CLNAI          Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy 
IMCC             Inter-allied Military Control Commission  
KNA             Kew National Archives 
LRWC          Law Reports War Crimes -The UN War Crimes Commission, 
NA-AMP      National Archives- Air Ministry Pamphlets 
NSDAP           Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  
                          National Socialists German Workers' Party 
 
PAC              USA Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality 
SIB               Special Investigation Branch 
SNP                 Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings 
USAHD        United States America Historical Division 
USDS             US Department of State, Publication 3556 
USFR             US Final Reports to Secretary of Army on Nuremberg War   
                         Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10 
 
VdS                  Verband deutscher Soldaten 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 
 
 
 
ALBERT KONRAD KESSELRING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uniform als Oberleutnant der kaiserlichen Armee  
NORTH AFRICA – Main elements 
FRENCH 
MOROCCO 
ALGERIA 
TUNISIA 
LIBYA EGYPT 
TANGIER 
CASABLANCA 
ORAN 
ALGIERS 
BIZERTA 
TUNIS 
TRIPOLI 
BENGHAZI 
TOBRUK 
EL ALAMEIN 
ALEXANDRIA 
MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
 
1
0
 
TUNISIA 
SALT LAKE/
MARSHES 
Land over 1,000 
metres 
Mareth Line 
Enfidaville defence 
Bône 
Bizerta 
Tunis 
Kasserine Pass 
11 
Syracuse 
Catania 
Messina 
Palermo 
Etna 
 INVASION of SICILY 
US 7th 
Patton 
US II CORPS 
Bradley 
BRIT XXX CORPS 
Leese 
BRIT XIII CORPS 
Dempsey 
Operation Husky 10th July 1943 
15 Army Group – Alexander 
Eight Army 
Gela 
11 July – Livorno Div & Herman Göring Div converge towards Gela. XIII Corps take Syracuse. 
12 July – H Göring tanks retreat north. Americans taken 18,000 prisoners but lost 1000 men.  
                Brit XIII Corps repulse Schmalz Group and head towards Augusta. 
13 July – Augusta falls. XXX Corps, 51st Div engaged by Herman Göring Div. At night Schmalz attacked by  
                 Brit to enter Catania plain; airborne troops dropped. 
14 July – Amer 1st Div enter Mazzarino & Niscemi. Allied bombing intensified along communication lines. 
16 July – Amer 2nd Arm sent by Patton against Palermo – Can 1st Div takes Caltagirone after battle with battalion of  
                German 15th Armoured Div  
17 July – Herman Göring Div & Schmalz Group resist attacks towards Catania 
Augusta 
Niscemi 
18 July – Brit 5th & 51st Divs halted before Catania 
19 July – Amer 7th head towards Palermo with less resistance 
20 July – Montgomery brings 78th Div from Africa intending to go around Catania 
22 July – American troops enter Palermo 
27 July – Nicosia falls to Amer 1st Div & Agira to Can 1st Div 
3 Aug – remaining Italians evacuate Island 
5 Aug – Brit troops enter Catania 
7 Aug – Amer troops bypass Sant’Agata with amphibious landing    
12 Aug – Axis forces withdraw towards Messina; Brit XXX Corps held in difficult  
                terrain south and east of Etna; Germans evacuating. 
17 Aug – Patton’s troops enter Messina at 10.15 am 
18 Aug – German resistance on island ceases 
Sant’Agata 
Enna 
Agira 
Nicosia 
12 
Rome 
Anzio 
Naples 
Salerno 
Pescara 
Reggio di 
Brindisi 
Cassino 
Foggia 
Bari 
Taranto 
Termoli 
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 1943 Sept – 1944 June 5th 
The Garigliano 
The Volturno 
The Rapido 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX  Gustav     
    Line 
Hitler/von Sen-
ger  
Line.. crumbles 
Caesar Line 
3 Sept 43 Montgomery’s army land 
Sept 5 43 Forces for Avalanche 
 sail from  Africa 
8 Sept 43 Italy surrenders 
9 Sept 43 Avalanche launched 
Operation Slapstick:  
9 Sept 43 Brit Airborne 
seize Taranto 
11 Sept 43 Brit Airborne 
take Brindisi 
12 Sept 43 Mussolini rescued 
14 Sept 43 Brit Airborne 
take Bari 
27 Sept 43 Montgomery’s 
8th enter Foggia 
2 Oct 43 US VI Corps head to-
wards Volturno 
2 Oct 43 Allied commandos seize Termoli 
14//15 Oct cross-
2 Nov 43 Allies  
reach Garigliano 
13 Nov 43 Italy recognised as ‘co’belligerent’ 
The Sangro 19 Nov 43 Brit troops arrive at Sangro 
25 Nov 43 Op Shingle ap-
30 Nov 43 Op Raincoat  
Ortona 23 Dec 43 Brit 5th fight for Ortona; captured 28th 
13 Jan 44 US II Corps 
close towards Rapido 
17 Jan 44 Op Panther to cross Garigliano  
22 Jan 44 22 Jan 44 Op Shingle, Anzio landings 
15 Feb 44 Cassino Bombed 23 Feb 44 Anzio – Lucas replaced by Truscott 29 Feb last attack on Anzio by Germans 
12 April 44 Emmanuel III resigns for Umberto 11 May 44 11.00 pm major offensive on Gustav line 
14 May Rapido crossed 
18 May Polish take  
     Cassino 
1 June 44 Gustav line breached 3 June 44 Hitler allows Kesselring to withdraw from Rome 
June 4/5 
1944 Rome 
falls 
13 
 14
PREFACE 
 
                   'A biography can be a problematic methodology, especially when 
it decontextualizes the individual and elevates him or her to the status of hero' 
which is why this biography is entitled 'Kesselring in Context'1. In writing an 
account of Kesselring, a German Field-Marshal condemned to death as a war 
criminal, it has been important to explore him in the context of his times. A 
danger with this type of research is the tendency to develop a degree of 
empathy with the central figure, or the polarisation of views which sanctify or 
demonise the man. I concur with the words of Christopher Browning when he 
wrote - ‘What I do not accept, however, are the old clichés that to explain is to 
excuse, to understand is to forgive. Explaining is not excusing, understanding 
is not forgiving’2. It is necessary to examine Kesselring in context in an 
attempt to discover the historical and psychological predisposition which 
made him the man he was.  
 
               Whether he was a great military commander, or simply another Nazi 
war criminal, is only part of the study; it is the importance of background and 
circumstance which dictate the human predicament that motivated this thesis. 
Much of Kesselring’s life was conflict, and ‘the physical, intellectual, and 
moral challenges of war allow us to see deep into the heart of Humanity’3.  
 
                    Because of the intricate nature of conflict and war, various 
academic disciplines must be drawn upon in this study, because underpinning 
some of this particular investigation are areas of Law, both national and 
international, matters jurisprudential, and sometimes the fraught area of 
human conduct.  
 
                   It is hoped that by placing Kesselring in the spotlight, the thesis 
will demythologise and reappraise some of the versions/narratives which tend 
to accumulate around admired enemy commanders such as Kesselring. 
                                                 
1    Priemel C & Stiller A Eds, Reassessing the Military Tribunals (Oxford: Berghahn Books,  
      2012)p.48  
2    Browning Christopher, Ordinary Men (London: Penguin, 2001)p.xviii  
3    Boff Jonathan, Military History, Studying Military History (Issue 20, May 2012)p.51 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Why this thesis? 
 
                 After the last war there was a steady stream of memoirs written by 
military commanders on both sides; they make interesting reading, but very 
few are self-deprecating. Fewer still accept errors or blunders on the part of 
the writer, even less reflect any form of apologia. The vast majority are self-
serving and self-justifying, and must be tested for historical truth. Following 
such autobiographies, a number of biographies appeared which still retained 
an appeal. Some tend to be hagiographies, which have a tendency to suggest a 
sneaking admiration for German commanders. Manstein's latest biography is 
proudly entitled Hitler's Greatest General, and Runsdedt's The Last 
Prussian1. 
 
                  There is almost a fascination and envy about enemy commanders, 
and Rommel is the classic example; he has been the subject of numerous 
books and articles casting him in a heroic light, frequently ignoring the fact 
that in his early years he was a passionate disciple of Hitler. Rommel, who 
was subordinate to Kesselring, has been consistently presented as the epitome 
of brilliance2. Even during the war Göbbels, after reading the English press, 
noted that 'they are making him one of the most popular generals in the entire 
world’.3 In her diary Countess of Ranfurly wrote of Rommel that 'in spite of 
being our enemy, he gained our admiration and respect, almost our affection,' 
reflecting a widely-held opinion during and after the war4. Many were 
cautious of giving an almost mystical heroic status to an enemy leader: 
Alexander noted, in his memoirs, ‘Rommel’s reputation contributed a great 
                                                 
1    Melvin Mungo, Manstein Hitler’s Greatest General (London: Weidenfeld &  
     Nicolson, 2010) and Messenger Charles, The Last Prussian, A Biography of Field Marshal     
     Gerd von Rundstedt (Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2011). 
2    Field-Marshal was generally a title more than a rank. Under Hitler a Field-Marshal was   
     simply the 5th rank of general and it was not unusual for one Field-Marshal to be   
     subordinate to another, 'Rommel –even when he was a Field-Marshal had always been  
     subordinate, first to the Italians, then to Kesselring, and later – in France – to Rundstedt’    
     Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt Potsdam (Eds), Germany & The  Second World   
     War Volume IX/X (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001)p.899. 
3    Lochner Louis (Ed), The Goebbels Diaries (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948)p.8. 
4    Ranfurly Countess of, To War with Whitaker (London, Charnwood, 1994)p.256. 
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deal to the English Army’s widespread belief in the invincibility of the Afrika 
Corps … a debilitating effect.5’ Likewise, it has been argued that 'the Allies 
esteemed Rommel more highly than did many German officers, partly 
because British and American self-respect was massaged by attributing their 
setbacks to his supposed genius6’.  
 
                  Kesselring's first biography, entitled Kesselring, German Master 
Strategist of the Second World War, wrote that he was 'one of the top three 
German soldiers,' the others being Guderian and Rommel7. This thesis 
examines Kesselring, and intends to put this much admired commander in the 
context of his background, and explore whether the admiration heaped on 
him, by so many, is justified. 
 
Current Research 
 
          There are two biographies on Kesselring one by Macksey, and recently 
another by Battistelli; both tend to concentrate on the military campaigns8. 
Macksey paints Kesselring as a great military strategist, and although it falls 
short of sanctifying him it is a sympathetic portrayal, viewing him as 
something of a patrician. The Italian historian Battistelli, who gave me 
personal assistance in understanding the Italian perspective, is more realistic, 
but only deals with Kesselring's military campaign. Finding personal 
information about Kesselring has not been easy, he left no diaries or notes, 
and his postwar interrogation was nearly all military.  The various German 
archives are seriously deficient in material, as I was warned by Kerstin von 
Lingen at Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen: much of the material was 
destroyed, although not the early personnel records in the Bavarian archives. 
This German historian has studied the change of attitude by the Allies to 
German commanders because of the need to keep postwar Germany in the 
Western fold, and her work is quoted where appropriate. Dr Richard Raiber 
                                                 
5    Alexander Earl of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs 1940-1945 (London: Frontline Books,  
     2010)p.13. 
6    Hastings Max, All Hell Let Loose (London: Harper, 2011)p.668. 
7    Macksey Kenneth, Kesselring German Master Strategist of the Second World  War   
     (London: Greenhill, 1978)p.11. 
8    Ibid and Battistelli Pier, Albert Kesselring (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012).    
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died before he finished his thesis on whether Kesselring committed perjury or 
not, and whether Kesselring was innocent. His work has been published 
privately, posthumously, and his detailed research casts new light on one 
aspect of Kesselring's trial9. The National Archives at Kew Garden has 
revealed a few items of interest, from an unexpected file which revealed 
evidence that Kesselring considered himself guilty, and may provide part of a 
confirming element in Raiber's research10. 
 
Context of General Consensus  
 
              Mainly arising from the early Macksey biography, but enhanced by 
other sources to be studied later, Kesselring is viewed as a non-political 
soldier, an educated man who was a linguist, good-natured and just followed 
orders. This would be Kesselring's own projected self-image, viewing himself 
as an honest career soldier who obeyed his government. He always claimed 
that, although a patriot, he had no idea of Hitler's plans for war. As a 
Luftwaffe leader who oversaw the bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam and 
London, he is often regarded as the originator of strategy-bombing and a 
successful commander11. When he was transferred to Italy and the 
Mediterranean he was understood by most, then and since, to have been in 
total charge, and was considered as sympathetic to the Italians. He had issues 
with Rommel because of supply problems, and leaving Malta militarily 
viable, but few consider this to have been Kesselring's fault. From the defeat 
in North Africa, through Sicily and Italy he developed a legendry reputation 
in defence. The American military historian D’Este described Kesselring as 
bearing ‘the stamp of genius for defensive operations’12. Graham and Bidwell 
in their history of the Italian Campaign informed their readers that the Allies 
were ‘facing as good a general as emerged from the German Army in the 
Second World War and certainly the best on either side in the Italian 
                                                 
9      Raiber Richard, Anatomy of Perjury (Delaware: Delaware Press, 2008). 
10    Unexpected source was a top secret communication from the Chinese Embassy in    
       Geneva, KNA, HW1/3007. 
11    See Murray Williamson, The Luftwaffe 1933-45 Strategy for Defeat (Washington:                        
       Congress Library, 1996). 
12    D’Este Carlo, Fatal Decision (London: Fontana, 1991)p.86. 
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Theatre13. There is a body of opinion that believed Kesselring operated 
independently from Hitler, and that he was the saviour of much of Italy's 
cultural heritage14. He always claimed total ignorance of the Holocaust and 
other barbarities, claiming the Wehrmacht always fought a 'clean war.' In 
Western Europe, in the final months, he fought to the bitter end claiming it 
was to save German soldiers fighting on the Eastern Front, as all he cared for 
was his soldiers and Germany's future15. Although condemned to death by a 
British Court, his sentence was commuted following pressure by Churchill, 
Alexander and many others, leading Kesselring and others to believe he was 
vindicated. His short term in prison, released after seven years was viewed in 
the same fashion. For a time a few considered him as a potential President for 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and he devoted his final years to caring for 
old soldiers and POWs16.  
 
                           This thesis will explore all these aspects of Kesselring, using 
a biographical outline looking at the various contexts in which Kesselring 
lived and fought, which will demonstrate that most of the above notions are 
far from the truth, and lack historical reality. 
 
Kesselring's Background  
 
                    Chapters 1-2 will explore Kesselring’s background, and the 
degree to which he was a ‘typical’ product of the German military, in so far as 
commanders reflect the ethos of their national background. It has been 
suggested Stalin ‘grasped the convenience of death as the simplest and most 
effective political tool’ especially in the war of extermination17. Stalin did not 
have any moral standards even when it came to 'close family and friends'18. 
As such a General like Zhukov merely reflected the ethos of his nation where 
                                                 
13    Graham D & Bidwell S, Tug Of War The Battle for Italy 1943-45 (Yorkshire:Pen and    
       Sword, 2004)p.38. 
14    See Nichlolas Lynn, The Rape of Europa (London: Papermac, 1995). 
15    Kesselring Albert,The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring (London:William Kimber,     
      1953). 
16    See Macksey, Kesselring.  
17    Montefiore Simon S, Stalin (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003)p.28. 
18    Ibid. 
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life was cheap. On the other hand, Field-Marshal Alexander appears at the 
opposite end of the spectrum. The son of an Earl educated at Harrow and 
Sandhurst he was raised a typical English gentleman, conscious of the sanctity 
of life and frequently accused of not being aggressive enough for that 
reason19. Alexander and Zhukov were two entirely different commanders 
from two diverse backgrounds. It would have been out of character for 
Zhukov to worry about the potential loss of life, as it would if Alexander had 
given an order which ignored causalities. Alexander reflected his background 
as Zhukov was influenced by the Soviet system. Alexander noted that ‘British 
Generals had to be conscious of the sanctity of men’s lives,’ Zhukov was not 
obliged to exercise that care20. For this reason Kesselring and his background 
must come under scrutiny. 
 
                    Chapters 1-2 will illustrate that Kesselring was a product of his 
own country's ethos from the earliest days. He was born into a changing 
Europe; ‘by 1871, yet another new order had been created in Europe: that of 
nation states’21. This new order had been created by war and industrialization, 
which was hastening a new military and social structure. At the time of 
Kesselring’s birth Europe was at peace, but there ‘were military dynamics at 
work;’ also nationalism was increasing, and in some states this sense of 
national self-consciousness took on a military ethos22.  Whether the Bavarian 
Kriegsschule was any different from the English Sandhurst of this period can 
be debated at length, but there can be little doubt that Kesselring’s birth-
country had its own unique military ethos, self-conscious of the importance of 
its military might, which was both aggressive and expansionist. Germany had 
its great musicians, theologians and doctors, but military leaders created their 
own niche.  
 
                 Kesselring was part of that generation which reflected the 
Wilhelmine military atmosphere; his generation was organic to a national 
                                                 
19    See Atkinson R, The Day of the Battle, The War in Sicily and Italy 1943-44 (London:  
       Abacus, 2013). 
20    Alexander, Memoirs,p.27. 
21    Howard Michael, The Invention of Peace & the Reinvention of War (London:Profile   
       Books, 2001)p.47. 
22    Ibid. 
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structure that viewed war as a profession, and he never questioned or took 
issue with this ethos. The Wilhelmine Empire was deeply affected by ultra-
right-wing-nationalism, and although there were numerous members of the 
SPD and communists, they were unlikely members of the influential military 
machine Kesselring joined. Later he was a member of that generation obliged 
to accept what they perceived as a humiliating defeat, allowing themselves to 
believe that they had not so much lost, but had been betrayed; ‘dolchstoss’ – 
the stab in the back, the popular theory that the undefeated military was 
‘betrayed by Social Democrats, profiteers and, most ominously, the Jews’23. 
This was a pernicious and fallacious lie that persuaded many that Germany’s 
greatness should be restored.  
 
               Another influence was anti-Semitism prevalent immediately after 
the Great War, as clearly demonstrated by the German historian Wolfram 
Wette. Although the Bavarian military took a slightly less offensive attitude 
than the Prussians, Wette clearly demonstrates that from the earliest days the 
military was riddled with anti-Semitism, which clearly influenced 
Kesselring.24  The man whom Kesselring admired most, General von Seeckt, 
was anti-Semitic, although his wife was Jewish. The defeat and humiliation of 
the Treaty of Versailles drove military officers such as Kesselring towards the 
extreme right-wing; it appeared to offer the route to recovery. Chapter 2 will 
explore Kesselring’s conduct in the 1920s, and will question Kesselring's 
claim he was non-political.   
 
              Seeckt’s sway cannot be underrated, and his influence on Kesselring 
was considerable. Seeckt 'succeeded in rebuilding its {the army’s} spirit by 
making each regiment the ‘tradition-bearer’ of several of the old, which he 
intended would be reborn in better times, and by teaching the officers that 
they were the guardians of Germany’s past and future greatness'25. Kesselring 
came under his pervasive influence, even though Seeckt made co-operation 
with Soviet Russia for military purposes necessary which was cynical and 
                                                 
23    Sangster Andrew, Nazi Thug to British Mayor (London: Robert Hale, 2010)p.18. 
24    Wette Wolfram, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality (London: Harvar UP,2007)p.33.                                      
25    Keegan J & Wheatcroft, Who’s Who in Military History (London:Hutchinson,  
      1987)p.279.  
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illegal, since it ran counter to the Versailles Treaty. Not only did they agree to 
build planes, train pilots and army officers, but also established a 
German/Russian joint stock company Bersol, near Samara, to build a 
chemical factory in order to make poison gas26. Seeckt's one aim was for 
‘Germany to recapture the prestige, powers and territories of which it had 
been stripped’27. Alexander was a product of English aristocracy and Zhukov 
a product of the Soviet regime; this thesis will illustrate that Kesselring was a 
typical product of the Wilhelmine era and the German defeat in the Great 
War. From his birth the thesis will argue that by nature Kesselring was 
unquestionably inclined towards right-wing nationalism, and remained so 
until his death. Chapters 1 and 2 will propose that Kesselring's political 
attitudes and views were built in by his national background, a posture 
Kesselring never questioned. It will also demonstrate that after the Great War 
Kesselring was part of a team that prepared for an aggressive war even before 
Hitler came to power, and Chapter 2 and 3 will propose that despite postwar 
claims Kesselring knew war was anticipated28.    
 
Context as Military Commander 
 
                This thesis does not throw any doubt upon Kesselring's military 
ability, and his administrative skills were unquestionably good, but Liddell-
Hart, noted that many German military leaders, ‘were essentially technicians, 
intent on their professional job, and with little idea of things outside it. It is 
easy to see how Hitler hoodwinked and handled them, and found them good 
instruments up to a point.’29 The thesis will explore this question in relation to 
Kesselring.  
 
                      Kesselring left the Army as a Colonel who had been deeply 
involved in the clandestine re-establishment of the Wehrmacht, and joined the 
                                                 
26    Haigh R, Morris D, Peters A, German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era (Aldershot,     
       Gower, 1985)p.165. 
27    Ibid, p.63. 
28    See Ibid and Blackbourn David, History of Germany 1780-1918 (London: Blackwell,        
       1997) and Citino Robert, The Path to Blitzkrieg (Mechanicsburg, Stackpole, 2008) and  
       Corum James, The Roots of Blitzkrieg (Kansas: UP Kansas, 1992). 
29    Liddell-Hart BH, The German Generals Talk (London: Harper, 2002)p.x. 
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Luftwaffe. His considerable contribution to military tactics, especially in what 
has been dubbed by others as Blitzkrieg, which is by nature aggressive, raises 
a question as to his claim that war came as a surprise. In chapter 3 the 
frequently made claim that Kesselring started strategy bombing or terror 
bombing with Warsaw, Rotterdam and London will be challenged. It was not 
a question of morality or ethics, but a matter of tactics and suitability to the 
system of surprise attack. Moreover, despite Kesselring's claims that the 
Battle of Britain was inconclusive it was not, and the British claim that it was 
the few against the many was a myth; this battle was Kesselring's first major 
defeat because he was against a superior foe that was equally as ruthless30.  
 
                  Also in Chapter 3 as a Luftwaffe commander Kesselring watched 
the Barbarossa attack fail because of the leadership's failure in 
underestimating Russia, yet despite this Kesselring remained loyal to Hitler. 
Kesselring and many others followed military decisions dictated by Hitler. 
The thesis will examine why Kesselring remained faithful to Hitler's wishes to 
the bitter end, and the strange hold Hitler exercised over men like Kesselring. 
This is examined in Chapter 8 when Kesselring was responsible for the 
Western theatre in the closing months of the war. Kesselring may not have 
been a party member, but he exhibited a loyalty and allegiance to Hitler which 
most contemporaries and historians do not ascribe to Kesselring31. 
 
               Attitudes towards Kesselring are mixed but mainly positive, and 
throughout the thesis this enigma will be explored. Amongst contemporary 
German officers and politicians Kesselring was admired, disliked, and held in 
affection. The critical and deeply religious Senger, who opposed the NSDAP, 
wrote that he admired Kesselring, whom he also recognised as a person torn 
between duty to his country and the evil of their political masters: this was a 
common attitude postwar32.  Opinions about Kesselring were divided at every 
level within the power structure. When Göbbels asked Hitler how the 
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Generals were doing he wrote that 'his opinion of Albert Kesselring’s military 
abilities is higher than my own.’33 Göring was less enthusiastic and Jodl, who 
had always opposed Kesselring, backed Kesselring once it was perceived that 
Kesselring’s Italian policy was working. Manstein, a major contemporary, 
had little time for Kesselring before and during the war, and his ADC, 
Stahlbertg, wrote he had the distinct impression that Manstein ‘had no time 
for his fellow Field-Marshal Kesselring.’34     
    
           It is immediately discernable that opinions during Kesselring’s lifetime 
are mixed, but generally favourable as they are amongst historians. There are 
many attitudes, and this thesis will attempt to examine him, and explore his 
context in an objective fashion to try and understand the real person. In 
Chapter 3 Kesselring's time in Eastern Europe raises the issue of how much 
Kesselring knew about the savagery and developing Holocaust, but there is 
little substantive evidence, only room for speculative assessment.  
 
                      Chapters 4 to 6 will explore Kesselring's reputation amongst the 
Allies: the vast majority of historians have commented on Kesselring's ability 
if not genius as a defence commander, as do some of those he fought, but 
these chapters will show that although Kesselring was a sound professional 
military commander, much of his success was due to the inept and 
inexperienced Allied military leadership, and the defensive nature of the 
Italian terrain. There can be an impression that as Rommel proved an excuse 
of failure in the desert, so Kesselring provided a similar excuse for failure in 
Italy.  
 
                   The Allies knew him as Smiling Albert because in all photographs 
he appeared convivial; in their 'top-secret cipher telegrams' in the Italian 
campaign they referred to Kesselring as the Emperor because of his supposed 
total control. The thesis will question the ambiguous and limited nature of this 
command in Chapter 4, and again in Chapter 5, for when the Italians 
                                                 
33    Lochner, Goebbels,p.382. 
34    Melvin, Manstein,p.421. 
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surrendered his power increased, but he never held total authority35. His 
London interrogator wrote that 'proud Kesselring insisted on calling himself 
Commander-in-Chief of all German forces in Italy … by 1944 he was nothing 
of the kind … Kesselring’s authority in Italy had been virtually confined by 
1944 to the realm of fighting the enemy; while the power of Himmler’s SS 
and SD police forces under the supreme control of General Karl Wolff was 
growing ever stronger’36. Kesselring's power fluctuated, but he was never in 
total control as he and the Allies believed. 
 
                    Kesselring experienced many failures which rarely detracted 
from the admiration expressed by so many. Chapter 4 will illustrate his failure 
to cope with British Intelligence, his failure as a commander to persuade 
Hitler and Mussolini to seize Malta, (which could have changed the North 
African war) his inability at times to control Rommel or provide necessary 
supplies, and his reputation also survived the surrender of a German army 
larger than that in Stalingrad.  
 
                     The image projected by Kesselring, as well as his defence 
counsel, and even some Italians, that Kesselring loved Italy’s cultural 
treasures needs to be explored. Chapter 6 examines Kesselring's reputation for 
fighting in a museum with minimum damage (increased by the Allied 
destruction of Monte Cassino Abbey) whilst saving the treasures and granting 
historical sites 'open city' status.37 What is not so well documented was the 
agricultural and industrial plunder which took place under his command.  
 
              Kesselring's charm disappeared when the Italians surrendered: 
Chapter 7 will explore the conduct of irregular warfare, and the vexed 
question of hostages and reprisals. Italy had become an invidious 
partisan/civil war, especially between the communists and the Fascists, and 
many other parties in between. Near the end of the war the brutality increased, 
and postwar the partisans fought one another killing on a scale commensurate 
                                                 
35    KEW, FO-954/17A File, Ref/296.  
36    Scotland Lt Col A P, The London Cage (London: Landsborough,1957)pp.175-176.  
37    See Kesselring, Memoirs. 
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with the war years38. Italy was in turmoil before, during, and after the war. 
Chapter 7 will examine the particular nature of the Italian partisan/civil war, 
and try and understand Kesselring in this context. 
 
                 Dealing with partisan/civilians involved political decisions which 
were subsumed into the questions of legality and morality. Kesselring's 
particular background made him a ready resource for the mores, or lack of 
mores, created by Hitler's NSDAP and their views on conquered races and 
civilian resistance. Max Hastings noted that Kesselring was in the front rank 
of commanders, yet in the same book states ‘that it is bizarre that Kesselring 
… was reprieved from execution at Nuremberg’39. This raises the question as 
to whether it is possible, as Hastings implies, that a general can be considered 
first class, but should also be executed for the way he conducted the war, 
unless one holds the view that a morally corrupt leader can be a good leader. 
A successful commander, if totally ruthless in disregarding human life, may 
be considered by some as not being successful, if destruction and annihilation 
are the outcome: others may view this as irrelevant. How others viewed 
Kesselring will be explored, and where possible, how Kesselring viewed 
himself.  
 
    The Context of Guilt 
 
                   Kesselring's main opponent in Italy was Field-Marshal Alexander 
who after the war, with Churchill and Attlee, spoke against his death sentence 
because he fought a 'decent' war'40. His first biographer, Macksey, portrays 
him in a sympathetic light, and his interrogator in the notorious ‘London 
Cage,’ Lt. Colonel A P Scotland became Kesselring’s life-long friend. The 
concept of the decent war in Africa and Italy often arises in autobiographies 
such as Colonel von Luck on the German side, and Lord Alexander himself 
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on the Allied side, as well as a variety of historical accounts.41 Chapter 9 will 
examine this concept of a clean war, both in terms of how it was viewed in the 
trial and in reality.42 Chapter 10 will examine why the clean war question 
became such a contentious political issue in the postwar period. 
   
               Kesselring's trial was based on events in Italy surrounding the 
partisan war, and as Howard writing on Clausewitz observed, if one side uses 
extreme measures the other reciprocates43. Italy typified this view and was a 
bitter war, and whilst Chapter 7 will explore the nature of the Italian partisans 
and Kesselring’s reactions, Chapter 9 examines the trial.  
                      
              Kesselring’s trial was founded on two charges, the first being the 
infamous Ardeatine Cave massacre, and the second his command-orders 
regarding the partisan war. How far Kesselring was personally responsible for 
the first charge must be examined with care, as must the legality of his orders 
in the second charge. Also to be explored is the accusation that Kesselring 
committed perjury to avoid yet another more serious charge.  
 
              In law the question is usually resolved by whether the defendant had 
the necessary mens rea; but in this trial the most frequently raised legal 
question was whether the law itself was retrospective, (the London Agreement 
was, for example, signed as late as 1945) giving us the important 
jurisprudential dictum ‘nulla poena sine praevia lege poende’ as well as 
‘nulla poena sine lege’ (no penalty without a law). There was also the vexed 
problem as to whether the Allies could agree that any law had been broken. 
Chapter 9 will examine the Southeast Case, United States v Wilhelm List, et al 
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when the Tribunal had occasion to consider at length the law relating to 
hostages and reprisals44. 'It was therein held that under certain restrictive 
conditions … hostages may be taken, and after a judicial finding of strict 
compliance with all preconditions and as a last desperate remedy hostages 
may even be sentenced to death’45. The Allied view appearing to be that the 
shooting of hostages was not necessarily illegal; immoral maybe, but not 
illegal.  
 
             The tangle is not just a legal issue, but involves moral and political 
perspectives. The alleged crimes were committed by Germans on Italian soil, 
yet it was tried in a British military court in Venice. The day the trial started 
the British and Italians signed a treaty which resolved past problems and had 
obvious economic benefits; the British however found it difficult to trust the 
Italians, the Italian record overseas in the Balkans was highly suspect, and the 
Italians wanted the British to oversee the trial. 
 
                    The British frequently claimed that the person who should be in 
the dock was the Supreme Head of the SS in Italy, Karl Wolff, but he was 
given favourable treatment by the Americans. Amongst the arguments never 
raised, because of Kesselring’s pride, was the fact that he was never solely in 
charge despite his title of ‘Commander-in-Chief South.’ The area of 
Kesselring’s authority was never raised in the court proceedings, and 
Kesselring’s conceit may explain this omission.   
                
                      Chapter 9 will demonstrate that the trial was made yet more 
complex by the moral and human issues. These are the factors that run the 
deepest in human memory. Recently, in 2011, nine ex-German soldiers were 
sentenced to life imprisonment for massacres carried out in the Emilia 
Region.46 The men, now in their 90s, ex-members of the Herman Göring 
Division had slaughtered up to 140 civilians. The ex-soldiers remain safe in 
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Germany, but the heat of the conflict was still being considered in a Verona 
court.  
                
                  Kesselring avoided using the Nuremberg Defence of obeying 
orders claiming his orders were legal, and that the partisans were immoral and 
illegal under international law. His other defence related to his efforts to save 
Italian treasures and historical places from the effects of war; but they are a 
side-issue compared to the question of the massacres. Chapter 9 will examine 
the original court notes and try to understand the nature of the essential 
arguments as they stand in law, and within the context of that historical 
period. The main probe must be to identify whether the process was fair, or 
whether it was the much vaunted expression, victor’s justice. Some newly 
discovered messages in the Kew National Archives will reveal how 
Kesselring personally regarded his own guilt. It will also be necessary to view 
the trial in its long term context and ask whether Kesselring behaved any 
differently from other commanders caught up in a total war.        
          
 Context of postwar Politics 
 
                Chapters 9-10 explore Kesselring in the light of the Cold War, when 
new memories were constructed for political expediency. It has been claimed 
that after 1975 Spanish 'people spoke of a voluntary collective amnesia.47' 
Kesselring’s trial also invoked the same phenomenon when 'the manner in 
which a punishable action … can disappear from the collective memory, 
while the trial itself can be retrospectively reinterpreted as an exercise in 
victors’ justice … such misinterpretation and reinterpretation can be explained 
by considerations of Vergangenheitspolitik, the politics of memory, that 
accompanied the war trials after 1945’48. This extract from Lingen’s study 
summarises one of the more intriguing aspects of Kesselring’s life after the 
war. The argument is that because the West perceived what it saw as potential 
dangers from the Soviet block, West Germany had to be brought back into the 
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fold both politically and militarily. Politically, it had to be believed that the 
Wehrmacht had fought a clean war, and that the imprisoned Kesselring and 
Manstein, were good soldiers, who must be released as a sign of respect in 
order to encourage the new Federal Republic of Germany to co-operate. 
Kesselring’s trial took place as the ‘Cold War lay its glacial hand on Europe. 
From the summer of 1947, the USA and Britain moved over to a policy of 
rapidly reconstructing western Germany as a prelude to any future agreement 
with the Soviet Union.’49  The new world politics needed it understood that in 
Italy the Wehrmacht conducted a clean war. 
  
                     In a debate on the King’s address in Parliament the Minister of 
Health, Mr Reginald Paget argued that ‘one of the conditions for getting the 
right sort of German into our defence forces is that we should stop treating the 
Germans who once served in the army as criminals. There are at present 
people like Kesselring, Manstein and other commanders in prison. I saw a 
newspaper article {German} the other day which was headed. 'What sort of 
people do they think we are?' It went on to ask if we imagined that they were 
going to serve as comrades with the men who are now imprisoning their most 
honoured commanders.’50 The question of good and bad Germans evolved 
quickly after the war. Eisenhower reflecting on Nuremberg said that the 
German officer corps had been identical with Hitler, ‘perpetrators of the same 
crimes, subject to the same penalties. Less than six years later, Eisenhower 
and the Allies had moved dramatically away from this global indictment; 
soldiers and NSDAP could not be lumped together… Eisenhower now 
averred that ‘there is a real difference between the regular German soldier and 
officer and Hitler and his criminal group.’51  As Eisenhower moved from 
military to political status he was aware of the need to have West Germany 
within the fold. Eisenhower’s declaration was made on January 23rd 1951, and 
the Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer made a similar statement on April 
5th 1951 because both leaders recognised that a new West German Army was 
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needed, ‘and that the expertise of the former Wehrmacht elite would be 
indispensable in creating it’52. 
 
                      The thesis will demonstrate that Kesselring’s postwar reputation 
was repaired mainly for political reasons, albeit briefly, as political pressures 
worked to clean up the Italian campaign in retrospect. When the House of 
Commons debate mentioned vide supra it was not that Mr Paget was part of a 
political scheme, a greater plan of ‘fixing’, but that it suited the current 
mentality to colour the past in order to secure a better future. The argument 
that politics demanded a different version of the Italian campaign for its own 
reasons is very cogent, but there were other factors.   
 
                   The actual trial of 1947 would not necessarily have felt the 
influence of Cold War politics, but the aftermath did, when there was intense 
political pressure to have Kesselring released; although this thesis will 
contend that the motives varied from person to person. The key to 
Kesselring’s release was probably his ‘defence lawyer, Hans Laternser, who 
accompanied by a barrage of publicity, combined to exert pressure to which 
British Vergangenheitspolitik had to react’53. There were some who sincerely 
believed that Kesselring and Manstein were being badly treated, both Lord 
Alexander, already mentioned, and Lord Hankey, were two such people. 
 
                  Kesselring was released for a variety of reasons, but mainly 
political. Chapter 10 evaluates the post-prison period, and Kesselring's 
decline. Kesselring never changed, and made an error in accepting the 
presidency of a right-wing ex-soldier’s association. Some hoped Kesselring 
might become the president of the new Germany, but he created diplomatic 
problems with an insensitive tour of Austria, and supported home-coming 
German officers who had committed war crimes. In his closing years his 
views and position made him something of a pariah. This thesis will show that 
in his final years Kesselring had become both a pawn in the new world of 
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Cold War politics, and also a slave to his own past, his reputation was tainted 
both at home and overseas. He was a product of a period that failed to 
recognise change.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
EARLY LIFE (1885-1922) 
 
Early Influences  
 
                Throughout his life, in his memoirs, postwar interrogations, 
interviews and various statements Kesselring consistently denied he had any 
interest in politics. He regarded himself as a professional soldier who simply 
served his political masters1. Like the vast majority of senior German army 
officers he never joined any political party, but his early life, from his 
adolescence, through the Great War and immediate postwar years, it becomes 
apparent that Kesselring was a dedicated right-wing military protagonist. 
Always noted as charming and amiable, the sobriquet 'smiling Albert' gives a 
sense of the affectionate, in reality this is a myth, he was a tough right-wing 
nationalist. 
                    
                The first part of this chapter will look briefly at Kesselring's birth, 
family, schooling, marriage and early military training. It will serve to 
illustrate that everything in Kesselring's environment was biased towards the 
traditional right-wing; from where he was born, the anti-Semitism of the 
military, and even his first posting at Metz which echoed the glory of the 1870 
Franco-Prussian War. It is necessary to examine the influence of the 
Wilhelmine era with its passion for patriotism, to understand why many 
German officers acted as they did. His early context was one of right-wing 
nationalism.   
 
                 Albert Konrad Kesselring was born on November 30th 1885 in 
Marktsteft, a municipality in the district of Kitzingen in Bavaria, where he 
spent his early childhood with members of his wider family who ran the local 
brewery. He was the sixth and youngest child of Carl Adolf Kesselring; his 
mother was Rosina, who had also been born a Kesselring, and was her 
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husband’s second cousin. Kesselring spent some of his early youth in the 
town of Wunsiedel2. His father was by profession a schoolmaster, later 
elevated to Schools Director in Bayreuth, he was a Lutheran and a Freemason, 
and Kesselring admitted in a prison interview that his father would have 
opposed the NSDAP. His father was eighty-nine when he died in 1934; 
Kesselring stated 'the death of my father was felt keenly, because we were a 
very closely knit family'3. His mother had died from kidney failure much 
earlier, at the age of fifty-five when Kesselring was twenty-eight. 
 
              Bayreuth is a traditional Bavarian town and became a centre of 
NSDAP attention because of the Wagnerian Festival in the 1930s. It was later 
to be the site for the Flossenburg Concentration Camp, built in May 1938 by 
the SS primarily for 'antisocial' prisoners4. This was the town associated with 
the young Kesselring, a marketing-centre for a large rural district. 
Researching Bayreuth shows that it is a conservative Roman Catholic area, 
widely known because of Wagner. Since the 1890s, and because of the 
Wagner connexion, Bayreuth became something of a shrine, and a fertile 
ground for nationalism. As noted by Macksey in his 1978 biography of 
Kesselring, Bayreuth with its sense of ‘national spirit’ must have had a 
persuasive influence on the young Kesselring. Lingen noted that the subject of 
Kesselring's matriculation essay was to do with the sense of loyalty to the 
empire as well as Bavarian patriotism5.  
 
          Kesselring associated his name with an aristocratic past of ‘knights, 
patricians and priests,’ but he was born into a middle-class environment and 
conscious of his ancestral heritage.6 In Bayreuth Kesselring’s schooling 
followed the typical German pattern of a Classical Grammar School, namely 
the Christian Ernestinum School in 1904. According to the school records he 
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held no great aptitude for ancient languages, but was considered by his 
teacher as diligent in studying English and Italian7. He was a pupil of average 
ability, unlike his two older brothers who went on to a university education - 
one was to become a medical Doctor. According to the school records 
Kesselring was viewed as ‘good-tempered and upright, his behaviour as 
composed and decent,’ and he was described, ‘as one who sought to battle his 
way to the top’8. This was a perceptive comment which characterised much of 
his life. When he matriculated in 1904 ‘one observer noted that he seldom 
smiled (nur selten lächelnden Schüler): an interesting observation since the 
nickname Smiling Albert has invariably been bestowed on him by almost 
every non-German writer'9.  
 
           Apart from a few details there is little information about his early life. 
It is not surprising that a Bavarian boy from a good family should join the 
military; it was regarded as prestigious to be an officer in the Imperial Army. 
In the socio-political atmosphere of that day, some young men would have 
considered themselves German before being Bavarian, but proud of their 
Bavarian roots, an attitude shared by many young Prussians. In the closing 
days of 1945 Hitler handed over the reins of power to Kesselring and Dönitz, 
whose upbringing was similar to that of Kesselring, except he was Prussian.  
Dönitz too came from a non-military background, was middle-class, and 
‘particularly aspired to be worthy of the ideals, to imitate the bearing and 
outlook and the manners of Prussian nobility of the sword who stood behind 
the Kaiser at the head of the empire’10. Kesselring, Dönitz and many of the 
German commanders of World War II were raised in an environment where 
patriotism and nationalism were fundamental. 
 
               It has been said that Kesselring’s non-noble birth and middle-class 
background were factors that played ‘a role in explaining not only the 
cadaver-like obedience with which Kesselring later served Hitler to the bitter 
end, but also helped him surpass many of his noble-born colleagues whose 
                                                 
7     Lingen, Kesselring,p.17. 
8     Ibid. 
9     Raiber, Anatomy,p.20. 
10    Padfield Peter, Dönitz The Last Führer (London: Harper & Row, 1984)p.11. 
 35
climb to the higher military positions had been accepted because of their 
birth-rights’11. However, men like Kesselring, Dönitz  and others, were part of 
a development in which senior officers were no longer automatically noble, 
‘officers of middle-class background succeeded in making substantial inroads 
… by 1913, they accounted for no less than 70 per cent of the total officer 
corps’12. The later blind obedience to Hitler may, as Raiber suggested, be part 
of Kesselring’s upbringing, but other factors such as his right-wing 
nationalism, patriotism and military obedience, later drilled in by Seeckt, all 
played a part. 
 
          Social class dictated entry into the army, and because his father had no 
military background Kesselring entered as a Fahnenjunker (corporal-cadet), 
one who hoped to become an officer. It was more difficult to become an 
officer-cadet in the Bavarian Army than in the Prussian Army, as the latter did 
not require a matriculation standard of education. The Prussian intake tended 
to rely on their aristocracy, whereas the Bavarian Army found its main-roots 
in the educated middle-classes. The competition for the Bavarian military 
entrance led to its own form of elitism, but not based on class. Hitler assumed 
he was von Kesselring as the officers normally came from the aristocracy. 
Nevertheless, the Bavarian background was right-wing-nationalism, and a 
breeding ground for possible NSDAP support.  
 
              On July 20th 1904 he enlisted as a gunner joining the 2ndBavarian 
Foot-Artillery-Regiment - 2nd BayerischeFußartillerieregiment.  He followed 
the traditional route, becoming an NCO (Unteroffizier) on the 25th October 
1904, an officer cadet (Fähnrich) in February 1905 and was commissioned 
2nd Lieutenant (Leutnant) on the 8th March 1906. His first two years were 
served at the Munich Kriegsakademie of the Bavarian Army which was the 
military academy and staff college of Bavaria, founded in 1867. It was based 
on similar lines to its Prussian counterpart, but only a tenth of the size. 
 
                                                 
11    Raiber, Anatomy,p.20. 
12    Berghahn V R, Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987)p.13. 
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                    Kesselring would have been deeply influenced by the 
Kriegsakademie and the Bavarian military ethos, which contained strong anti-
Semitic elements simply ‘because a general prejudice against Jews existed in 
the first place’13. Anti-Semitism was common throughout much of Europe, 
traditionally being at its most vicious in Russia as well as the old Hapsburg 
Empire; France had suffered the Dreyfus affair with its vast implications of 
inherent anti-Semitism, and 'Germany before the First World War was far 
from being Europe's heartland of anti-Semitism'14. In Bavaria and Saxony 
Jews were able to become officers until the turn of the century: in Prussia the 
prejudice appeared to be deeper. The German historian Wette, found that 
many affluent Jewish families left Berlin and moved to other states so that 
their sons could become officers15. In 1911 the Association of German Jews 
published a pamphlet on Jewish men in the military showing that twenty-six 
Jewish men had made the status of officer, because they had all converted to 
Christianity16. Anti-Semitism is mentioned at this juncture because it is not 
unreasonable assumption that Kesselring would have been influenced. 
 
          In 1906 he joined his Regiment at Metz, an important place from the 
point of view of understanding the young Kesselring and the spirit of the 
times. Metz, one time headquarters of the Third-French Army, became a 
German city and an important garrison after the 1870 war. The German army 
decided to build a second and a third fortified line around Metz.17 
Kesselring’s first posting was in territory won during a European war, and 
held as of right of military power. It was considered part of the front line, and 
a defence against a traditional enemy. As a young soldier Kesselring travelled 
with his companions to study the battlefields of the 1870 war: he never 
mentions any particular friends, and these outings came to an end as border 
sensitivity increased. 
 
                                                 
13    Wette, Wehrmacht,p.25. 
14    Kershaw Ian, Fateful Choices (London: Penguin, 2007)p.438. 
15    Wette, Wehrmacht,p.33. 
16    Ibid,p.34. 
17    Given back to France in 1918, retaken by Germans, returned to France 1945. 
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          His Regimental Commander, Otto Mayer, described Kesselring as 
amongst his best students, and to be found in the Munich War Archives 
personnel files that contain short sharp reports on the young Kesselring: 
'among the young officers, Lieutenant Kesselring is by far the best; all 
indications are that he will distinguish himself above the average … in 1911 a 
qualification report noted his leadership qualities … he was allowed to attend 
the School of Artillery and Engineering in Munich from 1909 to1910 … he 
had a positive intellectual inclination … a superb sense of duty, a reliable and 
stable character … had authority over subordinates to whom his attitude was 
decisive, just and benevolent … his behaviour towards superiors was tactful 
and modest … Kesselring’s good nature and polished social deportment were 
also mentioned’18. The same reports note that Kesselring was 
‘temperamentally suited to and technically interested in new forms of 
weaponry’19. Some of these attributes were to surface later in life; most of his 
later subordinates held him in high esteem, and his ‘tactful and modest’ 
approach to superiors even endeared him to some of his captors and 
interrogators as will be seen later. It would appear from this report, that his 
early training, along with later training under Prince Rupprecht, instilled in 
him good manners and a charming approach to people at a personal level, 
which became one of his hallmarks even during the years of his 
imprisonment20.   
 
          Kesselring developed an interest in the technical side of military life 
when he attended the Artillery School in 1909. He claimed to have played a 
role in the development of the powerful 88mm flak gun-flugabwehrkanone, 
but there seems no extant evidence to this claim21. However, as an artillery 
man with a technical knowledge he had an interest and possible involvement 
in one of the best artillery pieces of the war22. This curiosity in technical 
                                                 
18    BHKM-(Kesselring personnel file) 61536: and quoted in Lingen,p.18. 
19    Ibid. 
20    Had there been war trials post-1918 Prince Rupprecht's name was on the list- Hankey Rt   
       Hon Lord, Politics, Trials and Errors (Oxford: Pen in Hand, 1950)p.5. 
21    Prototypes were produced as early as 1928 by Krupp in Essen with Swedish Bofors 
22    The 88mm flugabwehrkanone - used in the Spanish Civil War against planes/tanks; it   
       could destroy any Western tank from 1000 metres, and was the one weapon capable of   
       dealing with the Soviet T34 tank. 
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development had been stimulated in Metz where new weapons and gadgets 
were frequently tested. Tactics and technology were important for Kesselring 
in his military progress; his instructors had considered him as developing into 
something of an ‘expert with an understanding of the interplay between tactics 
and technology’23. At Metz, along with testing new weapons, they practised 
artillery accuracy, and Kesselring became interested in balloon-observation 
for directing artillery fire, and for observing enemy movement. He 
volunteered for work in one of four Balloon Companies at Metz, but with the 
arrival of aircraft and improved optics balloons soon became redundant. 
 
                    During these years Kesselring considered marriage; little is 
known of Kesselring’s youth or family life; he was a private man leaving no 
personal papers. Kesselring married the daughter of a wealthy Bayreuth 
Apothecary on 29th March 1910. His bride was Pauline Anna Keyssler, often 
known as Liny, and it was Kesselring’s father who had encouraged this 
marriage for financial reasons, knowing that an army officer would need 
substantial funds; it has also been stated that Kesselring’s father received 
‘30,000 marks in the bargain’24. Part of the arrangement was that his wealthy 
mother-in-law should live with them25. The American historians Raiber and 
Mitcham state that the mother-in-law made Kesselring’s life miserable, but 
neither cite the information source, only claiming ‘Kesselring’s Catholic 
religion prohibited divorce’26.  
 
                 Kesselring and his wife honeymooned in Italy, possibly explaining 
Kesselring's early fondness of that country's culture. They could not have 
children and Liny underwent unsuccessful surgery to resolve this problem in 
1912 and in 1926 had to have the menopause artificially induced27. They 
overcame the childless problem by adopting Rainer, the son of Kesselring’s 
second cousin, Kurt Kesselring. They may have married for family and 
financial reasons, nevertheless, the marriage survived until Liny died in 1957. 
                                                 
23    Lingen, Kesselring, p.19. 
24    In some sources spelt ‘Kayssler’: Mitcham Samuel, Eagles of The Third Reich   
       (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole 2007)p.16. 
25    In 1946 Kesselring in prison, Liny was living in Telz still with her 89 year-old mother. 
26    Mitcham, Eagles,p.16. 
27    Goldensohn, Nuremberg,p.324. 
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Kesselring converted from his father's Lutheran faith to Catholicism to marry 
Liny, who was an ardent Roman Catholic. There is no evidence that 
Kesselring’s family life impinged on his military career. He never kept 
personal letters; his life was motivated by military considerations. He had 
become, by the age of thirty, a loyal, dedicated German Army Officer, 
undoubtedly looking for promotion; he was of an age and type that would one 
day be a fruitful resource for the NSDAP.  
 
                One of the major influences that moulded Kesselring was being 
born into a Germany which was looking outwards to a world policy 
(Weltpolitik) and was strongly nationalistic. What inspired nationalism is open 
to debate, whether it was Bismarck and his successors who understood 
diplomacy in the light of Germany’s lengthy borders, or, as argued by ‘Eckart 
Kehr, who, concluded that the peculiar shape of Wilhelmine foreign policy 
can only be understood in terms of the primacy of domestic politics’28. For 
young Kesselring his Germany was nationalistic and militaristic. 'The unified 
Germany created in 1871 was an authoritarian state based on Prussian 
traditions, and the thinking of its officers was characterized by the belief that 
armed conflict between nations represented the natural state of affairs’29. 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany ‘regarded pacifism as a mixture of stupidity, 
cowardice, and treason’30.  
 
               The Wilhelmine era included rituals which gave the military an 
almost divine status: in the months of May and June the ‘emperor reviewed 
troops every day from 7:00 a.m. until late morning. He then frequently 
lunched with the unit officers at their mess and was thus unavailable for 
government work until the afternoon’31. The emperor was extreme in his 
nationalism, always envious of the British fleet (of which he was an Admiral); 
‘his dream was to make Germany respected, feared and admired’32. Although 
                                                 
28    Berghahn, Modern,p.29. 
29    Wette, Wehrmacht,p.140. 
30    Ibid,p.143. 
31    Fink, Hull & Knox, German Nationalism and the European Response (USA:Oklahoma    
       UP, 1985)p.27. 
32    Gilbert Martin, First World War (London: BCA, 1994)p.5. 
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most royal families brought their children up with military discipline, 
Wilhelm treated military matters as worship, and the Crown prince wrote in 
his autobiography that ‘there was the reverence and military subordination 
taught us towards our father from our infancy’33. As a youngster the Crown 
Prince found the Kaiser remote because he was so enthralled with military 
matters; even finding an accidental meeting with Bismarck a kinder 
experience34. It has been claimed that in the modern world the Kaiser would 
have been 'diagnosed as having histrionic personality disorder'35. 
 
                 This atmosphere of nationalism and the priority given to military 
matters was re-enforced by the memory of recent martial success. The 
Franco-German War of 1870/1 had been ‘actively sought by the French, who 
were itching to teach the Prussians a lesson… they found themselves facing a 
coalition of all the German states, whose forces were better armed, better 
organised and better lead … the first cannon-shot was ceremoniously fired on 
1st August 1870 by the Emperor Napoleon’s son, to cries of ‘Á Berlin’… the 
long term consequences was the declaration of a united German Empire’36. 
This war helped create a Germany with a sense of military might, with France 
as the enemy, all of which would have influenced Kesselring. The fact that in 
the 1870 war the Germans had, with a single thrust, crossed the frontier and 
encircled the main French army at Metz, would not have been lost on 
Kesselring when he was stationed there. Kesselring had been raised on a 
military diet, which had strong right-wing attitudes so typical of Germany at 
this time, with a high degree of self-confidence.  
 
                   The nature of Wilhelmine Germany, Wilhelm's personality, and 
the competitive nature of industrialism, would have made nationalism and 
military power prominent in the mind of young men like Kesselring, who 
naturally inclined their attitudes towards the right-wing. It was not that there 
was no left-wing or liberal thinking in Germany, but ‘German liberals have 
                                                 
33    William Crown Prince, Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany     
       (www.forgottenbooks.org: Classic Reprint, 1919)p.15. 
34    Ibid,p16. 
35    Tipton Frank B, A History of Modern Germany since 1815 (London: Continuum,  
       2003)p.243. 
36    Davies Norman, A History of Europe (London: Pimlico, 1997)p.868. 
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often been assessed not according to what they did, but what they failed to 
do’37. The military circles, closely bound to the monarchy, with which 
Kesselring was associated, could not be described as liberal or left-wing. 
Unlike Britain the attitude of the monarchy was more influential than that of 
political leaders, ‘Wilhelmine Germany had a febrile, nationalistic, and 
superficial form of politics rather than a stable, democratic political culture … 
Wilhelmine politics were materialistic, populist and irresponsible. And the 
search for antecedents of the Nazi seizure of power is justified and 
important’38. 
 
                      As such ‘Anglo-Saxon historians were now ready to see a 
pattern of German aggression stretching back before 1914 … German 
historians after 1945 tend to see Hitler as an aberration’ but even they have to 
admit that ‘Wilhelmine Germany had its annexationist soldiers and Pan-
German extremists’ although they argue that the country’s leaders were not 
bent on aggression, and were obliged to fight a defensive war39.  
                      
                   Kesselring’s personality was being moulded in a right-wing 
nationalistic atmosphere. Even when Kesselring was a young officer in Metz, 
von Schlieffen in the December of 1905 had posited ‘the Schieffen plan 
which was to annihilate the French army in one enormous push 
(Vernichtungsschlacht)’ through Metz40. At the beginning of 1914 Kesselring 
was twenty-nine years of age, a Lieutenant who anticipated promotion; he had 
been moulded in military tradition which by its very nature made him 
nationalistic and right-wing.                        
 
World War I 
 
            In order to understand Kesselring and some of his generation, it is 
important to view the passions stimulated by the Great War: particularly in 
                                                 
37    Thompson Alastair, Left Liberals, The State, & Popular Politics in Wilhelmine Germany      
       (Oxford: OUP, 2000)p.7. 
38    Ibid,p.8. 
39    Blackbourn, History,p.334. 
40    Zuber Terence, The Real German War Plan 1904-14 (Stroud: The History Press,  
       2011)p.5. 
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Germany with its right-wing form of nationalism, patriotism, and anti-
Semitism. At a more personal level it is necessary to understand the 
influences on Kesselring’s development, for example his admiration of Prince 
Rupprecht; the changing nature of war and its technology; his early brush 
with Soviet communism, and his lack of comment on the tragedy of the mass 
slaughter. All of which will serve to illustrate how this product of Wilhelmine 
military culture, was further honed into a potential willing tool for the Hitler 
regime of later years. 
 
               Some believed that a large scale war could not happen; the English 
economist Norman Angell (1873-1967) argued that the economic interest of 
countries had made war redundant. Although Russia was busy building up 
military resources, the Tsar motivated two peace conferences of The Hague in 
1899 and 190741. The concept of pacifism was not always popular: the famous 
French pacifist Jean Jaurès was assassinated in a Parisian café by a 29 year 
old nationalist called Raoul Villain, on the grounds that pacifism was an act of 
treason. In Germany, famous for its musicians, theologians and scholars not 
everyone wanted war. However, the military establishment was becoming a 
rising feature. Moltke had claimed ‘perpetual peace as a dream’ and young 
officers like Kesselring probably saw war as their profession42. Kesselring 
like many others typified the military aspect of German society.  
 
                   Not everyone wanted war; recent research has indicated that this 
joy may have been exaggerated, almost 'a legend that Europe welcomed the 
conflict is today heavily qualified, if not discredited … thoughtful people 
were appalled.'43 As the war drew near 'the German public mood became 
much less exuberant.'44 In Berlin '100,000 people demonstrated against war.'45 
However, in the military, Kesselring noted that during an artillery exercise at 
the Grafenwöhr range near Metz the atmosphere was ‘pervaded with a warlike 
backdrop,’ and the batteries in the forts of the western front, such as Metz, 
                                                 
41     These conferences produced The International Court of Justice-1900, and The Hague    
        Convention, 1907, 
42     Davies, History,p.875. 
43     Hastings Max, Catastrophe (London: William Collins, 2013)p.118. 
44     ibid,p.82. 
45     Tipton, History,p.295. 
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were prepared and ready. In understanding this period it is critical to realise 
the significance of ‘patriotism and nationalism’ to all countries. Kesselring 
can recall the Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Army as it moved from 
Lorraine to Belgium saying ‘now with the happy prospect of war,’ a sentiment 
shared especially by the professional military46. 'The Kaiser had become the 
symbol of his country's assertive nationalism,' and this political stance 
eventually subsumed even the Socialists, who had initially opposed war47.  
           
                     Kesselring remained with his regiment in Metz, but it was clear 
that the war was not going to centre on the fortress, and Kesselring in the 
September of 1914 was caught up in an early local defeat. He was with the 
Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht attempting to breach the lines at Marne 
which, in his sector, proved to be a failure; the French had been lucky in 
discovering the plans on a dead German officer who had driven his car the 
wrong way48. The war changed its nature from one of mobility to the 
infamous trench warfare of attrition. Kesselring observed the slaughter in 
Flanders, but devotes less than two pages to war in his memoirs, and makes 
no comment on the numbers killed and wounded; as a professional soldier he 
appeared to view this as the order of war  
 
                Kesselring saw the trenches but never served in them; later a 
General Karl Ritter von Wenninger, who had been his Divisional 
Commander, wrote a report on 19th May 1917 pointing out that ‘he 
{Kesselring} had not served in the trenches on the front line … but he 
possessed the qualities and capabilities of a Generalstaboffizier’49.  An 
overview of Kesselring indicates he was regarded as a highly observant man, 
meticulous in detail, and the awfulness of trench warfare could not have 
evaded him. 
     
            On December 5th (1914) Kesselring was appointed Regimental 
Adjutant to the 1st Bavarian Foot Artillery holding his 1913 rank of 
                                                 
46     Kesselring, Memoirs,p.17. 
47     Hastings, Catastrophe,p.79. 
48     Gilbert, First,p.66. 
49     Raiber, Anatomy,p.22. 
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Oberleutnant. In 1915 he was promoted to Hauptmann and spent a 
considerable time with the Sixth Army in Vosges, and was involved in 
repulsing the French in their final assault on Vimy Ridge. As Adjutant to the 
GOC (General-Officer-Commanding)  he experienced the nature of command, 
and, as the war progressed, he noted that planes and artillery had a substantial 
role.  
 
                  The year 1917 brought Kesselring a degree of prominence, and 
enforced some of his political attitudes. Kesselring was made Adjutant to the 
2nd Bavarian Artillery which was mainly fighting in the Arras area. He was on 
leave on April 9th when the German front collapsed along an eight mile line, 
Kesselring returned as this attack was occurring, and repelled ‘a British 
bridgehead by means of a tactical dodge with operational consequences, 
subsequently closing the impending gaps in the line of defence and thus 
avoiding the threatening retreat, a gambit he used in Italy thirty years later’50. 
His prominent part was noted by superior officers, and he was commended for 
‘clear and carefully constructed orders despite being on duty for twenty 
hours’51. In January of that year he was praised by Lieutenant-General 
Kreppel for being an ‘alert and persistent observer with very strong nerves’52. 
As a result of this action at the Arras break his Commanding Officer decided 
that Kesselring was ready for the General Staff53.  One of the reasons for the 
success of the Allied push was the failure of the German Commander von 
Falkenhausen to employ Ludenforff’s ‘elastic defence,’ which allowed the 
enemy to break through by yielding space, giving the attacker time to exhaust 
himself. This created logistic problems, encouraged over-confidence, and then 
allowed for a strong counter-attack54. This was activated by Kesselring, and it 
was a modus operandi he used successfully in the next war in Italy. As a 
young professional officer Kesselring was learning the dark arts of warfare. 
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                     Kesselring also observed that whenever the British penetrated 
German lines, they appeared to lack orders as to how to exploit the advantage. 
This aspect was to repeat itself during the next war, and was instructive. 
Later, in Italy, he reckoned that if the Allies fought their way across a river or 
made a sea landing they would pause instead of advancing. Ironically, his 
future opponent Alexander was in agreement with Kesselring as he wrote that 
‘the British will go into the attack with great bravery and tenacity, as a whole 
they are not quick to exploit a success or to react to a sudden emergency’55. 
  
              In the winter of 1917 Kesselring met Russian communists at the 
armistice meeting between Germany and Russia at the Düna, which he 
attended as a General Staff Officer of the 2nd Bavarian Landwehr Division56. 
It was his first meeting with communists and it left an indelible impression on 
him. The armistice negotiations took five days, and the two senior Bolshevik 
negotiators were Russian Jews, Adolf Joffe and Leo Kamenev (Trotsky’s 
brother-in-law): there was a common opinion that the Bolsheviks were mainly 
Jews, a belief of which Kesselring would have been aware. There was also 
Anastasia Bitsenko, who had been a prisoner of the Tsar for murdering one of 
his ministers, and for the ‘sake of revolutionary propriety, a worker, a peasant 
and a soldier had also been included in the delegation: the peasant had only 
been found at the last moment, during the railway journey, at a wayside 
station’57. This probably explains Kesselring’s reaction to Soldiers’ Councils 
and the communists he met; in his memoirs describing them as 'peacocking as 
if they were the officer’s bosses.’ This experience ‘hardened his political 
views’ against the left-wing and confirmed his own right-wing position58.  
The right-wing attitudes inculcated into him, alongside this encounter with 
early Bolsheviks, left Kesselring further entrenched in his views. He was at 
the Düna River just over a month before he returned to the Western Front; it 
was insufficient time for Kesselring to understand what was happening in 
Russia, but sufficient time for the right-wing bigotry and growing anti-
Semitism to be inflamed.  
                                                 
55    Alexander, Memoirs,p.156. 
56    Landwehr, or Landeswehr - meaning 'defence of the country'. 
57    Gilbert, First,p.386. 
58    Lingen, Kesselring,p.19. 
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                      Kesselring must have been aware that General von Hohenborn 
had in 1916 demanded to know the numbers of Jewish men fighting in the 
Prussian army59. The census indicated the Jews were better educated and 
serving in large numbers, but the military did not publish and 'thereby 
supported the attack on Jews as slackers'60. ‘Many Jews regarded it as 
defamatory, and they were entirely correct’61. It caused uproar amongst the 
Jewish population, and no census was carried out in Bavaria. Kesselring 
distrusted the communists, and the ‘talk’ about Jews was a growing feature 
that surrounded him. It has been suggested that Ludendorff and Bauer may 
have started the Dolchstosslegende, since they believed that the ‘Jews had 
created a secret international organization to promote revolutionary 
movements in several countries, first Russia in 1917 and then Germany in 
1918’62. In his book Kriegführung und Politik Ludendorff wanted a Germany 
that was judenrein – ‘free of Jews:’ the ethos was similar to that promulgated 
by Hitler. For many people the fact that the two senior Bolshevik negotiators 
were Russian Jews placed communists and Jewish people into the same 
category, and Kesselring probably held the same view.   
 
                        Due to his energy and efficiency Kesselring was not required 
to participate in the special staff course before being selected to the General 
Staff63. The fact that Kesselring joined the General Staff without being 
required to attend the Sedan Course was an indicator of the regard he was 
held in by senior officers. On January 4th 1918 he was appointed as a Staff 
Officer in the Quartermasters Branch to the II Bavarian Army Corps with the 
Sixth Army. A few months later on 15th April he was appointed as GSO to 
Headquarters, III Army Corps. During this final period of the war Kesselring 
was involved in the preparations for what was to be the greatest artillery 
attack ever produced by the Germans.  
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               Prince Rupprecht influenced Kesselring in the meticulous in the way 
he addressed his officers, and held dinner parties for them; Kesselring 
emulated both these formalities. Rupprecht commanded the German Sixth 
Army at the outbreak of war in Lorraine, and while part of the German army 
was participating in the Schlieffen plan, the Crown Prince led his troops in the 
Battle of Lorraine. During the regrouping of 1917, as German troops moved 
back to shorten the line of defence, Ludendorff ordered the area to be heavily 
mined and totally destroyed; Prince Rupprecht strongly challenged this once 
he saw the nature of the devastation, but was overruled64.  
 
                   Eventually Rupprecht realised Germany was so out-matched it 
could not win the war; he pressed the German Chancellor, Count Hertling 
early on to open peace talks with Britain, France and Italy while Germany and 
Austria still held the military ascendency in the west65.  Rupprecht, promoted 
Field-Marshal in 1916 had been one of the better commanders during the war, 
but because of the postwar revolutions he went into retirement, though many 
regarded him as the natural king. When Hitler was seeking total dominance in 
1933 some hoped that in Bavaria, the monarchy would be restored under 
prince Rupprecht. Although appearing at first to support Hitler, Rupprecht’s 
outspoken opposition necessitated his flight to Italy66. Kesselring 
acknowledged his indebtedness to Rupprecht by emulating his style of 
leadership, as with Seeckt much later, who helped form Kesselring's style of 
command, all of which will be explored later.   
 
                During the closing period of the war Kesselring increased his 
understanding of defence against superior numbers and material; lessons he 
was to deploy effectively in the next war. His involvement with the 
communists entrenched his distrust of their political system, and his 
association with Rupprecht may have enhanced his courtesy levels, but his 
adherence to the extreme right-wing continued to grow. The continued anti-
                                                 
64    Gilbert, First,p.309. 
65    Gilbert, First,p.429. 
66    He went into exile in 1938 - in Florence  as guest of the Italian king during WWII   
       managing to avoid arrest, although his wife and children were interned in separate  
       concentration camps until the war ended. He died in 1955. 
 48
Semitism in the military would have prejudiced him, but above all his 
apparent lack of comment on the mass slaughter cannot go unnoted. For 
Kesselring, the military man, death appears to be part of the job whatever the 
scale; while being personally brave his acceptance of the mass slaughter 
indicates his ruthlessness. Part of the reluctance of the Western nations to 
confront Hitler in the 1930s was a fear of the repetition of the Great War's 
slaughter, which Kesselring never mentions. He gives the impression of 
belonging to a warrior caste in which war is their profession: a dangerous 
tendency with its roots in the Wilhelmine era: this was a major part of 
Kesselring's context.         
 
 WWI aftermath - 1918-1922 
 
              Kesselring’s background of right-wing nationalism, his admiration of 
Rupprecht and all things military, his experience of the war and meeting with 
the communists were amongst many factors forming his outlook and attitudes, 
and the aftermath of the war provided an environment in which his views 
developed to the point of conviction. The final part of this chapter will 
examine how the Versailles Treaty was perceived, especially by right-wing 
military men like Kesselring. The postwar political quarrels led Kesselring 
into personal conflict with his Freikorps superior. Kesselring was immersed 
in the mire of Freikorps street politics despite his protestations, and the 
experience taught him to conceal his political views. The inability of the 
Weimar Republic to deal with extremism, along with inflation became a 
breeding ground for men like Kesselring.  
 
                    The shock waves of defeat, revolutions and anarchy, as well as 
the unjust (as he would have viewed it) Versailles Treaty shaped Kesselring’s 
attitudes67. Most Germans regarded the reparations with anger since they were 
based 'on a manifestly false premise - the assertion written into the Versailles 
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Treaty (Article 231) that Germany alone had been responsible for the war'68. 
The treatment of Germany after the war fuelled nationalism once again - 
‘apart from the ostracism and humiliation of Germany, which in spite of the 
servitudes imposed by the treaty settlements, remained the most powerful 
nation in Europe’69.  
 
                    The legacy of the so-called Peace Conference achieved few of its 
aims; Germany was humiliated and with little hope of any internal or external 
reconciliation. The new Republic was delicate and run by a coalition 
dominated by social democrats, whose 'representatives only signed the Treaty 
of Versailles under the express threat of coercion’70. Kesselring saw his old 
stamping ground of Alsace-Lorraine returned to France; Poznania and parts of 
East Prussia and Upper Silesia given to Poland, territory was taken by 
Belgium, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. In addition to this war reparations 
were placed around the £6,600 million mark, which was to prove crippling for 
a country trying to re-emerge from a major war. There was a ban on any 
union between Germany and Austria, and a limitation of Germany's army to 
100,000 men with no conscription, no tanks, no heavy artillery, no aircraft 
and no airships, as well as limiting the German Navy to deploying vessels of 
under 100,000 tons, with no submarines. This was the treaty to guarantee that 
Germany never provoked another war. Many thought at the time that the 
treaty was far too drastic, too punishing, but it has been recently suggested 
that those critical of the treaty should try and imagine 'what sort of peace 
Europe would have had if a victorious Kaiserreich and its allies had been 
making it'71. However, with the benefit of hindsight it is possible to 
understand that although the treaty sought a peaceful stability in Europe, it 
created an environment for further conflict. It has been said that 'a harsh 
dictated peace must inevitably arouse a determination in the defeated side to 
reverse it'72. Even in 1939, John Colville, a civil servant at 10 Downing Street, 
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69    Howard, Invention,p.62. 
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anticipating an early British victory noted in his diary there should be no 'guilt 
clause' in the next final peace treaty73.  
 
                The financial reparations were just about possible but not 
manageable politically, and this is true of nearly every aspect of the Treaty: 
Germany was politically unstable and the Versailles Treaty made it more so74. 
John M Keynes as early as May 26th 1919 in a letter to Austen Chamberlain 
wrote that ‘we have presented a Draft treaty to the Germans which contains in 
it much that is unjust… if this policy is pursued, the consequences will be 
disastrous in the extreme’75. If the treaty divided the Allies at the time of its 
signing and afterwards, it certainly united the Germans. The treaty provoked a 
deep resentment on German military men like Kesselring; they felt that 
however long it took the treaty’s misdeeds had to be rectified for Germany’s 
honour: all they needed was a government or leader who agreed. 
 
            These financial consequences of the Great War were far reaching: 
Germany suffered to a far greater extent than most nations. In addition to the 
loss of a generation, and a recession that destroyed people’s savings, 
'including Kesselring’s wife’s wealth,' unemployment was high throughout 
Germany for a long time76.  Kesselring claimed he considered retiring from 
the army; dressed in mufti, he spent time with his wife looking for work, but 
employment opportunities were few and far between. Soldiers returning from 
a lost war which they believed was through no fault of their own, found their 
country on the verge of internal conflict, and under a very different political 
regime. Instead of a country trying to stabilize itself towards an era of peace, 
Germany found itself in the midst of a civil-war. Kesselring’s home, Bavaria, 
and Munich in particular, offered ‘exceptionally fertile soil for the 
development of right-wing extremism …the political pressures brought to 
bear by military and paramilitary groups in Munich was greater than 
anywhere else in Germany’77.  
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                 Kesselring struggled through a personal wilderness of despair, but 
emerged with a belief that Germany would rise again as a power, despite the 
Versailles Treaty, and the perceived weakness of the Weimar Republic. 
Kesselring was persuaded by his GOC to stay in uniform, and work on the 
demobilisation of the III Bavarian Army Corps in the Nuremberg area. This 
was not a difficult decision; Kesselring preferred the military life to that of 
family. Like many returning soldiers peacetime life was not simply difficult 
but bitter, ‘psychologically they remained in a state of war … they referred to 
the first few years after the war as the Nachkrieg, which means something like 
the ‘post-war war’ or the ‘war extension’78. Anti-Semitism flourished; it was 
probably Ludendorff himself who tried to forge a link between Rathenau and 
the stab-in-the-back theory which may have led to the latter’s assassination79. 
The military dictatorship had failed and shifted the blame to the Left, and 
opposed the new Republic: Kesselring and many of his military 
contemporaries would have been deeply involved in this ferment, as well as 
keenly aware of the way anti-Semitism was developing a dangerous political-
edge.               
                   
               Former soldiers were formed into Freikorps in order to combat the 
communists and left-wing groups80.  The right-wing Freikorps were ruthless 
and many parts of the country were reduced to street brawls. Nuremberg was 
not as bad as other parts of the country, but Kesselring experienced his GHQ 
(Deutschherrn Barracks) attacked by a riotous mob. By the spring of 1919 
Kesselring’s Freikorps was gaining the upper hand, although the Left 
continued to hold itself together. It is clear that Kesselring was a typical right-
wing nationalist who would have found a natural refuge in the extremism of 
NSDAP, and, speculatively, may have been involved in directing some of the 
street-fighting. 
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                By the end of 1919 the military had regained the initiative and 
suppressed the various 'soldier-sailor-councils.' After meeting the communist 
councils in the Russian armistice Kesselring would have seen this as a 
triumph. Ironically, Germany now had a ‘socialist led government which had 
authorised right-wing troops to stop workers struggling for a more democratic 
and socialist Germany’81. When the Weimar Constitution had been signed it 
protected basic liberties, gave freedom of speech, freedom of press, equality 
for women and equal voting rights for those aged over twenty one82. Although 
the communists rose three times against the state, it was ‘the Right that was 
Weimar’s greatest threat; probably more Germans stood on the right of 
politics’83. The Freikorps fought the Left, undermined the new Republic and 
in so doing prepared the ground for dictatorship. 
 
                   The Weimar Republic reflected Germany's problem: it remained 
divided because no single party or set of ideas could easily prevail. In the 
early days from 1918 to 1923 the main sway was left to centre, from 1924 to 
1929 it tended to be centre right, and from 1930 to 1933 it became 
authoritarian right. This movement towards the authoritarian right is a study 
in itself, but some factors ought to be noted in terms of understanding men of 
Kesselring's political and military inclination, who resented the Versailles 
Treaty, and seethed when France and Belgium moved into the Ruhr to seize, 
as compensation, key assets84.  When, by the end of November, a single USA 
dollar was bought for 4.2 trillion marks this, amongst many other factors, 
must have caused resentment thus shifting the political constellation to the 
Right. Because of the financial crash, many lost hope in the Weimar 
experiment, leaving political space for the extreme Right.  
 
                Kesselring's involvement with the Freikorps caused a moment in 
his life which he refers to as the most ‘humiliating moment of my life,’ and 
‘my cup of bitterness was full when I saw my devoted work rewarded by a 
warrant for my arrest for an alleged putsch against the socialist influenced 
                                                 
81    Weitz, Weimar,p.31. 
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84    January 11th 1923. 
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command of my III Bavarian Army Corps'85.  This is the only vague allusion 
to the incident in Kesselring's memoirs, leading his first biographer to claim 
that he was displaying ‘his obtuse knack of evasiveness in covering up 
personal miscalculations’86.  However, the Munich War Archives reveals a 
little more about this event: Kesselring had an argument with the leader of the 
Freikorps; Kesselring having refused to carry out orders which 'he claimed 
made no sense', probably because the officer had slight sympathies for the 
left87. The military authorities were actively involved in building up the 
Freikorps, Kesselring himself having been pro-active in this venture, and so 
falling out with a Freikorps leader was just as dubious as questioning his 
commanding officer, which in effect he had done. Kesselring's right-wing 
attitudes were self-evidently strong; he felt that the commanding officer(s) of 
the III Bavarian Army Corps were influenced by Socialist opinions. For a man 
who later claimed he steered clear of politics it was apparent that during this 
time he was deeply committed to the political right. His commanding officer, 
Major Hans Seyler, claimed he had failed to ‘display the requisite discretion’ 
and the Brigade Commander, Major-General von Zoellner decided Kesselring 
had been away too long from the troops, and therefore deployed him as a 
battery commander, only allowing him to re-join the General Staff once he 
had proved himself88. Kesselring was censured for being too stubborn; it was 
the worst assessment Kesselring had ever received leaving his career in grave 
danger.  
                   
                Following the debacle with the Freikorps leader, Kesselring found 
himself as Battery Commander in the 24th Artillery serving in Amberg, 
Erlangen and Nuremberg where he claimed he had close contact with 
servicemen on a daily basis. Little is known about him during this period, but 
given the length of time he served in the army, plus his war service, and being 
awarded four medals he must have been held in some regard89. He continued 
to be involved in the reduction of the German army, changing from a war-
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time fighting force to a small peace force (Führertruppe). The need to reduce 
the strength of the army was humiliating for senior officers serving in the 
Reichswehr; to carry out such a drastic re-organisation of their army was the 
result of defeat90. 
 
          He was commended for his administrative abilities, and for being of an 
amiable character91. Having served his stint as a battery chief in Artillery 
Regiment 24 it was felt that his time with the troops was served, and on the 
1st October 1922, he was seconded to the Reichswehr Ministry in Berlin; he 
was back on the promotional ladder where he became active in what he 
perceived as Germany's reconstruction. 
                 He may have been seen as an 'amiable character,' but the Freikorps 
incident had a marked effect on Kesselring, and may account for his future 
attitudes towards those in authority. Politicians may not be at the front line, 
but they hold the power, and this lesson was understood by Kesselring. The 
problem arises when politicians become corrupt, and therefore the apolitical 
officer class also becomes corrupt. The consequence was that for Kesselring 
he retained a blind obedience to his masters to the bitter end if not beyond. 
Kesselring learned from this point to conceal his right-wing politics, but they 
were now an intrinsic part of his very nature. By 1922 he was a highly 
professional military officer, a product of the Wilhelmine era with right-wing 
inclinations, anti-communist and possibly anti-Semitic views, and who 
regarded war as necessary for the policy of revanchism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE REICHSWEHR (1922-1937) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
                    In 1922 Kesselring, then aged thirty-seven stopped smoking and 
looked to his future1. The German historian Herde wrote that with ‘great 
industry and self-discipline united with a certain warm-heartedness and 
exceptional deportment, perhaps here and there mixed with an exaggerated 
self-confidence, he was marked as an achiever … the genial behaviour of a 
well brought up Bavarian … with a zealot’s pursuit of career advancement … 
but his political horizon was circumscribed … later in 1947 he would testify 
at his trial that the Führer had been placed in power legitimately … but he 
was more honest than most of his comrades who metamorphosed in the de-
Nazification process to a group of serious resistors’2.  
 
              The first part of this chapter will further explore the effects of the 
Versailles Treaty on postwar Germany, and the underhand way men like 
Kesselring opposed the Treaty, and consorted with their natural enemy Stalin, 
in order to build up a clandestine war-machine3. The new military was 
effective, and many felt that it undermined the Weimar Republic. During this 
period Hitler was of little significance, but the military machine prepared by 
men like Kesselring gave Hitler the tools for war. Kesselring always claimed 
he never anticipated war, but this chapter will illustrate the hypocrisy of this 
statement, by exploring Kesselring's rise through the ranks, as he participated 
in nearly every aspect of building an aggressive war-machine, deeply 
involved in the thinking behind Blitzkrieg, and the genesis of the Luftwaffe. 
Herde's described Kesselring as having the 'genial behaviour of a well brought 
up Bavarian,' and quite recently Overy called him 'jovial,' but in reality he 
remained ruthlessly right-wing4. As he had been with Rupprecht so he was 
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equally influenced by General von Seeckt, who typified German militarism, 
and encouraged men like Kesselring to pretend they were above politics, a 
profound deceit in which they emulated Pontius Pilate. 
 
Versailles Reaction 
 
                   On 1st October 1922 Kesselring was seconded to a key 
appointment as G.S.0.1 to the Chief-of-Staff Army Direction in the Berlin 
Reichswehr Office. During these inter bellum years he was involved in every 
aspect of military life, in training, technical developments, economics, law, 
personnel and administration. The Weimar Republic was rarely stable, and to 
understand Kesselring it will be necessary to explore the attitudes in Germany 
at this time. 
 
                 Versailles united most Germans, and Churchill viewed it as 'natural 
that a proud people vanquished in war should strive to rearm themselves as 
soon as possible’5. Most Germans considered Versailles unreasonable, but 
many more on the right-wing of the political spectrum regarded the treaty as 
‘criminal;’ there were many overseas who thought the treaty too stringent6.  
Keynes was one, and Churchill wrote that ‘the economic clauses of the treaty 
were malignant and silly to an extent that made them obviously futile’7. In 
1919 a Daily Herald cartoonist, named Will Dyson had sketched a picture of 
the Versailles gathering with a baby crying in the corner with the label '1940 
Class'8. It has long been stated that the allies imposed a clumsy peace 
settlement at Versailles, but it has been recently argued that had the 'Germans 
instead been dictating the terms as victors, European freedom, justice and 
democracy would have paid a dreadful forfeit'9. Nevertheless, as Kissinger 
wrote, 'it is the temptation of war to punish: it is the task of policy to 
construct'10. It is not a matter of suggesting, as Hastings does, that one side 
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did a better job than the other may have done, but an opportunity for peace 
was missed, making the ground fertile for war. 
 
                    Churchill anticipated how Germany would respond, and 
speculated how the Germans felt, but the sense of resentment in Kesselring's 
military circles was deep. It is true that 'the bitterness of national and personal 
shame produced an incoherent anger,' especially amongst many right-wing 
Germans11.  
 
                     Many Germans felt the humiliation of having the victors impose 
the Inter-allied Military Control Commission (IMCC) which tried to ensure 
that German industry was not rebuilding a war-machine, and that the 
Reichswehr remained a mere defence force. The Control Commission was 
eventually removed from Germany in January 192712. It was withdrawn even 
‘though its task was unfinished.’ Although Germany was eventually admitted 
to the League of Nations, and a better system of reparations was planned 
under the Dawes Plan, many military men like Kesselring still felt 
humiliated13. 
 
                   Kesselring in a moment of false apologia wrote that it was not the 
legendary militarism of Germany that circumnavigated the various clauses, 
but the fact that Germany had to take account of its 'geo-political situation'14. 
The implication was that Germany was surrounded by enemies was a 
common feeling, and this nervousness was aggravated when French and 
Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr in January 192315. The American historian 
Boyne noted that ‘before Hitler, Germany had a well-founded fear that either 
or both France and Poland would initiate a war’16. The political/military 
bodies of Germany, aware of their vulnerability in postwar Europe, felt 
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justified in supporting the clandestine re-organising of its military power17. 
The 100,000 army was made up of many NCOs prompting Churchill to claim 
that the 100,000 men were 100,000 officers in waiting.  Technically 100,000 
men meant 4,000 officers, but up to 40,000 were trained as NCOs18. Ever 
since Clausewitz had advocated that war was chaotic Germans were taught to 
do the jobs of the next two ranks up, to take action in the chaos, and thus the 
German military lent itself to 'mission command' at a time when its potential 
enemies, including the British did 'not sanction individuality'19. They were, 
military-wise, advancing on their old enemies even while the IMCC was 
present. 
 
Clandestine Activity 
 
            Kesselring, as Sparkommissar des-Reichsheeres, was involved at 
every level of military re-organisation and expansion; as head of the Seventh 
Regional Command in Munich, he was active at most of the crucial points of 
overall development20. He took considerable interest in the embryo Luftwaffe; 
this meant not only side-stepping agreements of the Versailles Treaty, but 
being involved in arrangements with the Soviets. It was clear that Kesselring's 
administrative ability and general aptitude were being utilised. 
 
                    Germany had retained a Reichswehr Ministerium giving them the 
opportunity to maintain a select number of the General Staff, with the 
expertise to circumnavigate the Air-Clauses which were intended to end 
military aviation in Germany21. The Treaty demanded that over 15,000 
aircraft and 27,000 aero-engines had to be surrendered22. However, the 1926 
Paris Air-Agreement withdrew these limitations, giving complete freedom in 
civil aviation. This was seized on by the Germans who increased the size of 
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their civil and commercial aviation, and generated the growth of various 
flying clubs. Italy and France were busy enlarging their air-forces, but, as AJP 
Taylor noted, by the late 1930s these countries had huge numbers of 
antiquated aircraft, whilst Germany and especially England by sheer default, 
and leaving it so late, managed to produce more up to date models23.                 
                      
                 To the consternation of the allies, Germany and Russia signed the 
Treaty of Rappallo in 1922, to normalise relationships between the two 
countries: this was not just an economic arrangement, but meant to 
circumnavigate many Versailles restrictions. Rappallo underlined the 
weakness of the Allied victory in that 'it revealed that Moscow and Berlin in 
concert could defy the West with impunity. Often unspoken, it underlay all of 
Europe’s peacetime deliberations until the nightmare finally turned to 
reality'24. In the treaty there was a secret clause stating Russia would supply 
heavy weapons to Germany, and provide pilot-training facilities. 
Arrangements were made with the Soviets for establishing a flying school, 
and for testing new types of combat-aircraft at Lipestsk, and even a branch of 
the Junkers Works was built at Fili close to Moscow.25 Kesselring ‘worked in 
the T-4 (Training) Department, where he was involved in the secret training 
of airman in the Soviet Union,’ and made several visits between 1923 and 
192426. Such was Kesselring's distrust of communism, it clearly indicates his 
determination to see the German war machine rebuilt, given that he was 
prepared to use their facilities in a most clandestine and cynical fashion. 
 
                    Ironically, Lloyd George in a secret note to the American 
President and French Prime Minister, as early as the 25th March 1919, stated 
‘that the greatest danger that I can see in the present situation is that Germany 
may throw in her lot with Bolshevism;’ he was thinking more of the German 
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socialists27. There were four articles in Versailles to prevent such 
German/Soviet relations, article 116 reserving Russian rights to reparations in 
order to stop Germany influencing the east28.   
 
                  Seeckt, who had a major influence on the emerging German 
military and on Kesselring, had been a member of the delegation in Paris, and 
worked against the treaty, never wavering in his conviction ‘that Germany 
needed to recapture the prestige, powers and territories of which it had been 
stripped’29. Like the Russians he distrusted Poland believing co-operation 
with the Bolsheviks would help Germany. There were trade-arrangements 
between the two countries, but Seeckt and his staff such as Kesselring, were 
engaged in secret collaboration. The Soviets needed to rebuild their military, 
and the Germans needed space and secrecy for the same reason. Such was the 
growing relationship that the Dawes Plan was viewed by the Soviet leadership 
as a bribe, to bring Germany back under western influence30. 
 
                       It has been claimed that ‘it was hard to prove that rearmament 
was in itself inspired by aggressive motives,’ but Russia and Germany were 
rearming, with more than defensive precautions in mind31. By 1925 in Russia, 
German firms such as Krupps, Junkers and Stolzenberg were producing 
ammunitions, aeroplanes and even poison gases32. The German-Russian joint 
stock-company Bersol, near Samara, produced poison gas. German pilots 
trained at Smolensk, and after 1923 at Lipestsk, where German officers were 
disguised as Red Army. It is estimated that between 1925 and 1933 
approximately 120 pilots were trained at Lipestsk, whilst tank-training 
facilities were used at Kazan33.     
          
                Men like Kesselring saw rearmament as a natural part of the 
recovery process, but war was also seen as a resolution. The German right-
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wing distrust of the communists underlines the cynical attitude of Seeckt, 
Kesselring and others. The hated Bolshevik used in the rebuilding process, 
later became a partner in the Polish war of 1939, and then a victim in the long 
planned Barbarossa. The work done in Russia and Germany at this time set 
the stage, so ‘when Hitler came to power in 1933 he found all the technical 
preparations for rearmament ready, thanks to the Reichswehr’34. 
 
                      Kesselring was daily immersed in rebuilding Germany’s 
military capabilities. Behind the scenes Kesselring dealt with many of the 
matters concerning the developing air-power as a senior staff officer to the 
Army Training Department (Heeresausbildungsabteilung). He had contact 
with the airmen of the day, including Walther Wever, whom he worked with 
on new concepts such as the Ural Bomber. The development of the air-force 
was strengthened when in 1926 the air-firm Lufthansa came into being. One 
of the directors was Erhard Milch, and it provided an ideal opportunity for 
training pilots in long-range operation/navigational skills35.  
 
                    These developments were observed by Kesselring who was 
promoted to Major on 1st February 1925. His progress through the ranks was 
less remarkable than the varying tasks he fulfilled. He was appointed First 
General Staff Officer in the General Staff of the Army Directorate to Seeckt. 
From 1st October 1926 until 1st April 1929 he was in the Defence Office 
(Wehramt), where he developed his administrative ability. In 1928 Kesselring 
proposed to the Chief of Army Organisation, a Major Wilhelm Keitel, that an 
air-inspectorate be organised. The same type of inspectorate had been 
organised by the panzer-units which, with the Luftwaffe, were to be the two-
pronged basis of the later so-called blitzkrieg. Kesselring was part of a team 
lead by Seeckt. 
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Seeckt - Politics and Blitzkrieg 
 
                   Seeckt, who would eventually find Hitler distasteful, influenced 
Kesselring to obey in blind obedience the elected politicians, and behave as 
one 'who took care to keep out of {party} politics'36. Seeckt was a dominant 
and persuasive man who influenced Kesselring, and many army officers, with 
an attitude towards the Weimar Republic which 'ranged from an angry denial 
of its legitimacy at worst to luke-warm support at best, a tragic state of affairs 
that contributed in no small way to the downfall of the republic and the rise of 
Adolf Hitler. Such is the political indictment; about Kesselring’s military 
abilities, however, there have been very few complaints'37. This comment 
about Kesselring remains true to the present day; he is always commended 
and upheld for his military skills, but his political side which he concealed is 
generally ignored. 
 
 
               Kesselring regarded Seeckt as a model for the younger generation of 
officers, who 'may be said to be the real founder of the new German Air 
Force; already in 1920 he was convinced that military aviation would some 
day be revived in Germany … he therefore secreted a small group of regular 
officers … in the various sections which dealt with aviation in his ministry … 
notably Felmy, Sperrle, Wever, Kesselring and Stumpf'38. He did not look for 
top pilots, ‘he needed planners and builders, not aces’39.  Given the state of 
postwar Germany ‘von Seeckt, known as the sphinx within the Army because 
of his arrogant secretiveness, seemed to have a hopeless task’40. 
 
                      Liddel-Hart argued that although Seeckt died three years before 
the war, and retired ten years before that, he remained the single German 
General who had the greatest influence on the Second World War41. Seeckt's 
authority during this period of reconstruction was immense. 'His polished 
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manners and pleasant personality contrasted with the domineering Prussians 
such as Ludendorff, making him a more attractive proposition to the leaders 
of the new Republic. He appeared to keep the army out of politics but pursued 
an aggressive Right-wing nationalist agenda ‘cloak{ing} his military 
development schemes, as well as the half-veiled political activities in which 
numerous officers of the older school indulged’42. Seeckt’s military manuals 
were based on the German Army being more than 100,000, and centred on the 
premise that every action should be based on surprise; this contrasted with the 
French manuals, which reflected the slow moving tactics of the First War. 
Above all Seeckt re-established the army and eventually ‘removed the danger 
presented {to the army} by the Freikorps by dissolving it'43.  
 
                    According to Kesselring, Seeckt encouraged him and all officers 
to be non-political. Kesselring’s insistence on ignoring politics is a deceit; it 
could be argued that ‘the Seeckt-pattern professional became a modern 
Pontius Pilate, washing his hands of all responsibility for the orders to be 
executed’44. The concept of the non-political-soldier can be carried too far: 
General Siegfried Westphal wrote that 'the soldiers’ political ignorance 
rendered them blind to the satanic side of his {Hitler’s} character and 
actions'45.  The officer class did not vote and it has been argued that 'political 
isolation encouraged political naivety, with many senior officers becoming 
apolitical rather than unpolitical'46. Bismarck was well aware that army 
officers, though pretending to be non-political, formed camarillas to influence 
the monarchy 'as they did in Russia or Prussia … in such extreme cases 
officer politics takes the form of conspiracy'47. Attitudes towards the military 
and politics has always been divided, from Seeckt's apparent no contact, to the 
political commissars of the Soviet Union, to a later commentator like 
Janowitz, stating that the 'military commander must develop more political 
orientation, in order to explain the goals of military activities to his staff and 
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subordinates'48. Kesselring's and Seeckt's views were fundamentally 
dishonest, because it was pretence that they had no interest in politics, when 
they were a secret cabal, what has been described as a state within a state. 
 
                             Kesselring always looked back with self-serving reflections, 
often convincing post-1945 listeners that he was politically neutral. Seeckt 
was a political intriguer, and quite capable of manipulating politicians. A 
traditional monarchist, he laid the foundations of a strong Reichswehr, and 
concealed the forbidden leadership of the outlawed General Staff, under the 
ubiquitous name of Truppenamt (Troop Office). An elitist, Seeckt surrounded 
himself with the best. He frequently ignored the Weimar government, and 
‘took major military decisions without going to the Reichstag,’ but he made a 
political blunder in allowing the eldest son of the German Crown-Prince to 
take part in an army manoeuvre, and this finished him in 192649. 
  
                     Kesselring was a pupil of Seeckt's: his ability to influence people 
by careful diplomatic manoeuvrings and pleasant personality was a trait of 
Seeckt, as was his boast of ignoring politics. If politics were raised postwar 
Kesselring brushed them aside as of no consequence. Seeckt had found 
nothing ‘incongruous in pledging the support of the armed forces to the 
Weimar Republic and in making it clear that he would not permit the army to 
interfere or become enmeshed in the sphere of domestic politics’50. Kesselring 
had become Seeckt’s disciple in ostensibly ignoring NSDAP politics, 
however morally reprehensible those politics were becoming. This aspect of 
his character will be explored later when this non-party member remained 
totally 'loyal to Hitler' to the very last51.                   
              
                            Kesselring worked with others alongside Seeckt with the 
aim to establish a 102 Division Army, a breaching of Versailles, which 
Kesselring regarded as patriotic. During the Weimar Republic, and through all 
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the political strife as the Hitler brokered his way to power, officers like 
Kesselring were rebuilding a technically advanced and efficient war-machine. 
Part of their planning was the preparation of Seeckt’s insistence on surprise 
and speed, combined with air power. The historian, Carlo D’Este, saw 
Kesselring as ‘one of the originators of the blitzkrieg'52. The core of Seeckt’s 
and Kesselring’s strategy ‘was founded on the harnessing of modern 
technology to armed warfare, and the utilisation of motorised armoured 
vehicles supported by self-propelled guns, aircraft and infantry’53. Blitzkrieg 
as a means of warfare remained effective until the Allies grasped its nature; 'it 
was a tactical innovation rather than revolutionary form of warfare'54.  Seeckt, 
Kesselring and others produced a professional expertise which would be used 
by a corrupt regime still in the ascendancy. 
 
               Blitzkrieg ‘proved Seeckt to be quite right … nobody could have 
foreseen that a clever combination of modern weapons untried in war would 
achieve such speedy results’55. It was self-evidently an offensive rather than a 
defensive military machine being built. During the Weimar Republic 
Kesselring helped re-build the German military machine, with the backing of 
various political masters and working with other officers preparing the way. 
Kesselring's key theme was 'efficiency,' and on complaining about red-tape he 
was appointed as ‘Reichswehr Commissioner for Retrenchment and 
Simplification.’ 
 
Planning war 
 
                                  Kesselring's claim that he was not anticipating war raises 
some doubts. 'German map production was deliberately stopped in 1931' so 
when war started there would be no up-to-date maps of Germany56. On June 
23rd 1933 all German newspapers had an identical article entitled ‘Red Plague 
over Berlin’ in which it was claimed that foreign planes had flown over 
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defenceless Germany57. It was Göring’s hope that this hoax would stimulate 
support for an increase in fighter planes. A young Berlin diarist wrote: 'At the 
end of June all the papers had banner headlines, Enemy Planes over Berlin! 
No one believed it, not even the Nazis'58. None of this necessarily suggests 
that war was being planned but at the very least it was ‘sabre-rattling.’ 
 
                     The British were alert to the German-Soviet agreements and 
interchange of personnel; there must have been an awareness of German 
developments, but not necessarily intentions59. Senger specifically mentions 
his relationship with John Dill who later succeeded Ironside as CIGS, and it 
was not unusual for military personnel to be acquainted with their opposite 
numbers as Kesselring was with Winterbotham, the British air-attaché in 
Berlin, though really working for MI560. On the 10th September 1931, Lord 
Robert Cecil, member of the British Government, claimed that ‘there has 
scarcely been a period in the world’s history when war seems less likely than 
it does at present,’ a world disarmament conference was being summoned 
(February 1932), and all seemed well in Europe61.  E.H. Carr in his 
Conditions of Peace wrote ‘reconstruction, restoration, recovery were the key 
words of the twenties,' and this may have made sense even to those Germans 
yet to perceive the corruption of the NSDAP62.   
                           
                       It has been claimed by Senger that ‘the isolation of the 
Reichswehr is said to have undermined the democratic basis of the Weimar 
state. The Army had not become integrated with the state’63. Men like 
Kesselring, who pretended to have no political views, planned a powerful and 
efficient war machine that was aggressive and not defensive, which 
undermined the democratic Weimar Republic, and provided Hitler's regime 
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with the means to wage war: Kesselring, along with his mentor Seeckt, cannot 
evade the responsibility for being a major part of the crime against peace. 
 
Arrival of Hitler  
 
                The latter parts of this chapter will examine Kesselring’s 
relationship with the NSDAP, his involvement with the emerging Luftwaffe, 
his continued pretence of disinterest in politics, and the Hitler Oath, along 
with the bribes by which Hitler bound military commanders to himself. In 
1930 Kesselring was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, and left Berlin to spend 
two years in Dresden as a full Colonel and Divisional Commander with the 4th 
Artillery Regiment. On Oct 1st 1933, aged 48, Kesselring was discharged 
from the army and put in charge of the Luftwaffenenverwaltungsamt 
(Administrative Office) of the Luftwaffe with the rank of Commodore. This 
date corresponds with the arrival of Hitler in power, who saw the emergence 
of the Luftwaffe as critical to his plans of domination.                
 
                    As Hitler rose to power, Kesselring, an educated and intelligent 
man, consistently pretended the politics passed him by. Even when the 
demilitarised zone was occupied (7th March 1936) he claimed that he only 
heard about the event on the same morning, and later when the Germans 
entered Austria (11th March 1938) he alleged he was equally surprised, but 
pleased; this ignorance seems almost impossible to believe, and is part of the 
postwar evasion in which many senior Germans indulged. The facts indicate 
otherwise, at the beginning of March Hitler ‘delegated the diplomatic 
coercion of Austria to Göring, who promptly put the Luftwaffe on a war 
footing;’ it beggars belief that Kesselring would have been unaware.64 
 
                           Although his claim to ignorance is barely plausible, it is 
likely that his military role was remote from the party political intrigue. 
However, it is difficult to conceive he had no knowledge of the growing ill-
treatment of the Jewish population. After the war he admitted that he had 
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flown over Dachau, and he must have been aware of the dismissal of Jewish 
and half-Jewish (Mischlings) men from the military. When questioned at 
Nuremberg (when he stood as a witness for Göring) and was asked whether 
Jewish officers were excluded from the army, he simply replied 'Jewish 
officers did not exist'65. As with so many other postwar soldiers he appeared 
to have blanked this crime from his mind. 'It required a considerable effort of 
denial for Germans not to be aware of what was going on. The steady drip of 
information from multiple sources was cumulatively compelling'66.  While 
Kesselring had nothing to do with the persecution of the Jews, he must have 
had some knowledge which made him complicit, using the sanctimonious and 
lame excuse that 'I paid very little attention to the junketings in Berlin,' and 
'kept myself from gossip'67.   
 
                       Kesselring could not, especially when given monetary gifts by 
Hitler, have been unaware of the corruption. Later, when told of Göring’s 
criminality in amassing stolen art, he was reassured when Göring informed 
him it was for the Reich. It could be Kesselring was unworldly, but more 
likely he was probably dissembling. It must be asked why an educated man 
like Kesselring aligned himself to Hitler and the self-evident corruption. Part 
of the answer was the military ethos of the day; Seeckt had re-enforced 
loyalty and therefore obedience: Hitler led the state therefore loyalty bound all 
to him. Hitler understood this and tied the military power to himself by what 
is called the ‘Hitler Oath’ in 1934; in his memoirs Kesselring asks the 
rhetorical question 'what else was the meaning of an oath'68? It had been a 
German tradition for a long time; any drafted man had to swear an oath of 
allegiance to the crowned head. Some older officers still wanted the oath to 
the monarchy, and who, Westphal wrote, were 'particularly resistant to 
attempts to make them adopt the National Socialist outlook and who believed 
that they could maintain their inner independence even under Hitler’s 
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dictatorship'69. Manstein wrote that ‘officers who were brought up as 
Christians, and this was the vast majority, particularly in the older generation 
could not break their oath to their supreme commander, let alone kill him’70. 
Senger, who was a Benedictine Lay Brother and a man not prone to lying, 
wrote ‘how little officers knew of the criminal nature of the Nazi 
leadership’71. German military tradition put great emphasis on ‘the oath;’ their 
English equivalents swear allegiance to the monarch, and 'did not differ 
significantly from that required of civil servants … or by United States army 
officers to the President'72. 
 
                    Historically, the Prussian King was not that far removed from the 
Führerprinzip – Leader Principle in which the strongest hierarchical lines are 
laid out. This involves acts of total obedience from everyone, and leads to the 
‘unquestioning cult of the Party Leader, the fount of all wisdom and 
beneficence, the Führer, the Vozhď, the Duce the Caudillo or the Great 
Helmsman … it was a centrepiece both of Stalinism and Hitlerism’73. For men 
of Kesselring’s generation it was not such a vast jump from Prussian style 
obedience to the ‘Leader Principle.’ In postwar interrogations Kesselring was 
one of the very few who never criticised Hitler, probably because of his 
misplaced loyalty: in this aspect 'he was not hypocritical like so many who 
back-pedalled in postwar interrogations'74. 
 
                    Hitler, perceptive of human-nature, gave senior military 
personnel ‘grants,’ usually a gift of some 6,000 RM, a considerable sum of 
money75. Kesselring was one who benefited: a gift of money as sizeable as 
this indebted the recipients, binding them to the donor. These gifts by Hitler 
were tax-free payments from a discretionary account in the Reich, and 'the 
timing and manipulation of the gifts showed that Hitler intended them not as 
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rewards but as bribes to ensure obedience'76. At Nuremberg, the USA army 
lawyer, Taylor noted that ‘Hitler had offered the Generals what they wanted 
… that is why they climbed on the Nazi bandwagon’77. This union between 
Hitler and the military leadership had been nurtured as early as ‘the evening 
of 3rd February 1933 when the commanders gathered for dinner at the Berlin 
home of General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord … the principal guest that 
night was Adolf Hitler … as General Blomberg had hoped, the dinner party 
inaugurated an alliance between the military elite and Hitler that would drive 
the first phase of all-out German rearmament’78. It could be said that the 
military leadership of Germany and Adolf Hitler needed one another: ‘the 
officer corps in particular was enjoying its new status and its expanded 
responsibilities’79. 
 
                 At a personal level Kesselring felt drawn to the NSDAP by their 
emphasis on loyalty, comradeship and duty. Kesselring admitted that the 
NSDAP made a strong impression because it was a ‘brilliant and smooth 
running organisation,' which appealed to many military personnel expecting 
high standards of presentation80.  There is the alternative view that ‘the Nazis 
use of drum and trumpet, light and luridly coloured symbols resulted in what 
the satirist Karl Kraus called cerebral concussion’81.  
 
                       The question of the NSDAP success is of interest where it 
portrays Kesselring in the political context, and his belief that Hitler was the 
legitimate ruler of Germany. It was Kesselring’s view, and many others that 
after the failed Putsch, Hitler and his party kept to the rules of the constitution 
and rose to power 'through participation in Germany’s democratic process, 
and at the invitation of the lawful authorities. It is beside the point that he and 
his ruffians were anything but democrats or constitutionalists at heart… he did 
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not breach the constitution once'82.  The powers of Germany saw in Hitler 
some form of answer to what terrified them most: communism, which 
Kesselring had detested since 1917. When von Papen made Hitler Chancellor, 
the NSDAP reached their political zenith within the rules. 'Hitler’s democratic 
triumph exposed the true nature of democracy. Democracy … is as good, or 
as bad, as the principles of the people who operate it … in 1933-4 Germany it 
produced a Nazi government because the prevailing culture of Germany’s 
voters did not give priority to the exclusion of gangsters'83.  
 
               On these grounds Kesselring accepted, and possibly with some 
justification, that Hitler was the head of a legitimate government who had to 
be obeyed84. Democracy when manipulated by evil men becomes a danger 
that can happen anywhere. In Germany it led to Hitler, and men like 
Kesselring, who obeyed him, who used the Hitler oath as a reason, along with 
their common hatred of communism, sealed by their acceptance of bribes, but 
what motivated the military leaders most was the power and resources Hitler 
gave them. 
 
Emergence of the Luftwaffe 
 
                Carlo D'Este described Kesselring as one of the 'architects of the 
Luftwaffe' and one of the originators of blitzkrieg; this may be an 
exaggeration, but he was among the 'main players,' and his role has frequently 
been overlooked85. Whether the Luftwaffe planned for strategic bombing is 
questionable, and Kesselring's part in this is open to debate and needs 
exploration. Kesselring's involvement at a senior level will be explored 
because it illustrates that his later protestations that war came as a surprise 
was sheer nonsense, both from the nature of his personal contributions, and 
the massive acceleration of the Luftwaffe development.  
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                     Kesselring headed up the Luftfahrt Commissariat 
(administration) technically first as a civilian, and as one of four colonels 
transferred from the Wehrmacht. He had finished Army life as a Colonel, but 
promotion in the Luftwaffe was rapid. Kesselring was created a Major-
General on 1st October 1934; promoted again on 1st April 1936, and was 
appointed Chief of General Staff (replacing Wever) on 9th June 1936. If 
Kesselring were zealous for promotion his transfer to the clandestine and 
emerging Luftwaffe provided him with meteoritic rise86. 
 
                       After Versailles Germany’s air-force was virtually non-existent, 
but was built-up through clandestine activity. In 1929, as a result of a 
commission led by Major Kesselring in his role as Reichswehr Commissioner 
for Retrenchment and Simplification, he proposed that all aviation officers 
and agencies be openly consolidated into one inspectorate for aviation. 
Colonel Hans-Jurgen Stumpf was tasked with creating a Luftwaffe officers 
corps virtually from scratch; during the years 1933-6 training schools were 
established drawing from a variety of personnel87. This was kept from the 
general public by using Lipestsk and other places in Russia. In 1933, in 
connivance with Mussolini, German pilots disguised as South Tyrolean 
soldiers, crossed the border and trained with the Italian Air Force, the Regia 
Aeronautica, at that time one of the best air-forces in Europe88.              
 
                  During the period 1933-1935 the Luftwaffe grew rapidly, 
personnel developed to approximately ‘900 flying officers, 200 flak officers 
and 17,000 men’89. This was a phenomenal expansion for a military force 
which relied on technology. Some criticised the use of ex-army officers at this 
time, claiming that it was all very 'amateur,' but men like Kesselring and 
Wever learned to fly, following the old military dictate that officers should 
not ask their men to do something they could not do themselves: Kesselring, 
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Wever, and Stumpf all belonged to the traditional officer corps and proved 
adaptable90. 
 
                        This developing air-power was far from defensive: there had 
been debate when the use of gas from the air was discussed. Seeckt had 
suggested that only non-deadly gas (forms of tear gas) should be dropped if 
civilians were present, but even this type of gas could prompt an enemy to 
retaliate by dropping a more deadly type91. As a result experiments in gas 
continued to be authorised in secret places in Russia, as well as its means of 
delivery; as it happened the Germans never used gas, they also advised the 
Italians against doing so. Himmler later initiated biological warfare, by re-
infesting the Pontine Marshes so that 'cases of malaria spiralled'92. Mutual fear 
stopped chemical warfare. 
  
                         Another doctrine under discussion during this period was the 
use of long-range bombers as postulated in Douhet’s theory on air power93. 
Douhet differed from other prominent early theorists, by proposing that 
civilian populations should be directly targeted, as part of the air campaign. 
This theory of attacking population centres as a means of causing morale 
breakdown, or making a political point was known as strategic bombing: a 
controversial policy in which heated arguments of legality and morality have 
a tendency to distant themselves from historical reality. The British and 
Americans deployed this more fully than any other nation. In Italy the Allies 
used all strategies, Monte Cassino was bombed to break the German front, 
Florence and Rome 'to provoke a military crisis' and later in Germany 
annihilation94. An air force 'could project power in this way, so by default the 
bomber became the supreme instrument for waging what was now defined at 
the time as total war'95. During the 1920s the Germans had no less than forty 
study groups evaluating airpower, but only four examined bombing with 
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Felmy and Wever as the two main protagonists. Most saw the Luftwaffe's 
primary task as supporting ground attacks; the Luftwaffe service manual in 
1936 excluded the use of aircraft for terror raids. 
 
                  Nevertheless, the theory of strategic bombing was examined. As 
early as November 1937 at his factory in Augsburg, Messerschmitt had shown 
Hitler a mock-up of a four-engine long-range-bomber, with a range of 6,000 
kilometres, with a one ton capacity and capable of 600 kph. There had been 
difficult relations between Milch and Messerschmitt and the German Air 
Ministry remained sceptical about the figures96. Wever had proposed that if 
there were to be a war against Czechoslovakia the Douhetian use of air power 
could break the enemy's will97. During the traditional German Staff procedure 
of war-games and quartermaster exercises, the Luftwaffe re-examined its 
requirements in time of war, and explored the need for heavy fighter 
bomber/destroyer aircraft with an effective fighter-escort. The long-range 
heavy-bomber was critical to Wever’s plans98. He argued for an ‘elastic 
defence to minimize casualties … the way to win wars was to destroy the 
enemy’s industrial heartland’99.  
 
                Wever’s plan for the four-engine and long-range Ural bomber was 
eventually put aside: Kesselring considered it too costly in raw materials100. 
Various Luftwaffe personnel such as Colonel Paul Deichmann (Chief of 
Operations) and Colonel Kurt Pflugbeil (Inspector of bomber-forces) 
'protested,' but Göring, wishing to ingratiate himself with Hitler who 
demanded large numbers, not large bombers, followed Milch’s and Udet's 
advice101. 
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                        Luftwaffe historians place the responsibility for the Ural 
Bomber’s cancellation on various heads. Richard Overy implies that because 
Kesselring was ex-soldier he was more interested in 'greater army-air 
cooperation'102. James Corum states that ‘Kesselring strongly supported the 
programme to produce a long-range heavy bomber’, and most tend to agree 
that there seems little question that both Udet and Milch did not, if only to 
please Göring103. The American historian Richard Raiber wrote that ‘this was 
a mistake for which both Kesselring and Göring must shoulder responsibility 
– that might have had a decisive influence on the war’s outcome,’ most 
probably in the east-European war104. The historian Corum is probably right 
in claiming that Kesselring initially supported the four-engine bomber, 
because although he hardly mentions the issue in his memoirs, his annoyance 
with Milch and disregard for Udet was probably based on their betrayal of 
Wever’s policy, which Kesselring had always supported. However, it was 
Göring who issued the cancellation order on 29th April 1937, and under his 
guidance, along with Udet and Jeschonnek ‘forced the Luftwaffe to fight till 
the end equipped for the most part with its first generation of warplanes – and 
far too few of them’105. Significantly, according to Hitler's Adjutant, Göring 
never realised the importance of advancing technology106. 
 
                     Kesselring may have had his doubts, stating that ground troops 
were essential, and this may have later influenced his opinion on the 
development of the four-engine long-range bomber. However, Kesselring 
published an article in a technical periodical in which he stated that 'I regard 
the purpose of the Luftwaffe in a total war by its very nature to have been 
achieved when lands are attacked, power centres annihilated, and the capacity 
of the people to resist smashed, so that occupation can follow more or less 
without a fight, or at least when the mere threat of occupation is enough to 
crash down the last vestiges of a people's will to resist'107.  This ruthless 
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argument tends to indicate that Kesselring leaned more towards Douhet than 
he later claimed in postwar times. 
 
                         Kesselring and his colleagues had secretly rebuilt the 
Luftwaffe, which, when it was eventually publically revealed in 1935, had 
1,888 aircraft and 20,000 officers and men. Significantly much was kept 
secret to conceal that it was more than a defensive force. His first biographer 
records that Kesselring met an air attaché called Frederick Winterbotham at a 
Berlin function, and that Winterbotham had found Kesselring sullen but later, 
away from meetings, an affable and pleasant person with excellent flying 
skills. Frederick Winterbotham worked for SIS as Head of the Air Section, 
and was in Germany estimating Germany’s air rearmament108.  Whether 
Kesselring knew Winterbotham's motives is unknown, but certainly 
Winterbotham 'had been taken into the confidence of General Reichenau and 
his Luftwaffe colleagues about the planned attack on Russia'109. Intelligence 
about the Luftwaffe was a difficult task for the British SIS. In 1938 they sent 
‘agent 479’ and a female companion on a tour of Germany, they produced 
little information because the airfields had been built away from the roads, 
and it meant penetrating agricultural ground to sight a place, which was 
extremely dangerous; it was all very clandestine110.  
 
                   ‘Kesselring played a major role in the construction of the 
Luftwaffe ground establishment and in creation of the parachute corps during 
his tenure as Chief of the General Staff’111. His influence was wide-reaching; 
as head of administration he prepared budgets, established airfields and 
training sites, and made the necessary contacts with industry. 
  
                         Kesselring worked strenuously making personal contact with 
the aircraft industry, owners and designers. As early as 1933 he arranged with 
Ernst Heinkel to build one of the largest aircraft factories, claiming the sales-
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orders would not stop112. Heinkel was initially a supporter of the NSDAP, but 
was acquitted after the war, because of his anti-Hitler activities. He was 
obliged to sell his interests in the factory to Göring. Where industrialists were 
uncooperative, such as Hugo Junkers, a socialist and pacifist as early as 1917, 
he was forced into partnership with Anthony Fokker to ensure war-
production. The regime demanded ownership of all Junkers’ patents, and 
control of his company. Whether Kesselring was involved in this brutal 
behaviour is unknown, but he must have been aware. 
                           
                     When Wever died in a plane accident on 3rd June 1936 it 
provoked problems within the leadership of the Luftwaffe, and his death gave 
way to a series of power struggles. The petty politics of the emerging 
Luftwaffe were almost self-destructive, and Kesselring was one of the 
protagonists. Wever was replaced by Kesselring, then a Lieutenant-General, 
as the Luftwaffe’s Chief-of-Staff, described by a Luftwaffe historian as a 
good choice, with a hardworking and dynamic personality, 'yet behind his 
friendly Bavarian demeanour he was as demanding as the toughest Prussian 
aristocrat'113.   
 
                       The growth of the Luftwaffe was hindered by Göring’s 
tendency to interfere. Until Wever’s death he had been content to let others do 
the work: yet at this critical moment in the development, he interfered. It was 
aggravated by Göring’s fear that Milch was becoming too powerful. Whereas 
Wever had managed to carry both Göring and Milch with him in his views, 
Kesselring found it difficult to handle Milch, who some believed, was too 
ambitious114.  Kesselring became involved in some abortive machinations of 
returning Milch to civil aviation. Matters were aggravated when Milch 
demanded that Major Jeschonnek, commander of the III Training School at 
Greifswald, be court-martialled because of the high number of flying 
accidents. Kesselring saw this as none of Milch’s business, and refused to 
comply. He even ‘accused Milch of high treason for divulging too much 
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information about the Luftwaffe’s strength to the British during a trip he took 
to England’115. Kesselring does not refer to this incident, but these so-called 
revelations by Milch to the British were all part of an official scheme called 
‘bluff’116. There was a great deal of personal animosity mainly based on 
policy and personality; a feature of the Luftwaffe during this period. In a 
prison interview after the war Kesselring was asked how he and Milch got on; 
he said they were good friends, but 'some differences arose,' - Kesselring was 
evasive117.  
 
            Adding to the problems Göring promoted an old friend, Ernst Udet 
(with a previous career of stunt-pilot, filmmaker and described as a ‘hard-
drinking bon vivant’) to the position of Chief of Luftwaffe’s Technical 
Office118. Udet was not competent for this office, committing suicide in 1941 
because of the strain. From 1936 to his death he was responsible for the 
development and selection of aircraft and overseeing production. This 
appointment and weak administration by Göring created more friction in the 
Luftwaffe resulting in poor production, lack of technical progress, and an 
emphasis on the wrong type of aircraft.  
 
                          Despite these problems Kesselring remained a key figure, and 
with Stumpf they embarked on the largest peacetime air and joint air/ground 
exercises in the inter-war period; a process that would make the German war-
machine formidably efficient119. In the June of 1936 he directed that night-
fighter exercises be held for the first time, and as a result the Luftwaffe’s first 
manual on night-fighting was published in April 1937120.  
                        
                     Kesselring also initiated the full paratrooper (Fallschirmager) 
training programme, which by July 1938 was under the command of General 
Student. This force was designed for aggressive attack121. The concept of 
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dropping highly-trained troops from aircraft had been studied first in Russia. 
The German copy, encouraged by Kesselring, was first-class and was 
emulated by the Allies. Apart from their ability to parachute, they were 
highly-trained soldiers who proved their effectiveness on the ground in many 
places, especially Monte Cassino.  
 
                      As Chief of Air Staff Kesselring emphasised the importance of 
training bomber-navigators and bombardiers for long-range missions, as well 
as the Flak regiments whose guns were useful against aircraft and tanks122. 
The Flak guns, by being dangerous to both aircraft and ground-forces, were 
powerful and feared by the Allies. Kesselring produced a blueprint of how the 
Luftwaffe should be organised in groups of Air Fleets: Göring agreed by 
signing the policy on 2nd June 1937, and Kesselring offered his resignation 
seeking a field post123. According to his son Rainer it was to avoid 'the 
frictional strife' developing in the command; it has also been suggested that 
Kesselring sought a senior field post to ensure that his plans worked124. 
Another more likely suggestion has been made that because Kesselring failed 
to accommodate himself to Milch ‘the back-biting between the two led to 
Kesselring’s replacement by Hans-Jürgen Stumpf within a year’125. An 
immediate postwar study by the British Air Ministry, suggests that Kesselring 
was replaced by Stumpf because 'Kesselring was a forceful character and 
potentially troublesome to Göring'126. Kesselring wrote little about Göring, 
but he had been quoted as saying that ‘Göring could be made to work, and 
when he felt the need for it he worked with remarkable concentration and 
perseverance’127.                     
                       
                From the very beginning of Hitler’s regime, it was clear that war 
was his intention; as early as 30th September 1934 Schacht submitted to Hitler 
a ‘Report on the state of preparation for war-economic mobilization’ and it is 
extremely unlikely that Kesselring was unaware of such long-term intentions, 
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despite what he claimed in his self-serving memoirs.128 Kesselring's 
introduction of aggressive parachute regiments; his support of strategic 
bombing; his insistence on night-fighters; training the navigators of bombers 
for long distance navigation, and his concept of mobile control areas for the 
various Air Fleets, are all highly indicative that Kesselring, through these 
preparations knew an aggressive war was being planned. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LUFTWAFFE COMMAND (1937-1941) 
 
Introduction 
 
                      Kesselring's involvement with the Luftwaffe in Poland, the 
West and Russia will be examined in this study of Kesselring. Kesselring's 
postwar protestations that he knew next to nothing of Hitler's plans will be 
seen as nonsense: he may not have been consulted, but his involvement was 
far too intense to pretend he was caught by surprise. First, the fact that he 
prepared for an aggressive war, not least because he was a leading figure in 
organising the Luftwaffe for aggression, not defence. Secondly, for a long 
time there has been a popular myth that the Luftwaffe initiated strategic 
bombing, first Warsaw, then Rotterdam, London, and Barbarossa. This 
chapter will suggest that strategic, or what the Germans described as terror-
bombing, was not part of the original plans, not for moral reasons, but in the 
belief that there was greater efficiency when airpower supported ground 
forces. Terror bombing may not have been planned, but the lack of technical 
resources meant it happened anyway. Thirdly, there will be an overview of 
how Kesselring's Luftwaffe fought in the east and the west, including the 
Battle of Britain. In Poland and Western Europe Blitzkrieg worked, but its 
initial success in Russia stalled because of the size of Russia. In Britain the 
Luftwaffe found itself up against an equally modern and ruthless opposition, 
and failed. Kesselring also had weak intelligence information, a problem that 
would dog him until the end of the war. Finally, as this thesis progresses the 
question must be asked as to how much Kesselring knew about the genocide 
and cruelty of the NSDAP in the Eastern war, because this is the context in 
which he planned and fought. 
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Kesselring's claimed ignorance of an Aggressive War 
 
            Carlo D’Este wrote that Kesselring was one of the 'originators of 
blitzkrieg,' a term used after the Polish invasion, and only by the Allies’1. ‘The 
German armed forces blended the tactical lessons of the First World War with 
the new technologies of armoured vehicles, combat aircraft and radio 
communications to create a devastating new form of combined-arms 
warfare’… although in Poland they ‘had still not perfected its novel tactics, 
and German casualties were relatively heavy for such a short campaign’2. 
Under the guidance of Seeckt, Kesselring had made a rigorous study of 
mobile war, and Carlo D’Este was correct in his estimation of Kesselring's 
input. Even Hore-Belisha in a 1942 parliamentary debate linked Kesselring's 
name with the military development of land and air working together3. 
 
                    Kesselring argued that only ground troops could give final 
victory using a supportive Luftwaffe. This was one of the central themes of 
the so-called blitzkrieg, which was prepared for an aggressive war to restore 
Germany's borders. Luftwaffe-regulation-16, ‘The Conduct of Air 
Operations’ (Luftkriegsführung) issued in 1935 ‘served as the primary 
expression of Luftwaffe battle doctrine in World War II in which six major 
missions were outlined,’ four of which related directly to supporting the army 
on the ground, especially the second which specified support for ground 
troops4.  
 
                    Significantly, when in 1947 the RAF decided to write an 
objective account of the Luftwaffe their report on the Polish campaign read 
that 'from the German Air Force point of view, {the Polish campaign} was the 
supreme test of all the theories of air warfare on which the Air Force had been 
built up; in its overwhelming success it was viewed as the complete 
justification of all the hopes and principles which had been enumerated 
consistently by the German Air Staff and tested experimentally in Spain. The 
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principles laid down for the employment of the Luftwaffe was simple and 
direct … It was the theory of Blitzkrieg; the elimination, stage by stage, of 
each and every obstacle which might frustrate the freedom of movement of 
the ground forces. It was an art of war which attributed to the Air Force 
almost every possibility except that of occupation of enemy territory. It was 
ideal for the type of continental warfare which the German High Command 
had planned'5. They noted that 'Kesselring had written that beyond all other 
military arms, the Luftwaffe, by virtue of its mobility in space accomplished 
tasks which in former wars had been inconceivable … in this campaign the 
Luftwaffe learned many lessons and prepared itself for a second, more 
strenuous and decisive clash of arms'6. 
 
           Kesselring's work was well known as he primed the Luftwaffe to 
operate in an aggressive war; there can be no justified claim that Kesselring 
was establishing a defence-force. By the very nature of his work Kesselring 
knew that war must be imminent. He claimed in his memoirs that he was kept 
in the dark about war-plans as did Manstein: Manstein insisted that Hitler 
conferred only with political colleagues who would never have contradicted 
him; military officers were simply given instructions. Hitler initiated all 
policies - the only exception was 'Raeder’s suggestion of invading Norway' 
for strategic reasons7. However, Kesselring mentions his meetings with Hitler 
and Brauchitsch in the June of 1937 and alleged no mention of military 
matters was made; yet in the summer of the same year he was preparing 
airfields near the Czechoslovakian borders. The General Staff may have 
called it 'War-Games,' but there can be no escaping the conclusion that 
Kesselring and Manstein were alert to Hitler's intentions: many of the postwar 
biographies are self-serving in evading incriminating knowledge.  
  
                        From mid-1937 Kesselring had been in charge of Air-Region 
III operating from Dresden, and from the 1st October he became Chief-of-
Staff of Luftflotte-I operating from Berlin. He left the paper work to his Chief-
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of-Staff, Wilhelm Speidel, while he flew his own Ju52 with his personal 
flying instructor Zellmann, visiting airfields from Berlin to Dresden8. He 
attended training sessions, checked fighting conditions; he was preparing his 
Luftflotte over eastern Germany where the political tensions existed.  
 
               Kesselring knew that invasion was close; the majority of Germans 
felt that the Sudetenland was German and it was much discussed. It was 
known that many international contemporaries agreed with the Germans. 
When Chamberlain asked Lord Runciman to give a considered opinion on 
Sudetenland, Runciman stated that the Czechoslovak rule over Sudeten 
Germans had ‘been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty 
intolerance and discrimination… and I consider, therefore, that these frontier 
districts should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany’9. 
Kesselring was instructed to prepare in the May of 1938 for an invasion. He 
noted there was no Maginot defence, and proposed to drop airborne troops 
behind the frontline. In preparation Kesselring moved his operational 
headquarters to Senftenberg in the Lansitz to be closer to his units.  
 
                     The situation was resolved at the four-power conference in 
Munich and Kesselring asserted he was relieved at the solution. Despite his 
postwar protestations of ignorance, he knew war was coming because his 
continuing preparatory plans included air-raid precautions, and educating 
civilians.  
 
                   When the order came for the annexation of the rest of 
Czechoslovakia, Kesselring stated he had no time 'to speculate on the 
justification or need for intervention' he simply had to respond to his orders10. 
Seeckt's influence was manifest: although Kesselring never relied on the 
defence of obeying orders, he explains any awkward moment in his memoirs 
claiming he was a soldier who obeyed. 
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                   Poland, like Czechoslovakia was a ‘creation’ of the Versailles 
Treaty; Lord Vansittart wrote in his autobiography 'that Piłsudski threw over 
the Left, banned communists … ruled for nine years and riddled the state with 
his creatures. Their poor quality antagonised not only their neighbours but the 
few British politicians who knew anything of Poland'11. Many, including 
Kesselring would have been aware there was no immediate tradition of 
Anglo-Polish friendship, and more than aware of Hitler's intentions. 
  
                         Kesselring is vague and evasive concerning the start of the 
Polish offensive despite being summoned to the Berghof with all major 
commanders to hear Hitler's plans. An Australian professor of History 
published a book in 1937 clearly indicating why Hitler would go to war: 
‘Hitlerism cannot achieve its aims with war; its ideology is that of war’12. It 
seems ludicrous that an Australian academic in 1937 understood what was 
happening, but military commanders could pretend ignorance. Kesselring 
could not deny knowledge; amongst the Luftwaffe documents gathered at 
Nuremberg was one entitled 'Organisation Study-1950' dated 2nd May 1938 
which dealt with the most suitable proposals for staffing when the Luftwaffe 
spread beyond German borders13. A map shows the Luftwaffe in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, and the 
need to concentrate forces in the west in order to reach all parts of English 
territory. The document undoubtedly ‘shows the lines upon which the General 
Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that time’14. Found amongst documents 
post-war was one entitled ‘Basic target maps of British ground organisation,’ 
September 15th1938, and another demanding 'tactical maps of London and 
Hull' to be produced before September-1938’15. It may just indicate war 
games, but it is probable that Kesselring was aware of Hitler's war intentions. 
 
                     Kesselring would also have been aware of the outlawing of 
aggressive war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact signed by Stresemann; the opening 
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clause read that the participants were ‘deeply sensible of their solemn duty to 
promote the welfare of mankind,’ and outlawing war as they prepared for 
battle16. He was a high ranking commander, intelligent and educated, and this 
international pact could not have passed him by without notice. 
 
              Kesselring always alleged he was unhappy about the war, and claims 
Göring was opposed to the policy. He was with Göring when he received the 
phone call saying the invasion was on, who then phoned Ribbentrop saying 
'Now you’ve got your ***** war it’s all your doing' and furiously hung up17.  
Kesselring made no comment as to the morality of the Polish invasion, for 
him it was a matter of duty under the authority of the recognised government. 
Despite post-war protestations Kesselring, like most other senior 
commanders, knew that war was inevitable: he had prepared the war-machine 
for aggression, worked on Blitzkrieg and planned the attacks: the only aspect 
over which he probably had late knowledge was the precise timing.                             
 
Strategic bombing 
  
                   British tradition claims when the Luftwaffe started 'the blitz' over 
London they inaugurated terror bombing, a traditional myth which also has its 
roots in justifying the retribution German cities suffered later in the war. 
Kesselring had been one of the authors of the regulations governing the 
Luftwaffe-Manual/16, namely only to bomb areas of military importance. The 
technology for accurate aerial bombing had yet to be developed, and although 
Kesselring had initiated scientific investigation for accuracy, he believed it 
was years away18.  
                    
                   Corum wrote that ‘the Luftwaffe did not have a policy of terror 
bombing civilians as part of its doctrine prior to World War II … Rotterdam 
was bombed for tactical military reasons in support of military operations… 
the Luftwaffe leadership specifically rejected the concept of terror bombing in 
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the interwar period, and one must look well into World War II, starting with 
the night bombing of selected British towns in 1942, to see a Luftwaffe policy 
of terror bombing in which civilian casualties are the primary desired 
result’19. It remains a ‘prevalent myth about the Luftwaffe that the Luftwaffe 
had a doctrine of terror bombing… in order to break the morale of an enemy 
nation:’ the evidence, regarding Kesselring indicate that this was not part of 
original Luftwaffe development, and terror bombing only came into being 
later in the war under the direction of Göring and Hitler, and was taken to its 
zenith by the Allies20.  In general practice 'German air strategy was linked 
closely to the ground campaign'21. 
 
                      Despite popular myth most historians accept that the Luftwaffe 
was a tactical air force designed to assist the army. Telford Taylor argued ‘the 
Luftwaffe’s fundamental limitations were not the consequence of its 
immaturity but of a deliberate decision, taken in 1937, to design it for short-
range operations in support of the army, rather than for long-range strategic 
undertakings of its own’22. Under Kesselring and Wever the Luftwaffe 
developed an extremely wide doctrine of air power. Although a tactical force 
it was able to locate and bomb Coventry at night, seeking to hit the industrial 
heartland, but it led to indiscriminate for bomb-aiming techniques remained 
primitive for many years.  
 
                  Near the end of the short Polish campaign Warsaw still held as a 
centre of resistance, and the artillery and Luftwaffe were ordered to bring it to 
a conclusion, which it did on September 27th. The bombing of military sites 
may have been Kesselring’s claim, but in reality bombing was indiscriminate. 
Ribbentrop, in his trial, claimed that Hitler did 'not want Polish civilians 
harmed,' but Hitler in his fanaticism wanted Warsaw erased, and the result 
was that '15% of Warsaw was ruined brickwork; 60,000 homes were 
destroyed'23. It has also been claimed that although the Polish resistance was 
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finished Warsaw was left unoccupied ‘only because the Germans wished to 
destroy it before claiming the ruins24. However, most historians agree there 
was still some resistance; the bombing started on 25th September, sometimes 
known as the Black Monday air-attack; Richthofen was allowed to strike 
using 1,150 airplanes: ‘eleven percent of the bombs that fell were incendiaries 
… they were dropped by thirty Ju52 transports … two men in each plane 
hurled the two-pound fire bombs out of the cargo door with ordinary potato 
shovels,’ - hardly suggestive of preparation for terror raids25. ‘Special Purpose 
Air Command flew 1,776 sorties against the city and pulverized it with 560 
tons of high-explosive bombs and 72 tons of incendiaries’26. The American 
military historian Williamson Murray somewhat understated the case by 
writing ‘in these raids the Germans were not adverse to any collateral damage 
inflicted on the civilian population’27.  
 
                     Warsaw was virtually destroyed yet Kesselring wrote that the 
war 'was conducted with chivalry and humanity as far as is possible:' aerial or 
artillery bombardment in civilian areas can never be chivalrous or humane28.  
The only reason Kesselring was not indicted in postwar tribunals was because 
the Nuremberg prosecutors decided not to pursue this line of enquiry, for fear 
of reciprocal charges. 
 
                        There was a similar issue in Rotterdam where Student called 
for air-support by bombing areas where there was resistance. Rotterdam was 
the key to Dutch defence, and on May 12th in a unique attack the Luftwaffe 
seized the Willems Bridge with twelve or so Heinkel seaplanes by landing on 
the River Lek. Two days later, on May 14th surrender negotiations started, but 
the Dutch, still with larger numbers, stalled for time. 
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                    Kesselring alleged that the bombing of a city’s defences or 
defenders was 'not against the Geneva Convention,' and that he had serious 
arguments with Göring who wanted the city flattened; the seriousness of this 
debate was confirmed by Göring’s biographers29. After the war, when 
interrogated about Rotterdam, Kesselring referred to the Bomber-Wing 
reports, pointing out that on their maps only military targets were marked; if 
red flares were seen they were to divert. The bombers had taken off closing 
down their primitive trailing radio-antenna. The smoke from the ground 
obscured any vision, and one wing went in and bombed whilst another, under 
Wing Commander Höhne saw the flares on time, and turned away30. They 
dropped high-explosive bombs; some fell on a margarine warehouse creating 
serious fires in the city. Kesselring claimed it was a justified tactical operation 
in support of ground troops. Precise figures are difficult to establish, but it is 
generally assessed that some ‘980 people were killed and some 78,000 were 
left homeless’31.  A Dutch officer, Captain Bakker, had started to negotiate a 
surrender of Rotterdam and during the ‘coming and going’ process the 
German General Schmidt, aware of the proposed aerial bombardment, ordered 
the red flares to be fired, but he was literally minutes too late32. The truth of 
the situation may never be known. The bombing so horrified the Dutch 
supreme commander, General Henri Winkelman that he surrendered that 
evening with his army intact.  
 
                    Historians are again divided as to whether the bombing of 
Rotterdam was an act of terror or tactical: ‘it was another deliberate act of 
force inspired by Göring,’ and ‘a deliberate act of terror, as Telford Taylor 
suggested, it ‘was part of the German pattern of conquest – a pattern woven 
by Hitler and the Wehrmacht’33. The postwar British Air Ministry report 
omits any reference to a terror attack, and implied a motive stating that ‘a 
particularly savage attack on the centre of the city of Rotterdam had its 
immediate effect and on May 15th the Dutch Army capitulated after five days’ 
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fighting’34. Kesselring’s point of view that the bombing was aimed at military 
targets has some support.  
 
                      The official German historical view of Rotterdam is that ‘it 
appeared to the British, who got wind of 30,000 civilian losses, - in fact there 
were just 980 - to be a terror attack, showing that the gloves were off’ it was 
no longer so regarded after the war; though opinions differed35. The British 
used the attack to justify their later retaliations: an 'RAF air-training manual 
issued in March 1944 described the attack as an unexampled atrocity with 
30,000 dead in 30 minutes'36. Overy stated that the later 'German campaign 
against Britain was based on a detailed gazetteer of industrial and military 
targets scrupulously compiled before 1939 from photo-reconnaissance 
evidence and industrial intelligence:' the plan may not have been terror 
bombing, but bomb-aiming inaccuracy meant it happened anyway37. 
 
                     The general conclusion must be reached that Kesselring, and the 
Luftwaffe made no plans for strategic bombing, but not from moral 
considerations, as the Condor Legion illustrated in Spain38. Kesselring 
frequently stated that he considered high level bombing imprecise, and saw 
the tactic as wasteful of time and money. The Luftwaffe was used primarily as 
a support for the land forces, and in this Kesselring's preparation played a 
major part, as will be explored in the next section. 
 
 Poland 
  
                  When Kesselring's Luftwaffe fought in the mobile mode that had 
been planned in the 1920s, and with machines built in the 1930s, it was 
successful. Poland fell, Western Europe fell, and Russia nearly collapsed. 
Where it did not apply was the Battle of Britain where the English Channel 
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meant the Luftwaffe faced a different foe and set of circumstances, where 
Kesselring's military intelligence was faulty, and the opposition just as 
ruthless.  
 
             'The German aggression against Poland which began on 1st September 
1939 was a model of the modern exercise of air power'39. Kesselring used the 
Luftwaffe in Blitzkrieg style, to help Bock’s forces on the ground. Kesselring 
with Luftflotte-I was responsible for the northern part of the Polish invasion, 
the Danzig area which would return East Prussia to Germany. He organised 
attacks on the Polish naval installations near Danzig, claiming that the Polish 
air force was destroyed on the first day, but it was not until the 14th September 
that the Polish air-force virtually ceased to exist. It is a myth that the Polish 
air-force was destroyed on the ground in days; the Poles had 800 aircraft of 
which 430 could be rated  as first-line operational, and they fought with their 
sturdy but out-dated PZL P-11s40.   The Polish air-force ‘put up a substantial 
resistance in the first days of the war; its pilots, as they would do in the Battle 
of Britain, not only proved themselves tenacious and brave but highly skilled 
as well’41. Kesselring never mentioned that the Luftwaffe had considerable 
trouble locating the dispersed Polish airbases, ‘and only about 24 combat 
aircraft were destroyed on the ground during the campaign’42. The belief that 
the Polish aircraft hardly had time to get airborne is as much legend as the 
infamous Polish cavalry charge against tanks. However, numbers and 
technologically advanced aircraft gave the Luftwaffe unquestionable 
superiority. There were errors and exaggerations, but the Luftwaffe succeeded 
with ease because men like Kesselring had spent the previous two decades 
preparing for this war. Military commanders like Kesselring were as guilty as 
Hitler who wanted this war.                                  
 
                     As Luftflotte-I settled into eastern air-fields, unbelievably 
Kesselring again alleged ignorance of proposed military plans in Western 
Europe. His task was extending the airbases in Northern Poland, assisted by 
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General Bieneck, Commander of Administration in the Posen Area. A 
bomber-school was established at Thorn, and aircraft-workshops were set up 
in Warsaw. Even these preparations could hardly be regarded as defensive. In 
fact observing Kesselring in Poland with all the anticipation in the west 
caused the British to wonder whether Kesselring was preparing for war 
against Russia43. 
                         
                      Kesselring's contributions, along with other senior officers, had 
shown the world how effective air-power was when deployed in blitzkrieg. It 
worked in mainland Europe to a terrifying extent, and it would take time for 
Germany’s enemies to assimilate the lessons, and for Germany to realise the 
ineffectiveness of the dive-bombers when they met fast British fighters. 
 
Western Europe 
 
                     When a Major Helmut Reinberger with the plans of the proposed 
invasion in the West crash-landed in Belgium, it led to General Felmy, the 
commander of Luftflotte-II, being replaced by Kesselring44. The loss of these 
plans had provoked Hitler’s anger against Göring. The Commander of 
Luftflotte-II, Felmy and his Chief of Staff Colonel Kammhuber, were sacked 
from their posts where they had been preparing for the invasion of Western 
Europe. Kesselring with his trusted pilot, Zellman, and his Chief of Staff, 
Speidel, flew to Munster, the battle headquarters. It was a mere quirk of fate 
that the German pilot's disaster led to a train of events, that was to place 
Kesselring in charge of a critical part of the battle for Western Europe.  
 
                        Kesselring claimed he was confident of ultimate victory; the 
German military machine had battle familiarity, and was more experienced in 
mobile warfare. Kesselring also believed, from his Great War experience, that 
the western Allies would be hesitant. He never explains why, just assuming 
that Western commanders were inept, when often it was caution for men's 
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lives. He may have detected the same hesitancy in the overly-cautious 
diplomatic handling of Hitler, and again for the same reasons, no good man 
wants war. In the battle plans Luftflotte-II had been allotted to support Army 
Group-B under Bock; they had worked efficiently together during the 
invasion of Poland. When Kesselring saw the plans, he noted the amount of 
tactical intrusion made by Hitler, who would not agree to any changes. He 
started the technique for what he was to become adept at, chipping away by 
persuasive argument until he felt the plan was more feasible45.  
 
                       Meanwhile, in France the Luftwaffe was generally feared 
because of its experience in Spain and Poland. The French General Joseph 
Vuillemin in 1938 had been given a tour of Luftwaffe airfields where Milch 
and Udet had played a hoax, showing him the very same planes as he 
travelled from airfield to airfield, giving the impression the German numbers 
were far greater than they really were46. It was this kind of preparatory 
deception that helped undermine French morale; it may have increased 
German self-assurance too much. Nevertheless, Kesselring was concerned 
about the aircraft, not least because the heavily used Ju52 was not the best 
transport plane, having no bullet-proof fuel-tanks, and the Me-109s had a 
limited fuel range. His fears were well founded; on May 10th the Luftwaffe 
lost 304 aircraft of which 157 were Ju52s.  
 
            Kesselring was again in disagreement with Göring who had promised 
Hitler that ‘his’ Luftwaffe alone could destroy the British on the Dunkirk 
beaches47. Kesselring's forces had been reduced, and repairs were necessary; 
there was personnel fatigue and his Luftflotte was reduced by up to 50%.48 His 
supply lines were stretched to the limit, and the Stukas, ideal for a Dunkirk 
attack, were exhausted, pilots and machines49. The reality was that the 
Luftwaffe was being weakened while keeping its image as a formidable 
threat. 
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                  Kesselring followed Göring’s orders and entrusted the destruction 
of the beaches to Fliegerkorps-I/IV/VIII led by Generals Grauert, Keller and 
Richthofen. They caused considerable damage, but failed to halt the 
evacuation. The Luftwaffe was hampered by bad weather, and in Kesselring’s 
words the 'modern Spitfire had appeared on the scene'.  It has been suggested 
that over Dunkirk the Luftwaffe suffered its first defeat50. Most of the forces 
were evacuated at night; a difficult time for aerial attack.  Despite what 
British soldiers thought on the beaches, the RAF was busy, and what Göring 
had promised his Führer was impossible – over 250 German aircraft were to 
be lost over Dunkirk in proving it’51. 
                           
                 Kesselring knew that in hitting French military targets that civilians 
would be killed: 'it is a matter of rueful reflection that in these high and low 
level attacks civilians intermingled with the troops were hit,' he wrote after 
the war52. One of the many criticisms of blitzkrieg was the inhumane attack 
upon civilians. There is justification in this criticism, but from 1000 feet a 
clear vision is seldom possible. James Holland relates how German soldiers 
encouraged an Italian family to flee the battle area, keeping in the centre of 
the road to avoid mines, and run for cover every time an allied aircraft 
appeared53. This was a common feature for fleeing civilians; in her diary the 
American/Italian Iris Origo describes the Allied machine-gunning of civilians 
from the air, stating that ‘it cannot easily be explained. It is difficult to believe 
that public opinion in England, if fully informed, would approve of all this’54. 
She recited many incidents; one where a woman and a child were machine-
gunned whilst on the beach55. However, a recent investigation into German 
POW conversations appeared to confirm that strafing civilians was not just 
rogue pilots but orders: 'We had orders to drop our bombs right into the 
towns. I fired at every cyclist;' a pilot of a 109, May-20-194256. There is no 
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information as to who gave the order, but this statement confirms similar 
behaviour against retreating civilians.  
 
                      The French signed the Armistice on June 22nd, and Kesselring 
thought this would end the war, that the English would sue for peace. The 
French had lost 757 aircraft in combat and the RAF 900+ including 453 
fighters.  Kesselring knew the battle had been costly; the Germans lost an 
estimated 1,279 aircraft between May 10th and June 20th including 500 
bombers and 300 fighters. In fact since the start of the fighting in Norway the 
Luftwaffe had lost 36% of its force57.  
 
                    On July 19th 1940, in the Berlin Kroll Opera House, ‘Hitler 
offered Britain peace’ and created Kesselring as a Field-Marshal along with 
eleven others58. The general feeling in Berlin was that the English would not 
pursue the war; Halder believed that Britain 'probably still needs one more 
demonstration of our military might before she gives in,' though reporting that 
Hitler 'is greatly puzzled by Britain's persisting unwillingness to make peace;' 
he would have been aware of the strong pro-peace lobby59. Halder believed 
only Sea-Lion was 'the surest way to hit England'60. 
 
Battle of Britain 
 
                      It is clear that the sudden collapse of France had surprised 
everyone, even Hitler. There were no carefully prepared plans for the invasion 
of England, and Kesselring noted that Sea-Lion may have been contemplated, 
but was never realistically considered, quoting the historian Fuller in 
support.61 'Hitler would have preferred to avoid a life-and-death struggle with 
the British Empire because his real aims lay in the East' was Manstein’s view, 
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and shared by most senior military leaders62. It has been claimed that Hitler 
stopped the panzers outside Dunkirk because he was not interested in the 
British; this is nonsense, it was Rundstedt's plan for practical reasons and only 
needed Hitler's say so63.  
                         
                Hitler had acknowledged as early as May 1939 to his Commanders-
in-Chiefs that ‘a country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air-Force’64. He 
believed a seaborne invasion was an ‘antiquated and unnecessary method of 
forcing her capitulation’ and that it was merely a simple matter of cutting 
England’s lifelines65. There is no clear information about his thinking; even 
the Directive dated August 17th 1940 gives two dates in August66. During 
these months of indecision, it was decided that the RAF had to be destroyed.  
 
                       In mid-July 1940 Kesselring received orders to prepare for the 
attack on Britain, and his pre-war planning ensured that the transfer of 
Luftwaffe units to Western Europe was efficiently expedited. He sent out 
armed reconnaissance missions against British shipping, attacked some of the 
ports, and selected to bomb some armament factories such as the Vickers 
Armstrong Aircraft works at Reading. Between July 10th and August 12th 
30,000 tons of shipping was sunk, making the English Channel highly risky, 
and 148 RAF aircraft downed for the loss of 286 German planes, of which 
105 were fighters67. Bombers, and especially dive-bombers were easy targets 
for British fighters, and it was soon evident that experienced pilots were 
critical. Kesselring understood this as he observed aircraft from his 
underground HQ at Cape Gris Nez68. When a German pilot parachuted over 
England he was lost, whereas an RAF pilot could return next morning. A 
German pilot, Steinhilper, in his biography, makes it abundantly clear that 
                                                 
62    Manstein, Lost,p.155. 
63    Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk (London: Penguin Books, 2007)p.246. 
64    Mendelssohn, Nuremberg,p.203. 
65    Ibid,p.206. 
66    Ibid, p.212, giving the dates of August 17th as well as August 27th . 
67    Macksey, Memoirs,p.77. 
68    Cape Gris Nez - advanced HQ; main HQ - Brussels. At Cap Gris Nez he was pinning a           
       Knight’s Cross on Galland when interrupted by Spitfires, Galland Adolf, The First and   
       the Last (London: Methuen, 1995)p.52/3. 
 97
many German pilots felt on a back-foot despite the myth that the Luftwaffe 
was a David and Goliath battle69.      
 
                Kesselring observed there was always chivalrous conduct, but noted 
that killing parachuting pilots would have been more effective than the 
destruction of aircraft. He noted the English were aware of this, but accused 
them of attacking air-ambulances in the Channel by order of the war cabinet70. 
Such a claim clashes with the myth of gentlemanly conduct, but boundaries 
were crossed as in this English naval account: ‘on July 1st1940, we were off 
the Tees with a southbound convoy about 6am when we sighted an unusual 
aircraft… it was a white seaplane with red crosses painted on the fuselage, 
and while we were wondering whether to open fire or not, the question was 
settled for us by a couple of Spitfires, who zoomed up from nowhere and shot 
the machine into the sea … the crew were highly indignant at being shot 
down … they explained they were an unarmed rescue plane …71’  For the 
British this was total war, and again on March 15th-1941 the Hospital Ship Po, 
at anchor in the port of Vlore was sunk by British planes72. It was two way 
process, both sides were guilty, the hospital ship Talamba was sunk off the 
Sicily coastline during operation Husky, with many numerous examples both 
sides. The notion of a total war is often ascribed to Germany, but both Britain 
and eventually America responded in kind. Kesselring has frequently been 
described as ruthless, but the British were also ruthless, and when Kesselring 
gave orders that there should be no operational flying over England during the 
Christmas period 24th – 26th December, he wrote in his memoirs that he was 
disappointed the British did not reciprocate. Kesselring had underestimated 
the British, who, Hitler once told his dinner party guests, 'are realists, devoid 
of any scruple, cold as ice'73. To Kesselring the battle was a campaign, but the 
RAF knew it was a matter of life and death.  
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                       On August 6th Göring ordered Kesselring 'to stun the island 
defences by sharp hammer blows and launch the attack with the Luftwaffe'74. 
Kesselring viewed the plan in two phases. The first from August 8th to 
September 6th was preparation for invasion by eliminating the RAF and 
attacking shipping; Kesselring insisted that terror raids were forbidden. In his 
memoirs Kesselring makes uncomfortable reading for people raised on the 
Battle of Britain. Kesselring argued that in the early battles the Luftwaffe held 
the tactical superiority and later battles resulted in a ‘draw.’ 
  
                At the beginning of September Kesselring felt confident because the 
Luftwaffe had air-control over Holland, Belgium and Northern France. Adler 
Tag, the start of the attack on August 12th, had inflicted damage to many 
fighter airfields, but the following days were hampered by weather conditions, 
and Kesselring never realised the effectiveness of British radar, and the 
excellent ground-to-air-communications in the RAF. The attack on the 
airfields could have been fatal, but there were many airfields and weak 
German intelligence could not differentiate between major and minor 
airfields. Kesselring lacked any real intelligence about the strength of the 
opposition. Ultra, radar and ‘Y’ Service intercepts of the German radio traffic 
‘gave the British an increasingly accurate picture…’ 75. On the other hand, 
with details from crashed aircraft, crew interviews, and some ‘ultra’ 
information the British ‘deduced the nature of the German blind bombing 
system, the so-called knickebein method’76. Kesselring always had the 
reputation for being astute, but his weakness was not only in his own military 
intelligence, but his optimism probably gave him the adolescent belief they 
could not lose. He also woefully underestimated the British advances in radar, 
fighter planes and many other scientific advances. When the Luftwaffe 
attacked the radar installations the damage was contained, and Kesselring 
made the mistake of leaving the radar alone; he had grossly underestimated its 
value. Perhaps the greatest intelligence errors were the 'persistent 
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underestimation of the size of Fighter Command and the capacity to reinforce 
it continuously with men and aircraft'77. There is the same sense of arrogance 
in this assumption as there was in the conceited certainly that the Enigma 
code was unbreakable. Part of the Luftwaffe’s overall failure had been poor 
intelligence about Britain: the Head of Luftwaffe Intelligence was a Colonel 
Joseph ‘Beppo’ Schmid, whom Galland in post-war interrogations described 
as ‘a complete wash-out as an intelligence officer, the most important job of 
all’78. In addition to this there had been the failure to develop a ‘coherent 
naval-air-war doctrine:’ General Felmy had proposed to Göring that the best 
way to attack Britain was to attack the ports and the shipping79. He had 
‘pointed out in 1938 how an aerial-mining campaign could be pursued to shut 
British harbours’80. Finally, as Kesselring always knew, the Luftwaffe had 
suffered serious losses in the continental campaigns, while the RAF could 
retract their fighters to safety. It is interesting to note that in an immediate 
postwar British Air Ministry study the German failure was not attributed to 
the Luftwaffe commanders, but to ‘the attitude of Hitler and Göring 
themselves, rather than any lack of foresight on the part of the German Air 
Force Staff’81. 
 
                            Kesselring needed to engage RAF fighters within range of 
his fighters in the South-East, and claimed that the attacks on London were in 
order to draw the fighters up to protect the city. In reality RAF Bomber 
Command on August 25th had made five minor raids on Berlin in eleven days 
‘doing little material damage but infuriating the Führer … who on Sept 4th 
publically announced: ‘when they declare that they will attack our cities in 
great strength, then we will erase theirs82!’ Kesselring may have preferred 
military reasons for these tactics, but it was the whim of an angry Führer. 
During early September a Luftwaffe Officer Conference had been called at 
The Hague: present were Kesselring and Sperrle of Luftflotte-III. A directive 
of August 20th had been to exhaust or destroy the British fighters by directly 
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engaging them, drawing them to the bombers. Sperrle believed the RAF had a 
thousand planes at its disposal, but Kesselring’s opinion was that the RAF 
was finished. Kesselring optimistic and with poor Intelligence made the 
wrong military judgement. Kesselring would have been startled to know that 
although the British economy was smaller than Germany, it out-produced 
Germany, and 'was ahead in aircraft from 1940 and in tanks in 1941-2'83.  
                         
                    In October Kesselring was informed that the English had been 
interfering with the radio beams which assisted the Luftwaffe to pinpoint 
targets. When questioned postwar about the attack on Coventry he pointed out 
that Coventry was similar to Essen with its armament factories; in fact they 
'levelled twelve armament factories, gutted the medieval cathedral, and killed 
380 people … Coventry was to become a symbol'84. The raid was carefully 
observed by Kesselring who flew over the operation85. The Coventry raid was 
not strategic bombing, but it was also evident that accurate bombing was too 
difficult to achieve by either side, and that area-bombing was the 
consequence. Kesselring had some justification in arguing that the first raids 
on ‘Open Cities’ were flown by the RAF.                      
 
                           In February 1941 Göring's conference at Quai d’Orsay in the 
historic Salle de l’Horloge, discussed the future war against England, but they 
knew they had lost this battle which would have ramifications for Germany’s 
war.  The battle had also been costly to both combatants: the Luftwaffe lost 
1,773 aircraft and almost 3,000 aircrew; the RAF 1,265 aircraft and 1,537 
aircrew86. 'This was never the contest of the Few against the Many. High 
attrition … could not be made good from German production'87. Although 
Kesselring tried to console himself that the battle was 'more of a draw' it was 
in effect a serious defeat for the Luftwaffe. 
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Barbarossa 
 
                          In July the OKW had been instructed to plan an attack on 
Russia. From Hitler’s viewpoint it would have been easier had England sued 
for peace avoiding a war on two fronts. On May 21st Field-Marshal Sperrle 
became air commander in the west and Kesselring moved to Posen in 
occupied Poland. 
 
                  Barbarossa was known only to the few, and Kesselring was 
complicit in keeping it from his staff until the last moment. From February 
1941 he was kept in touch by a small planning-staff led by Göring at Gatow 
Air-Academy; and he flew to Warsaw for a conference with von Kluge, the 
Commander-in-Chief. The Luftwaffe was already playing a major but little 
known role in preparation. In October 1940 a Lieutenant-Colonel Rowehl had 
been given instructions to organise ‘long-range reconnaissance formations 
capable of photographic reconnaissance of Western Russian territory from a 
great height’88. The Russians could not see such high-flying planes. This was 
advanced camera-technology which has attracted little attention in post-war 
history, and which the Americans emulated a couple of decades later with U-
2s. 
 
           Kesselring attended Hitler’s final conference on Barbarossa, held on 
June 14th 1941, during which Hitler made a speech lasting one-and-a-half 
hours. Kesselring never commented on whether he found Hitler’s views 
barbaric. The concept of launching an attack on a country with a treaty-
relationship was not discussed; the military leaders just accepted the orders. 
Nowhere in his memoirs does Kesselring reflect on the criminal nature of 
such orders, nor on the suicidal enormity of such an enterprise. In Mein 
Kampf Hitler had written on the dangers of a two-front war, yet in his 
memoirs Kesselring agrees with Hitler’s decision to invade Russia. Kesselring 
accepted Hitler’s belief that there were fundamental ideological antagonisms 
between the two countries, as if that created a legitimate case for war. After 
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Kesselring’s earlier experiences at the end of World War I, he had a hatred of 
communists; his memoirs written in the Cold War reflect this. As a dubious 
justification Kesselring indicated that on the two hundred mile German/Soviet 
front in September 1939, the Russians increased their military89.  
  
                        Stalin’s unbelievable trust in Hitler greatly assisted 
Kesselring’s Luftwaffe attack; Stalin had issued an order that ‘restricted 
flying over German territory' so that ‘the Russian bomber force (which had 
largely escaped the first Luftwaffe strike, owing to its bases being farther 
from the front) took off obediently in accordance with an already outdated 
operational plan. Over 500 were shot down’90. Kesselring had flown his FW-
189 over the projected war-zone to familiarise himself with the territory, to 
see the gathering of German forces, and in his memoirs confesses that it was 
incredulous that Stalin would not believe all his informants.  
 
                   OKW Directive No 21 made the Luftwaffe responsible for 
eliminating enemy planes, cutting communications and assisting ground-
troops. Kesselring knew he needed more flyers and flak, and he claimed that 
after a heated argument with Göring, and with the support of Göring’s Chief 
of Staff, Jeschonnek, he ‘got his way’91.  
 
                   In view of the Finnish war Kesselring believed that the Soviets 
had exposed their military weaknesses, and was confident that the Luftflotte-II 
would work efficiently with Bock’s Army Group. There was a degree of truth 
in these claims, yet, as with other German commanders, there was an 
arrogance which believed German technology and efficiency was superior, 
whilst underestimating both the potential Russian logistics, and the character 
of their soldiers.  
                     
                     Bock, in charge of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) 
frequently told his subordinates that it was a ‘good thing’ for a German 
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soldier to die for his country; ironically he was to be the only German Field-
Marshal to be killed by enemy fire92. Kesselring described Bock as a ‘kindred 
spirit,’ probably because he concurred with their aims of using war to re-
establish the power of pre-Versailles Germany. Bock controlled a formidable 
striking force made more fearful by large Stuka concentrations in Kesselring’s 
Luftflotte-II. 'This mailed fist…’ could hardly fail against an unprepared 
Russian force93. 
 
                      The Luftwaffe caught the Soviets totally by surprise, and within 
a few days destroyed 2,500 aircraft, mainly on the ground94.  Soviet fighter 
strength was virtually wiped out: it has been described as the 'Pearl Harbour 
of the air'95. The Russian air force was destroyed on the ground, in ‘the 
Western and Kiev military districts, the fighters and bombers were so neatly 
lined up on the runways … not hundreds but thousands of machines were thus 
displayed in a style best fitted to ensure their destruction’96. Some, including 
Major-General Zakharov in Odessa, ordered his aircraft to disperse. The 
figures regarding destroyed Russian aircraft vary, but it has been claimed that 
the Luftwaffe destroyed more than 5,000 Russian aircraft by October 5th 97. 
 
                           The Citadel of Brest-Litovsk resisted bravely for nine days, 
and Kesselring sent in a Stuka-Geschwader and dropped some 4000-pound 
bombs98. Remarkably this garrison fought for some considerable time against 
the odds99. Within a few days Kesselring was able to fly his FW-189 over the 
Russian zone; the Luftwaffe had total air superiority. The Russians had old 
fashioned Polikarpov 1-15s/16s which were easy targets; unlike Spitfires 
these obsolete planes could not shoot down Ju-87 dive-bombers. It also meant 
that the Soviets lost some of their best air-crews. Guderian requested that the 
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Luftwaffe bomb general artillery areas, not so much hoping for accurate 
bombing, but as a means of scaring the artillery men away from their guns 
into shelters. It was a cynical and clever use of air-power which the pragmatic 
Kesselring appreciated. 
 
                  However, poor intelligence failed to note the primitive roads in 
Russia, especially the minor roads, so the intermittent poor weather slowed 
advances. The Luftwaffe’s ground-organisation had no track-vehicles and so 
Kesselring was obliged to move his Air Command HQ to a train north of 
Brest-Litovsk, and then in July to a motor-transport command column east of 
Minsk, in order to stay in touch with his forward units. These were just some 
of the flaws already appearing in the Barbarossa plans.  
 
                       There were areas where it was possible to encircle the enemy, 
but the task was vast, the country wide. Kesselring, flying his FW-189 over 
the area saw Russian soldiers escaping between Yartsevo and Smolensk. He 
wanted to drop airborne troops, but they were too depleted from the battles in 
Holland and Crete100. Kesselring kept pace with the fast moving army/panzer 
assaults; it has been said that ‘the Luftwaffe carried the German army to the 
gates of Moscow. After that point it became overextended … now essentially 
a fire-brigade.’101 Blitzkrieg had worked in the West, but was destined for 
long-term failure in Barbarossa, because of the ‘infantry’s inability to keep up 
with the armoured spearheads over a long distance’102. Army Group North 
covered 200 miles of Soviet territory in the first five days, and then had to 
wait for a week for supplies103. The Luftwaffe proved useful in destroying 
tanks, motor vehicles and bridges. Kesselring moved his command post to 
Smolensk and used the huge freight gliders (Giganten type) to try and bring 
necessary supplies to the front.  
 
                    By August 1941 Kesselring and other commanders were 
becoming concerned at what Kesselring called the High Command’s shilly-
                                                 
100    Macksey, Kesselring,p.97. 
101    Boyne, Influence,p.221. 
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shallying, and especially when the decision was made to strike south, in order 
to cut off fuel supplies from the Caucasus104. As the German forces struck 
north towards Leningrad and south towards Kiev, Kesselring was unhappy 
that Luftflotte-II was now too diversified to help Guderian at Smolensk.  
 
                          The Luftwaffe was losing men and material. Hitler had 
demanded bombing to undermine the morale of the Russian people, but the 
raids over Moscow were dangerous, and crews were lost behind enemy lines. 
It has been suggested by his first biographer that Kesselring may have had 
moral qualms about bombing civilians: ‘I think Kesselring realised this. His 
record is pretty clean when it comes to deliberate attacks on non-combatants', 
but he never stopped105. Kesselring noted that some better Russian fighter-
planes were beginning to make appearances, and it was proving difficult for 
the Luftwaffe bombers to penetrate, allowing the Russians the opportunity to 
build planes and tanks. 
 
                    Despite the weather the Russians were fighting back. Kesselring 
found it difficult to understand how the arrival of Siberian troops was not 
caught by reconnaissance, but he also realised that the Luftwaffe were finding 
it more difficult  to assist the army, because the Russians were becoming 
invisible in the winter landscape; the Luftwaffe was also now overstretched, 
over-tired and down on equipment. It was at this point that Kesselring 
received a completely new assignment. 
 
               Kesselring and his compatriots, who had planned what is now 
dubbed blitzkrieg, and prepared the formidable Luftwaffe, were able to watch 
it work well in Poland, the Low Countries and France. The defeat, which it 
was in the Battle of Britain, sent the warning signs: against the RAF he met an 
equally ruthless foe, and Kesselring's military intelligence was extremely 
weak if not misleading. The sheer enormity of the attack on Russia was not 
only immoral but militarily insane, and men such as Kesselring showed a 
continuous lack of judgement in supporting Hitler. In doing so Kesselring's 
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reputation, along with other famous names, comes under question: Kesselring 
may have claimed to have been non-political, but it was the same right-wing 
fanaticism as that of the NSDAP that drove him forward.           
 
Did Kesselring know of the Atrocities? 
 
               At the Berghof, when the invasion of Poland was proposed, Hitler's 
speech included the extermination of inferior races. Kesselring’s Chief-of-
Staff, Speidel, spoke of the event as one of 'unmistakable dismay' and it has 
been suggested that Kesselring and many others thought the idea too 
incredulous to believe106. Despite this statement by his first biographer 
Kesselring expresses no strong opinion or remorse about the 'lesser races,' 
denying all knowledge and evading the question. Hitler's obsession with 'sub-
humans' and their treatment may well have sounded like mere rant to military 
men wanting to re-create German borders; its reality would become apparent 
in the years to come, but unquestionably if Speidel were aware of the 
proposed atrocities, so was Kesselring. 
 
                 It must be asked how aware Kesselring was of the brutality of the 
SS under Governor Frank, particularly in Warsaw. Blaskowitz had protested 
loudly at the atrocities, and Kesselring knew Blaskowitz107. Kesselring related 
how Hitler had asked for a field-kitchen meal to be served on the airfield, 
which Blaskowitz organised using table-clothes and flowers, causing Hitler to 
storm off, which, Kesselring wrote, put Blaskowitz in Hitler’s bad books. 
Kesselring must have known that Blaskowitz was incensed by the treatment 
of Poles and Jews in Warsaw and had written several memoranda, one to be 
delivered by von Barsewisch, his Luftwaffe commander, but Milch intervened 
before it was presented to Hitler. When Blaskowitz continued protesting 
against all advice he was sacked, not because of table-clothes and flowers, but 
by his protestations against the inhuman treatment of Poles and Jews.  
                                                 
106    Macksey, Kesselring,p.60. 
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                   Later in life Kesselring and many others made much of ‘fighting a 
clean war,’ but it has been cogently argued that large swathes of the 
Wehrmacht had willingly participated in the process of Gleichschaltung, that 
is the coordination of the army into the NSDAP state, and there were many 
officers and men who genuinely thought they were fighting Untermensch 
(subhuman) who would otherwise destroy Germany108. It is generally 
accepted that the Wehrmacht did behave differently in the West – ‘there is a 
clear difference from the moment they were transferred from the West to the 
East … always when they arrived they tended towards brutality,’ but 
Kesselring, during his time in Poland must have seen some of the cruelty 
perpetrated in the east, even though he were not personally involved 109.  
 
                     Kesselring, like all senior officers, pretended to ignore politics, 
and never revealed his thoughts about the NSDAP, of which he was never a 
member, but he was self-evidently at one with their views on re-establishing 
and expanding German powers. He wrote only on what concerned him most, 
namely the effectiveness of the war machine he had helped create. He had 
complained about the Russians and their lack of co-operation in sending 
weather reports, describing them as ‘strange bedfellows in a coalition war’110.  
In comparison with Blaskowitz, he was ruthless; his one interest was military. 
 
                       The moral repugnance of attacking another country is still open 
to debate; it continues to happen, but Hitler's orders relating to Jews, 
commissars and POWs is one of the most hideous events in history. From the 
start of Barbarossa it was common knowledge that Russian POWs were being 
starved to death, commissars shot and anti-Semitism had become lethal. Most 
of Hitler's military commanders like Kesselring said nothing. Hitler and 
National Socialism had no need for political commissars ‘to provide the 
troops with an ideological indoctrination; the German generals were taking 
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care of this need themselves’111. National Socialism had managed to define 
Aryan-Germans as a master-race (Herrenvolk) and those in the east as less 
than human (untermenschen); ‘it was Adolf Hitler who then fused the idea of 
an Asian peril with anti-Semitism, anti-Bolshevism, and anti-Slavic 
racism’112. Recent research has indicated that many of the generals acquiesced 
in the criminal orders, and the OKW orders which specifically mention the 
question of Jewish people113. Halder and Blaskowitiz had been aware of the 
atrocities in Poland, and when a Field-Marshal Georg von Manoschek 
protested in Poland he was removed from his post. Before Barbarossa Hitler 
had given a speech on March 30th to some 250 generals on the approaching 
war against Russia, and the generals made it clear that they stood alongside 
their Commander-in-Chief in terms of the invasion, the criminal orders 
against captives, commissars and Jews. An order issued by von Reichenau 
stated that ‘the primary aim of the campaign against the Jewish Bolshevik 
system is the complete annihilation of the means of power and the eradication 
of the Asiatic influence on European culture …the {German} soldier is not 
only a fighter in accordance with the rules of warfare114. He is also the bearer 
of merciless national ideology … that is why the soldier must fully understand 
the necessity for hard but just retaliation against Jewish sub-humanity’115. The 
military seemed at one with their political masters, and Rundstedt circulated 
the commands to all his troops. 
 
                  Kesselring was Luftwaffe, and saw himself as a professional 
commander with only technical expertise, but by being there he would have 
heard, if not seen, the consequences of Hitler’s perversions; he was complicit. 
The Luftwaffe were not above brutality, Göring himself had said ‘I … do not 
care if you say your people {the Russians} are dying of hunger. So they may, 
as long as not a single German dies of hunger’116. Richthofen, commander of 
Luftflotte-IV who, having read in Mein Kampf about Russian and Eastern 
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policies decided the troops in his area must be made fully aware of such 
orders117.  
 
              There can be no doubt that Kesselring had sufficient knowledge of 
the barbarities carried out in Germany's name, to make him realise that the 
regime for whom he worked was fundamentally evil. Yet he had helped 
prepare the military aspect of their onslaught, using his skill as a Luftwaffe 
Field-Marshal: the conclusion must be that when viewing Kesselring in this 
context, one can only see a man seeking military success, who accepted the 
fundamental evil of Hitler. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117    Ibid,p.132. 
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CHAPTER 4    
 
 
SOUTHERN COMMAND (1941-1943 (45)) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
                  This chapter and the next two will have several themes in 
common. These include the nature of Kesselring's command as 
Oberbefehlshaber-Süd, the weakness of Allied command, and the problematic 
relationship with Rommel. These themes need to be studied chronologically.  
 
                First, there must be a brief examination of the relationship between 
Italy and Germany before exploring the ambiguous and changing nature of 
Kesselring's appointment in Italy; it is often assumed that Kesselring was in 
charge, but this lacks reality. This appraisal will also include Kesselring's 
views of the Italian situation, because his misconceptions hampered his 
command, and when German Intelligence failed he was quick to blame the 
Italians. Secondly, the conflict between Kesselring and Rommel will be 
introduced, and looked at again in the next chapter when the tensions between 
the two commanders became critical in the Italian campaign. Connected to the 
Rommel question the failure to invade or destroy Malta must be explored. 
Thirdly, in terms of the North African war the thesis will explore how 
Kesselring had major supply problems, uncertainty about French attitudes, 
and experienced trouble with his own subordinates, oversaw a defeat as great 
as Stalingrad, and yet apparently started to develop a reputation as a great 
defence commander. The reason was the inexperience and ineptitude of Allied 
command, which used Kesselring as an excuse in the same way they had with 
Rommel. Also to be examined is the postwar claim that the war in Africa was 
a clean war, almost a sporting enterprise, which in reality was a myth, not 
least in the brutal treatment of Tunisian Jews. Finally, the major question 
must be asked as to Kesselring's responsibility in allowing nearly a quarter of 
million men to be captured.  
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 Backdrop to Italy  
 
            As Kesselring was questioning the wisdom of attacking Russia he 
heard from Jeschonnek that he would be sent to the Mediterranean1. 
Mussolini's bellicose actions had not been successful, and the ventures into 
Albania/Greece and North Africa needed German assistance. 
 
                  The relationship between Hitler and Mussolini had its origins in 
Hitler's admiration for Il Duce, a term both Hitler and Franco adopted. Hitler 
admired Mussolini, even becoming annoyed on a state visit when he felt 
Mussolini received 'demeaning treatment' from the royal court - 'those 
courtesans'2. Mussolini had tried to play statesman as a European peacemaker, 
and he 'did not actually enter the war until it indeed seemed won by his 
fearsome German ally'3. 'The revisionist De Felice … agreed that 'one man 
alone' had taken Italy into the war, although, in his opinion, Mussolini's 
motivation was at least in part the creditable one of suspicion of Nazi 
Germany and a desire somehow to restrict its hegemony'4. The historian 
Farrell in his work Mussolini also argued that the Italian dictator was taking 
the safest route for his country, whilst building up the defences at the Brenner 
Pass5. Despite these claims, Mussolini was bellicose, had imperial desires in 
North Africa, and was resentful towards the British. The relationship between 
Germany and Italy was not always healthy. 'Privately, Il Duce referred to 
Hitler as a sexual degenerate' but as the years passed Mussolini became more 
and more dependent upon Hitler6. Hitler, despite his admiration for Il Duce 
‘unceremoniously excluded {Mussolini} from the negotiations in the railway 
carriage at Compiègne, and Hitler rejected his claim on the French fleet even 
before it was destroyed by the British’7.  Mussolini lacked judgment, fatally 
under-estimating Greek resistance, and also the USA, informing his own 
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Foreign Office 'that America has no military importance'8. By 1941 Hitler 
considered it essential to stabilize Italy; the main concern was that in the 
Mediterranean the British were fighting back, the Africa Korps had supply 
problems, and Rommel was continuously complaining about the Italian 
military at every level. Hitler looked to Kesselring as a problem solver; he 
was known to have diplomatic skills, was considered loyal to Hitler, he was a 
linguist, and having honeymooned in Italy had some experience of the 
country.      
 
The Appointment9 
 
                        Kesselring’s arrival had been prepared by General von 
Waldan, of the Luftwaffe General-Staff, who had been the air-attaché in 
Rome. Kesselring received his briefing from Göring and Jeschonnek, and the 
title of Oberbefehlshaber-Süd – Commander-in-Chief-South. Kesselring 
understood he was to be in charge of all matters military in Italy, but subject 
to the 'complex Italian command and the OKW and Hitler'10.   It was a strange 
appointment in so far that Hitler wanted to impose his military authority 
through Kesselring, but the Italians were bemused, viewing Kesselring as a 
senior liaison officer who would, within a short space of time, be known by 
the Allies under the code name of 'the Emperor.11.                
 
                        Kesselring's new position was difficult to define because there 
were many complex factors within the Italian situation. In his memoirs he 
admitted that although Hitler saw him as in charge, for diplomatic reasons, he 
subjugated himself to Italian command under Mussolini and his fascist 
council, but there were also the political factors of the monarchy, the army, 
and even the Vatican to be considered, and a high ranking German was not 
necessarily welcome. Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law, was always suspicious of 
Kesselring and German motives, and later wrote, as relationships between 
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Rommel and the Italians deteriorated, that 'Cavallero found himself between 
Rommel and Kesselring like Christ between the two thieves'12.     
                      
                     Cavallero, the Italian Chief-of-Staff, was not prepared for 
Kesselring to take command of naval and air-forces, only placing some of the 
air-force at Kesselring’s disposal. Hitler had anticipated that Kesselring 
should have the whole command, but Kesselring recognised that tact was 
essential, and in his words 'ignored Hitler’s orders' by respecting Italian 
demands, making himself 'only subordinate to the King and the Duce'13. It has 
been said that he moved into 'a political balancing act, the precarious 
diplomatic course which was to govern his every subsequent move'14. 
Kesselring not only had Mussolini and the King as superiors, but was also 
responsible to the OKW and Hitler. The relationship between Kesselring and 
the Italians remained cordial for a time, but the Italians successfully kept him 
in the dark about many things, and especially the planned downfall of 
Mussolini, and surrendering in September 1943: then the diplomatic and 
charming side of Kesselring was replaced by the ruthless streak which would 
one day bring him before a British Military Court. 
 
                    The title Oberbefehlshaber-Süd was almost misleading: it was 
'not until the beginning of 1943 that he became chief of the German Army 
formations in Africa and Italy'15. Throughout the African campaign 
Kesselring was obliged to spend considerable time on diplomacy, but as the 
Allies grew in strength and the Italians weakened, Kesselring's power 
increased exponentially. This theme will be further explored in the next 
chapter. Eventually, Kesselring became the only General to control all three 
services in a joint command, with the exception of the Afrika Corps. When 
supply-lines became a serious problem, Kesselring even considered arresting 
Vice-Admiral Weichold because the navy refused, with Grand Admiral 
Raëder’s support, to allow Kesselring to control the sea-lanes directly. Much 
later, with the arrival of the SS, it was obvious that Kesselring was never truly 
                                                 
12     Muggeridge Malcolm (Ed), Ciano’s Diary (London: Heinemann, 1947)p.490. 
13     Kesselring, Memoirs,p.104. 
14     Macksey, Kesselring,p.107. 
15     Westphal, German,p.122. 
 114
Oberbefehlshaber-Süd, and his insistence and pretence that he was caused 
him problems in all aspects of his postwar trial. As far as Hitler and 
Kesselring were concerned he was Oberbefehlshaber-Süd, and the British and 
Americans also viewed him as having this full authority. In reality 
Kesselring's position, senior as it was, remained ambiguous to the bitter end, 
and will be examined further, but he never had the type of total authority that 
his Allied code name, Emperor implied16. 
 
Kesselring's views of the Italian situation 
 
                     Kesselring believed the Italians lacked any sense of urgency, and 
his observation was based on the Italian military and the apparent peaceful 
lifestyle compared to Germany. The White Russian aristocrat Marie 
Vassiltchikov, wrote of 'the sense of normality and the abundance in Rome 
compared to Germany'17. What irritated Kesselring was Mussolini's failure to 
inspire what Kesselring called a 'warlike manner:' later the Italian partisan 
showed this fighting spirit lacking in Mussolini’s time18. 
 
                     Italian soldiery attracted tasteless humour; the photographer 
Robert Capa, wrote about the Sicilian invasion it 'turned out to be a twenty-
one day race and in the lead was the Italian Army. They were afraid not only 
of the Americans, but of the Germans too, and ran in every direction'19. In 
North Africa they had surrendered in thousands, and Capa was reflecting the 
unfair humour then and now, and again, when Sicily was invaded 'one 
observer remarked that the Italian coastal troops 'stampeded to the safety of 
our prisoner of war cages on the beach in such terrific disorder that our troops 
faced greater danger from being trampled upon than from bullets'20. No one 
with any humanity could claim that Italians are any different from other 
nations; in North Africa it is a myth that they did not fight well, 'such a point 
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of view is completely incorrect'21. When they were unwilling to fight it often 
arose from varying factors such as not supporting the war in the first place, 
unsuitable equipment, poor leadership and frequently poor training. 
Kesselring has sometimes been given too much credit; in a relatively recent 
American military research paper, at the Quantico Command and Staff 
College, which studied the Italian military potential, the author relied upon 
Kesselring's personal observations. It reached the conclusion that Italy is a 
place of varying cultures, differing regions, which meant that a military force 
lacked cohesion and real identity, the 'Italians themselves admit that the 
Italian victory in the 1986 Soccer World Cup promoted greater national pride 
than any other event in recent history'22. This conclusion is cynical, but as 
Keith Lowe noted in his book on postwar Europe 'national rivalries still come 
to life occasionally for the duration of a football match'23. Equally cynical was 
Kesselring's belief that the southern temperament was not belligerent, 
pointing out that the only protection for some cities was medieval cannon; he 
believed the Italians did not make ‘natural soldiers,’ observing that in the 
changing of the guard they appeared to have no enthusiasm for their 
profession.24  
 
                 Kesselring's views of the Italian were typical of his background in 
which professional militarism was given undue priority. Unlike Rommel he 
was more able to conceal his contempt, but both of them only observed the 
situation militarily, and misunderstood the Italian people. His subordinate, the 
more perceptive Senger, was probably closer to the truth when he wrote that 
'the Italian is by nature more critical and therefore politically more mature 
than the Germans,' and they had realised they were in a hopeless situation25.     
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Military Situation & Intelligence Failure 
 
                 The British attacked the Italian fleet at Taranto making it 
inoperative, and later sank three Italian cruisers and two destroyers off Cape 
Matapan. The rest of the Italian fleet stayed in port for the duration, and was 
criticised for this by Kesselring and many others; it was an unfair criticism 
because there was a shortage of fuel, and hypocritical because the German 
navy tried to keep its larger surface vessels safe from attack. As 
Oberbefehlshaber-Süd Kesselring had the task of supplying the Axis troops in 
Africa, complicated by the problem that 'German and Italian equipment was 
invariably different and rarely interchangeable'26.  
                        
                  Kesselring frequently spoke of 'total war', but he was now realising 
that Germany and Italy were not geared up for such an enterprise27. The USA 
would soon show an industrial commitment to total war, and Kesselring found 
himself running short of essential supplies and of the means of delivery. 
Kesselring felt his hands were tied, there were too few ships for the supply 
lines, Malta was active as a naval and airbase and the OKW had forbidden the 
use of Tunis and Bizerta because of French sensitivity. In order to send 
Rommel supplies Kesselring was using destroyers, submarines and air-
transport formations which were hardly designed for logistical support.  
 
                   This shortage of military supplies and transport was one of 
Kesselring's major problems, and he was also aware that the British appeared 
to know about the supply-line timetables. In his memoirs he suspected that 
there were leaks in Italian Intelligence, and he may well have been correct 
since a recent history of MI6 shows the British Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS) was active in Italy, and their co-operation with the Italian Servizio 
Informazione Militaire (SIM) may have started early in the war28. The British 
spy network was excellent, but Kesselring never knew the Enigma code had 
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been deciphered. Ultra ‘revealed to the Allies more about what the other side 
was doing and planning than had been vouchsafed to any previous combatants 
in history’29.  Throughout the war this was a hindrance he would never know 
about, since the secrets of Enigma/Ultra were not revealed in his lifetime. 
Brooke frequently referred to intercepts to or from Kesselring. On November 
26th1942 Brooke knew that Kesselring had 'insufficient forces to hold both 
Tunis and Bizerta', and then later he was able to read the whole of 
Kesselring’s outlook on the situation in Italy; on June 28th1944 Brooke was 
able to read about Hitler’s instructions to hold northern Italy, and realised that 
Kesselring’s military capacity was being held hostage by political 
interference30. Kesselring, like the vast majority of the German commanders 
was obliged to accept Hitler's whim. The revelations by Enigma/Ultra would 
bedevil Kesselring throughout his professional life. In the spring of 1943 a 
'whole air-transport wing of Ju-52s and six-engine Giants' were caught by 
British fighters and totally destroyed, and once again 'Ultra had revealed 
where they would be flying'31. The failure to discern Enigma may have been 
breached was arrogant and a major disadvantage, making Kesselring 
suspicious of others and most especially the Italians. Kesselring later 
condemned the Italian Admiral Maugeri for passing secrets to the Allies, and 
being responsible for the loss of lives. Maugeri later wrote that 'the British 
Admiralty had many friends among our high-ranking admirals' leading 
Westphal also to suspect that this was the source of betrayal32. Spying was a 
two-way process: intercepted messages revealed that spies in Lisbon were 
informing Berlin of the difference 'of opinion between English and American 
staffs, chiefly in regard to fixing the boundaries to future spheres of 
influence,' but this knowledge was of little advantage compared to the Ultra 
revelations33. As in the Battle of Britain, it appears that Kesselring paid too 
little heed to the security of his military intelligence, and found it difficult to 
gain accurate information about the enemy. His failure in this area, both in the 
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Luftwaffe and in Southern Command leaves a question mark over his 
supposed renown as a great commander.  
                   
Rommel 
 
                 The tensions between Rommel and Kesselring started in North 
Africa and continued in the Italian campaign which will be examined later. 
The attitude of friend and foe towards military commanders remains an 
interesting phenomenon: Rommel has always been painted in bright colours 
and Kesselring to a lesser degree, but both were frequently held in esteem by 
their enemy. 
 
                     Rommel was almost popular, even admired by the enemy.34 The 
Countess of Ranfurly wrote of Rommel that, 'in spite of being our enemy, 
gained our admiration and respect, almost our affection'35. In Germany he was 
Göbbels' great propaganda figure, and much admired. He was a leader of 
fighting men, but 'less was known about his neglect of logistics, a critical 
factor in North Africa,' for which Kesselring often took the blame36. When 
Kesselring was appointed he was needed by Cavallero to smooth the 
differences between German and Italian commanders in the African command 
structure. Rommel was subordinate to both Cavallero and Bastico, but 
‘showed little regard for the Italian generals’37. According to Kesselring he 
'had to act as intermediary between the Commando Supremo and Rommel'38.  
There had been times when 'Rommel was incensed by the performance of 
most Italian Divisions,' and this one time ardent supporter of Hitler became 
equally critical of the top leadership, even of Göring when he claimed 
Americans 'can only make razorblades'39. 
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                     Kesselring first met Rommel when he was an instructor at the 
Dresden Infantry School, and they met again during the Polish campaign. 
Ironically they were both sons of schoolmasters; Kesselring respected for 
apparent modesty and Rommel for excessive confidence. The relationship 
between Kesselring and Rommel occasionally deteriorated, not least when the 
Afrika Corps failed to get necessary supplies, and on one occasion when the 
Luftwaffe attacked German ground troops. Kesselring believed Rommel’s 
independence was potentially dangerous, what he called 'fatal insubordination' 
which could lead to disharmony40. It was in North Africa that their problems 
emerged. Their relationship was complex and sometimes strained, but they 
were not always at loggerheads: when Hitler ordered them to stand and fight, 
when retreat from El Alamein was the only sensible move, 'Rommel was 
shaken and bewildered by the insanity of the command,' but 'assured by 
Kesselring's support Rommel ordered a general retreat' which, as Westphal 
pointed out, avoided the total destruction of the German army41. 
                    
                Some of Rommel's staff 'suspected Kesselring of double-crossing 
him, of continually reporting against him and the Afrika Korps to Göring, 
while assuring the Army Command that all was going well in North Africa;' 
Ciano referred 'to Kesselring running to Berlin to complain of Rommel'42. 
Kesselring was far too optimistic, and was criticised by those who admired 
him for his 'over-optimism,' Rommel was more of a realist. Rommel 
frequently resented Kesselring's support of the Italian command: on the 
13thDecember 1941 having resolved a disagreement with Cavallero, Rommel 
discovered the Italian had returned with Bastico as well as Kesselring who 
'backed him up strongly'43. This disagreement between Cavallero and Rommel 
was over whether to retreat or press forward, and Rommel was determined to 
have his way, writing that 'finally, after Kesselring had made some attempt to 
back him {Cavallero} up, he went off growling'44. 
 
                                                 
40    Kesselring, Memoirs,p.141. 
41    Beevor, Second,p.378. 
42    Young Desmond, Rommel (London: Book Club Associates, 1973)p.168. 
43    Liddell-Hart BH (Ed), The Rommel Papers (New York: De Capo Press, 1953)p.175. 
44    Ibid,p.182. 
 120
                     These types of problems flared up during their time together, 
Kesselring finding Rommel too pig-headed, and Rommel being critical about 
Kesselring's putting too much trust in the Italians, being over optimistic about 
their military potential, and his failure to provide air-cover and bring 
necessary supplies. On Rommel's death Kesselring wrote to Rommel's wife 
'there were times when I did not always agree with him, just as he did not 
always understand me …but I was glad when he was appointed to an 
important command in the West, because I knew his experience of fighting 
against the British and Americans would be of the greatest value'45. The 
relationship between Kesselring and Rommel is difficult to ascertain with 
accuracy, there was certainly mutual respect; there was probably a touch of 
egotistical and professional jealousy. Their apparent differences regarding the 
Italian contribution was Rommel's passionate and sometimes irrational desire 
to push on, and Kesselring's constant concern about logistical supplies. It was 
also to do with their personalities, but the history of major clashes between 
the two became more serious in the Italian campaign. 
 
 Malta 
 
                     Hitler had sent Kesselring to Italy to stabilize the military 
situation, but was irritated by Kesselring's insistence on invading Malta. 
Hitler's main concern was Russia and he expected Rommel to win the war 
while Kesselring smoothed the way. North Africa for Hitler was almost 
inconsequential, the British often referring to the conflict as the 'cauldron' 
while the Germans 'called it the sausage pot'46. 
 
                  The year 1941 was a critical time for supplies to Africa; in August 
some '35% of supplies and reinforcements were sunk and 63% in October' 
which caused serious concern47. Malta was like a port in the middle of the sea, 
or put more succinctly by Rommel's adjutant, 'Malta probably has to be 
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occupied first, as we cannot leave the English on our flank'48. Throughout 
January Kesselring continued an intensive air attack on Malta, but he later 
wrote that the island needed to be captured. Kesselring's failure to invade 
Malta would prove to be a decisive factor in the Mediterranean, and Rommel 
became one of his scapegoats, Kesselring complaining in his postwar 
interrogation that Rommel kept changing his mind about Malta49.  
 
                    It was a matter of timing: in the Rommel Papers it is clear that 
Rommel believed 'Malta should have been taken instead of Crete'50. Later 
Rommel was to write 'it had actually been intended that Malta should be taken 
by Italo-German parachute and airborne forces … but for some unaccountable 
reason our High Command abandoned this scheme. My request to have this 
pleasant task entrusted to my own army had unfortunately been refused the 
previous spring'51. Given that these lines come from Rommel's papers written 
during the war, and Kesselring's version postwar it seems that Kesselring may 
have been shifting some of the perceived blame cast in his direction during 
and after the war. 
                     
                        Kesselring knew that North Africa stood or fell on the question 
of supplies, so he flew to Germany in February to persuade Göring, Mussolini 
and Hitler of the strategic importance of Malta. The meeting became heated 
and Kesselring alleged Hitler grasped him by the arm and said 'keep your shirt 
on Field-Marshal Kesselring; I’m going to do it'52.   
 
              The OKW eventually agreed March would be ideal for the Italian 
invasion of Malta, to be known as Operation Hercules. Frustratingly 
Kesselring discovered that Cavallero was ‘getting cold feet,’ and proposing 
August. In mid-March Kesselring increased pressure on Malta with 
destructive air attacks, destroying new Spitfires and Hurricanes on the ground 
as they arrived, and stopping supply ships arriving safely. Rommel demanded 
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that Malta should be taken before he attacked Tobruk. Eventually on 29th 
April at Obersalzberg, Hitler and Mussolini with Kesselring and Cavallero 
gave permission, but when Kesselring asked for a start date of May 31st 
Mussolini and Cavallero still clung to August.  
 
                       Because of this Italian reticence, operation Theseus, the attack 
on Tobruk, took precedence on June 18th and Malta was reset for July 18th. 
Kesselring organised a number of aircraft to assist in the Tobruk operation 
diminishing the number available for attacking Malta. The British made a 
remarkable recovery in Malta, flying in new Spitfires while their ground 
control ensured their safety on the ground. Kesselring was mistaken in 
thinking that Malta had virtually been destroyed53. The problem with Malta 
was that it was a natural fortress with miles of underground tunnels, stores 
and barracks, Malta 'had a hard outer shell … a rhinoceros-like hide' which 
was difficult to crack54. 
 
               Kesselring’s plans for Malta may well have succeeded55. Student’s 
airborne troops were to seize the southern heights while the airfields were 
bombed; then naval forces and landing parties were to attack in the harbour 
during which there would be a diversionary attack by sea against the Bay of 
Marsa Scirocco. Had it succeeded then the North African situation may well 
have changed; German and Italian supplies would have been much more 
reliable. 
                                    
                        Kesselring believed the failure to invade Malta earlier was a 
serious blunder by the OKW; he also blamed the Italians56. After the war, 
during interrogation, Kesselring also blamed Rommel's desire to advance after 
the capture of Tobruk; Rommel had 'wanted the Luftwaffe support so he 
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could destroy the 8thArmy before it recovered, and he had Hitler's support'57. 
Kesselring also blamed Jodl and Keitel and finally Mussolini for failing to 
take Malta and 'leading to the loss of the Italian colonies and of the German 
and Italian armies'58. There were many factors in the decision not to invade 
Malta, not least Hitler's fear of a Crete repetition where victory was 
expensive, but Kesselring, as Oberbefehlshaber-Süd should probably have 
pushed harder, and the failure to invade or destroy Malta caused the German 
defeat. General Montgomery was to write later that 'The battle of El Alamein 
could not have taken place if Malta had fallen'59. 
 
North Africa - Supply Problems 
 
                Kesselring became personally involved in the ground battle when 
General Crüwell’s pilot mistakenly landed amongst British troops. For 
Crüwell it was the end of his war: Kesselring had just sent him 'birthday 
greetings'60. Kesselring took over Crüwell’s ground-command for a time, and 
was able to observe Rommel’s leadership in the desert. Kesselring would 
overfly the battle areas, and frequently guide the bombers to the target: 
whether it was appropriate for the senior commander to expose himself to so 
much risk is questionable. For example, it was not long after Crüwell’s 
capture that Kesselring landed his Storch at Italian Headquarters, and was 
fired on by machine guns.  
 
                         Tobruk capitulated and its stores were soon in German hands. 
Rommel was created a generalfeldmarschall for which Kesselring 
congratulated him, but believed an important decoration would have been 
more appropriate, because the Italians were unhappy at this promotion.  On 
June 26th Kesselring, Rommel, Cavallero and Bastico held a meeting at 
Gambut; Kesselring argued about the dangers of stretching supply lines too 
far, and had the backing of Halder in Berlin who thought Rommel had gone 
‘stark mad’ … {and} he was sharply critical of Rommel’s pathological 
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ambition’61.  Kesselring at this stage of the campaign referred to himself as a 
glorified quartermaster, but without total control: there were about '91,000 
German soldiers vis-à-vis about 146,000 Italian soldiers' using different 
equipment making their supply complicated62. In reality Kesselring was the 
superior commander, but he was correct in the cynical self-application of his 
title as quartermaster; Rommel was in the driving seat, and Kesselring had to 
supply the fuel, ammunition, replacements. Kesselring had promised fuel 
supplies which never arrived, and remarked he should not be saddled with the 
sinking of the tanker at Tobruk, which carried seven thousand tons of petrol 
and was a 'severe blow'63.  Hastings wrote that 'vanity and ambition often 
caused the Desert Fox to overreach himself' which Kesselring would have 
agreed with, but Kesselring's experience and seniority should have cautioned 
him against promising so much64. It has been suggested that the fault was 
Rommel's, because of his impulsive nature, namely it 'was Rommel's own 
land logistics arrangements that let him down'65.  In reality it was a German 
command fault, Hitler pressing for too much, Rommel over-stretching himself 
and Kesselring promising impossible supplies. 
 
                  Kesselring and Halder had been right about stretched supply lines, 
but Hitler wanted results, and backed by the enthusiastic Mussolini the Axis 
fought against desperate odds at El Alamein. The Luftwaffe, few in number, 
lacked fuel and the RAF controlled the skies; less than 20% of supplies were 
getting through. Rommel complained to Kesselring that 'air reconnaissance 
has been completely inadequate' which caused reverberations66. Later 
Rommel complained bitterly that 'we urgently need fighters'67. The German 
supplies were inadequate, and British strength was superior. Rommel, falling 
ill, asked to be relieved; in postwar interviews Kesselring believed Rommel 
had a 'nervous breakdown,' but there is little evidence for this68. Exhaustion is 
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not the same as a nervous breakdown, and by March 9th when Rommel left 
North Africa for the last time, it was clear he 'was suffering from jaundice'69. 
 
                       In is curious to note that postwar British analysis was kinder to 
Kesselring than his colleagues: 'the British also knew that Kesselring had 
responded to Rommel’s request for fuel with alacrity and sent five ships with 
fuel under foggy conditions therefore anticipating its safe arrival'70. Ultra 
picked it up and Kesselring’s old English acquaintance Winterbotham, 
phoned Churchill for permission to find and sink these vessels immediately 
without first pretending to spot them with aircraft. Rommel actually suspected 
Enigma at this stage, but 'Winterbotham sent messages thanking Italian 
informants that he knew would be picked up by German interception'71. There 
is little wonder that Kesselring and other German commanders hardly trusted 
Italian security.  The British noted the criticism of interrogated German 
POWs that Kesselring was accused of ‘criminal optimism,’ and his failure to 
provide supplies he was blamed for the defeat. However, the British noted 
that 'Kesselring’s efforts were energetic and continuous, and the blame must 
be shifted to the British naval and air efforts. The postwar British Air Ministry 
review concluded that Kesselring was the innocent, stating the blame 'can 
hardly be laid at his door, but were rather the result of the short-sighted policy 
of Hitler and the Supreme Command'72. This was a kinder review than later 
history has given.  
 
Torch and understanding France 
 
                    A landing by the enemy was suspected. Kesselring requested 
reinforcements for the air-force bases in Sicily and Sardinia, and demanded 
that submarines be despatched to observe and challenge, and asked the OKW 
for one division in Sicily which he could move to the endangered areas; the 
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latter was not approved.   The watching U-Boats detected an empty convoy 
SL125 and attacked, thereby missing the main invasion fleet73.   
 
                   Westphal wrote that the OKW found it impossible to conceive of 
an African landing, and Göring 'even went so far as forbidding Kesselring to 
let the Luftwaffe make any preparation for a North African landing'74. 
Kesselring and his Chief-of Staff were more accurate than Göring, but never 
dared criticise their superiors, indicative of a command weakness.  
 
                       The day before the invasion Göring assured Kesselring the 
invasion would be Southern France, but radio-messages from submarines 
indicated that the invasion convoys were heading south-east. Meanwhile 
Rommel was in full flight, poor supply-lines were a major issue, and until the 
Axis powers knew where Vichy France stood, the use of French ports was not 
permitted. Kesselring checked the Italian defences, and found them so 
appalling that he rushed in German construction staff to remedy the 
problem75.                       
 
                  It was claimed that Kesselring suggested to Dönitz they invade 
Spain and take Gibraltar to avoid a North African landing, and although 
Dönitz was convinced, Hitler was not76. Kesselring, watching the British 
8thArmy move westwards, considered it might be on the West African coast. 
He believed the Luftwaffe threat precluded Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica, and 
that the invasion force was too small for the south of France. 
 
                   The methodical Montgomery was ‘gently’ pursuing Rommel west 
and Kesselring, correctly, feared that an invasion west of Tunisia could 
squeeze the Germans out of Africa77. Montgomery’s leadership on this 
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laborious pursuit has been criticised by General Bradley who believed that 
Liddell-Hart’s criticism of Montgomery characterised every battle he fought, 
and ‘his failure to annihilate Rommel when the opportunity was there … set 
the stage for very difficult times ahead in Africa for Ike and the Allies’78. 
Kesselring was faced by superior industrial might, and hampered by inter-
personnel problems within his own forces, and disharmony between Italians 
and Germans. The 'Torch landings had provoked Hitler into reinforcing 
Tunisia and occupying South France' which diverted numerous troops and 
Luftwaffe, in fact 'Göring's formations had lost 40% of their entire strength in 
the Mediterranean'79. Hitler had no intention of allowing the Allies a base for 
invasion of Southern Europe. 
 
                  Kesselring wrote he was concerned about French reactions: this 
was natural since Vichy France remained lost in its own world of 
conspiratorial conflicts: Pétain was just a figurehead, Laval was the power 
and 'always confident of his ability to manipulate others'80. It was anticipated 
that Pétain would direct the French to resist the allied invasion, but 'there were 
now three claimants to French sovereignty: the Vichy regime in France; 
Darlan in North Africa; de Gaulle in London'81. Roosevelt detested de Gaulle; 
'Murphy believed Giraud would serve allied interests best' and Darlan who 
just happened to be visiting a sick son in North Africa, took the initiative82. 
Eisenhower was criticised for being too involved in the politics, but 
Kesselring was also just as lost. The pro-German Laval had 'allowed the Axis 
to use the French airfields in Tunisia', but Hitler also occupied the free zone 
of France83.   
 
                   Hitler was inclined to trust that the French would fight with the 
Germans. Laval, pro-German and Prime Minister of the Vichy government 
agreed to the German demand that French airports in Tunisia should be 
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opened to the Luftwaffe. Pétain informed Roosevelt that the French would 
always defend their empire if attacked, although in a secret telegram he 
allowed French Admiral François Darlan to negotiate with the allies if 
necessary. Kesselring was at first hopeful of French assistance, and the Allied 
'calculations about French cooperation were ill-judged. Over 1,000 US 
soldiers died from French fire on the beaches near Casablanca'84. 
 
                                       The reaction of the French remained a mystery to both the 
Germans and the Allies, and when on November 9th Patton’s troops attacked 
Port Lyauty they met unexpected fierce French resistance. The next day, 
Darlan read an order over the radio informing all French troops in Algeria and 
Morocco not to resist the allies. In the early stages Kesselring acknowledged 
that German and French troops were co-operating, and in his memoirs for 
some reason blamed the unexpected arrival of an Italian air squadron as the 
cause of the break down between the French and the Germans. This was just a 
local situation: the real issue was political and fought out in a series of 
mysterious negotiations between the Allies and the French; the turning of the 
Colonial French 'put an end to the senior Fascist experiment; it deprived the 
Reich of it most important ally'85. Kesselring and Hitler may have understood 
Vichy France, but they misunderstood the French as much as they 
misunderstood the Italians. 
 
Defence in Africa 
 
                          Kesselring established a viable bridgehead as Italian troops from 
Libya joined with German troops, and took over the old French defensive 
position called the Mareth Line, built to protect the eastern border, and then 
occupied Tunisia86. (See maps, pages 10-11) Kesselring stabilised the military 
situation, and Tunisia operated as a port supplying the Axis forces with tanks 
and guns despite the aerial onslaught launched from Malta. Rommel had been 
able to ‘extricate a substantial part of his forces, the Eighth Army had taken 
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30,000 Axis prisoners and destroyed large quantities of weapons and 
equipment’87.  By November 16th Axis forces had occupied nearly all of 
Tunisia; German paratroopers had tried to capture the airfield at Souk-el-
Arba, but had been met by Allied paratroopers dropped virtually at the same 
time, not so much a coincidence, but the use of Ultra.  
 
                                   Rommel had reached El Agheila with just thirty-five tanks and 
the remnants of two divisions, with Montgomery only 60 miles away88. The 
winter weather slowed down the British troops, but Kesselring's problems 
were mounting. Rommel and Bastico were in open feud, and Cavallero failed 
to arbitrate. On Hitler’s instructions Göring had arrived in Rome for a 
conference with Kesselring and Rommel. Göring instructed that Rommel 
delay his retreat in order to hold onto the Tripoli airfields as long as possible; 
he gave further instructions to the Italians, and took a tourist tour of Naples 
and Sicily. Göring was more interested in attending parties and searching for 
art treasures, and Rommel claimed that he ‘was disgusted with Göring, who 
was quite mad, and Hitler was not much better’89. Alan Brooke was aware of 
'Kesselring’s difficulties' because of the German code was being read90.  The 
German command was not as efficient as some believe; it was a matter of 'too 
many cooks.' 
 
                              On January 22nd the Axis forces evacuated Tripoli, and a week 
later the German troops established themselves at the Mareth Line. Kesselring 
could not stop the inevitability of the Allied advance, but he reported that on 
January 25th they took 4,000 prisoners; however, shortage of supplies and fuel 
was weakening the Axis forces.  
 
                                The Mareth Line was only a series of block houses near the coast 
beside a mountainous area, and in that terrain the enemy could not conceal 
outflanking manoeuvres. Kesselring had demanded time and time again 'that 
the enemy be held up as long as possible in the area before Mareth, since 
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otherwise reception of Panzer-Army-Rommel will be exceptionally difficult;' 
which Kesselring must have known would be true anyway91. 
 
The Opposition 
 
                                By mid-February the scene was being set for the dénouement. 
The two Allied armies were still apart, but Kesselring observed the capability 
of the four-engine bombers attacking the port from a ceiling of 30,000 feet, 
and his inability to counter such attacks. Also frustrating were the continuous 
problems with subordinates Arnim and Rommel; Kesselring described them 
as 'pigheaded'92. These strained relationships were known by the Allies; when 
Rommel arrived in Berlin the London Times speculated that Rommel could 
be suffering some tropical illness, or he was on bad terms with Kesselring, or 
because of his failures, which the writer considered the least likely93. 
 
                              Rommel and Arnim had their own plans and Kesselring accepted 
neither: he produced a master plan, which some military commentators see as 
excellent and others as a disaster. It did, however, result in a disaster for the 
Allies, especially the untried Americans at Kasserine, where they suffered a 
considerable loss of men, equipment and pride. The historian Carlo D'Este 
noted, 'Kesselring exercised command through two independent-minded 
subordinates, von Arnim and Rommel,' with Kesselring being 'an outwardly 
amiable bear of a man {whose} sunny disposition marked an iron will'94. 
Despite his amiable bearing this 'triangular argument' betrayed a command 
structure that created problems for Kesselring95. 
 
                                  Kesselring was astonished at Montgomery's slow pursuit of 
Rommel after El Alamein, a point made by many military historians: 'that the 
remnants of the Panzerarmee got away at all was due to Montgomery's slow 
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reactions and excessive caution'96. Montgomery's record was tarnished by his 
failure to destroy Rommel by the 'sluggishness of his subsequent pursuit'97. 
The western advance may have been slow, but 'the Allied advance east toward 
Tunis was ill organised and almost unplanned'98. Many historians have been 
critical about Allied leadership, noting that the British 'had numerical 
superiority of men and armour, but this advantage was nullified by weakness 
of command, tactics and equipment … the institutional weakness of the 
British Army produced commanders at every level who lacked energy, 
imagination and flexibility: most units deployed in the desert were poorly led 
and trained'99. 
                              
                         Kesselring suspected that the American troops were inexperienced. 
Eisenhower admitted his troops were unprepared, even finding engineers 
ordered to dig into rock to give cover for senior officers; ‘it was the only time, 
during the war, that I saw a divisional or higher headquarters so concerned 
over its own safety that it dug itself underground shelters.’100 The blame for 
the Kasserine Pass 'must be shared by Anderson, Eisenhower and Fredendall' 
and led to the humiliating spectacle of some 4,000 Allied POWs being 
marched through Rome101. Eisenhower, amongst the reasons he listed for 
failure, noted ‘greenness, particularly among commanders,’ as well as the 
failure to comprehend the capability of the enemy102. It has to be 
acknowledged that 'Fredendall was a disastrous commander'103. 
 
                                   As with Kesselring the Allies had their tensions in leadership. 
Bradley saw Rommel's retreat towards Tunisia as slow because he faced 
'Monty's ponderously oncoming Eighth Army,' and Alan Brooke had noted in 
his diary that 'unfortunately 'Ike' had neither the tactical nor strategical 
experience required for the war in Africa'104.  Bradley confessed 'it was 
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probably the worst performance of U.S. Army troops in their whole proud 
history,' and Harmon accused Fredendall to Patton of being a 'physical and 
moral coward'105. These leadership tensions amongst the Allies were to 
become a constant feature, and their weak planning and leadership, meant that 
victory had required 'five months more fighting than the Anglo-American 
high command has first anticipated,' and it allowed Kesselring's reputation to 
blossom106. This question of inexperienced and inept leadership by the Allies, 
which enhanced Kesselring’s reputation, is important and will be a theme 
throughout the next two chapters. 
 
Defeat 
 
                              By February15th the Axis appeared to have the ascent, but it was 
temporary. Kesselring knew that with the paucity of supplies and 
reinforcements, the Axis troops were losing, and solders were passing 'bitter 
jokes about Tunisgrad'107. When Rommel had turned to face Montgomery and 
the 8thArmy at the Mareth Line he found Montgomery waiting and was 
obliged to stop his attack108.  Kesselring seemed to think another leading 
Italian had betrayed them, this time Messe. On March 9th Rommel left for 
what Kesselring called some ‘well-earned leave;’ Kesselring recommended 
him for the Knight’s Cross with diamonds; he failed however to persuade the 
Italians to give any significant award. After Rommel’s departure the New 
Zealanders blocked the Tebaga Pass, and the British XXX Corps launched a 
frontal attack against the Mareth Line, which was being held by divisions of 
the Italian 1stArmy. The Axis forces retreated to the defensive position known 
as the Enfidaville line (maps p.10/11) which was attacked by British troops on 
20thApril, and although there was some bitter fighting, General Messe’s 
troops held. Kesselring was out-numbered and faced better technology. 
Westphal later blamed the defeat on 'poor supply-lines' and lack of 'air and sea 
power'109. Kesselring was outgunned at all levels, and although the Allies 
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suffered '76,000 casualties they also captured 238,000 prisoners of war,' a 
greater number than those who surrendered at Stalingrad110. The British 
suffered heavily, accounting for more than 'half the Allied casualties'111.  
 
A Clean War 
 
                               After the war, for political reasons to be discussed later, it was 
claimed that North Africa was a ‘clean war’ and Kesselring encouraged this, 
though it was a myth112. Certainly it has been noted that the terrain afforded 
few opportunities for booby traps, and the dreaded sniper, since it was 
possible to see the enemy from afar113. It was seen as two professional armies 
facing one another, and when General von Thoma was captured, Montgomery 
invited him to dinner claiming he had enjoyed the battle. 'British commanders 
and their superiors in London became increasingly dismayed by local 
capitulations and the allegedly excessive sporting spirit of the campaign'114. 
There are plenty of autobiographies making reference to the cordial if not 
friendly relations between German and British soldiers, notably Hans von 
Luck who recalled a possible exchange of '600,000 cigarettes' in exchange for 
a family member of the 'Player cigarettes' company115.  Other accounts, 
although referring to deals of 'Schnapps for English cigarettes' also mention 
Italian prisoners being killed because of home news of bombing116. However, 
when Kesselring was shown captured British orders of the 'Armoured Brigade 
that German prisoners are not allowed to eat, drink or sleep before their 
interrogation;' he reciprocated the orders for English prisoners117. Luck wrote 
of Kesselring that 'he was a charming man of medium height with warm and 
sympathetic eyes. We respected him as he was the only high commander to 
come to Africa'118. Some of Kesselring's fighter-pilots were less enamoured 
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with him, Franz Stigler pointing out that when Kesselring had 'heard that 
Marseille {a top ace} was casting doubt on the G {model of Bf109} he 
ordered Marseille to fly the new plane anyway,' in which he died because of a 
technical failure119. There is no clear picture; sometimes Red Cross signals 
were accepted and sometimes ignored; the French Goumiers terrorised the 
enemy and civilians, and in a north Algerian village drunken US engineers 
gang-raped six middle-aged Arab women120. War cannot be clean, and the 
concept of a ‘clean war’ came to be an expression only once the horror of the 
Eastern European war came to public notice.  
 
                            The Jews of Tunisia were used for labour, and all Jews who lived in 
Tunisia suffered by having their homes looted, property confiscated, and ‘the 
rape of Tunisian Jewish women by German soldiers was far from uncommon. 
Walter Rauff, the Gestapo Chief in Tunis, transferred from the killing fields 
of Eastern Europe, quickly instituted a reign of terror against the Jews of 
Tunis’121. Kesselring had 'responded favourably to the suggestion of 
Mollhausen's superior, Ambassador Rahn, that instead of deporting the 
Tunisian Jews' they were to be labour122.  This was sometimes referred to as 
the 'Tunisian solution' because the entire community suffered but survived, 
but nevertheless, the 'Tunisian Jews were rounded up for forced labour … the 
Jewish community was also ruthlessly plundered for gold and money'123.  
Göbbels complained in his diary about the Italian lax treatment of the Jews, 
both in occupied France and Tunis, neither compelling them to work nor 
making them wear yellow stars124. The civilian population of North Africa 
was minimal, there were no well-known major massacres, and it was not until 
the partisan/civilian involvement in Italy, that any fantasy of a clean war 
could be seen as false.  
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Concluding notes 
 
                               Kesselring’s task was too vast. Westphal, his adviser and loyal 
friend, recalled the frequent times they visited Mussolini to keep him stable. 
On one occasion, Kesselring had politely declined some of Mussolini’s more 
dangerous ideas such as using gas, and using hospital ships to transport 
fuel125. Not only did Kesselring have to keep Mussolini on side, but he had to 
ensure that Germans worked with their Italian counterparts. This was not 
made any easier when Cavallero was later side-lined for being too close to the 
Germans. Despite his diplomatic skills and charm Kesselring had problems 
with the Italians, especially Cavallero’s replacement, Ambrosio. Kesselring 
was 'regarded as reliable and prescient' in matters of defensive war, but he 
had, as he acknowledged in his memoirs, made strategic errors, not least 
capitulating too quickly in Tunisia, and giving the Allies total victory that 
boosted their morale and confidence, whilst at the same time de-stabilising the 
Italians who now saw their motherland in peril126. 
 
                                         Following the defeat the blame fell with varying degrees of 
intensity on different people, but most especially on Kesselring. In Trent 
House England, where captured German generals were secretly monitored, 
they first blamed the defeat on the Italians, others felt Tunisia had not been 
worth hanging onto, and Arnim believed his personal reports had not reached 
Hitler127. Some blamed Arnim, some Rommel, but it was Kesselring who was 
blamed most: Göring had insulted him about running away. The failure led to 
a heated postwar debate in which Kesselring felt he had to justify himself, and 
'this he did in a dignified manner: he shouldered the responsibility,' according 
to the official German history128. A significant reason for the defeat was the 
failure of the OKW, especially Keitel and Jodl, as well as Mussolini in not 
heeding Kesselring’s advice to occupy Malta. Keitel and Jodl paid little heed 
to essential logistics, because they were consumed with the Russian 
campaign, to them, North Africa was a mere sideshow.  
                                                 
125     Macksey, Kesselring,p.146. 
126     Westphal, German,p.128. 
127     Neitzel Sönke (Ed), Tapping Hitler’s Generals (Yorkshire: Frontline Books,2007)p.35. 
128     Militärgeschichtliches, Volume VI,p.755. 
 136
                             
                              The defeat of the Axis was critical, they had failed to ‘disturb 
British control over Egypt and the Middle East, {the Allies} denied the Third 
Reich access to key sources of oil … {they} signalled the fact that the British 
were determined not to give in, but also the strength of the far-flung British 
Empire, backed to an increasing degree by the material resources of the 
United States’129. They had also lost a vast number of troops, and 'these forces 
would have provided a very strong defence for the Italian gateways to Europe, 
and the Allies chances of a successful invasion would have been dim'130. 
Kesselring had been the senior commander when the defeat occurred, and the 
question of the logistics and the failure of the supply lines will be debated as 
long as this is studied, but Kesselring cannot avoid all the responsibility for 
the failure. As Oberbefehlshaber-Süd, the man on the spot and trusted, he 
pleaded for the invasion of Malta, but as a Field-Marshall he failed to 
convince the OKW and Hitler of the magnitude of the island's importance, 
thus giving the enemy both sea and air-dominance. 
 
                             Kesselring's only success was the fighting defence German soldiers 
persistently produced, but his real failure was not to evacuate the huge 
number of fighting troops to Italy. Rommel's personal papers clearly indicate 
that he could see that the sheer logistics meant the German and Italian forces 
were going to be captured, and he was determined to get his men out; he 
approached Kesselring who told him, eventually 'that the Führer was unable 
to agree with my judgement'131. Rommel linked Kesselring with the OKW 
and Hitler, stating that 'it was clear that our higher authorities were building 
illusions for themselves on the strength of our increased shipments'132. 
Rommel went to Rome with Ambrosio and Westphal but Mussolini saw 
Rommel as a defeatist. Ignoring Göring's offer of a trip in his private train he 
flew directly to Hitler's HQ where it was apparent that Hitler was 
'unreceptive:' it dawned on Rommel that Kesselring had already flown to 
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speak to Hitler and 'was the bearer of better tidings'133. 'Rommel's reasonable 
and strategically sound requests to extricate his forces' came to nothing.134  
 
                           Kesselring, as with the proposed Malta invasion, should have 
pressed the issue much harder, but failed because he had the traditional blind 
view of obeying the master. In a single line Rommel put his finger on 
Kesselring's weakness without referring to him directly, he simply wrote that 
'optimism could not help, nor energy however ruthless'135. Time and time 
again Kesselring's critics were right, his optimism encouraged Hitler to stand 
firm on his 'stand and die' orders, and thus Kesselring assisted Hitler in 
producing another Stalingrad but with greater numbers.    
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
SICILY TO SALERNO (1943) 
 
Introduction 
 
 
                This chapter looks at Kesselring within the context of Operation 
Husky, the invasion of Sicily, through to the invasion of the Italian mainland 
via Calabria and Salerno. It will not try and trace the various military 
campaigns, but will develop the themes of the previous chapter, specifically 
the ambivalent nature of Kesselring's command, and his complex relationship 
with Hitler and Rommel; it has been assumed that Kesselring was total 
commander of the Italian campaign, but this thesis will cast serious doubt on 
this assumption. The second part will study his relationship with the Italians, 
the problems of military cooperation, and Kesselring's apparent inability to 
realise what was happening in the Italian political body. It will also take stock 
of the effect of the collapse of Mussolini's regime, and of Kesselring's change 
of attitude towards the Italians: as he said, 'I loved the Italians too much. Now 
I hate them'1.  
 
              Thirdly, and critical to the analysis here and subsequently, will be the 
theme started in the previous chapter regarding Kesselring's role in the 
defence of the 'soft-underbelly' of occupied Europe. The tendency has been 
for most historians to portray Kesselring as a master of defence, bearing the 
'stamp of genius'2. Allied commanders spoke highly of him, especially 
Alexander, his opposite number3. The argument made here and in the 
following chapter is somewhat different. Instead it will be suggested that the 
reputation of a man who was 'as good a general as emerged from the German 
Army' grew mainly because he faced inadequate opponents4. His reputation, it 
will be argued, was augmented by Allied blunders, poor planning and 
frequently weak leadership. Putting Kesselring on a plinth has, in reality, led 
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to inadequate critical analysis of the performance of the inexperienced and 
anaemic Allied command in the Italian theatre. 
 
The Nature of Kesselring's Command 
 
               Kesselring, as did other Wehrmacht commanders frequently found 
himself at odds with Hitler over policy. Even as Operation Husky was being 
planned Hitler opposed both Kesselring and even Mussolini in their belief that 
Sicily was the next Allied objective. Richthofen and other senior commanders 
were convinced it would be Sardinia, but Kesselring remained convinced 
Sicily was the obvious candidate5. He perceived Sicily to be 'the door to 
Fortress Europe'6. Hitler was convinced that Churchill was intent on the 
Balkans, and recent research into the Allied deception codenamed Mincemeat, 
which attempted to convince the Axis command that the attack would not be 
Sicily, suggests that because Hitler sent reinforcements to the Balkans the 
deceit succeeded7. Kesselring's analysis demonstrated that air-power would be 
the critical factor underpinning Allied plans, making Sicily the obvious place, 
and he was correct. Fortunately for the Allies, it was Hitler's decision that 
counted as 'in Rome, neither Albert Kesselring nor the Italian high command 
was deceived' by the British subterfuge8. Hitler's reputation for being right in 
his instincts was based on Poland and France, but now these so-called 
instincts were hampering Kesselring's command and authority. Kesselring 
was the leading German presence in Italy, but was always tied by Hitler's 
constant intrusions, even minor command issues such as his insistence that 
certain troops be evacuated from Sicily before others, and later, in Anzio, 
which regiment should lead the attack, even though, once again, it was a self-
evident blunder of gigantic proportions9.   
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                  Although Kesselring carried the title of Oberbefehlshaber-Süd his 
position was, prior to the Italian capitulation, far from what the title 
suggested. Hitler considered him to be in sole charge, but in reality it was 
only of the German troops. Most of the Italian military viewed him with a 
high degree of suspicion; as noted he had only an advisory position within the 
Italian High Command, the Commando Supremo, subordinate to Mussolini 
and therefore the monarchy. Hitler had begun to suspect the Italians of 
seeking peace, and accused Kesselring of being too sycophantic towards the 
Commando Supremo10. This was because Kesselring was well known for his 
charm and diplomacy; after the war he turned his British interrogator, Lt Col 
Scotland into a friendly witness for his trial, and the American Historical 
Division Commander admitted to admiring him. This charm and diplomacy 
managed to maintain friendly relationships with an ever growing suspicious 
Italian military that was beginning to be cautious about German dominance11. 
 
               As the Allied threat to Italy drew closer it seems implausible that 
Kesselring was not sharply aware about the political and military 
machinations taking place amongst his allies. He had managed to gain a co-
operative and friendly relationship with Cavallero, (Chief of the Commando 
Supremo until February 1943), but his successor Ambrosio was hostile 
towards him, being involved in the plot against Mussolini with the King12. 
Some of the senior military wanted to change sides and were planning 
Mussolini's downfall. Politically the Italians were divided on issues of 
fascism, Mussolini, the Royal family, communism, the place of the Vatican 
and above all their relationship with Germany. It seems that Hitler was more 
aware of some of these issues than Kesselring, which suggests that when 
Hitler described Kesselring as gullible when it came to the Italians, he was 
probably right. There seems little question that Kesselring viewed the Italians 
as reliable colleagues, and he convinced many senior Italian figures of his 
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sincerity. However, as the months unfolded towards the Italian collapse, it 
became obvious that Kesselring had failed to gain any real understanding of 
the Italian political scene. 
 
               He was more alert in the military theatre and it was during the 
invasion of Sicily that Kesselring started to assume more authority. Originally 
Mussolini had insisted that General Guzzoni commanded in Sicily: Kesselring 
was only there to assist and keep a watchful eye on the some 90,000 German 
troops preparing for the Allied invasion13. Even as he was attempting to work 
alongside Guzzoni power politics were at play in Germany.   
 
               Kesselring's lack of authority was further undermined when Hitler 
appointed Rommel as his adviser in the Mediterranean theatre without 
informing Kesselring14. Hitler seemed to fan the personal conflict between 
Rommel and Kesselring, both men wanting the authority to wage war their 
way. Jodl and Rommel had recommended that there be one ‘competent’ 
commander, namely Rommel, and that Richthofen take over the air-force; it 
was an attempt to cut Kesselring from the picture15. Hitler had a series of 
'mind-changes' about Kesselring; he was unsure how the Italians would react 
to Rommel. At other times Hitler was sure that Rommel was best choice 
because of the glamour attached to his name by Göbbels' propaganda. At 
times affairs for Kesselring looked bleak. When his friend Jeschonnek, Chief 
of Staff to the Luftwaffe, committed suicide, Kesselring was forbidden to 
attend the funeral: he disobeyed. The day Sicily fell, Hitler created a 
10thArmy under Vietinghoff, so when Kesselring had gone Vietinghoff would 
be reporting to Rommel16. There is little question that Rommel was scheming 
against Kesselring; even at an important meeting with General Roatta, 
Kesselring had not been invited by Rommel, and had tendered his resignation 
as a result; it was refused by Hitler, who was still undecided17.                    
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                   Rommel, like Hitler, openly distrusted the Italians, and proposed 
that the Germans defended from the north to block the Allies entering Europe, 
like a cork in the Italian bottle18. Kesselring postulated that the best defence 
was to fight from the south. Rommel actually 'believed that he would shortly 
take over from Kesselring as Commander-in-Chief South, especially since the 
latter had no control over what he was doing'19. It was power-politics as 
Rommel 'interpreted the two opposing strategies in personal terms: this was a 
battle between himself and Kesselring for Hitler's Trust,' and there can be 
little doubt that Kesselring also felt this personally, although in later years he 
always denied this20.   
 
               Hitler claimed 'Kesselring doesn't have the name,' the charisma21. 
Hitler knew that although Rommel could be enthusiastic, he was an 'absolute 
pessimist when the slightest difficulties arise,' whereas Kesselring was the 
eternal optimist22. Rommel had projected a New Army Group B of some 
thirteen to fourteen divisions to hold North Italy, but Kesselring eventually 
won the debate for defending from the south23. This was a blow to Rommel's 
prestige who had hoped to 'upstage' Kesselring. Hitler, who once considered 
'Kesselring as a replacement for Keitel or Jodl', favoured Kesselring because 
of his blind obedience24. 
 
                   It is difficult to understand the type of magnetic influence Hitler 
held over so many people, not least Kesselring. Despite Hitler's undermining 
Kesselring's authority by appearing to favour Rommel, and continuously 
criticising Kesselring for trusting the Italians, Kesselring remained loyal to 
Hitler even to his postwar trial. When the coup against Mussolini was 
eventually announced it was not until after the war that Kesselring claimed 
that he discovered 'Hitler’s double-track methods of organization' namely that 
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that Himmler’s agents were working in the intelligence service in Rome. 
Their information was ‘not reported to me, or to the ambassador, but to 
Himmler or Hitler'25. It seems incredible that Kesselring was unaware of 
Himmler's activities, indicating an appalling naivety. Badoglio, the Marshal of 
Italy declared martial law, and formed a cabinet without fascists which again 
caught Kesselring completely by surprise. Hitler frequently complained that 
Kesselring trusted the Italians too much, that he was an ‘Italophile’26. 
Mackensen, the German Ambassador had asked Hitler not to be too 
'pessimistic about Italy', and Kesselring claimed the post-Mussolini Badoglio 
'government is trustworthy and is against any interference on our part'27. 
Hitler was not fooled, and by August 9th he insisted the King and Badoglio's 
government were 'planning treachery'28. Kesselring trusted the Italians, but 
according to Douglas Porch, his trust of the Italians 'had not blinded him to 
Italian treachery and made him insufficiently vigilant in protecting German 
interests'29. Nevertheless, Hitler's sources appeared more reliable to what was 
happening than that of Kesselring, the man supposedly in charge, the 
Oberbefehlshaber-Süd. 
 
                 Hitler may have understood the Italian situation better because of 
his information and suspicious nature, but his continual fascination with the 
glamour associated with Rommel was a mistake, and a continuous threat to 
Kesselring's status. During the Salerno landings the OKW, on Rommel's 
advice, refused Kesselring a single division from North Italy; Kesselring 
believed this caused the loss of the Apulian airbases. Some historians argue 
that had Rommel sent troops 'events might have been very different in Italy,' 
and 'if Rommel had sent his eight divisions in the North of Italy to join 
Kesselring's in the south the beachhead would not have survived'30. Had Hitler 
heeded Kesselring, and given him the northern divisions, most agree there 
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was a good chance that the Salerno landings would have failed. This would 
have created a sense of Allied nervousness, and may have had ramifications 
for future amphibious landings including Normandy.  
 
                 On 12th September Hitler resolved the question of Field-Marshals. 
He observed that the Salerno landing nearly failed, and the successful policy 
of delaying defence caused another change of mind towards Kesselring. The 
amphibious landings posed less danger than previously feared; OKW having 
been concerned that an entire army could be isolated. Hitler decided to hear 
both Rommel and Kesselring on whether to fight in the south or the north. 
Rommel was recovering from appendicitis and feeling depressed, Kesselring, 
optimistic as usual, had Vietinghoff as support with him at Rastenberg. 
Kesselring was smooth as a diplomat, and won against Rommel who was at 
his gloomiest. Kesselring argued that he could hold the line for nine months. 
Hitler was incapable of reaching an immediate decision, but Jodl, who had 
rarely appreciated Kesselring, agreed that Kesselring was right31. On October 
25th Rommel left, and on November 5th he was sent to France to prepare the 
defence of Western Europe.  
 
                     Kesselring, Oberbefehlshaber-Süd, was finally put in charge of 
Italy on November 21st. Up to the invasion of Sicily Kesselring had little real 
power or authority, and had to use his diplomatic and social skills to carry any 
weight with the Italians. Many Italians had been deeply suspicious of him, 
Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law, had written that in Kesselring 'Mussolini has 
swallowed a toad', meaning he had swallowed poison32. During the Sicily 
invasion Kesselring's authority grew exponentially as the Allies progressed. It 
was Salerno which was the making of Kesselring's position, as finally Hitler 
accepted his defence arguments, and following Italy's capitulation Kesselring 
assumed more control with no need for diplomacy. His power was never total 
even though his code name used by the Allies was 'the Emperor,' because 
Mussolini was restored as a puppet, and Himmler's SS now became an open 
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factor within the Italian scene33. His authority expanded but he was never in 
total control though he always considered himself as such. Scotland, his 
British interrogator, described Kesselring as 'the correct, proud, too proud 
Field-Marshal,' and this appraisal was close to the truth34. Kesselring insisted 
on being Oberbefehlshaber-Süd in total control, but he never was in reality. 
He started as an officer on Mussolini's staff, and was the highest ranking 
German in Italy, but he was 'far from supreme in executive powers'35. It was a 
misnomer by the Allies to regard Kesselring as Emperor, but it was a delusion 
shared by Kesselring, and paid for at his trial. 
 
Kesselring and the Italians 
 
                  As Kesselring’s time in the south progressed, his relationship with 
the Italian military did not, and he was caught by surprise by Mussolini's 
downfall and the Italian capitulation. Kesselring was the highest ranking 
German officer in Italy and the chapter will raise the question of Kesselring's 
failure to have any understanding of what was happening on the Italian 
political front, where he appeared to be out of his depth. Finally, this section 
will examine Kesselring's change of attitude towards his one-time partners, 
and how he started down the road of brutality.  
 
                 There is no doubt that in North Africa Kesselring had appreciated 
and supported the Italian partners a great deal more than Rommel. He had 
realised 'the Italian soldier did play a part in the war in North Africa, even 
after the arrival of the Afrika Corps'36. He had also rejected the nonsense that 
the Italians could not fight, but during the Sicily invasion he also started to 
feel the tension between the German militaristic approach, and the Italian lack 
of desire to be involved in such a war. 
 
                In Rome the Italians had informed Kesselring that Sicily's defences 
were satisfactory, but after flying there he formed a different view. He 
                                                 
33    KNA-Top-Secret-Cypher-Telegram/19th March 45/Ref/FO-954/17A-File-Re-296. 
34    Scotland, London,p.173. 
35    Ibid,p.175. 
36    Crociani, Italian,p.4. 
 146
discovered gun-emplacement constructions which were mere ‘eyewash’ and 
altogether the defences 'all so much gingerbread'37. The Todt organisation 
used re-enforced concrete, but many of the Italian constructions, viewable 
today, show gun-emplacements made from brick covered with thin cement.38 
Kesselring flew in construction teams to work with Italian labour, but time 
was against them.  
 
                There was an immediate clash; the Italians wanted their defence out 
of sight of naval guns, but Kesselring wanted them close by the beaches; 'the 
resulting controversy was still raging when the invasion commenced'39. 
Kesselring finally admitted his surprise at the accuracy of the naval guns and 
admitted they made a powerful impression upon him40. The master of defence 
may have been wrong: the Italians appeared to appreciate the Allied naval 
threat better. 
 
                Disturbingly for Kesselring, Marshal de Bono wrote to Graziani 
claiming morale was high, but warned of lack of mechanised transport, the 
age of the soldiers, and that conscripts had 'a scant familiarity with modern 
automatic weapons'41. The equipment, training and attitudes of German and 
Italian soldiers were very different. The German military had prepared for 
war, but most Italians were uncertain about fighting this war, and according to 
recent research by Italian historians their weapons were not the best, and 
'adequate training was, from the beginning, a serious shortcoming for Italian 
soldiers'42.  
 
                                 Kesselring was amazed at the effectiveness of the Sicily 
beach-landings, and the effective transfer of fighter-planes to captured 
airstrips, but was more disturbed on hearing that the Augusta Fortress had 
surrendered to the British without a fight. He flew to Sicily to assist, 'and to 
check on the story that Italian formations were surrendering without a shot 
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being fired'43. A Brigade Commander, Schmatz, sent Kesselring a telegram 
regarding Augusta stating 'the English have never been in there. 
Notwithstanding this the Italian garrison has blown up its guns and 
ammunition and set fire to a large fuel dump'44. This transpired to be true, and 
the Italian surrender in large numbers was a shock to the Germans as well as 
to the Allies. The invasion of Sicily was the invasion of the Italian homeland, 
and there was some truth in what Ciano said to Admiral Maugeri that 'our 
people have no faith in the war, or in our leaders …they have lost their will to 
win'45. Kesselring should not have found this so incomprehensible, he should 
have known that the Italians were divided about fascism and Mussolini, they 
were generally opposed to German occupation, not particularly antagonistic 
towards the British and Americans in particular, which made them question 
the need to fight: 'every soldier and every officer had to make that decision 
and it was very apparent when allied troops finally invaded Sicily on 10th July 
1943, that the majority of Italian forces had decided not to do so'46. When 
Patton marched into Palermo it was self-evident that the Italians wanted no 
part of the war, 'the citizens of Palermo had waved white flags at the invading 
Americans' and the Germans had time to prepare their escape 47.   
 
                It was apparent that many Italian soldiers simply did not want to 
fight, not through cowardice, nor because their weapons were outclassed, but 
because their leadership was as confused as the ordinary soldier who had 
families in Britain and America. Their heart was not in the war and many 
regarded fascism as a failing system. So it was that on Monday July 19th 
Hitler felt obliged to fly to Treviso to encourage Mussolini and ensure the 
Italians stayed in partnership. As Hitler gave one of his infamous monologues, 
'an elegant Job's messenger in the person of an air-force officer violated 
protocol by bursting in excitedly' with news that Rome itself was being 
bombed48. It was clear that Mussolini's Italy was in serious danger, and it still 
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appeared that Kesselring was either trying not to believe this, or did not 
understand.  
 
                 In addition to this problem Kesselring appeared to remain totally 
ignorant of the motivations and machinations of senior Italian officers. When 
Kesselring offered Ambrosio three divisions they were accepted reluctantly. 
When Hitler offered Ambrosio five divisions the Italian refused; it was clear 
that the Italians did not want that number of Germans in their country. In a 
conference with Dönitz, Kesselring claimed, somewhat naively, that the 
refusal was simply that the 'Italians wanted to remain masters in their own 
house'49. Hitler was right to doubt Kesselring's judgment in the matter of 
Italian loyalty. Given that the Italians appeared to be trying to resist the 
presence of too many German soldiers, it is remarkable that Kesselring did 
not realise earlier that the Italian heart was not in the conflict. It should have 
been part of his remit to understand what was happening, but Kesselring 
appeared oblivious to the dissent at all levels, and that many Italians wanted 
to be free of German dominance.  
 
                Later Kesselring recognised that when the Allies were broadcasting 
to the Italians that they would be invaded it was intended to de-stabilise 
Italian leadership50. There was no certainty prior to the mainland invasion as 
to whether the Italians would fight with their German partners. As such on 
August 6th representatives of the Italian and German governments met at 
Tarvisio to clarify their relationship. Attending were two foreign ministers, 
Ribbentrop and Guariglia, along with two Chiefs of Staff, namely Keitel and 
Ambrosio. The Italians claimed they were intent on fighting on, but there was 
a total lack of trust by everyone, except Kesselring, who was optimistic in 
trusting the Italians. 
 
                     On Sunday 15th there was a further meeting at Bologna between 
the Italians and German military representatives, Rommel, Kesselring and 
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Roatta51. No resolution was reached on a unified defence, and the meeting 
was tense and full of suspicion. A week later on Saturday 21st August 
Kesselring claimed he had a more optimistic meeting with Ambrosio, who 
wanted a German Division in Sardinia which Kesselring refused on military 
grounds. In hindsight Kesselring later suspected that Ambrosio had wanted to 
assist an Allied takeover, and during postwar interviews Kesselring admitted 
some were concerned that Ambrosio was trying to place German divisions 
where they could be taken by the Allies as an Italian gift52. Two days later on 
Monday 23rd Kesselring had a meeting with Hitler and Göring in which Hitler 
said he had evidence of Italy’s betrayal, and Kesselring had to stop trusting 
the Italians. Kesselring, who expected the Italians to honour the partnership, 
was ordered to be realistic, and have plans prepared if the situation changed. 
As early as July 28th Badoglio had sent Hitler a telegram stating we 'shall 
carry on the war in the spirit of our alliance', but Hitler was not fooled53. As a 
professional soldier Kesselring had followed OKW instructions and prepared 
for the eventuality of an Italian collapse, but his understanding of the Italian 
military was totally disastrous. He was described by Hitler as too trusting, and 
Göbbels that 'Generals are usually too unpolitical to understand the 
background of such a scene;' in fact Kesselring was duped making it clear that 
with his Italian colleagues he was out of his depth54.  
 
                 Hitler and the OKW appeared more aware of the Italian military 
thinking than Kesselring, and in the political sphere Kesselring appeared 
totally blind as to Mussolini's fortunes. Even in February 1943 Kesselring still 
felt Mussolini to be secure, as did Mackensen the German Ambassador, and 
Rintelen, the Military Attaché.  
 
                  Mussolini also appeared unaware of his imminent danger, although 
he had conducted a purge in February of 1943 of discontented party-members, 
'this was virtually his last decisive act. Disorientated and demoralised… the 
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sacked party bosses began to intrigue against him'55. Mussolini was not in 
touch with reality: in a meeting with Kesselring he claimed that Grandi was 
loyal, although he was eventually the very man who led to his downfall. He 
informed Kesselring that Grandi had just left him and that 'we had a heart-to-
heart talk, our views are identical. He is loyally devoted to me'56.  Kesselring 
later told the American Historical Unit 'nothing could have surpassed 
Mussolini's blind confidence:' his overthrow could have been avoided with the 
support of the Germans and loyal Italians, which was possible given his re-
emergence later57.  
 
                  In effect 'there were two coups, in other words a Fascist and a 
Monarchist one, and the royal coup superseded and overtook the Fascist 
coup'58. Mussolini later claimed that the king had said to him 'you can no 
longer count on more than one friend. You have one friend left you, and I am 
he'59. Mussolini was confused, and so were the Germans like Kesselring who 
never had a clue to the Machiavellian plots of the Fascist council, the military 
or the king.  
 
              Later in September when the armistice/surrender was announced it 
was also a total surprise for Kesselring. The SS interpreter Dollmann later 
wrote that 'whatever their former rank, unit and colour of uniform, any 
Germans who claim to have had advance knowledge of 8th September are 
simply lying'60. However right Dollmann was, Kesselring should have made it 
his business to try to know more about what was happening in his command. 
To pretend he was non-political in this situation is to admit failure. As the 
announcement of the surrender was made, and deliberately timed with the 
Salerno landing, Kesselring's HQ was also seriously bombed. A map was 
retrieved from a downed-bomber pinpointing the headquarters which 
Kesselring shared with Richthofen, indicating to Kesselring that the Italians 
had betrayed him. It is now known that 'Castellano had obligingly ringed the 
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Field-Marshal's Headquarters in red on an aerial map which the Allies had 
given him in Lisbon'61. From this juncture Kesselring changed his attitude 
towards the Italians; they were now the enemy. 
 
                  As Kesselring extricated himself from the bombed ruins Jodl 
managed to make contact with him demanding to know the truth about the 
Italian capitulation. The Chief of Staff for the Italians, Roatta said that it was 
a hoax, and when the truth eventually emerged Roatta claimed he was just as 
surprised; but by then the King and government had fled Rome 'leaving only 
the cryptic instructions that the army should resist the enemy'62.  It seemed as 
if 'they were preoccupied with saving their own skins … their pusillanimous 
flight …left Italian troops bewildered and demoralised' and the Germans 
perplexed63. 
 
               The Italian plot had been clever, on September 7th the Italian Navy 
Minister, Count de Courten had informed Kesselring that their navy would 
not be caught in harbour, and they had sailed to engage the British. According 
to Westphal, Kesselring’s Chief of Staff, Courten shed ‘tears and … his 
invocation of the German blood that flowed in his veins from his mother’s 
side, did not fail to make a deep impression’64.  It never occurred to 
Kesselring that it was a ruse to lull German suspicions, the Navy turned south 
in order to surrender as the Allies demanded. 
                        
                     Kesselring viewed the surrender as simple betrayal. Cavallero, 
when released from prison, along with other fascist officers, was put in 
Kesselring’s care. These officers were told they would be flown to Germany 
in order to assist the restored Mussolini. Cavallero, Kesselring's trusted 
colleague apparently committed suicide in Kesselring's garden. He did this 
because Mussolini 'possessed compromising material about him'65. In reality, 
'Cavallero had sent Badoglio a memorandum from Fort Bocca, informing him 
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that he, Cavallero, had devised a plan for ousting the Duce as early as Autumn 
1942' and he must have realised that Mussolini now knew66. Kesselring was 
disgusted at the Italian betrayal, but whether he had Cavallero murdered, as 
was the popular rumour within Italy at the time, is questionable67. In a post-
war interrogation, Kesselring gave a full account of Cavallero's death, which 
his British and later American interrogators generally accepted as truthful68. 
Kesselring had been close to Cavallero, yet still had no idea of the various 
machinations. 
 
                            As from the capitulation Kesselring's change of attitude 
towards the Italians grew from mere toughness and reasonable demands to a 
more hard line approach which eventually developed, as will be seen in the 
next chapter, into a ruthless brutality which he always brushed aside as 
military necessity. 
 
                          The issue of taking over the Italian military had to be 
addressed, especially in Rome where the Italians resisted, and could have 
created serious problems for the Germans. The 2ndParachute Division arrived, 
but on the 9th September General Carboni surrendered their arms69. General 
Count Calvi de Bergolo and Colonel Count Montezemolo talked under a flag 
of truce with Kesselring and Westphal. Kesselring left it to Westphal to 
ensure that there would be an immediate demobilisation, and that the soldiers 
could then return home. Kesselring promised to be ruthless, telling the 
negotiators, if they did not agree, he would bomb Rome. Later Kesselring 
declared Rome an open city and 'sought with ultimate success, to preserve 
Rome as an open city, off-limits from destructive military conflict'70. 
Kesselring has been portrayed by some as saving Rome, and although there 
may be a small degree of truth in this claim, he was utterly ruthless in his 
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military control, sending out the following public notice: 'Rome is under my 
command and is war territory, subject to martial law. Those organizing 
strikes or sabotage as well as snipers will be shot immediately - private 
correspondence is suspended. Telephone conversation should be brief as 
possible. They will be strictly monitored'71. Kesselring issued threats to 
imprison or execute recalcitrant Italians, by whom he felt betrayed, which 
found their way into the London Times thereby increasing his reputation of 
being ruthless72. Kesselring also made an appeal over the radio, and through 
posters for the Italians to co-operate, and later appealed for Italian recruits to 
join the German forces, which many did73. 
 
               The Germans were fortunate there was no serious backlash because 
the Italians were a substantial force and armed. Rommel demanded that 
Kesselring should have dispatched all Italian soldiers to Germany for 
manpower. This ruffled Kesselring’s feathers as Rommel was acting as his 
superior. As it was, in North Italy many Italian soldiers deserted en masse, so 
later the partisan war found both men and arms because of Rommel’s failure 
to collect in the weapons74. According to an Italian historian, 'Kesselring's 
decision to disarm Italian soldiers and allow them to go home meant that 
Italian resistance was mainly focused in north-west Italy, in the area under 
Rommel's control'75. Nevertheless, Kesselring's political and military 
measures clearly indicate a rapidly changing attitude towards his ex-Allies; 
the level of ruthlessness grew from this time.  
 
                 However, under Kesselring there were no massacres as in the 
Balkans and Greek islands76. Westphal wrote that Kesselring was 
reprimanded for not imprisoning the Italian soldiers but, as he noted, 'the 
surrender of their war material was carried out without friction. Nor was the 
fear that they would at once join the partisan movement justified by events. 
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Everyone was pleased that this loathsome business was over at last.'77 There 
were incidents of resistance; General Don Ferrante Gonzaga was shot after an 
apparent show of personal resistance78. 'Overall, it has been estimated that 
about 25,000 Italian officers and men were killed in fighting and roundups 
after the armistice' but in mainland Italy where Kesselring was in control it 
was done rapidly, there were no massacres and Italian soldiers were allowed 
to return home79.  
 
                    Later there was the conscription of Italian labour-battalions 
operating under Italian bureaucracy through German control; they were used 
for defence-construction and Kesselring claimed that 'the workers altogether 
were well cared for'80. Perhaps Kesselring liked to think they were well cared 
for, but the workers would have felt otherwise. Later, after a major massacre 
of civilians on Monte Sole, Kesselring brushed it aside as just a 'military 
action'; this attitude of playing down the grotesque probably applied to his 
wishful thinking that conscripted workers 'were cared for.' It is also worth 
noting that ‘Naples became the first European city to rise up against the 
Germans … the Quattro giornate – the famous four days – started by 
Kesselring’s attempt to deport 20,000 men’81. 
 
                     Kesselring never really understood the Italian military command, 
failed to understand why all Italian soldiers did not want to fight, completely 
failed to foresee Mussolini's downfall and Italy's capitulation, after which 
event his attitude moved from the reasonable, to the ruthless and, as will be 
examined in chapter 7, became brutalized.                
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Kesselring - Master of Defence? 
 
                     There were occasions in the North African campaign when such 
was the admiration for Rommel that Montgomery and others were concerned 
that officers and men were using him as an excuse for failure. Although 
Kesselring never carried this reputation on the battlefield, his prestige started 
to develop in Italy among some Allied leaders, and most postwar historians 
praise him for his professional defence. Alexander, who suffered so many 
nervous moments at Salerno, Anzio, and Monte Cassino, commented that 
Kesselring 'showed very great skill'82. The American Bradley referred to him 
as 'the able Field Marshal'83. Even the London Times stated that Kesselring 'is 
manifestly too short of reserves: yet the German defence remains stubborn 
and dangerous'84. 
 
               Historians have continued in the same vein, with the exception of 
Richard Lamb, (who fought in Italy) and refers to Kesselring as 'a brute,' most 
praise Kesselring as a master of defence85. His defence has been described as 
'superb' (Hoyt); having the instincts of 'the true gambler' (Hapgood); 'bearing 
the stamp of genius' (D'Este); with 'few equals in the army' (Atkinson), and 
the 'master of delaying tactics' (Hickey)86. Two respected historians refer to 
him 'as good a general as emerged from the German Army in the Second 
World War and certainly the best on either side in the Italian theatre'87. He has 
been described as 'superior even to Rommel' (Roberts); the 'canny 
commander' (Macintyre); 'in the front rank of commanders' (Hastings); 
'talented and experienced' (Harper); and Beevor noted that the 'Wehrmacht in 
Italy under Kesselring proved far more durable than even Hitler expected'88. 
Most of these appraisals tend to paint a far too exalted picture, and there is a 
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tendency to use the Kesselring image as a 'master of defence' to gloss over 
inadequate Allied opposition, and forget that defence in Italy was the better 
option than attack. When Douglas Porch described Kesselring as a 'tough no-
nonsense German General' he was probably the closest to the truth89. 
Kesselring was a solid professional commander, experienced and brought up 
in a militaristic tradition, but he was no 'genius' as D'Este and others claim90. 
 
                        This final part of this chapter will continue the theme started in 
the previous chapter, and be developed in the next to demonstrate that there 
were significant errors of judgement by the Allied command, poor planning, 
not least in the way they misunderstood Italy's geography and climate in 
military terms. It was these factors which increased Kesselring's reputation. 
 
                                       In many ways Kesselring's ability was assisted by 
poor Allied planning. As Bradley put it, 'astonishing as it seems in retrospect, 
there was no master plan for the conquest of Sicily'91. According to Bradley 
some Allied intelligence believed Italians would flee others 'that on home soil 
the Italians would resist fiercely'92. Eisenhower later criticised those critics 
who claimed they should have evaluated the 'low combat value of the huge 
Italian garrison' but few could have guessed how individual Italians would 
react; Kesselring failed to foresee this93.  
 
                       During the campaign Allied progress was tardy and 'most 
historians blame the failure on the lack of planning and coordination at the 
very top. Throughout the Sicily campaign, the board of directors was widely 
scattered: Alexander in Sicily; Tedder in Tunisia; Cunningham in Malta; Ike 
in Algiers'94. After the war, referring to Sicily and Italy Montgomery 
'admitted to the New Zealand commander Major General Sir Howard 
Kippenberger: 'We went in without a plan'95. The fact that the Allies felt they 
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could simply invade and 'take Sicily,' as opposed to the possibility of making 
a direct and immediate attack on Messina, allowed Kesselring not only to 
create a defence, but also gave him time to extricate troops back to the 
mainland. In terms of Sicily, there was no coordinated plan to attack Messina 
even though the Allies were aware of the evacuation: 'it was left to 
Montgomery to belabour the obvious: 'the truth of the matter is that there is no 
plan'96. Senger, Kesselring's best strategic general who controlled Monte 
Cassino, noted that ‘when I look at the Allied plans … I cannot refrain from 
criticism’97. 
 
                  Kesselring did not realise at the time that the Americans were 
almost hostile towards the Mediterranean theatre, cynical about the soft-
underbelly, and suspicious of Britain’s empire. Churchill was unhappy about 
an invasion across the English Channel and dismissive about the American 
idea of invading South France, and constantly applied pressure for the attack 
through Sicily and Italy. The major Allied political leaders were at variance, 
but, more to the point, their senior commanders were frequently in conflict 
with one another; Marshall distrusted the British fascination with the 
Mediterranean and suspected the USA was being used for colonial defence, 
and Alan Brooke was almost contemptuous about American military power. 
In terms of battle command all too often personalities were in open conflict, 
and this frequently played into Kesselring's hands, especially later when 
troops were removed for South France and Normandy.     
 
                Lower down the rung senior Allied commanders failed to co-
operate, and their egocentricity soured relations. Montgomery and Patton 
behaved like competitive schoolboys, compounded by ‘Alexander’s 
unwillingness to take control of the campaign at its most crucial moment’98. 
Alexander’s failure to direct pressure and placing the 7thArmy into a 
secondary role, allowed the evacuation of the German army and equipment 
across the Straits of Messina. Bradley found Montgomery impossible to work 
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with, and despaired of Eisenhower when he supported Montgomery. Bradley's 
distaste was mild compared to the behaviour of Patton and Montgomery. 'If 
Montgomery did not push his men, neither did Alexander push him, nor in 
turn did Eisenhower push Alexander. The reason was that the Allies had not 
been able to readjust their thinking as quickly as the Germans'99. 
 
                  Poor Allied leadership made Kesselring's task easier. ‘The British 
and American commanders despised each other for lack of drive, attacking in 
insufficient strength and lack of appetite for combat. In this they resembled 
two whores upbraiding each other for lack of chastity’100. At Salerno Clark 
had decided not to prepare his landing beaches with naval-fire as an attempt to 
surprise what was already a well broadcast invasion101. Clark, ignoring British 
advice, being well known as a bitter Anglophobe, also believed that the 
Italians would 'stop the Germans' taking over the coastal defence and refuse 
them the use of road and rail traffic, a naivety that beggars belief. As it was 
Kesselring 'acted with amazing speed,' but probably because Allied security 
was lax102. Salerno and its hinterland was tough, the London Times 
grudgingly admitted that in Italy 'the German resistance has been skilful, 
stubborn, and fierce … most of his {Kesselring} divisions are of high quality 
… some … are exceptionally good … and his engineers have shown their 
customary skill’103. 
                
                       Throughout the Italian campaign there was a growing 
uneasiness between the Allies; senior officers were almost at war between 
themselves, and there was indecisiveness at the highest level. McCreery held 
Clark in utter contempt, and Clark often referred to Alexander as a 'peanut 
and feather-duster.' In Sicily Alexander had stood on the side-lines and 
allowed the egoists Montgomery and Patton too much freedom. Later Clark 
complained Montgomery was strolling up through Italy, yet the crisis at 
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Salerno was traceable to a flawed invasion plan for which Alexander and 
Clark were responsible. Alexander ‘was self-effacing and capable but utterly 
unwilling to assert his authority’104. Alexander's superiors had their doubts 
about his ability, Alan Brooke writing that ‘I am afraid that Winston is 
beginning to see some of Alex’s shortcomings! It was bound to come 
sometime or other, but means difficult times ahead. I wonder how I have 
succeeded in keeping him covered up to now’105! Montgomery complained 
that Alexander ‘had a definitely limited brain and does not understand his 
business’106. Clark was vain and inexperienced and no other officer was more 
openly ambitious; he had a public relations staff of nearly fifty men. The 
American Brigadier-General Wedemeyer reported to Marshall that Clark ‘is 
self-seeking and ambitious; not a broad gauged man who would subordinate 
himself to the big picture’107. These were prophetic words forecasting the 
prolongation of the Italian campaign when Clark, for personal glory and a 
paranoid distrust of the British, captured Rome allowing the German army to 
escape and defend in North Italy108. Clark often refused to let Americans fight 
alongside the British and many of his plans were so poor they were noted by 
the opposition109. Eisenhower admitted that the American commanders at 
Salerno 'lacked skills,' and Alexander admitted the British and Americans 'did 
not get along'110. The Allied leadership was distrustful, their planning poor, 
and their sense of direction confused: Montgomery complained he had been 
put ashore in Italy with no clear destination. There was a great deal of 
personal animosity, General Clark accusing the New Zealander Freyberg of 
having 'no brains', then behaving with Leese like a pair of prima donnas 
‘interested in their own personal agendas’, and it was generally accepted that 
Clark and Alexander ‘rarely agreed on anything and poisoned the 
atmosphere’111. As the war progressed the Allied leadership played into 
Kesselring’s hands, especially in the battles of Monte Cassino and Anzio. The 
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most serious weakness on the Allied side was between Clark and Alexander, 
as noted by Graham and Bidwell ‘Alexander was the victim of the delusion he 
had created for himself that he could only coax and cajole but never 
command. Clark was obsessed with the capture of Rome, come what may’112. 
In Salerno the Allied leadership was seriously weak, 'what we saw was 
ineptitude and cowardice spreading down from the command, and this 
resulted in chaos'113. 
 
                 Only Marshall had the foresight to point out that in North Africa a 
small German force had fought an irksome rear-guard, but in Italy they 'might 
make intended operations extremely difficult and time consuming'114. In Italy 
the Allies had chosen a battle where the edge would always be with the 
defenders, who in the words of Churchill's Private Secretary 'were the best in 
the world' and led by professional military commanders115. 
 
                        Kesselring had good subordinates, faced a divided and weak 
opposition; Mussolini had become a puppet, and the Italians were descending 
into a vicious civil war. After Salerno Kesselring's status as a defence 
commander continued to grow, but it was too often Allied ineptitude that built 
his reputation. 
 
                    This command ineptitude became apparent in Sicily, and despite 
overwhelming Allied resources and the capitulation of many Italian soldiers, 
too many mistakes were made which cost lives and enhanced Kesselring's 
reputation as a formidable commander. Patton's useless thrust towards 
Palermo, and putting Bradley's army virtually on hold become insignificant 
compared to the sloppy preparation for the airborne drops116. 
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                 The Allies created this disaster by using airborne troops in an 
unforgiving situation and without appropriate preparation. General Browning 
planned Husky to start with the American 82nd Airborne division and the 
British 1stAirborne division. Many planes were thrown off course by high 
winds, and some pilots prematurely released gliders. 'The pilots of the 366 
planes were green to combat and inexperienced in airborne and over-water 
operations'117. Only fifty-four gliders landed in Sicily118. Eisenhower claimed 
they feared a great loss of life, but in a weak postwar apologia claimed 
'though statistics later showed that casualties were less than we feared, it was 
still a tragic incident'119. Another airborne lift was repeated on July 11th when 
Patton ordered up 144 C-47s carrying 2,008 soldiers to be dropped inland. 
One USA naval gunner mistook them as the enemy and most others opened 
fire. 'In all, twenty-three planes were lost and thirty-seven badly damaged. 
The airborne force suffered 318 casualties; 88 dead, 162 wounded, 68 
missing'120. On July 13th a third airborne left Tunisia with 1,900 members of 
the British 1stParachute Brigade and disaster was repeated, 'of the 1,900 
paratroopers … only about 200 reached their objective, and that was too few 
to do the job properly'121. Inadequate training, poor weather and failure of 
communications were the main causes; it was a steep learning curve122.  The 
Allied command had failed to give adequate preparation, failed to use 
experienced pilots, failed to communicate with the navy and unnecessarily 
lost some of the best fighting men. On July 12th Kesselring authorised 
German paratroopers to be dropped 'with great precision in zones south of 
Catania,' and as the historian Hoyt wrote, 'it was as if the Germans were 
showing the Allies how it should be done,' but Allied misjudgement certainly 
put Kesselring higher on his plinth123.   
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                  The misjudgement at Messina did not cost the same lives as the 
parachute blunder, but it allowed an entire German army to escape and may 
have changed the face of the Italian campaign. Unlike the Allies Kesselring 
recognised the value of Messina and had selected General Hube who, with the 
help of his Chief of Staff von Bonin, and an 'unorthodox Colonel Ernst-
Günther Baade' made Messina a heavily defended area124. The naval officer, 
Baron von Gustav Liebenstein, extricated across the Messina Straits 60,000 of 
the 90,000 original German troops, 75,000 Italian troops, plus most of their 
equipment125. It was achieved only because the Allies failed to attack the 
escape route. Ultra had flagged up Kesselring's intentions, but neither the air 
or naval forces intervened effectively; 'this was a shocking failure'126.  The 
Germans started at night but 'they soon found that Allied interference was so 
ineffective that they also moved by day'127. Eisenhower claimed 'the 
narrowness of the strait allowed the evacuation,' nevertheless, Messina was a 
'remarkable Dunkirk commenced on August 10th. It was carried forward over 
the next six days and seven nights with German efficiency'128.  Such was the 
German success it has led one historian to call 'Operation Husky an abject 
failure'129. Hindsight is an unkind tool to use on past decisions, but it seems 
incredible that the Allied planners had failed to recognise the importance of 
Messina given its close proximity to the Italian mainland, and more 
pertinently to virtually ignore the Ultra signals and not attack the escaping 
army. 
                   
                Messina fell on 17th August and German resistance ceased the next 
day: many historians have acknowledged that although the Allies occupied 
Sicily it was not brilliantly achieved. The American historian Ambrose wrote 
that 'the Germans had won a moral victory:' although the Italians had 
capitulated in massive numbers for 38 days some 60,000 Germans had held 
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126    Hastings, Hell,p.449. 
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off an Allied force of 500,000130. The Messina evacuation did not deprive the 
Germans of their men or weapons, and although the Germans lost 12,000 the 
Allies lost an estimated 20,000131. 'It was a dismal conclusion to a campaign 
that had already taken too long'132.  Eisenhower grudgingly wrote that 'the 
German garrison was fighting skilfully and savagely'133.  
 
                  Montgomery sacked the able Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel Wigram 
for his unfavourable report which concluded that 'the Germans have 
undoubtedly in one way scored a decided success in Sicily'134. The failure at 
Messina was all part of the weak preparation planning. 'The American naval 
historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote: 'I cannot avoid the conclusion that the 
entire Husky Plan was wrong; that we should have attacked the Messina 
bottleneck first'135. Allied failure enabled Kesselring to accomplish what 
Rommel and many others had claimed to be impossible, and thus enhance his 
reputation yet further.  
 
                  Allied command problems were further compounded at Salerno.                       
When General Clark’s Fifth Army landed at Salerno on the 9th September the 
Germans had fourteen divisions ready, and by the end of October at least 
twenty-five. Kesselring recognised the value of the Foggia airfields because 
of their range into Germany and Austria, which was part of the reason for not 
falling back to Rommel's defensive-line north of Rome136.  
 
                   The invading Allied soldiers were aware of the Italian 
negotiations, and some troops were wildly optimistic, expecting ‘they would 
dock in Naples with an olive branch in one hand and an opera ticket in 
another’137. It was clear that from the very top of the Allied command to the 
fighting soldier there were misconceptions about the reality of what was 
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happening in Italy. The strength of the gathering German military, and the 
divided Italian body was grossly underestimated, and since Arab merchants 
had been selling postcards of Salerno to the embarking troops it was equally 
clear that security was lax. Clark, as mentioned earlier, ignored Royal Naval 
advice and failed to bombard the shore first; he was further under the delusion 
that the Italians would stop the Germans taking over the coastal defence. It 
was a poor decision by Clark because it was too risky to make such an 
assumption. 
 
                The Salerno beachheads were dangerous for the Allied troops as 
Vietinghoff’s Tenth-Army launched a serious counter-attack on the 13th 
September. It nearly worked; it came dangerously close to cutting the 
bridgehead in two, and the US 5thArmy considered the possibility of 
evacuation. A British Colonel remarked with some degree of truth that ‘this 
reminds me of Gallipoli,’ and Alexander, with his usual understatement said 
the situation was unfavourable138.  Clark considered re-embarking, and to this 
day on a small monument in Salerno there are two quotations carved with 
Clark's words "Prepare to evacuate the beach" and the response by Major-
General Middleton "Leave the water and the ammo on the beach. The 45th 
Division is here to stay." 'It is rare indeed for a division to castigate publicly 
its army Commander for considering sailing away from the battle'139.  It was 
so bad at one stage that Vietinghoff sent this telegram to Kesselring and 
OKW:  
 
                       ‘AFTER DEFENSIVE BATTLE LASTING FOUR DAYS ENEMY 
RESISTANCE COLLAPSING + TENTH ARMY PURSUING ENEMY ON WIDE FRONT 
+ HEAVY FIGHTING STILL IN PROGRESS NEAR SALERNO AND ALTAVILLA + 
MANOEUVRE IN PROCESS TO CUT OFF PAESTUM FROM RETREATING 
ENEMY’140. 
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                Göbbels proclaimed it a victory and 'Lord Haw Haw taunted the 
Allied troops and wished them bon voyage'141. However, the naval gunfire 
was powerful and accurate, and with air-superiority prevented Salerno 
becoming another Gallipoli. The figures of Salerno illustrate the near disaster: 
Germans inflicted 8,659 casualties whilst suffering 3,472 and the Germans 
took 3,000 prisoners whilst losing 630 themselves, mainly on D-Day from the 
beach142. In any seaborne operation against a defensive position the odds will 
be against the attackers, but there were too many misjudgements made, and 
only the overwhelming air and sea power saved the day. The close run nature 
of Salerno continued to enhance a misplaced respect for Kesselring.  
 
                      One of the great weaknesses of the Allied planning was the 
apparent ignorance of the Italian weather and terrain. Kesselring and his staff 
had a thorough knowledge of Italian geography, whereas the Anglo-American 
forces 'were inexplicably and culpably ill-informed about the geographical, 
tactical, political and economic problems they would meet there'143. There is 
next to no mention of terrain in the plans, yet throughout the Italian campaign 
it was one of the dominant features to cause problems144. 
 
                   This terrain caused Montgomery immediate problems as he faced 
considerable criticism for his slow progress from Calabria to Salerno. 
Kesselring had ordered the troops retreating from the south to destroy bridges, 
roads and booby-trapped anything of interest making it difficult for the British 
8thArmy to cover more than three miles daily. The terrain was such that these 
methods were easily accomplished at great cost to the attacker. This was the 
work of a sound military professional made easy by the terrain, but has led 
some historians to overly praise him: Hickey wrote that he had ‘clearly 
demonstrated in his Panzer’s withdrawal from Calabria that he was master of 
the art of delaying tactics’145. 
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                  The same terrain of mountain and valley allowed Kesselring to 
build a series of in-depth defence lines across the breadth of Italy's 'leg', the 
first line ran through Monte Mignano called the Berhardt/Reinhard, and 
beyond this the Garigliano River to the Cassino line, the well-known Gustav 
line. Kesselring had the terrain on his side; Italy was long, narrow, 
mountainous, with narrow roads and cold winters it was easier to defend than 
to attack.  Ernie Pyle the war correspondent wrote '…the war in Italy was 
tough. The land and the weather were both against us. It rained and it rained. 
Vehicles bogged down and temporary bridges washed out. The country was 
shockingly beautiful, and just as shockingly hard to capture from the enemy. 
The hills rose to high ridges of almost solid rock. We couldn’t go round them 
through the flat peaceful valleys, because the Germans were up there looking 
down upon us, and they would have let us have it. So we had to go up and 
over. A mere platoon of Germans, well dug in on high, rock-spined hill, could 
hold out for a long time against tremendous onslaughts'146. There was hostile 
weather, terrain, and experienced German forces who 'were never routed in 
battle. They generally withdrew in good order to planned and prepared 
defence lines'147. As they withdrew they blew up bridges, blocked passes, 
flooded valleys, and left booby traps; in Salerno and some other towns there 
were 'fuses with a 42-day run'148. Italy gave Kesselring the opportunity to 
exhibit how easy it was to defend such terrain.  
 
                       Kesselring was never entirely in charge, as he claimed, and 
after his failure to understand what was happening under his very nose in 
Italian politics, he turned against his hosts in a way, which, as will be seen, 
became not just ruthless but criminally brutal. The difficulties experienced in 
Sicily and Salerno caused by Allied planning, weak decision making, a 
defender's terrain and inexperience multiplied exponentially on the way to 
Rome. This unjustifiably enhanced Kesselring's reputation for defence, 
excusing Allied ineptitude and inexperience.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ITALY (1943-1944) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
                 There are four points of exploration in this chapter, beginning with 
the ambiguous nature of Kesselring's command; especially in the light of the 
arrival of the SS with their brutality and deployment of biological warfare. 
Secondly, and briefly, Kesselring continued to be hampered by espionage and 
counter-intelligence a problem he never overcame. Thirdly, he tried, postwar 
to set his image as the saviour of Italian treasure, for which he had some 
justification, but in reality his policy of plundering industrial and economic 
resources, and the agricultural devastation caused by some of his troops, 
marred any hope he had of being seen as the saviour of Italy. Finally, and 
most critically regarding the general view of his status as the master of 
defence, the Italian campaign, far more than any other single factor, gave 
Kesselring his reputation. Therefore it is important to view him against the 
backdrop of four highly significant military events, the Luftwaffe attack on 
Bari, the attack on the Gustav line, the Anzio landings, and the fall of Rome1.  
The Italian campaign was pivotal for Kesselring; what happened in Italy gave 
him among some military commanders and historians a reputation of heroic 
professionalism, but the same events also led to a death sentence, and 
although he survived this threat, what happened in Italy haunted him to his 
deathbed. This period will give further substance to the theme of Kesselring's 
reputation as a 'great' defence commander: Carlo D’Este wrote that Kesselring 
‘symbolised the German defence of Italy, and he became the bedrock upon 
which it was built. Where others would have drawn the wrong conclusion or 
over-reacted Kesselring remained composed and was quite literally (sic) the 
glue that held the German Army in Italy together’2. This chapter will use 
these chosen campaigns to illustrate that Kesselring's reputation was more a 
myth to excuse the divided and anaemic Allied command which was the real 
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2     D’Este, Fatal,p.132. 
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bedrock of Kesselring's perceived strengths. There needs to be some 
descriptive passages of how the Allied command reacted in order to illustrate 
how their weakness enhanced Kesselring's reputation in history. One of the 
most recent books on the Gustav line battle at Monte Cassino stresses as a 
'core theme … the reality of the impact of personalities:' this was true at the 
time and in postwar analysis3.                        
 
The Backdrop 
 
                        To understand Kesselring it is important to try and unravel the 
complexity of what happened in Italy. Mussolini was restored in North Italy 
as Hitler’s Quisling, and his German SS guard were both guardians and 
prison-wardens: he had become a tragicomic figure. The Germans controlled 
Italy, which is probably why the Allies used the word Emperor as 
Kesselring’s code name4. The Allies, with huge resources were advancing 
with the ever-present threat of another invasion near Rome, and with an all-
powerful air-force, making the Luftwaffe virtually ineffective. The civilian 
population was close to starvation, and Mussolini technically presided over a 
country divided by civil war, and uncertain as to who was the enemy. 
Between July 1943 and 1945 Allied bombing 'killed 64,000 Italian civilians,' 
although this general figure is unverifiable5. Italian soldiers were trained in 
Germany, and most were killed on the Eastern Front6. Of those called up 
'10,000 of them deserted within the first few weeks' of 1943:  it was a time of 
mixed loyalties, total confusion and suspicion7. The south of Italy was under 
Allied control, parts of Northern Italy were ostensibly held by Mussolini, the 
Badoglio government and Royal Family were down south, partisans ranging 
from Communists to Catholics fought mainly in the north, the German 
military held sway north of the frontline: Italy was suffering a complex and 
bitter civil war. It was not just the Allies against Germany, but political 
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ideologies, religion, and geographical areas seeking self-government were all 
varying aspects of a multifaceted causation in the fighting. 
 
                  The battleground of Italy had focal points which have since 
become household names. After Salerno the Allies pressed north through 
heavily defended river crossings until they came upon the Gustav line with its 
pivotal point at Cassino. The nature of the mountainous terrain demanded 
more amphibious landings, and although Kesselring believed the Allies would 
carry out another invasion Anzio still took him by surprise. He had 
preparatory plans; Operation Richard entailed having reserve divisions ready 
to swing into action across the breadth of Italy. Even after Anzio he remained 
convinced, with Allied deception, that there would be another landing around 
Leghorn. The Allies planned two major advances: General Clark's 5th Army in 
the west to enter the Liri Valley after eliminating Monte Cassino; 
Montgomery’s 8th Army along the Adriatic; Kesselring's reserves would be 
rushed from one to the other when necessary.  
 
Kesselring's Command and the SS 
 
                     As mentioned earlier although Kesselring held the grand title of 
Oberbefehlshaber-Süd he was answerable to many chiefs in Italy as well as 
Hitler and the OKW. As Italy disintegrated Kesselring's command became 
better defined and more embracing, but after Italy's capitulation Himmler's SS 
moved into Kesselring's sphere, and although he claimed to be their technical 
superior it was a misnomer, because they had their own command structure. 
There was also the Reich Foreign Labour Service, tasked to transport 
labourers, and which reported directly to Berlin. Obergruppenführer Karl 
Wolff was responsible for security, and the war against Partisans8. Wolff 
approached Kesselring with the idea that the SS did ‘police’ duties within the 
army-controlled area. From1934 Kesselring had been living within a police 
state, 'a category of political regime in which the police, the security services 
and the special forces are authorised to bypass the normal procedures of the 
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law'9. As such Kesselring nearly accepted the offer, but was warned off by 
Westphal, who was more adverse to the SS than Kesselring. As Westphal 
noted, 'not even a field-marshal of the Army was permitted to punish a soldier 
of these forces with a single day's arrest. The Army authorities could do no 
more than make representations to Göring or Himmler'10. 
 
                   There was command-confusion, and by May 1st1944 Kesselring 
demanded that Keitel send a signal defining his duties; Kesselring was made 
the highest authority, but the partisan war was given to Obergruppenführer 
Wolff and his guerrilla operations-staff. They were subordinate to Kesselring 
only for the sake of military appearances. Where the army was involved, the 
SS and the Police shared combat-roles, but not within a 19/20 mile zone from 
the front. The whole issue of the partisan war will be examined later. The 
communication problems meant that often 'SS deeds went unobserved' by the 
High Command, Kesselring sometimes only hearing about them through 
casualty reports11. The SS was afforded the opportunity for independent 
action, and some of their reports simply read 'partisans put down' covering a 
massacre. 
  
                Himmler wanted Rome evacuated, but Kesselring refused on the 
grounds of potential starvation and riot. Then Kappler was ordered by 
Himmler to arrest 800 Jews, Kesselring had no authority to disobey, but, 
following a conversation with Kappler and Möllhausen he circumnavigated 
the order by not detailing troops to the task12. The Jews in Tunisia had been 
ill-treated but not exterminated, and it was Kesselring's awareness that the 
Italians were not anti-Semitic, that meant he would have avoided the issue 
when possible. Up until July 1943 frontier officials were known to permit 
Jewish refugees to find sanctuary in Italy13. Once Himmler's SS arrived the 
situation changed. Kesselring was right-wing nationalist and undoubtedly 
anti-Semitic, but he never played an active role in the Holocaust. 
                                                 
9     Davies, Simple,p.303. 
10    Westphal, German,pp55/6. 
11    Lingen, Kesselring,p.42. 
12    Kurzman, Special,p.165. 
13    Bosworth, Mussolini,p.393. 
 171
Unquestionably, despite his denials, he must have known of these crimes 
against humanity, as they were later described, and his guilt, for which he was 
never convicted, lies not so much in his general anti-Semitism, but in his 
unquestioning support of Hitler who had made the Holocaust a priority. It is 
possible to be guilty without committing the crime by being in liaison with the 
one who does: this has long been embedded in English criminal law. 
 
                     Rome had been declared an Open City, but the Pope, being 
concerned with a breakdown of law and order, had asked Kesselring to police 
the city. Some have argued that Kesselring's Open City was 'a mere pretence:' 
Kesselring had to use the city as a transport-communication area because all 
the roads led towards the Gustav line and Anzio14. Rome’s citizens were 
anticipating the end of the war, but during April the city was reaching 
starvation level. There were bread riots and the SS reacted with brutality 
shooting 'ten women on a Tiber bridge' as an example15. No mention of this 
incident is ever made in connection with Kesselring, underlining that the SS 
were their own independent wing: they only paid lip service to Wehrmacht 
Field-Marshals. Himmler had reacted with equal ferocity south of Anzio 
where the Pontine Marshes had been drained by Mussolini for farming. 
Himmler had the area checked by 'hydrographers and malariologists, who by 
flooding knew it would revert to a larval nursery for Anopheles Labranchiae, 
which made the place dangerous and in many ways it was probably the first 
and only example of biological warfare'16. The perpetrators were Himmler's 
medical specialists from Himmler’s 'Ancestral Heritage Research 
Organization'17. There is no available evidence that suggests Kesselring knew, 
and if there is no extant evidence it is best to give the benefit of the doubt. 
However, as will be discussed later, Kesselring was aware of the execution of 
American POWs, which no one believed possible at that time, and he 
committed perjury to avoid indictment. He may not have had total control as 
he wished, but his awareness of what was happening was undoubtedly 
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comprehensive. As with the Holocaust, he may have disagreed, he may have 
had nothing to do with the deed, but he was working with and for the 
perpetrators; he was complicit.  
 
Military Intelligence 
 
                   Kesselring technically carried more responsibility than any other 
commander, though limited, as noted above by other command structures. He 
was also hampered by having his intelligence continuously breached.  He 
tried to keep his new military HQ in Soratte secret because of spies, although 
in April 1944 it was seriously bombed18. His various Headquarters were 
bombed several times because of information fed through to the Allied forces. 
Kesselring eventually discovered a spy in his actual staff, 'an Italian operative 
… an ardent Royalist who served as a liaison with the Fascist command in 
Rome, also secretly provided the German order of battle and details about the 
Fischfang counterattack'19. He was eventually shot after two months of torture 
failed to break him. 
                
                      The SOE spy in Rome, Tompkins, was giving such detailed 
information about units; it was believed he 'was the mole in Kesselring's 
camp'20. Kesselring was running a military campaign against an enemy who 
was more welcome in Italy than he was. Kesselring had his own spies, when 
the mustard-gas leaked after the raid on Bari, which the Allies had tried to 
keep secret, the Berlin radio through the voice of the Berlin Bitch was 
mocking the soldiers for poisoning themselves with their own gas. Kesselring 
became suspicious, doubting various Italian commanders, and, as already 
mentioned, there was the fear that the Abwehr chief was not reliable.  
 
                       Occasionally Allied plans fell into Kesselring's hands, but he 
never knew that most of his orders were decoded in Bletchley, and dispatched 
to Allied command the same day. 'In central government circles the few who 
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20    Katz, Fatal,p.165. 
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knew of their existence referred to them as 'Boniface'21. To the select wider 
world it was 'Ultra' and information to and from Kesselring was known to the 
Allies. Kesselring’s orders to Mackensen regarding the attack on Anzio, was 
read by Ultra, and Carlo D’Este opined this was one of the most important 
Ultra intercepts of the entire war22. Typically, Mark Clark had 'set little store 
by the valuable information streaming from Bletchley Park' but the Anzio 
information changed his mind23.  Kesselring's strategies and plans were 
continuously breached, something he never realised even postwar. 
 
The Policy of Plunder 
 
                 Kesselring, an educated man who appreciated Italy's culture, 
contrasted with the infamous Göring who was plundering art throughout 
Europe. Kesselring alleged he questioned this, but acquiesced when informed 
it was for the Reich's museum of European Art: a naïve attitude, but more 
likely necessary compliance. 
 
                 A Lt-Colonel Schlegel, who 'before the war had been an art 
historian and librarian,' was the true instigator behind saving the considerable 
treasures at Monte Cassino, and is still honoured there to this day24.  When 
Schlegel and a Lt Becker, members of the Herman Göring Division 
approached the Abbot, Dom Gregorio Diamare, suggesting they save the 
treasures and library, the monks were suspicious because of Göring's 
reputation as 'perhaps the most celebrated snapper-up of unconsidered trifles 
in the Second World War'25. Eventually they accepted this once Weizsacker 
spoke with Kesselring, who, with Senger, authorised they be transported to 
the Vatican, a safe place26. After the war Kesselring implied he was the true 
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saviour of the Cassino treasures; he may well have signed the order, but the 
initiative started with men like Senger and especially Schlegel.  
 
                  Most of the art treasures of Naples had been placed in the 
monastery, and it took three weeks to pack; 'considering the precarious 
position of the German armies north of Naples, it was an extraordinary use of 
military effort'27. It was suspected with some justification that not all the work 
arrived at the Vatican but an appeal 'was made to Kesselring himself, {and} 
the recalcitrant Göring Division finally agreed to return part of their 
holdings'28. Some Italian treasures were purloined and some lost forever, but 
even Kesselring's most ardent critics acknowledged that this was not his 
doing. 
 
                According to von Weizsäcker, German ambassador to the Vatican, 
Rome's survival was due to the Pope and Kesselring29. Later evidence 
indicated that it was Hitler’s demand that preserved Rome. Kesselring had 
recognised the open city, but, as mentioned, there had been no withdrawal of 
‘military installations … if only for geographical reasons, and because of the 
railway system,’ it was difficult not to do otherwise30. Despite accusations 
levelled against Kesselring many concur that Rome avoided disaster and, 
along with Cardinal Schuster, he was also credited with helping save 
Florence, Bologna and Milan31. His reputation at this stage was not one of 
villainy, he had interfered in the resurrected Italian fascist movement, and 
stopped the 'torture chambers,' and up to June 1943 his reputation in Italy was 
reasonable32.  
 
                      Kesselring had once famously remarked that the Italian 
campaign was like 'waging war in a museum,' and although he could assume a 
modicum of credit for not totally destroying or plundering that museum, he 
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was ruthless with Italy's economic future33. On the 20thSeptember 1943 
Kesselring issued a directive to retreating troops that industrial-machinery be 
sent north; and there be a demolition of communication-systems, power-
plants, docks/water supplies. It was done ruthlessly, and when, for example, 
Benelli's, a motorcycle manufacturer tried to avoid this 'the Germans 
kidnapped and held a Benelli brother as hostage' until the cache was 
revealed'34. It ought to be noted that the Allies had organised a Task-Force of 
'technical thieves' to purloin anything of military interest as Italy, France and 
Germany were invaded35. Museums, churches, monasteries and hospitals were 
mainly spared. It has also been claimed that he ordered that 'milk-cows should 
not be killed because their milk was important for Roman children', but given 
the evidence of history this seems unlikely36. This type of fighting-defence 
was horrendous on civilians. It is estimated 92% of all sheep and cattle in 
South-Italy with 86% of poultry was taken by the retreating army, there were 
delayed action-bombs, booby-traps, but, it must be recalled 'some Allied 
soldiers behaved no better than their enemies, vandalising priceless 
artefacts'37. Nevertheless, despite the behaviour of some Allied troops there is 
no escaping the fact that Kesselring's retreating troops destroyed much of 
Italy, they 'fired the ricks and farmhouses, slaughtered the cattle, and 
murdered more than a few civilians'38. Despite Dollmann's strange claim that 
Kesselring worked with Speer to avoid Hitler's burnt-earth policies he had 
little control over widespread troops39. In mid-October 1944, Kesselring spent 
time with Albert Speer discussing making North Italy self-sufficient which 
was lacking reality. Kesselring's policy of removing industrial plants was for 
the salvation of Germany, not the survival of Italy. 
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The Four Battles 
 
Bari 
 
                 The raid on Bari is noteworthy because it underlines the degree of 
complacency that had crept into the Allied camp; the Luftwaffe raid was more 
a failure of the Allies than the brilliance of Kesselring and the Luftwaffe. The 
Allied superiority in the air was overwhelming, and the number of German 
planes was diminishing every month. In late November 1943 Kesselring held 
a conference at his HQ in Frascati with Richthofen, Pelz, Baumbach to 
discuss how to slow the inexorable Allied advance; the Foggia airfields were 
seen as the most viable option. Richthofen argued for Bari because of the 
huge number of supplies passing through the port, and Kesselring agreed. Air 
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, (1stAllied Tactical Air Force) had claimed the 
Luftwaffe was finished, stating that 'I would regard it as a personal affront and 
insult if the Luftwaffe would attempt any significant action in this area'40. 
Richthofen was informed by spies that such was their confidence the Allies 
were unloading at night with all the lights on in Bari. When the raid took 
place on December 2nd the complacency of the Allies was self-evident, and 
the port was lit up.  
  
           The raid was so successful it became known as the 'Little Pearl 
Harbour' or 'Second Pearl Harbour.' The Luftwaffe managed to sink seventeen 
ships, and damage many others, as well as the dockyards41. Amongst these 
vessels was a Liberty ship called the SS John Harvey: it was carrying mustard 
gas bombs which caused massive fatalities42. 
 
                Bari Port was out of commission for a long period of time, and was 
the second greatest shipping disaster for the Allies during World War II. 
Kesselring's raid had some serious effects on the Allied campaign; not least 
amongst the problems was lack of supplies to the 15thAir Force at Foggia 
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which had been dependent upon Bari's imports. It 'prevented Mediterranean 
Allied Air Forces from attacking German airfields prior to the amphibious 
landing at Anzio'43. Some historians believe the ramifications of the Bari raid 
stretched as far as Normandy44. This may be putting too much weight on the 
German success, but it did cause serious problems for the Allied campaign 
and at the expense of many lives. From Kesselring's point of view it was an 
outstanding success, but it succeeded because the Allied air command was 
over confident and mistakenly thought the Luftwaffe was finished. Allowing 
the lights to stay on just a few miles from the enemy lines was a blunder, 
especially with so many merchant vessels side by side. This fatal error by 
Allied command was first hidden from the public, and then excused by 
admiring Kesselring's skill.  
 
Gustav Line and Monte Cassino 
 
              There were many destructive battles before the major assault on the 
Gustav Line. Kesselring was surprised at the Allies' slow progress; it 
transpired that the Allied casualty rate was greater than the German, and there 
was a 'steady rate of attrition to which Montgomery contributed with the 
uninspired obstinacy of his methods'45.  The campaign had become a 
positional-war, and the British Official History speaks of Kesselring as a 
'formidable commander,' whereas it might have been more accurate to 
question Montgomery's leadership, but at that time it would have been 
inappropriate46.   
 
                Kesselring had competent commanders, especially Senger and 
Chief of Staff Westphal; Vietinghoff was back in command of the Tenth 
Army, with Mackensen as commander of the newly-formed Fourteenth Army. 
After the British widened the bridgehead at the Garigliano, and the American 
36th Division arrived at the Rapido they were met by heavy German 
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artillery47. The German resistance was strong, and Alexander wrote to 
Churchill that 'the Germans are fighting magnificently. Never imagine they 
are crashing. Their staff work is brilliantly flexible’48. However, there was 
poor planning by Clark; it was a slaughter and 'the officers and men of the 
36th Division were unequivocal as to who was responsible … it was entirely 
Mark Clark's fault'49. There were some persuasive arguments that the 'bad 
show' was the responsibility of the local commander Walker, but either way 
the Allies made it easier for Kesselring and his subordinates to defend and 
earn Alexander's praise50. Once again the admiration is given to Kesselring 
instead of questioning the leadership of the Allied command. 
 
                          As the Anzio landings were being contained, Hitler issued 
Order Number 52 in which he demanded that the fight had to be merciless not 
only against the enemy, but against any officers or units failing in their duty, 
referring to that 'hazardous enterprise which will be drowned in the blood of 
Anglo-Saxon soldiers'51. After the Anzio landing Hitler had sent a message to 
the troops demanding 'it must be fought with bitter hatred against an enemy 
who wages a ruthless war of annihilation … without any higher ethical aims, 
and strives only for the destruction of Germany and European culture'52. 
Kesselring's first biographer claimed that Hitler's ruthless orders 'weighed on 
his conscience,' but given Kesselring's reaction to later events this seems 
problematical53.  There is no written evidence that Kesselring demurred from 
the orders.  
 
                The Gustav line was a series of battles, but the Allied victory on 
Monte Cassino was elusive and cost many numbers of lives54. Kesselring 
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admitted the use of the 'natural features with concrete armoured positions and 
enfilading fire' made defence easier than attack55. They had prepared their 
defence points and 'their skilled commanders were determined to hold out 
whatever … they were assisted by Allied ineptitude in the first three battles'56. 
 
                On February 3rd Alexander ordered the New Zealand 2ndDivision 
and the 4thIndian Division under General Freyberg to join General Clark’s 
5thArmy. Freyberg believed that Cassino and its surrounds were inviolate 
unless the Abbey were destroyed: he was convinced the Abbey was an 
observation point and demanded its destruction; this drastic thinking may 
have been influenced when he heard that his only son was missing at Anzio57. 
The destruction of the Abbey is a point of contention to this day, but it played 
into Kesselring's hands as if he had been handed a victory. 
 
                Typically of the Allied command there were division of opinions, 
claims and counter-claims that continued after the war. Many argued Monte 
Cassino could be outflanked, including Major-General Tuker and the French 
Commander Juin58. Tuker claimed Freyburg 'should never have been put in 
charge of a corps, he had not the tactical understanding' he nevertheless had 
Alexander's support59. 'Tuker could not understand why Cassino town, 
monastery and point 593 be made point of attack' unless bombing could 
guarantee total destruction of resistance otherwise outflank along the northern 
route and Gari river - 'I went on arguing this from hospital by letter through 
my divisional headquarters.'60  Later Alexander wrote that a misinterpretation 
of a German radio message prompted the Allies to think the Germans were 
inside the Abbey61.  
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                     It is extremely unlikely that the Germans used the Abbey despite 
what the occasional spotter-plane and misunderstood radio-messages claimed. 
Kesselring refused the use of the Abbey, having 'given his assurance to the 
Vatican on the 11thDecember 1943'62. Westphal confirmed that Kesselring had 
the Abbey cordoned off by military police for its protection63.  The Abbot said 
the Germans had not broken the agreement; the Abbot's secretary, Don 
Martino Matronola's diary recorded that the Germans never entered the 
premises64.  Senger, a Lay-Benedictine attending mass said he was the only 
German present; and even Churchill later admitted that the evidence indicated 
there were no Germans65.   
 
               The military theorist JCF Fuller described the bombing as 'not so 
much a piece of vandalism as an act of sheer tactical stupidity'66. The 
Germans were dug in below the buildings on that formidable hill, and the 
antiquity of the religious site was a secondary consideration to Freyberg and 
Eisenhower who decided human life was more important; yet they were aware 
'that as many as 3000 Italian civilians had sought shelter within the 
monastery's walls'67. The Germans had declared a three-hundred yard wide 
non-combat zone around the abbey, which in terms of the sharp decline is still 
within the shadows of the walls. To preserve the Abbey meant avoiding the 
mountain, but it was militarily out of the question for the Germans, so 
whether the monastery was occupied or not was a fatuous debate - Monte 
Cassino dominated the area, and if they had declared it an ‘open site’ that 
would not bind the Allies68.  
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            On the morning of the 15thFebruary 96thBombardment Group in 
Foggia read their brief which stated that the Abbey ‘is a huge ancient 
monastery which the Germans have chosen as a key defence and have loaded 
with heavy guns … the monastery has accounted for the lives of upwards of 
2,000 American boys who felt the same as we do about church property and 
who paid for it because the Germans do not understand anything human when 
total war is concerned. The monastery MUST be destroyed and everyone in it 
as there is no one in but Germans’69. Later that day over four-hundred tons of 
bombs were dropped on the Abbey killing sheltering Italians and monks, and 
totally destroying the buildings: according to Senger no German was killed70.   
                            
             The bombing will always remain contentious and the Germans made 
propaganda from the 'Philistine' act. A Berlin diarist wrote that 'photographs 
of the battle of Monte Cassino are piling up. The destruction of that beautiful 
monastery is horrifying. What will happen to Florence, Venice, Rome71?’ In 
Dublin de Valera took a brief moral advantage to send an appeal to the 
belligerent governments and to Roosevelt personally on behalf of Rome72. 
Kesselring said the bombing 'was not only quite unnecessary but prejudicial 
to the subsequent conduct on the battle'73. In this Kesselring was accurate; the 
German parachutists, led by Major Rudolf Bohmler, used the rubble as a 
defence. Sengler wrote, 'now we would occupy the abbey without scruple, 
especially as ruins are better for defence than intact buildings'74. Bohmler later 
wrote that if the Allies had attacked immediately with a flanking movement, 
they would have won the hill, but the paratroopers had time to turn the rubble 
into a fortress.75 It created shelter, defence and advantage points; it is easier to 
fight from rubble than from a building. It has been said that from the Allied 
perspective 'there did not appear to be a glimmer of intelligent leadership 
anywhere from division up'76. Questionable leadership by the Allied 
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command has been the subject of much investigation, especially with Mark 
Clark, - 'there is no doubt that the tactics adopted by Clark's 5thArmy at Monte 
Cassino were poor'77.   The historian Ellis on his book on Monte Cassino 
concludes with the powerful indictment that both the 5th and 8th armies were 
'poorly led during the Cassino battles'78. The bombing which created 
defensive strong points and the late, untimed, infantry attack were indicators 
of this poor planning, and made the German defence easier, and helped create 
the image of Kesselring as the great commander of defence. It was a mistake 
which gave Kesselring a better platform than he deserved.  
 
                       The debate will undoubtedly continue: the Germans appeared to 
respect the Abbey and its treasures, but they could not ignore the dominating 
mountain on which the Abbey stood, and the non-combat zone was pointless. 
The Allies were right to place lives before ancient monuments, but the 
bombing provided excellent defensive rubble for the paratroopers. Monte 
Cassino had an effect in that property of an historic nature such as the Ponte 
Vecchio in Florence and Venice, were spared by Kesselring, and on Feb 17th, 
forty-four days after the bombing, Alexander sent a belated letter to 
commanders about preserving 'property of historical and educational 
importance in Italy'79. In the postwar period the debate intensified with Clark 
claiming he was always against the venture, but Freyberg, then New Zealand's 
Governor-General in a letter to Kippenberger, wrote that Clark had said 
'nothing would do but to bring in the heavy fortresses'80. Personality conflict 
in the Allied coalition during and after the war assisted Kesselring. 
 
                 On Wednesday March 15th there was another bombing raid on 
Monte Cassino. Over 1,400 bombs were dropped but, because of the safety of 
the rubble from the initial raid, the parachutists were dug in, and although 
they could only move at night they still put up formidable resistance. 
Churchill complained about the failure to take Monte Cassino to Alexander, 
who in his reply wrote that lack of success was that the 'the tenacity of these 
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German paratroops is quite remarkable …. I doubt if there are any other 
troops in the world who could have stood up to it and then gone on fighting 
with the ferocity they have'81. Despite warnings from Eaker the rubble created 
by the bombing stopped the proposed use of tanks, and again the infantry 
were sent in late and in small numbers, 'dribbled in' according to 
Kippenberger82. 
 
                   The use of air superiority became questionable at this stage. 
Kesselring and his commanders had only a few aircraft at their disposal: in 
January 44 they had 370 planes whereas 'the Allies had close to 4,000'83. It 
would appear the Allies failed at this juncture to use their supremacy 
appropriately; it was 'sadly inadequate'84. The actual bombing raid on Cassino 
town damaged towns away from Cassino and killed Allied troops and hitting 
'8th Army HQ, General Juin's FEC HQ, Allied gun-positions, the 4th Indian 
Division's B Echelon and a Moroccan military hospital'85. What planes the 
Luftwaffe had were used effectively, especially in shipping attacks with the 
new radio-guided bomb86. Senger admitted the air attacks on their supply 
lines were disturbing, but they were never cut, and the aircraft came at 
enormous costs: 'some 315,000 men were needed to keep those thousands of 
aircraft operational - almost as many as the 5th or 8thArmy'87. It should also be 
noted that aircraft were frequently grounded because of 'appalling weather 
conditions,' and Anzio would not have survived without air support.88 
Regarding the Gustav line Churchill saw the 'air offensive as a failure'89.  
 
                       Alexander wanted to stop the frontal attacks, but Freyberg was 
insistent they could win, but on March 23rd Alexander called off frontal 
attacks for a time. 'The performance of commanders is critical to the outcome 
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of any conflict' and this was more than apparent at Monte Cassino90. The 
British official historians were condemnatory in their criticism of Wilson who 
they claimed 'lost touch with the realities of war'91. The poor planning by 
Clark, 'perhaps the most egocentric Allied general of the War,' and Alexander, 
who 'acquired a false reputation as a great commander in the field,' along with 
Freyberg's mistakes meant that Kesselring's defence strategy worked better 
than it should have done given the over-powering numbers92.  'On the whole 
both 5th and 8thArmies were poorly led during the Cassino battles, where 
operations were consistently marred by lack of strategic vision and slipshod 
staff work'93. 
 
                    As well as weak Allied leadership the Italian terrain of 
mountains, rivers, valleys and winter weather gave Kesselring the best 
defensive measures; it was the Allies who had the difficult task. In addition to 
this 'modern artillery and the invention of the machine gun meant there was a 
relative shift to the power of defence on the battlefield'94. It has been 
described as a 'military campaign of consummate strategic stupidity - an 
offensive up the entire length of a long, thin, mountainous country.'95 
Kesselring's reputation was enhanced because the Allies were cautious: a 
criticism frequently made of Montgomery who was always vigilant on the 
grounds of maintaining his reputation. Kesselring's reputation was enhanced 
because he was defending and not attacking, and the opposition made too 
many mistakes: Monte Cassino was a bonus for Kesselring's reputation.      
 
Anzio 
 
                       The concept behind Shingle, the Anzio landing, was to break 
the deadlock of the Gustav Line and Monte Cassino. It was an effort to save 
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what Churchill called the 'stranded whale'96. Unlike Salerno Kesselring was 
caught unawares, but Operation Richard meant reserves were prepared, and 
with considerable alacrity he drew in additional manpower. In postwar 
interviews Kesselring remained critical of the frequently criticised General 
Lucas who, having landed dug in even though the way inland was virtually 
undefended: ‘the road to Rome was open, and an audacious flying column 
could have penetrated to the city,’ Westphal wrote97. It has been claimed that 
on the first morning an American Lt John Cummings of the 36thEngineer 
Regiment attached to Truscott's 3rdDivision, ordered a reconnaissance along 
highway 7, the Appian Way to Rome, and it was all open98. 
 
                   At Anzio Kesselring recalled the Allies being cautious in the 
Great War, as well as Montgomery’s failure to break through following his 
success at the Sangro99. Lucas was initially supported in this caution by Clark 
and Alexander, who recalled the near failure of Salerno, and who prompted 
the need to build-up forces; Maitland Wilson called this the ‘Salerno 
complex.’  
 
           News of the landings reached Kesselring by 3am, by 5am troops were 
heading to the beach, and by 7.10am orders were given for northern reserves 
to move south. Kesselring flew to the front in the early morning and returned 
late evening to avoid Allied aircraft100. The situation stalemated, and as 
German numbers increased both Allied Commanders and Churchill criticised 
the hapless Lucas. Some argue the distance between Rome and Anzio was too 
long to defend, and Lucas had been made the scapegoat. Lucas found support 
in the memoirs of Major General Harmon, and Major General Temple who 
pointed out that ‘the Germans produced seven Divisions in ten days with 
plenty of armour.’101 It is generally agreed that the breakout was delayed too 
long, and further contributes to the view that Kesselring was opposed by 
mediocrity.  
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                      Kesselring was blinded by lack of aerial reconnaissance, and not 
helped by Admiral Canaris issuing a categorical denial of a planned 
invasion102. Canaris had just taken to the air when the invasion started103. The 
policeman Schellenberg suspected Canaris of treachery, and Kesselring's 
ignorance of the invasion meant he had sent reserves to the southern front 
leaving Rome exposed104. Kesselring was on the back foot, but the 
sluggishness of the Allied command saved the immediate fall of Rome and 
entrapment of major German arms. The German logistical strategy was 
efficient: Kesselring moved troops back and forth where they were needed 
like a ‘mastermind controlling reserves to Anzio and Cassino … who 
managed like a Chess Master to balance each front’105. There was an initial 
sense of achievement in Anzio because in one day they had disembarked 
50,000 soldiers with their equipment106. However, even as Lucas dug in 
Kesselring ordered von Pohl to surround the beachhead, with a string of 
batteries strong enough to make it difficult for tanks, and other weapons to be 
rushed into the area; as Kesselring wrote, 'time was our ally'107.  
 
                  At the end of January, General Lucas attempted the first tentative 
breakout from Anzio, around Cisterna and Campoleone. Edward Grace, a 
Gordon Highlanders' officer, referred to this area as the bitterest fighting of 
the war, and more akin to the trenches of the Great War108.  For Kesselring it 
was a matter of anticipating the next move; he had reliable commanders such 
as Heidrich and Baade who constantly secured the area. Kesselring and his 
commanders were more able than the inexperienced Allied commanders; 
Lucas had the reputation of tending to stay in his shelter.  
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                  At a critical stage Hitler interfered, ordering that the Infantry 
Demonstration (Lehr) Regiment be sent for the assault. As Kesselring noted 
this was a home-defence force with no battle exposure; they lacked 
experience and the time of attack meant they would be fighting in unfamiliar 
terrain in the dark. Hitler's interference cost 3,000 men and thirty tanks: 
Kesselring wrote 'they were thrown back disgracefully'109. By March 1st 
Kesselring realised they had failed because of the sheer number of Allied 
tanks. They had failed for two reasons: the first was the sheer size of the 
Allied reserves, but secondly Hitler's inane interference: he had insisted the 
wrong regiment lead the assault, and Kesselring once again would not 
challenge him. 
 
                    During this attack Lucas had been replaced by Truscott, with 
orders to breakout from the bridgehead. By March 11th there were some 
90,000 Americans and 35,000 British ashore. Kesselring expressed the 
obvious concern that the Allied commanders were becoming battle-
experienced and producing better combat-formations, and in an interesting 
insight Kesselring criticised German propaganda for goading the Allies for 
lack of initiative110. Kesselring ordered the strengthening of parts of the 
Gustav Line to enable defensive retreats, and also strengthened the switch-
lines to the Hitler Line, renamed the Senger Bolt111. The Anzio beachhead 
seemed frozen and 'Kesselring used this hiatus to create a new defensive line, 
the Caesar C Line, to contain the beachhead'112. Although the defence scheme 
is often called a series of 'defence lines' this is a misnomer, it was 'a series of 
defended positions in depth,' a system Kesselring perfected113.  
 
                  Kesselring was professional in his approach, as were his 
subordinates, but the Allied command was inexperienced. It would have been 
an interesting scenario had Patton and Truscott been put ashore first; as it was 
the final victory of Anzio was undermined by the initial failures and the 
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reason given was Kesselring's ability. It is true that Kesselring was a reliable 
and well trained military commander, but because of the inexperience and 
ineptitude of some of the Allied leaders he was given the credit. 
 
Rome 
 
               On April 12th King Victor Emmanuel announced his abdication to 
son Umberto, who in an interview with the Times claimed his father had not 
opposed Mussolini's wish for war because he had the support of the people114. 
It was 'clear that the royal household would act against the interests of the 
Italian people in order to save the throne'115. Ten days later Badoglio 
established the first government of National Unity made up of the parties of 
the Committee of National Liberation (CNL). 
 
                 Kesselring, however, was more concerned with his sparse resources 
and knowing his soldiers were continuously on duty: heavy casualties were 
being experienced by both sides in the continuous skirmishes but the two 
fronts appeared stable. Vietinghoff informed Kesselring that all was ‘as 
usual,’ and was called to Berlin to receive a medal; Senger went for the same 
reason plus a course on ideology; Westphal was in hospital. Allowing the 
absence of so many key commanders was a fault that Kesselring does not 
dwell on in his memoirs, because with his commanders away he was caught 
by surprise when the Allies erupted with a major offensive on May 12th in 
some 'fierce and costly fighting'116. Kesselring produced plans for 
Vietinghoff’s Tenth Army to retreat from the Liri Valley which was 
eventually achieved117. 
 
               Kesselring's defence scheme had held months longer than the 
Allies had anticipated, but was now crumbling118. The German defence was 
being attacked at every point, and on May 22nd the French made some sudden 
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advances at Pico which some claim made 'Kesselring cry with rage'119. 
Kesselring asked for the 29thPanzer Grenadiers to be placed at the disposal of 
the Tenth Army, but Mackensen was unhappy about this because he was 
facing a serious breakout attempt at Anzio. Kesselring became critical of 
Mackensen who, when he offered Kesselring his resignation for the third time 
at the end of May, Kesselring accepted it and replaced him with Joachim 
Lemelsen: 'smiling Albert remained a tough no-nonsense German General'120. 
He used Mackensen again, but it sent a warning to subordinates about reacting 
to orders without question. This contrasts with the American Mark Clark and 
his attitude to his superior Alexander, and more pertinently Alexander's 
reaction when, as shall be described, Clark deliberately disobeyed orders with 
incalculable consequences over his infatuation with conquering Rome. 
 
                           Ultra had picked up Kesselring’s message to Hitler asking 
permission for both armies to retreat, and for Rome to be evacuated without a 
fight121. In breaking out from Anzio General Clark had been instructed to 
entrap the Tenth-Army by encirclement, by making for Valmontone to stop 
the German supply route122. Instead, in one of the worse Allied blunders, he 
turned towards Rome to be met by Mackensen in the Alban Hills acting as a 
delaying line before the Caesar Defences. Clark was determined to take Rome 
at all costs, and take it before the British arrived to share any glory. In his 
postwar memoirs Clark admitted that he intended to be the first to take Rome 
from the south in fifteen centuries, 'but we intended to see that the people 
back home knew that it was the 5thArmy'123.  
 
                    Clark’s failure to close the Valmontone Gap, which could have 
entrapped the whole southern wing of the Tenth-Army, and forced some 
elements of the 14th to retreat, went against Alexander’s orders in Operation 
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Buffalo, and, by so doing ‘he deliberately committed what must be ranked as 
one of the most misguided blunders made by an Allied commander during 
World War II’124. Clark was obsessed with ensuring the Americans arrived in 
Rome before the British, whom he believed were conspiring against him. 
Clark was an embittered Anglophobe and his 'growing disdain for his British 
colleagues in Italy began to affect his judgement'125. Clark’s planning was 
poor and at Salerno, the Rapido crossing and Rome he made gross errors of 
judgment126. Truscott never changed his mind that Clark had made the 
greatest error for the sake of personal vanity. Had the Valmontone Gap been 
closed, and the Germans encircled, then Rome would have fallen probably 
more quickly than the circuitous route taken by Clark. Kesselring could see 
what ‘Clark obsessed with his private goals could not see, that it was the 
combination of the Allied thrusts … that posed the threat’.127  
 
                   Clark arrived in Rome as the all-conquering saviour, but the 
failure to capture an entire German army was a serious error. Alexander was 
too gentlemanly, and there were no personal consequences; Kesselring had 
sacked Mackensen for being tardy, 'Adolf Hitler would have had him {Clark} 
shot'128. This major Allied blunder allowed Kesselring to continue the defence 
for which he was becoming famous; it could have been a very different 
history had Clark followed orders. 
 
                        In the battle leading up to Rome the Allies lost 42,000 men and 
the Germans 25,000. It is apparent Kesselring was not faced with highly 
competent commanders on the Allied side. 'No important victory was 
achievable, certainly not by field commanders of such meagre abilities as 
Alexander and Clark'129. It has been believed by many that Clark 'was unfit to 
be an army commander,' and there is little doubt by taking Rome and not 
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entrapping the Germans forces, he gave Kesselring the means of prolonging 
the war in Italy to the bitter end130.  
                       
                      Alexander wrote that 'every time we attacked Kesselring in Italy 
we took him completely by surprise; but he showed very great skill in 
extricating himself from the desperate situation into which his faulty 
intelligence had led him'131. Once again a senior Allied commander used 
Kesselring's growing reputation for failure of his own orders. In addition to 
the problem of outwitting Kesselring, Alexander admitted that 'I think we may 
well have underestimated the remarkable resilience and toughness of the 
Germans'132. Again on March 22nd he wrote to Brooke 'unfortunately we are 
fighting the best soldiers in the world - what men'133! It is true that Kesselring 
had to order the paratroopers out of Cassino 'otherwise they would have 
fought to the death,' but the praise of the enemy covers the weakness of one's 
own side134. 
 
                     Kesselring has been admired by friend and foe for his ability in 
commanding fighting defences: he once claimed that his military strategy in 
Italy was 'simply to make the enemy exhaust himself,' and had it not been for 
the massive Allied resources Kesselring would have been successful135. There 
is little doubt that once again the Allies lacked the true measure of their 
adversaries, and although much of Kesselring's military standing springs from 
this period, his reputation was assisted by the weak Allied command. 
 
Conclusion to Mediterranean Military campaigns 
 
                  The whole Italian campaign has been questioned, claiming that 
'Churchill did not appreciate that landings in France were simply a better way 
to defeat Germany than fighting up the spine in Italy'136. In Italy                  
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Kesselring's reputation was enhanced by some serious blunders by the Allied 
leadership, and their uninventive predictable planning, but there were other 
factors which allowed the Germans to give such a sound defence. The 
Americans had felt propelled into Italy by Churchill, and after Salerno there 
was a distinct feeling they were a sideshow to Western Europe, and Marshall 
admitted 'to maintain morale under these conditions was very hard'137. The 
American soldiers had learned a great deal since their baptism at Kasserine 
Pass, and had 'gone beyond being an army at dawn, {but they} still had much 
to learn'138. On the other hand, it has been claimed that because of the Great 
War the British were forever conscious of avoiding 'unnecessary risk where 
possible'139. 'In Italy' Marshall wrote, 'the fighting spirit and aggressive quality 
of British Divisions began to decline, and for the reason of the sheer factor of 
exhaustion'140. The diary of a British infantry man, Rifleman Bowlby 
illustrates both the sense of exhaustion and the need to stay alive as being 
paramount, 'the ethics of desertion had a deeper pull'141. Bowlby faced danger 
throughout the latter part of the Italian campaign, 'the fear of disgrace' being 
his source of his courage, but not once does he appear to have fired a 
weapon'142.  
 
                 To bring about the collapse of the Monte Cassino resistance it took 
the Polish brigade who bore utter hatred for the enemy, and similarly with the 
French under General Juin who created a breach in the line. All these factors 
are in the background of a mountainous country which by its nature is easier 
to defend than attack. Logistics were on the Allied side, but man to man it was 
a bare numerical superiority over the Germans 'at a slender one and one-
quarter to one'143. In effect the Allies were attacking the most effective army 
of the Second World War in terrain that favoured the defensive144. The 
ineptitude of the leaders, the inexperience and exhaustion of many troops, the 
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sheer landscape were all in Kesselring's favour, so even after Rome the 
fighting in Italy 'limped on rarely on the front pages but always hard and 
bloody'145. Kesselring's reputation stood high as an excuse for Allied failures. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
NORTH ITALY AND PARTISANS (1944-1945) 
 
Introduction 
 
 
           This chapter will continue to evaluate Kesselring's loyalty to Hitler, 
and briefly outline the rest of the Italian campaign with Kesselring's near fatal 
accident, but the main thrust of the chapter will deal with the nature of the 
partisan war in Italy. First it is critical to understand what 'partisan' meant, and 
how it was viewed historically and in international law. Secondly, the reaction 
of the Allies to the partisans was complex and with hidden agendas, and 
illustrates the multifaceted nature of the civil war. Finally, the sheer brutality 
of partisan war must be viewed, and Kesselring's reactions. Some Allied 
commanders expressed sympathy for Kesselring; this thesis will argue that in 
reality he ordered, and was complicit in crimes against humanity. 
 
Kesselring's Loyalty 
 
 
                  There were rumours amongst the Allies that Kesselring was at 
odds with Hitler; 'Kesselring, whom Allied propaganda broadcasts had 
frequently suggested was not a strong supporter of Hitler, and who indeed 
often disagreed with the Führer' did not have the same reputation with the 
Italian civilians1. When Hitler demanded his traditional 'last stand,' Kesselring 
claimed he gave a 'short and heated reply,' but this was stated in the safety of 
postwar memoirs2. Hitler's adjutant wrote that the Italian theatre was in 
Kesselring's hands 'and Hitler hardly ever interfered there'3. Kesselring, who 
was the only Field-Marshal never sacked, remained loyal, and in the last 
'bunker days' was listed by Hitler's aides as one of nine generals 'most loyal to 
Hitler'4.  
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                       After the Stauffenberg bomb-plot, Kesselring claimed 
ignorance, but mentions that Dr Karl Gördeler had tried to 'approach me in 
1942, but unsuccessfully, as I could not then be reached'5. Dollmann confirms 
this, referring to Gördeler as 'a ringleader'6. Certainly after the war Kesselring 
conceded to his son that he was aware 'that something was afoot'7.  Westphal 
and Senger knew about the plot, and Senger had informed Kesselring’s son 
that he owed his life to Kesselring’s intervention at that difficult time8. It is 
certainly true that Senger's COS was a friend of Stauffenberg9. It also appears 
he saved another staff officer, two in all, it may have been Westphal10. The 
plot was probably organised because 'with Hitler the war {would} certainly be 
lost', but Kesselring was obedient to the fruitless end11. The July 20th plot 
involved many executions, and Kesselring did not seem to come under 
suspicion because of his undoubted loyalty. This intense loyalty was evident 
during the rest of the Italian campaign, and especially in the end days in 
Western Europe where his ruthless streak, a point of admiration amongst 
some historians became lethal, in Lamb's words 'he acted like a brute'12. This 
brutality reflected Hitler and was self-evident during the latter months of 1944 
as the Allies pressed north, and the partisan war turned vicious. 
 
Retreat North  
                            
                   As Kesselring retreated north he 'was slightly wounded while in 
the front line,' but carried on after a field dressing13. As early as November 
1944 the Guardian newspaper referred to the Italian campaign as 'the toughest 
of all side-shows' and referred to Kesselring as the 'ex-airman' who transpired 
to 'be one of the most stubborn and least advertised of German generals'14. 
However, Kesselring was no longer master of events, 'no matter how skilled 
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their conduct of defensive battles, the weight of Allied military power was 
wearing away the Wehrmacht's tactical advantages'15. 
 
                 Kesselring knew he was fighting a battle without the numbers or 
reserves, but Alexander 'foolishly informed the Italian partisans in November 
1944 that the exhausted Allies were taking a winter break on the Gothic line' 
so they could disband; the Italian fascists and German intelligence heard this 
with obvious consequences16. This announcement was made despite the fact 
that the massacre on Monte Sole of some 1800 civilians had occurred a month 
before17.  
 
                   The Allies had advanced just over two hundred miles and paused 
for a winter-break, and both Germans and Allies contented themselves with 
the belief they were tying down the other side, Alexander writing that 'it was 
the Germans, not the Allies, who were contained in Italy'18. It could be argued 
that the Germans, with fewer troops, were holding considerably larger 
numbers, and Alexander commented to a journalist in 1950 that who was 
holding who 'permitted no easy answer, then or now'19. 
 
                      On Wednesday 25thOctober Kesselring was on the main road 
from Bologna to Forli when his car crashed into a long-barrelled gun turning 
into a side road; it was a serious accident, fracturing his skull, cutting his face 
wide open and rendering him unconscious for twelve hours. Vietinghoff 
replaced him and contained the Allies until the end of the year. The Allies had 
decided to rest, but time and time again while Kesselring was still in hospital, 
he was given credit for conducting a brilliant defence.  
 
                In the New Year Kesselring returned to his staff HQ at Recoaro 
from which he had been absent for three months. The Italian campaign was at 
a standstill, and it was self-evident that Italy was a secondary theatre; the 
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OKW had withdrawn ten divisions for other fronts. Just before he had his 
accident, it is claimed he had secretly encouraged Wolff, one of the 'tamer SS 
generals' to contact the Americans in Switzerland, but it was Wolff and 
Dollman who took the initiative with Dulles20.  The Allies were wary that 
Stalin would suspect them of making a separate peace21. It was at this 
juncture, that in a top secret telegram relating to this situation, Alexander used 
the code ‘Emperor’, signifying the importance the Allies attached to 
Kesselring22. Wolff had wildly predicted that in a postwar Germany 
Kesselring would be President. On March 9th Kesselring was summoned to 
see Adolf Hitler, deep in his Berlin bunker, and the next day was made 
Commander-in-Chief of the Western theatre. In effect the Italian campaign 
would grind to a halt just before the final capitulation.  
 
Introduction to Partisan War   
  
           Kesselring was well-known for his speed of reaction in organising an 
effective fighting-retreat; it was an aggressive retreat, 'by a series of rearguard 
actions which, inch by inch, opposed the Allied vanguard up to the definitive 
withdrawal on the Gothic line {leaving} a horrifying trail of massacres 
splitting the peninsula transversely'23. What made this part of the war so 
appalling was Kesselring's reaction to increasing partisan activity, and the 
civil war in Italy, especially with a newly created army of Fascist Italian 
troops in Liguria under Graziani, who might well have ended up fighting the 
troops of the Badoglio government.  
 
Partisan or Terrorist 
 
                  It has been claimed that the word partisan derives from 'the 
Spanish resistance to Napoleon' but its meaning is more complex24. Guerrilla, 
meaning 'little war' dates from the same period in Spain, but partisan can be 
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traced back to the work of Johann von Ewald just a few years earlier25. This 
involved raising troops from the local population in order to fight the invader, 
but, as with the partisans of the American Civil War, they were expected to 
wear a uniform or recognisable insignia. By the twentieth century this was not 
the practice, and the words guerrilla fighter, partisan and terrorist became 
confused, and not only took on different meanings, but attracted a wide 
variety of opinions.      
 
                One man’s terrorist is another's patriot, and this phenomenon has 
become more prominent since the last world war. The terrorist/partisan 
emerges because his country has been invaded or oppressed. Churchill 
demanded that Europe be set alight, and Alexander asked Italians to kill 
Germans at every opportunity. Britain was the main external sponsor for 
resistance in Europe, though many senior officers believed this type of war 
not to be ‘gentlemanly;’ Air Chief-Marshal Portal objected to dropping 
civilian agents in order to kill Germans26. The strategy was adopted because it 
tied down German troops, but Kesselring viewed it as his 'struggle against 
gangs with most severe measures'27. 
 
International Law and Attitudes 
 
                     Guerrilla warfare played little part in German military theory, 
but in 1942 the Wehrmacht produced a booklet on guerrilla-warfare regarding 
partisan-war as illegal. The 'international law did not provide any 
unambiguous rules for dealing with guerrilla warfare. The 1907 Hague 
Convention was full of contradictions and open questions concerning the 
rights and responsibilities of an occupying force'28. Partisan war was 
technically illegal from the point of view of the 1907 Hague Convention; the 
section dealing with the The Laws and Customs of War on Land, states that 
'the laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia 
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: to be commanded by a 
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person responsible for his subordinates; to have a fixed distinctive emblem 
recognizable at a distance; to carry arms openly; and to conduct their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war29. 'Article 50 of 
the Hague Convention allowed collective punitive measures against a civilian 
population if a connection between partisans and their general environment 
could be proven'30. Between the wars 'hostages were deemed legitimate 
everywhere but in France'31. There were questions on whether hostages 
should be killed, and the German military lawyers took the extreme line; the 
'point of hostage-taking required the community to make a choice' but it still 
permitted the innocent to suffer32.  
 
                 Resistance and partisans are risky and reprisals were anticipated. In 
October 1941 de Gaulle broadcast a message prohibiting assassinations 
stating ‘war must be conducted by those entrusted with the task’ in case of 
retaliation33. Beneš was warned that Heydrich's assassination would lead to 
catastrophe. If the Germans had invaded Britain there were plans to hide 
‘saboteurs.’ It must be noted that partisans did not always invoke sympathy, 
'although a rosy hue surrounds the deeds of the partisans, for many people 
they were only thieves who issued dubious promissory notes for the food they 
took, but a dangerous liability that brought indiscriminate German reprisals'34. 
When in 1941 some communist partisans in Paris shot Germans on a Paris 
Metro Station 'even convinced patriots had their doubts about the morality of 
these random assassinations which met with reprobation among ordinary 
people'35. On the other hand, in France, a Roman Catholic resistance 
movement called the Défense de la France wrote 'kill the German to purify 
our country, kill him because he kills our people … kill those who denounce, 
those who have aided the enemy … kill the policeman who has in any way 
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contributed to the arrest of patriots … kill the miliciens, exterminate them 
…strike them down like mad dogs … destroy them as you would vermin'36.  
 
                  In the East European war and Balkans the partisan war was very 
different from the resistance in France; reprisals were swift and unbelievably 
sadistic. Much of this was to be repeated in Italy. 'Together with the execution 
of prisoners, the battle against partisans was the framework in which German 
soldiers most frequently committed war crimes'37.  This applies to Kesselring 
who was tried as a war criminal because of the partisan war.  
 
The Italian Partisan 
 
                    It is critical to explore the nature of the Italian partisans in order 
to 'to understand the preconditions for psychologically normal people to do 
things they would not otherwise do'38. After Mussolini's rescue the 
Badoglio/Royal government had fled south and Italy was fractured; as the 
Italian historian Claudio Pavone wrote, the 'armed resistance of 1943-1945 
was, simultaneously, a national war, a civil war, and a class war'39.  This war 
was complicated by a lack of national identity:  it has been suggested there is 
no unified Italy, 'that those who are thought of as Italian regard themselves as 
Piedmontese, Tuscan, Venetian, Sicilian, Calabrian and so on, sometimes 
even fellow countrymen feel like foreigners'40. As the war moved north the 
partisans became more active, and were made up of every nationality, 'a band 
of partisans had formed in the neighbourhood, all nationalities, Italians, Poles, 
Yugoslavs, a few German deserters and some escaped Russian prisoners, they 
roamed the mountains looting the peasants’ dwindling stocks of food, stealing 
their beasts and raiding towns, no quarter was asked or given'41. In another 
contemporary diary, a wealthy American woman married to a landowning 
Italian, recognised that Italy had fallen into a complex civil war. Although 
helping the partisans she perceived the dangers they created. ‘When some hot-
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headed partisans would shoot at a Carabiniere from behind a hedge, or disarm 
two Germans in a village pub, disappearing themselves into the woods and 
leaving the hapless villagers at the mercy of German reprisals’42. Her account 
ranges from incidents where German soldiers politely request permission to 
purchase sheep, when partisans become local robbers, and SS commit 
atrocities. She paints a realistic picture of a country torn by innumerable 
factions, human passions, and extreme human behaviour. It is reckoned that 
by September there were some fifteen-hundred partisans of which about a 
thousand were in the north and the rest around Rome and Abruzzi regions, 
and it was to grow to a speculated 250,00043. 
 
                The partisan groups were sponsored by political parties looking to 
the postwar, especially the communists, equally feared by the Pope, the Allies 
and Germans. 'For the Communists the partisan movement was the vanguard 
of the revolution'44. 'The ultimate goal of communism was not the liberation 
of France or Italy, but the merging of the working classes of all nations in a 
supranational brotherhood'45. The Communists were the most aggressive, 
believing the ‘blood of the martyrs’ builds their foundation. In the via Rasella 
massacre the communist leader, Giorgio Amendola had been at a Meeting  
with De Gasperi of the Christian Democrats when the explosion occurred; it 
was precision timing for the communists to demonstrate their muscle46. It 
provoked the reaction they sought, but to a greater extent than anticipated, 
even though Radio Rome had already announced that a 'ten-to-one reprisal 
had been inflicted in Florence' after the murder of a fascist official47. 
 
                   For most political parties the war provided them with a legitimacy 
denied under Mussolini. Some groups were disbanded soldiers loyal to the 
monarchy, many contained escaped Allied POWs; there would have been 
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many more POWs had the British officers not been instructed to remain as 
prisoners, to await the arrival of the Germans48.  
 
                      After considerable debate the partisans established the 
Committee of National Liberation, the CNL49. It was a mixture of 
Communists, Socialists, a Republican Liberal Party (Partito d’Azione), 
Christian Democrats and others. There were constant tensions, and they 
eventually divided into three main groups, the communist Garibaldi Brigades, 
the Giustizia e Libertȁ Brigades (associated with the Partito d’Azione) and the 
Matteotti Brigades (socialists). There were also many other smaller groups, 
some Catholic based, some Monarchists, (i.e. Di Dio and Mauri) and some 
Anarchists. 'Apart from the PdA {Partito d'Azione} all existed before 
Facism'50. It was complex and at times they fought and betrayed one another; 
on one occasion some Communist partisans had killed some German soldiers 
and were ‘on the run;’ they were traded to a Fascist group by the Azzurri, a 
group of Monarchy partisans. 'Frequently the Fascists were more cruel than 
the Germans'51. 
 
                 'In Italy the violence against political rivals was more extreme52.' 
The centre of this violence was what became known as the 'Red Triangle', or 
the 'Triangle of Death' - that area of Emilia-Romagna between Bolgna, 
Reggio Emilia and Ferrara, the Germans were the centre of attraction initially, 
but it soon became a matter of political ideology. This aspect of Italy's 
partisan war continues to this day, 'one of the most controversial books to 
have been published in Italy at the beginning of the twenty-first century was 
Giampaolo Pansa's Il Sangue dei vinti, which attacked the heroic idea of the 
Italian resistance movement by describing in detail the murders that they 
carried out during and after liberation'53. The book has caused outrage on the 
left as Pansa is seen as tapping into a new and growing right wing. The 
complexity of the right and left politics in modern Italy reverberate to this 
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day: 'street battles over the coffin of a Nazi war criminal {SS Erich Priebke} 
have illustrated that Italy is still torn over the legacy of Fascism as it 
commemorated the 70th anniversary yesterday of the deportation of Rome's 
Jews'54. 
 
                      In the north-east the partisans were influenced by Tito and 
Mihailović establishing an irregular army to seek control postwar; they 
established political commissars with each unit. An almost deadly conflict 
arose between the Partito d’Azione and the communists. The partisans in the 
north tended to be left-wing and in Milan formed the Committee of National 
Liberation of Northern Italy55. The Osoppo resistance wore green scarves 
while the communist Garibaldini wore red scarves; on one occasion the 
communists carried out a wholesale massacre of the Ossopo; the Garibaldi 
even linked themselves with the Slovenes, offering the NE of Italy as part of 
Yugoslavia so long as the Garibaldi leaders stayed in charge56. They were 
eventually tried and convicted in Milan in 1951. 
 
                  There is some duplicity in the Italian partisan debate. In 2005, the 
Berlusconi government inaugurated a new national day of remembrance for 
several thousand Italians killed during the war by Communist-Yugoslav 
partisans around Trieste. It has been cogently argued that 'Italian history has 
tried to overlook the Fascist war of 1940-1943 hoping that the partisan war of 
1943-45 would put the emphasis on Italy as the victim' not the aggressor, and 
help ignore the previous twenty years of Fascism57. Despite this there is no 
monument to the resistance in Italy58.  
 
              It is often overlooked that Italian forces waged a ‘violent counter-
insurgency campaign against Slav and Greek resistance to Axis rule, attacking 
the civilians held responsible for protecting the partisans, and committing 
atrocities which emulated and sometimes even surpassed the occupation 
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methods of their Nazi ally.’59 It is estimated that about '25,000 Slovene men 
and women were captured and deported to concentration camps in Italy and 
the Adriatic islands'60. 
 
The Allies and the Partisans 
 
                   Italy was complex and their politics 'was becoming a serious 
problem in the conduct of America's war in Italy,' who, along with the British, 
were as worried about Communist Partisans as they were Kesselring's 
forces61. When the Allied command extraordinarily announced a winter break, 
the situation escalated, and it has been suggested that the Allies hoped the 
communist partisans would lose heart; 'they were suspicious of communist-
partisans; even at a personal level there was always the danger of betrayal'62. 
The Allies were particularly concerned about the large powerful communist 
groups, in view of postwar politics. It was generally understood that the 
communists were still waging a class-war, based on Lenin writing that 
Socialists differed from the bourgeois because 'we understand the inevitable 
connection between war and class struggle'63. The same concern about 
communist motives was felt on the German side: Wolff, Dollman and Rahn 
believed that with French communists in the west, Tito to the east there would 
be a communist block and they believed 'the only solution was to arrange an 
orderly surrender of German forces'64.  
 
                  The partisans were an embarrassment to the Allies; it was not a 
matter of incorporating them into the army, 'the problem was much more 
difficult, and military and political interests were more in conflict' as they 
moved north65. Although numerous the partisans failed to stop Kesselring's 
one-hundred-fifty mile retreat towards the Gothic line. For the Allies the 
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partisan situation was complex, and there was no agreed policy, 'combat 
commanders were concerned with deriving maximum military advantages … 
while the control commission was intent in minimizing political and social 
disorder'66. There was no real control; the American spy in Rome, Peter 
Tompkins, for personal safety had to maintain a cautious eye not only on the 
Germans but on the different partisan groups67. Some partisans were self-
seeking and criminally inclined, but the main problems were the political 
motivations, especially the communists. 
 
                        The OSS tended to find its Italian speakers from the American 
Mafia, and an OSS Major William Holohan, when dropped by parachute 
carrying large amounts of money, was poisoned and robbed by his own 
recruits68. The Allies, aware of the partisan criminal elements, were interested 
in winning by any means. Alexander asked the CLN in Milan to extend their 
operations promising to help the non-political partisans, but not the Garibaldi 
brigades. The Communists frequently carried out operations to goad a 
German reaction hoping that the quiescent Roman population would join the 
partisans; it was a vicious circle which was successful. It was for this reason 
that Carla and Bentiregna attacked the Barberini cinema killing and injuring 
fifteen Germans69.  
 
                   The Italian Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana Militia, the so-called 
Black Brigades, fought a savage war against the partisans. The complexity of 
the partisan civil war still defies any agreed analysis. It is hardly surprising 
that the Allies lacked perception of who was who, and today the Italian 
Ministry of Defence will not open all its archives. 
                                       
                       Alexander’s broadcasts on 19th/20th/27th July asked Italians to 
shoot Germans in the back so they lived to do it again. Kesselring replied that 
to answer such medieval methods demanded repressive counter-measures. In 
the London Foreign Office Archibald Ross wrote that 'it looks as if General 
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Alexander was not quite careful enough in his choice of words, and the 
Germans have not unduly distorted his appeal.'70 It was better for men to join 
the partisans than be deported as industrial labour, and German reprisals were 
certainly a motive as the partisans had anticipated. 
 
Kesselring's Reaction to Partisans 
 
                    Partisan war in Italy had not been anticipated, and when the 
Italians signed the co-belligerent agreement many Germans felt betrayed. In 
Trent Park prison in England, Oberstleutnant Kurt Kohncke, a one-time 
wealthy landowner and anti-Nazi, on hearing this said 'if I were commander 
of the German troops I would set alight every village and every town in Italy 
and withdraw slowly to the Brenner'71. Kesselring had misunderstood and 
underestimated the Italians, and ‘the German troops felt furious with their 
former allies for their betrayal and took their revenge on civilians at the 
slightest provocation'72. This sense of betrayal extended to French partisans 
who proved uncooperative with their Italian counterparts, having not forgiven 
the Italians for their invasion. Initially Kesselring limited reaction when 
partisans bombed the Flora Hotel where he had been the same morning73. 
Eight days later eight Germans were killed by a grenade attack, and again 
'Kesselring refused to be goaded into retaliation'74. It was only four months 
earlier he had issued an order that 'every German soldier now serving in the 
southern area conducts himself in a specially exemplary manner … officers 
are again to be warned of the necessity for the sharpest supervision'75. The 
year 1944 was a period of rapid change in partisan activity and Kesselring's 
attitudes.  
 
                    As early as Salerno partisans had been busy, but especially in the 
north, where there had been some small attacks at hotels and cinemas 
frequented by Germans. Matters escalated when, on Thursday March 23rd, 
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Kesselring was informed by Westphal that a Company of the Police-Regiment 
Bozen, had been attacked in via Rasella, Rome, resulting in thirty-three (two 
died later)76. ‘These were middle-aged policemen, nearly half of them married 
with children, who had been recruited from South Tyrol, the disputed frontier 
area known as Bolzano in Italian, and their officers were Reich Germans’77. 
They were half Italian and half German, 'that they were SS was a myth 
created by the partisans after the war … these policemen did not belong to the 
SS as nearly every writer has claimed'78. Amongst the carnage were dead 
Italians including children. The perpetrators knew the Germans had warned of 
reprisals, and that the Gappists ‘may have calculated that the inevitable 
reprisals would be beneficial to their faction as the resistance hostages 
consisted largely of Trotskyites from the Bandiera Rossa, or members of 
another resistance group, the Fronte Clandestino Militaire;’ they claimed they 
wanted to provoke an uprising79. The action was condemned by the Vatican 
and other resistance groups, but the violent reprisal of 335 civilians killed in 
the infamous Ardeatine massacre soon became headlines. Kesselring's 
involvement will be examined in the chapter on his trial, but it ought to be 
noted that this incident typified a civilian war which permeated the war in 
Italy, scarred Italian society in the postwar years, and haunts Italy to this day. 
It became the iconic incident of the partisan war descending to barbarity. Pope 
Pius XII, who had asked for the presence of German/Italian policemen, and 
who feared the Communists appeared neutral, writing in the Osservatore 
Romano on 26thMarch that 'thirty two victims on the one hand, and on the 
other three hundred and twenty persons sacrificed for the guilty parties who 
escaped arrest… we call upon the irresponsible elements to respect human 
life…' implying the partisans were guilty80.                      
                   
                  On '9thAugust communist partisans in Milan had killed nine 
German soldiers as well as eight passers-by,' and Kesselring, who tended to 
apply the ten to one rule, relented to an appeal by Cardinal Schuster; however, 
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a fascist firing squad executed fifteen political prisoners the day after 81. To 
this day there is confusion as to whether the Fascists were under command by 
Germans or not, such was the complexity at the time. As Manstein argued, 
'the Commander in Chief … has only one interest, namely that rear areas 
remain quiet. To achieve this, he will do all in his power…' and Kesselring 
fitted in the same mould82.  
 
                 International law at that time was not known for its clarity, and 
later a British MP and lawyer, Paget, would argue that a 'sovereign 
government has authority to give any orders albeit they infringe international 
law;' this aspect will be further explored in the chapters dealing with the 
trial83. No amount of law can possibly give any justification for some cruelty. 
In October 1944 a Reichsführer-SS Division moved into Bologna, and 
committed a massacre at Marzabotto 'and perpetrated a massacre three times 
the size of Oradour and ten times the size of Lidice'84. In his book Silence on 
Monte Sole, Olsen related these horrific details of the massacre of 1800 
civilians living on the mountain in reprisal for the partisan group the Stella 
Rossa (which was not as later claimed a communist band), old men, women 
children and babies. Such was the atrocity that even if half of it was true the 
evil is still unbelievable, yet Kesselring felt justified in telling 'an Italian 
journalist nonchalantly that the Monte Sole/Marzabotto action was a 'war 
operation' neither more or less'85. 
 
                 Kesselring responded to the increased partisan activity with two 
orders (the 'Bandenbefehle'), which are examined in the chapter on 
Kesselring’s trial86. Basically it was similar wording to a command issued by 
Keitel namely, 'the fight against the partisans must be carried on with all the 
means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I will protect any 
command who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity of the 
methods he adopts against partisans. In this connection the old principle 
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holds good, that a mistake in the choice of methods in executing one’s orders, 
is better than failure or neglect to act.' Kesselring reconstructed the order as  
‘fighting against the guerrillas must therefore be conducted with the utmost 
rigour … I shall protect any commander who, in the choice and severity of 
method… the old principle still holds good, that a wrong choice of method is 
used to achieve one's object is better than neglect and indolence'87. The Ultra 
decoding note on this message is marked with a red-pen for attention; its 
ruthlessness was self-evident. Kesselring was not simply passing on OKW 
orders but rewording them to his style. He suggested that the Italian fascists 
should select hostages, and where the partisans were in abundance 'hostages 
will be taken from among the local population - relatives or able bodied 
sympathisers… and villages will be burnt down'88. Although the SS behaved 
characteristically, Kesselring expected the same from the Wehrmacht, stating 
that 'anti-guerrilla warfare must in large measure be carried out by the army'89. 
 
                     Kesselring's new HQ at Monsummano left him remote, and 
whilst his critical interest was in holding the Anglo-Americans 'Northern Italy 
began to look like Byelorussia.'90 Weizsäcker was later to acknowledge the 
'terror and brutality left in the wake of the security police as they retreated,' 
but the Wehrmacht and Italian fascist groups all played a part91.  
                   
                  Alexander’s broadcast to kill every German was unhelpful, but the 
Wehrmacht and SS responded with brutality. Following complaints by 
Mussolini through Ambassador Rahn, Kesselring was prompted to send 
further orders not to bring a bad reputation on the Wehrmacht for fear of the 
over-zealousness which would occur92. The new orders were signed 14thJuly 
but on the 11th orders were already signed by a local commander in Covolo 
encouraging massacres93.  
  
                                                 
87    KNA, HW1/2982. 
88    KNA, WO204/11496. 
89    KNA, HW5/474. 
90    Davies, Simple,p.190. 
91    Guardian, May 23rd1946, p.6. 
92    Appendix 2. 
93    Appendix 3. 
 210
                It has been claim that Kesselring rarely followed up reports on ill-
discipline, but Panzertruppen General Traugott Herr, testified under oath that 
Kesselring did have soldiers shot who had raped or looted94. Kesselring tried 
to heighten the deterrent effect by using posters to link the death of particular 
Germans to particular reprisals. In his trial Kesselring, claiming innocence, 
appeared shocked when witnesses spoke of the barbarity resulting from these 
orders. However, Ultra now reveals his reports to OKW, one on the 25thJune 
reporting on an engagement with guerrilla group stating 'many guerrillas 
killed, village burnt down' on the grounds that the guerrillas were 'in w/t 
contact with the British' 95.  
 
                 Kesselring always maintained he was innocent, but he must have 
been aware of the brutality of such orders: just after issuing the orders it was 
reported by the Chinese Chargé in Berne that Kesselring had recently 
'commissioned a genealogist named FURICS to obtain proof that Kesselring's 
ancestors originally came from ARGOVIE (AARGAU) in Switzerland' also 
noting that in Swiss nationality law 'it is comparatively easy for all persons of 
Swiss ancestry to obtain citizenship by application'96. Kesselring was a proud 
Bavarian, and the possibility of Swiss nationality probably occurred to him 
because he knew that Keitel's orders, which he had endorsed, would one day 
return to haunt him. ‘Kesselring himself was a superb general, surprising 
Hitler with his success in slowing the Allied advance up in the peninsula;’ but 
his brilliance as a commander went hand in hand with an utterly ruthless 
attitude towards the local population, for which, he may have foreseen, he 
would be held to account97.   
 
                Cardinal Schuster or Mussolini sometimes persuaded Kesselring to 
rescind orders against recriminations, but were not always successful. 
Kesselring could be totally ruthless, and, as the witness Costa wrote in his 
affidavit regarding an execution in Milan, 'Kesselring would not change his 
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mind'98.  This streak of ruthlessness was applied even to his so-called beloved 
pilots; in North Africa he had given an order that careless pilots who made 
mistakes would 'be punished, replaced and transferred to a Field Battalion in 
Russia'99.                
 
                 Kesselring always blamed the Italians and pointed out that his 
soldiers suffered death from hanging, drowning, freezing, crucifying and 
every kind of torture. It had, as Kesselring noted with some truth, 'involved 
both sides in committing the most abominable crimes with mathematical 
predictability'100. He expostulated that 'my soldiers were ambushed; they were 
hunted; they were burned, the wounded soldiers in Red Cross ambulances 
were burned; their bodies nailed to window frames, their eyes struck out, their 
noses and ears were cut off, also their sexual organs; they were put into 
barrels which were filled with water and afterwards machine gunned, and, at 
last but not least, in Pisa as a sign of gratitude that we supplied the children 
with milk the wells were poisoned'101. As in any war neither side were 
clinically clean, John Bassett serving in Italy wrote in his diary that there had 
been an 'ugly rumour that Sgt Meier had lined up several Krauts on Mt 
Belvedere … and shot them in a fit of rage,' but this was battlefield rage, not a 
calculated decision by a senior commander102.    
                    
                 The historian Klinkhammer suggested that '95% of soldiers in Italy' 
were not involved directly or indirectly with these mass murders, and it is 
known that most incidents took place near the front battle areas of the 
occupation zones103. It is evident that some reprisals took place during retreat, 
when the troops felt most vulnerable, but still inexcusable. There are many 
references to the Italian campaign being a 'clean war' by both sides, and 'not 
until fifty years after the war had ended did the legend begin to crumble'104.  
As recently as 2009 Kesselring's highly decorated Ordnance Officer, Josef 
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Scheungraber, 'was sentenced to life imprisonment at Munich's No 1 State 
Court' for shooting four Italians, then ten more as a reprisal for partisans 
killing one of his NCOs and a sapper105. Taped German POWs frequently 
revealed the extent of Wehrmacht behaviour, one German soldier who was a 
translator 'was outraged at how Wehrmacht soldiers had treated the civilian 
population' in occupied Italy106. It was a vicious circle; the partisans inflamed 
the wrath of the Wehrmacht whose brutal reaction swelled the ranks of the 
partisans. The historian Bartov argued that NSDAP influence within the ranks 
meant their actions were 'unexpectedly accompanied by the irrational and 
nihilistic modes of behaviour typical of the regime'107. 
 
                  There were in Italy SS detachments who had been serving in 
Russia, including some Totenkopf and their Unterführers who would already 
have been brutalised108. Thomas Kühne, a military sociologist found that the 
closer soldiers were to the front line the less there were normal controls, and 
'excesses are committed under cover of the group'109. This was certainly seen 
to be true in later wars, especially Vietnam.  How much Kesselring knew of 
all the activities of the SS and the Wehrmacht can never be established, but as 
the Italian Minister of Pardon and Justice wrote in 1947, 'it is not likely that 
the Commander of the German Forces in Italy is ignorant of such a massacre 
{SS massacre at S.Anna di Stazzema} of which we still do not know the 
authors'110.                     
 
                   Ruthlessness breeds ruthlessness, and many times communist 
partisan leaders executed other partisans of differing persuasion.  In places 
like Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy …'much of the violence of the war had been 
directed not against Germans but against fascists and collaborators within 
their own population'111. It was a bitter time, and 'revenge was a fundamental 
part of the bedrock upon which postwar Europe was rebuilt,' and 'to this day, 
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individuals, communities and even whole nations still live with the bitterness 
born of this vengeance'112. Italians had been storing up resentment against the 
Fascists for over twenty years, and 'on one side were the Fascists, whose 
atrocities against their own people had only accelerated after the Germans had 
invaded'113. 
 
               After the war the ruthlessness continued, and it is estimated at a 
conservative level that some 30,000 may have been killed in this way, though 
such figures must always be suspect with the lack of records114. A civil war 
within an international war meant civilians suffered most; the statistics are 
still debated to this day, but currently it is estimated that between 1943 and 
1945 nine thousand women, children and elderly died. Kesselring claimed 
there were more German deaths than partisans, and it is estimated that in the 
region of 15,000 Germans were killed by the partisans between June and 
August 1944115.                        
 
                 The partisans caused many problems, but failed to stop Kesselring 
conducting his defensive retreat, but in combating them Kesselring and the 
Wehrmacht were stained with the same criminality often associated with the 
SS. A form of voluntary collective amnesia regarding the role of the 
Wehrmacht swept over postwar Germany, who with the western allies used 
the SS as a scapegoat to turn the rest of Germans into victims. The trial of 
Erich Priebke in Rome on May 7th1996, illustrated that the 'Italian military 
judges could not have ignored the significance of the mechanism of terror that 
was put into effect by the whole army and not just by the specialized SS 
troops'116. Kesselring acted 'as if the existence of the Partisan movement were 
the fault of the civilian population'117. It is self-evidently a myth that 
Kesselring fought a chivalrous war as he contended, or that he was ignorant of 
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the massacres. His own commands are clearly written and reflect those of the 
OKW on the Eastern Front, and any sympathy Alexander, Churchill and 
hundreds of others expressed appear to neglect the suffering of the innocent. 
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CHAPTER 8  
 
 
COMMANDER to PRISONER (1945-1947) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
                           Primo Levi wrote that in the last months of the war 'grey 
men, blind first and criminal later, frenziedly divided among themselves the 
tatters of an iniquitous and moribund authority'1. The first part of this chapter 
will explore why Kesselring fought to the last, looking at his obsessive oath to 
Hitler, the influence of Hitler upon him, and his fear of communism. It will 
also explore why he irrationally threatened his subordinate Vietinghoff in 
Italy for seeking an end to a finished war, as well as the brutality of the 
'drumhead' courts. The second part will look at the nature of his 
imprisonment, and how much Kesselring knew of the regime's inhumanity, 
specifically the Holocaust. This section will also, picking up from the last 
chapter, examine the way the Wehrmacht was white-washed in the postwar 
era by unloading guilt onto the SS, who could then become an alibi for the 
whole nation. Through the early interrogations Kesselring consistently 
maintained, as he did for the rest of his life, a claim of total innocence, and 
raised the concept of 'victor's justice.' Finally, it will examine how 
Kesselring's charm frequently won over his captors, but how they failed to 
influence him in reconsidering his views on what had happened.  
 
Western Command  
 
                          On March 8th as Wolff and Kesselring were discussing the 
future of the Italian campaign, Kesselring was ordered to Berlin to be given 
new orders and 'told to hurry'2. 'Nothing since the July 20th plot had agitated 
Hitler so much as the capture of the bridge at Remagen,' giving him the 
excuse to sack Rundstedt 'who seemed only to want to retreat'3. Kesselring 
suggested he was needed in Italy and was suffering from his injury, but was 
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told by Keitel this 'would hold no water with the Führer'4. Hitler had prided 
himself on the defences of the Western Wall but after Remagen was lost - 'the 
barrel flowed over'5. Hitler trusted Kesselring, stating at a Führer conference 
on Jan 9th 1945 that 'as you saw with Kesselring, if someone does it right, it 
does work'6. Kesselring had a reputation as a 'tough commander-in-chief … a 
leader of high professional competence who took care to keep out of politics. 
He was an arch-loyalist, always exuding real or contrived optimism, however 
grim the military situation'7. Kesselring may have kept out of political 
wrangling, but he was loyal to Hitler. When Bradley heard of Kesselring's 
appointment he sensibly noted that 'Kesselring has always been considered a 
rather good general' but added 'he has arrived at this front at the wrong time'8.  
 
                    On April 1st Kesselring sent a highly emotive message to all 
troops, reading 'I greet you, soldiers, the stake is Germany, our people, our 
children and their future. To throw in our hand now is to betray Germany. 
Those who have fallen with a triumphant faith in the future of Germany expect 
their sacrifices shall not have been in vain. I appeal to each and everyone of 
you, be a sworn brotherhood of warriors, rating honour higher than life, 
knowing only one thing: Germany'9. Kesselring did not hesitate to reflect the 
Führer's melodramatic language of 'heroic final battles'10. He may not have 
been a party member, but he shared their views on communism, belief in 
German cultural superiority, supremacy in Europe and a soldier could not 
surrender. It was desperation, and Hitler’s orders commanded them to fight 
‘in a spirit of holy hatred for an enemy who is conducting a pitiless war of 
extermination against the German people’11. Nevertheless, recognising 
Kesselring's importance in Italy, Hitler kept Kesselring's transfer secret for 
'security reasons'12. This was the eschatological period for Hitler, and it defies 
credulity that men like Kesselring were prepared to engage in this Dantean 
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inferno. A Wehrmacht military judge remarked on the inevitability of defeat 
and queried why the leaders fought on, 'How long' he asked, 'will it take for 
the very last German to realise this13?' Even, the same diarist recorded, the 
'most educated Germans' seem to believe Hitler's claim they could still win14. 
Kesselring and others, who should have known better, became even more 
Draconian as the eventual defeat became blindingly obvious. There is the 
argument that soldiers will fight to the bitter end as part of their tradition, but 
the best senior commander looks beyond the battleground to the people he is 
defending. According to Kesselring, Hitler was full of confidence, but the 
interview was unrealistic; there was pointless talk of new-fangled weapons, 
and 'certain expectations of fresh successes by new types of U-Boats … 
effects will be felt in a foreseeable period'15. It is difficult to ascertain 
Kesselring's true feelings which he concealed then and later, but there was 
perhaps a degree of self-cynicism when he introduced himself to his staff with 
'I'm the new wonder weapon16!' The tragedy was that 'research on the last 
phase of the war shows many Germans still invested improbable hopes' in 
such wonder weapons when in reality they were a fantasy and deceit17.  
 
                   Nevertheless, Kesselring described Hitler as lucid with a penchant 
for detail: in Hitler's presence Kesselring seemed to lose his grasp of reality. 
Kielmansegg, an officer on the German General Staff, witnessed the 
motivating effect Hitler continued to possess, calling it 'the Wehrmacht high 
command bug'18. Another officer described Dönitz going in to Hitler 
depressed and returning as 'floating on a sea of emotion'19. Westphal too, 
described Kesselring as arriving in a cheerful fashion when he declared he 
was Hitler’s new V3 weapon20.  It appeared that Kesselring had absorbed 
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Hitler's phantom troops and miracle weapons, but at the front-line the realities 
emerged.  
 
                         Kesselring later claimed he fought on to allow those in the 
East sanctuary in the West, also arguing part of the army should not surrender 
whilst another fought21. This has a certain sense, but by capitulating in the 
West he may have found sanctuary for those in the East. There is no evidence 
that Kesselring was concerned about civilians, only the soldiers. A report to 
the British War Cabinet noted in July 1944 that 'fear of the Russians continues 
to dominate their thoughts, and there are indications of widespread anxiety 
that the threat from the East should be staved off at all costs'22. If, as one 
German military judge wrote in his diary, 'if we are bolshevized, then all of 
Europe will be … so hurry up with your invasion you Western democracies'23. 
It appears a middle-ranking military judge had better foresight than a Field-
Marshal.  
 
                    It was not just the fear of communist reprisal that kept Kesselring 
fighting, but his obsessive military-nature of staying loyal to one’s oath. It 
could be argued that the oath to Hitler could be viewed as to the country 
through the figurehead of Hitler; Hitler was now finished and allegiance to the 
country demanded a change of attitude. Kesselring, regarded by many as a 
rational man, must have perceived that Hitler was interred in his bunker away 
from reality, and the war lost. The July 20th conspiracy had failed because 
Hitler survived; 'his physical presence on this earth was enough' and 'only 
death would destroy Hitler's hold over Germany' which applied to 
Kesselring24. Kesselring continued to fight when most felt it was a waste of 
life, probably because Hitler was still alive, and partly, that 'disappointments 
scarcely altered soldiers' desire to perform their military tasks'25. Even on 
April 1st Kesselring was sending orders to his troops to 'fight to the end'26. His 
orders were brutal in that he stopped POW transports 'marching with white 
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flags as protection against fighter-bombers'27. He warned his troops to ignore 
the enemy 'broadcasting reports about ostensible German peace offers … 
intended to cause confusion'28. 
 
                  Kesselring must have known it was hopeless. He saw Hitler on the 
15th March and was promised a full strength Division from Denmark, which 
never appeared. Kesselring read reports where some Americans had been 
quick to surrender having no intention 'of letting themselves be shot dead so 
near the end of the war'29. Nevertheless, there was no opportunity for any 
defence; troops were exhausted, and the Luftwaffe virtually extinct, and Hitler 
still expected to win.  
 
                   By the end of March Hitler's 'Grossdeutschland was pressed 
between two rivers - the Oder and the Rhine'30. Even, Kesselring complained, 
'the best General cannot make bricks without straw'31. The German jet-planes 
were too few and too late, the March/April weather was poor, and their sites 
under constant threat32. Yet Kesselring fought on, but later claimed he was 
conscious that Germany would need rebuilding. He had managed to get his 
hands on Eclipse which was the Allied plan to divide Germany into two 
zones33. When Hitler issued his ‘Destruction Order on March 19th the Nero 
Order, a scorched earth policy of Soviet style,’ he claimed to have 
collaborated with Speer to avoid senseless destruction, but there is no 
evidence of such agreement34. Kesselring was too obsessed with following 
Hitler's orders, and fighting to the last man to spare time for Speer, despite 
useful postwar claims. 
 
                    On March 18th Kesselring reported that the population 'was 
playing a negative role in the struggle against the advancing American forces,' 
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in so far that town/village deputations were begging officers to go around 
them, and they were yielding to these desperate pleas35. Hitler was not 
impressed, claiming 'that can't be any concern any longer, get them out,' and it 
was not until 'the Americans were advancing on all fronts, both Kesselring 
and Model now decided against any more destruction'36. Westphal claimed 
that Kesselring ignored Keitel’s and Bormann’s instruction that every 
town/village should be defended, by commanding that positions be taken up 
outside the boundaries37. If Westphal were correct in this statement, then it 
was probably the first time that Kesselring had accepted the sheer 
hopelessness of the situation, which was absurdly late. 
 
          Kesselring noted that 'I felt like a concert pianist who is asked to play a 
Beethoven sonata before a large audience on an ancient, rickety and out of 
tune instrument. In many respects I found conditions which contradicted all 
my principles, but events were moving too swiftly for me to have time to 
influence them much. My post was too important and my rank too high for me 
to shirk the responsibility38’. He saw Hitler four times within the first six 
weeks of his new appointment, and followed his instructions admitting that he 
‘felt utterly at sea,’ which must have been unusual for the continually 
optimistic Kesselring39. The end was imminent, Kesselring's entire front had 
evaporated; from now on there could only be a bitter delaying action, which 
was pointless.  
  
              Meanwhile, in Switzerland SS General Wolff held secret meetings 
with Allen Dulles to finish the war in Italy for fear of a communist take-
over40. Harold Macmillan claimed that ‘the first indications that some of 
Kesselring’s officers wished to treat for terms had reached us on 8th March’ 
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and that Wolff, together with OKW representative, was presumably from 
Kesselring’s staff41. The British assumed that Kesselring was cognisant, and 
Dollman, postwar said he was42. Wolff visited Kesselring on the 23rd March 
to persuade him to allow Vietinghoff to surrender. Kesselring was obviously 
aware of this operation which the Allies had code-named 'Sunrise'43. 
Following a row with Wolff, Kesselring had 'backed the steps that were being 
taken and agreed to be associated with them' but added 'that an end only came 
into question for him if the Führer was no longer alive'44.  
 
                  Kesselring's hesitancy was obtuse; he dismissed Vietinghoff for 
surrendering because Hitler still lived, which given what was happening was, 
as Kershaw wrote, a 'graphic case' of following 'insane orders'45. It was 
unlikely to be Kesselring's fear of Hitler's wrath, but his fanatical brutality in 
that not only did he dismiss Vietinghoff, but 'he ordered his arrest and 
execution'46. The obsession with obeying Hitler was typical of the higher 
command, as von Hassell wrote in his 1943 diary, 'none of the Field-Marshals 
is acting as if he knew any higher concept of duty'47. Originally it may have 
been that Kesselring was seeking an immunity deal from Dulles; he had 
investigated 'Swiss citizenship', but the delays were poor judgement48. 
Kesselring undoubtedly still felt 'bound by his oath despite Hitler's death'49. 
                     
                        Kesselring's relationship with Hitler bore a strange mystical 
hold which countermanded common sense. When on April 12th Kesselring 
last saw Hitler alive, he was still hopeful for victory. Kesselring was as 
optimistic as ever, but von Below unbelievably claimed that Kesselring 'was 
not deceived and probably decided that henceforth he would follow his own 
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inclinations;' yet he fought to the bitter end50. When to capitulate is a vexed 
question, but by the spring of 1945 it was unquestionably clear that soldiers 
and civilians were dying for a lost cause; there was no glimmer of hope for 
the tide to turn. 
 
                After the capture of Remagen Bridge Hitler ordered 'Flying Special 
Tribunals West' which were drumhead courts; Kesselring said they 'would 
weaken morale along the entire Western Front,' but apparently used them51. 
Gersdorff claimed that Kesselring 'complained to his general staff that 
nowhere on his journey through the army area had he seen a hanged deserter, 
a sure sign of ineffective military leadership'.52 Kesselring was fanatical 
enough not to recognise that this was all out of control, and 'the brutality of its 
repressive measures all moved to their peak precisely as the regime itself 
neared collapse'53. Kesselring had organised a ‘Field Raiding Detachment’ but 
eventually admitted that it failed. He knew Hitler was furious at the 'number 
of soldiers allowing themselves to be captured in the west'54. Kesselring was 
ruthless with deserters; most were hanged from lampposts. Together with 
Model, he had the officers who failed to destroy the Remagen Bridge 
executed, proclaiming 'the verdict to all their troops as a deterrent example, 
adding that the 'greatest severity' was expected of the courts martial'55. Some 
'9,732 death sentences were carried out up to Dec 1944 with 8,000 in the army 
alone, possibly 15,000 to 20,000 in the whole war; by contrast, in the USA 
there were 146, France 102, Britain 40 and Soviets 994,30056.  
 
                    It was decided that should the German forces be divided, the 
southern area would come under Kesselring with a small OKW staff under 
General Winter, and in the north, Dönitz. Hitler’s bizarre hope was pinned on 
a newly created 12thArmy, deus ex machina, even Kesselring knew it was a 
phantom. Macmillan, in his war diaries, noted as late as May 4th that 
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Kesselring, through Wolff had 'sent Alex a message asking to be put in touch 
with Eisenhower - a very interesting development'57. Kesselring, like other 
political and military leaders still saw himself in an important light, even in 
projected defeat: they were no longer living in the real world. 
 
                The question remains as to why Kesselring fought on to the end. It 
has been suggested by his son Rainer, that there was always in his mind the 
hope of at least some sort of negotiated peace with the Western Allies58. 'The 
only faint rationality' was the hope that the 'unholy coalition' between the 
West and Soviets would collapse giving the Wehrmacht a 'new purpose,' but 
this was mere bunker fantasy59. The terms of total surrender he understood 
meant the destruction of the Germany as he knew it, and he had argued that he 
would 'sell our skins dearly'60. How it would help soldiers in the East is 
difficult to understand, unless his notion that a number could be saved by a 
series of forced-marches west. It is easy to judge from hindsight, but even a 
rational man like Kesselring may have hoped, albeit unrealistic, that a deus ex 
machina in the form of a German/Allied alliance might happen.  
 
           Unbelievably, on April 23rd the last football match took place between 
Bayern Munich and their local rivals – it was an unreal world. The hope for 
miracle weapons was prevalent amongst a few even at this late stage; others 
still expected the West would join forces to expel the Russians. There was no 
reason to keep fighting; the suggestion has been made that they fought 
because of the demand for total surrender, and the Morgenthau plan to turn 
Germany into a farm, but Kershaw in his study 'The End' argues cogently that 
the reasons ran deeper than the traditional historical thinking. While Hitler 
persisted in living, the mentality of the day meant fighting on under some 
sense of misguided loyalty to what was a meaningless oath. It was not just 
personal loyalty to Hitler, but to the character of his rule and the debased 
mores the NSDAP had established. Whilst Hitler remained alive, professional 
soldiers like Kesselring fought on costing more lives.  
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                      Although the OKW South had been authorised, Kesselring’s 
actual plenipotentiary powers were not activated. Efficient administrator to 
the end, even in this unreal world, Kesselring sent a Dr Hayler to Dönitz to 
regularise his appointment which was duly done. He had held a conference in 
Graz where Kesselring reckoned that Army Group South wanted to continue 
fighting, but issued orders to move towards the West, forced-marches where 
necessary. Postwar he claimed that by this action, thousands escaped Russian 
clutches, and blamed the Americans for not allowing this figure to be much 
higher. 
 
                       Kesselring appointed General Foertsch to conduct negotiations 
at his HQ in Alm for the 1stArmy to surrender, having received direction from 
Donitz61. There were no negotiations just dictation of terms, the unconditional 
surrender took place on May 4th at Salzburg. Kesselring had asked, and been 
sent a message by Dönitz authorising him 'to conclude an armistice with the 
6thAmerican Army,' but total surrender was the only option62. There was no 
point in not surrendering, 'there were clear signs of disintegration among the 
troops, and hostility towards the Wehrmacht by the civilian population in 
Bavaria and Austria'63. 
 
                      There was confusion over who was surrendering, and Kesselring 
complained that he was kept in the dark. By May 6th Kesselring’s HQ staff, 
was the only official group technically not to have surrendered, Kesselring 
having transferred his reduced staff to Himmler’s personal train at Saalfelden. 
He claims to have considered suicide like Model, but decided against it on the 
grounds that it would simply place the burden on someone else64. 
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Surrender and Prison 
 
              After offering Eisenhower his surrender he claimed his concern 
became the feeding of the troops and general population. This postwar 
statement of concern sounds more like a man trying to maintain status. 
Kesselring suggested to General Devers, whom he found very aloof, that his 
technical troops should not be disbanded but used in repairing bridges, 
communications systems and helping out in the ruined agricultural areas. He 
claimed to have 15,000 signals service men ready to repair the 
telegraph/telephone systems, but was ignored. Kesselring believed that this 
was due to the influence of Morgenthau plans having permeated the American 
mind. This was unlikely, no Allied general wanted a German Field-Marshal's 
advice and 15,000 German troops, even if they were just signals. Kesselring 
was still living in an unreal world. 
 
                      An American Major of the 101stAirborne took Kesselring to 
Berchtesgaden permitting him to keep his weapons, medals and baton. 
Kesselring was at first unprepared to surrender to anyone because their rank 
was too junior: 'then in came Kesselring, the Supreme Commander South, 
accompanied by a long column of cars, all bearing white flags. Charmingly, 
but firmly, ‘smiling Albert’ refused to deal with anybody from the 
101stAirborne Division, for they were all junior in rank to him. That the power 
he had once held was gone seemed not to have been realised'65. Dönitz's 
request that Kesselring be flown to join other German leaders was turned 
down. Kesselring was beginning to learn that as a captured enemy officer he 
would be given little respect.  
 
                  Kesselring was interviewed by Allied journalists and made the 
acquaintance of Kurt Riess, who later played a part in his trial. Kesselring's 
request to speak to Eisenhower was refused. There was an interlude of 
freedom, but as German atrocities were uncovered, Kesselring's imprisonment 
became more restrictive. On May 15th he was taken to the camp at Mondorf 
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via Augsburg, where he had to leave his treasured medals and baton: he was 
now a mere prisoner of war. 
 
                         Kesselring argued that officers stood above politics, and owed 
obedience to the legal government, and were bound by their military oath 
which enjoined obedience as a categorical imperative66. In his memoirs he 
stated that ethical grounds could cause a departure from this norm, but he 
concludes with the theological allusion of self-pity, namely that it is a narrow 
path between ‘Hosanna’ and ‘Crucify Him’67! The next few months were to 
be very different, as he was obliged to come to terms with the reality of 
NSDAP crimes, begging the question as to why Kesselring failed to consider 
the question of ethics until defeat. 
 
Did Kesselring know? 
 
                        Kesselring experienced different prisons, some tougher than 
others, his guards having seen the results of German atrocities. Westphal 
wrote 'naturally one knew of the concentration camps. Nevertheless it was no 
more possible for the Army to know the number and nature of these camps 
and their occupants or their condition … right up to the end of the war the 
majority had only heard of Dachau and Oranienburg. Names such as 
Auschwitz, Belsen, and Buchenwald only became known after capitulation'68. 
Kesselring claimed he knew nothing, which is impossible to verify but viewed 
objectively, highly unlikely. 
 
                   There has been considerable debate about the role of the 
Wehrmacht in crimes against humanity. The photographic exhibition in the 
late 1990s entitled 'War of Extermination: The Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 
1941-1944 opened up a difficult yet productive debate on the role of ordinary 
Germans in the murder of innocent civilians,' and Wette demolished any 
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argument that the Wehrmacht always fought a clean war69. He pointed out 
that serious scholars no longer drew a distinction between the SS and the 
Wehrmacht, and although it is impossible to simplify any distinct picture of 
the Wehrmacht, there is a growing perception to depict it as 'a real instrument 
of the National Socialist policy of extermination'70. However, 'the majority of 
the Wehrmacht's crimes had been perpetrated in the East,' and Westphal’s 
attitude may have validity for some71. Westphal argued in postwar Western 
Germany that relatively few were found guilty before the tribunals72. Yet 
postwar attitudes were changing for political reasons, some appalling 
perpetrators of cruelty escaped, the classic example being 'Barbie's extradition 
to France should have been completed … but the change in the political 
atmosphere had changed the rules,' by the late1940s73. Many others also 
escaped justice for quite cynical political and military needs: the Americans 
grabbing rocket scientists such as Werner von Braun, and 'the British 
prevented Hermann Abs, head of the Deutsche Bank from being prosecuted 
by the Americans,' for their various expertise74. 
 
                       The British imprisoned senior German military officers in Trent 
Park, and professional eavesdropping  revealed  that knowledge of atrocities 
varied; 'the prisoners at Trent Park had been captured exclusively in North 
Africa, France and finally in Germany, therefore in the theatres of war where 
the 'fewest infringements of international law were committed' and utterly 
different from the way things had been done in Poland, the Soviet Union and 
the Balkans, but knowledge of massacres was still widespread75. Some knew 
more than others, but some officers were astounded when German atrocities 
were brought to their attention.  A study of German prisoners of war held in 
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Britain showed that 'to British camp staff it appeared these men were 
genuinely appalled by the atrocities of the Nazis'76. When they were shown 
the compulsory film about concentration camps 'some even tore off their 
decorations and stamped them into the ground as soon as they left the hut 
where the film had been shown'77.      
   
                      Those fighting in Africa and Italy experienced less atrocity than 
those in Eastern Europe, and subsequently a myth grew that Africa/Italy was a 
clean war. It has been suggested this myth was encouraged by Kesselring’s 
defence counsel, but there have been myriad references to the clean war in 
Africa/Italy; as mentioned, Colonel von Luck refers to friendly exchanges 
with the British, including an attempted trade off with cigarettes for a cousin 
of a wealthy tobacco family, and a German doctor returned for medicine for 
malaria78. The same German soldier on reflection wrote that it was a 
'merciless but always fair war in North Africa'79. It was never 'chummy,' but 
sordid civilian massacres occurred in the southern war to a lesser extent than 
in the East. Nonetheless, there were massacres in Northern Italy. It was 
unbelievable that a senior figure such as Kesselring could be ignorant of what 
was happening within and without his area of responsibility. During the 
subsequent Nuremberg Trials (SNP) the 'prosecution had offered a detailed 
and comprehensive exposition of the 'staggering enormity' of Wehrmacht 
crime'80. It beggars belief that Kesselring could be ignorant of the barbarity of 
the Wehrmacht. In the SNP the prosecution 'described the cooperation 
between the Wehrmacht and the Einsatzgruppen' and simply blaming the 
problems on the SS might be useful for shifting the guilt, but it was far from 
plausible81. It has been argued with some insight that during the trials the SS 
were ideal for taking the blame; certainly 'the cooperation between the 
Wehrmacht and the SS was poorly highlighted'82. In fact, for many, including 
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Kesselring, 'the focus on the SS, which had resulted from the Nuremberg 
trials, bore all the marks of an Alibi of a Nation'83. Over twenty million 
Germans served in the Wehrmacht, and to shift the guilt to the SS may have 
helped in the reconstruction of a nation, and military leaders like Kesselring 
encouraged this line of scapegoat thinking. It 'offered solace and refuge to a 
people emerging from catastrophic defeat and living under the opprobrium of 
world opinion'84. 
 
                     The Nuremberg and SNP were a very definite attempt not only 
to try and outline what had happened, and where the responsibility could be 
found, but to educate those who were ignorant or pretending to be ignorant. 
Kesselring found himself going  through this process and wrote that his 'life 
was now a bitter progress through every type of Allied camp and prison'85.  In 
Mondorf, known as the Ash Cage, Kesselring found the officer in charge, 
Colonel Andrus, unpleasant, but the officers/NCOs more sympathetic. At 
Oberursel he was well treated, but complained that too many emigrant 
Germans had been ‘roped in’ and they had no objectivity.  The Allies relied 
upon German speakers, many of whom, for political/racial motives, had fled 
Germany pre-war. Kesselring was right in his belief that they would have had 
little sympathy for a German commander of the NSDAP regime. A senior 
figure like Kesselring could expect little sympathy, and his complaint that 
they lacked objectivity indicated a lack of understanding or care of what had 
happened. 
 
                    All this begs the question of how much did Kesselring know 
about the industrial death camps? It has been suggested that he would have 
flown over them, but that would not show the brutality. In Trent Park, the 
listeners knew that apart from a very few, most senior officers had heard 
gossip of such places. Kesselring must have had some knowledge because he 
was aware that Himmler demanded the Roman/Jewish population be 
transported. This is just feasible when it is recalled that in Tunisia, 
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Ambassador Rahn had suggested that instead of deporting Jewish people that 
they were given work, so Kesselring ordered the mobilization of Jewish 
workers for defence constructions; this artifice saved that Jewish 
community86. 
 
                             Kesselring was guilty of single-mindedness and turning a 
blind eye to anything not directly under his command. This attitude was 
endemic in Germany, but Kesselring should have asked questions, and the 
Allies were justified in exposing him and others to what the NSDAP had 
done. Kesselring was undoubtedly brutal, he was to be tried for massacres, but 
it is generally agreed that he was not guilty of any involvement in the 
Holocaust. Like many others he was guilty of turning a blind eye, and because 
of his senior position he could be regarded as morally and legally complicit. 
Manstein was aware of atrocities committed by the Einsatzgruppen87. It will 
always remain a vexed question as to how far the majority of Germans knew 
what was happening: 'police reports monitored widespread awareness of the 
Final Solution as it was being implemented' and 'in 1942 an article in the local 
newspaper in Osterode mentioned the extermination of the Jews'88. One 
educated middle-ranking German diarist noted five times in his short 
compilation that Jews were being 'gassed and then burned,' and the NSDAP 
had intended the 'liquidation of Europe's Jews'89. Another diarist simply wrote 
‘everyone knew about the Concentration Camps90.’Kesselring may not have 
been involved, but it is unbelievable he was ignorant of these events. At his 
trial when asked about Jewish soldiers, he simply said there was no such 
thing: it is inconceivable that a man in his position was totally ignorant of the 
Holocaust. 
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Early interrogations and victor's justice 
 
                              He attended the main Nuremberg trial as a witness for 
Göring, and was puzzled that when under oath he claimed something to be 
true or false, he was still questioned on the matter; he was accustomed to 
people fearing to doubt him. Although Kesselring regarded himself as a 
military man, the Allies saw in any German leaders the degenerate 
perpetrators of the worse crimes mankind had ever experienced.  
 
                      Kesselring’s first biographer suggested that Kesselring's 
presentation of the air-bombing charges regarding Warsaw and Rotterdam, 
stopped bombing-raids being an issue, but the Allies had previously agreed 
lists 'concerning their own policies and actions the defence was to be 
prohibited from raising in court such as area bombing and the Molotov-
Ribbentrop annexatio.'91.  When the Soviets tried to blame Katyń on the 
defendants, such was the reply by the defendant’s counsel that the Soviets 
dropped the matter instantly. However, the tu quoque argument, (you as well) 
did not work at any of the trials given the vast and incomparable atrocities 
committed by the German war machine92. 
 
                        Göring wrote in the prison’s psychologist’s autograph book 
that 'the victor will always be the judge and the vanquished the accused,' 
prompting Norman Davies to note that 'in this way the fundamental dilemma 
of the Nuremberg Trials found expression even before the trials started'93. 
Davies appears to imply it was impossible to have a fair trial under the 
circumstances of victor and vanquished, but such were the horrendous crimes 
against humanity this is questionable. The concept of victor's justice 
'represents one of the fateful postwar legends,' and was frequently used in 
Kesselring's case94. As a concept its roots are classical, as Plato through 
Thrasymachus claims 'everywhere justice is the same thing, the advantage of 
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the stronger'95. Victor's justice can lead to the concept of 'cleaning up the past,' 
but 'the scrupulous forgetting was an essential component of the great 
collective repression that Ralph Giordano has called the Germans' second 
crime'96. It was assisted and compounded in the Wennerstrum Scandal when 
an American judge claimed 'the victor in any war is not the best judge of the 
war crime guilt'97. It has been claimed, supra, that the clean war legend started 
with Kesselring who, despite the Wehrmacht's brutal behaviour, argued that 
the battle may have been gory, but was based on humane and cultural criteria 
- Kesselring 'even expected that the Italians would erect a monument to 
him'98. 
  
                    It has been claimed the 'Western press encouraged the idea of 
collective-guilt labelling all defendants as criminal even before verdicts'99. An 
attempted argument was that the defendants were decent soldiers obeying 
orders, and ignorant of Hitler's criminality until too late. Another argument 
that the Soviets had started the brutality only rang true because 'the 
intensification of the Cold War proved a consistent and fertile context for 
these and other explanations'100. 'Victor's Justice' can be argued both ways, but 
there is no question that post-1946, with the need to keep West Germany on 
side, it became a political balancing act. Jurists such as Shawcross saw it as 
justice, but politicians, even Eisenhower, started to view the situation 
differently in order to win German opinion. The question of victor’s justice 
will be pursued in the next chapter in the context of Kesselring’s trial.   
 
                      Kesselring appeared dominant and arrogant in his self-
assuredness, and was given five month's solitary confinement. He complained 
there was no table, no privacy, and he felt like a leper whether on exercise or 
in Church. In a prison interview in February 1946 he complained that his 
'teeth were loose' and he was having 'moments of dizziness:' this was 
undoubtedly due a down-grading of diet and the way he was treated by the 
                                                 
95      Plato, The Republic (New York: Basic Books, 1968)p.16. 
96      Wette, Wehrmacht,p.223. 
97      Hébert, Hitler’s,p.40. 
98      Wette, Wehrmacht,p.224. 
99      Davies, History,p.1055. 
100      Priemel, Reassessing,p.200. 
 233
Americans, of which he also complained101. He was now regarded as a minor 
war criminal, and by the 'London Agreement' his trial was to take place in the 
country where the alleged crimes had been committed.  
 
Kesselring's charm 
 
                           After solitary confinement Kesselring was sent to Dachau 
and along with five generals he was placed in a cell with others for ten days in 
pitch-darkness: it was time to reflect that 'their continued allegiance to the 
Führer before and during the war represented a lapse in moral and 
professional judgment that no circumstance could mitigate'102. In April 1946 
Kesselring testified regarding Allied pilots who had been murdered, his task 
being to outline how enemy prisoners should be treated, in theory. Again 
Kesselring was squeezed in to a cell with Field-Marshals Brauchitsch and 
Milch, the Secretary-of-State Bohle, Ambassador Bargen and a troop 
commander. Kesselring found this demeaning, but his Allied captors deemed 
it necessary to drive home the moral corruption of the regime they had served. 
 
                      Following his internment in Dachau, Kesselring returned to 
Nuremberg, then onto Langwasser where he met old comrades, and shared a 
heavily barred prison-hut with Skorzeny.  During his time here Kesselring 
went with Field-Marshals List and Weichs to meet a Colonel Potter at 
Allendorf. Kesselring was impressed with the car, probably feeling it was 
suitable for his rank, and he noted that they were treated with some respect. 
Colonel Potter headed up the American Historical Division, compiling a study 
of the war. He appeared to like Kesselring, and sometimes referring to him as 
the old boy; later he opened the Allendorf facilities for the use of the German 
defence lawyers.  
                       
                   In the autumn of 1946 he was transferred to the London Cage in 
Kensington, run by Colonel Scotland. It was the centre for interrogating 
suspected war criminals, and postwar had a mixed reputation, one recent 
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writer claiming 'it is certainly a sordid piece of British history'103. Scotland, a 
hardened interrogator, found as did the American Colonel Potter, Kesselring 
charming, and assisted his defence. Scotland referred to Kesselring as Kessie, 
admitting he liked him, and wrote that he was the most 'blameless of all the 
German army leaders who ever set foot in wartime Italy'104. Nevertheless, 
having read his evidence, Scotland explained to Kesselring he was likely to be 
tried as a war criminal. Scotland blamed it on Kesselring's pride, as he 
claimed being Commander-in-Chief he was responsible. Remarkably, 
Kesselring with one British Officer was permitted to explore the sights of 
London; few, if any other prisoner, was allowed this privilege. 
 
                    From London Kesselring returned to Allendorf, where over the 
Christmas and the New Year of 1946 he spent some time with his wife. On 
January 17th 1947 Kesselring was removed via Salzburg to Rimini for his trial 
in Venice. Colonel Potter personally took him to Frankfurt, where he handed 
him over to what Kesselring described as two pleasant army officers. 
Kesselring had the ability to charm even his guards, and the imprisonment 
does not appear to have any effect on his attitudes towards all that had 
occurred. He was now to face a British military court, and the reality of what 
had happened in Italy, because despite time in prison, he still regarded his 
deeds as legal, and himself as innocent. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
THE TRIAL (1947) 1 
 
Introduction 
 
                 This Chapter will deal with Kesselring's trial, the nature of the 
Court, the prosecution and defence, and the outcome. The introduction will 
briefly examine the Nuremberg context, and the way the British Trial of 
Kesselring reflected the Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings. It will explore 
the legal issues; the competency of Court Official and the concept of Victor's 
Justice. It will also raise the issue that Wolff, a major potential culprit was 
given American protection; and the reasons for holding the trial in Italy. The 
second part will examine the Prosecution's first charge relating to Kesselring's 
conduct in the Ardeatine massacre, and Kesselring's defence. The third part 
deals with the second charge relating to Kesselring's orders, which the 
prosecution claimed gave rise to the killing of innocent Italians. After the 
Prosecution's evidence is outlined, the main defences to this charge will be 
examined. The fourth part of the chapter relates to Kesselring's defence that 
he managed to preserve much of Italy's cultural heritage. Kesselring's survival 
instinct is exposed in the fifth part, when research by Richard Raiber appears 
to show that Kesselring lied in Court about his whereabouts, in order that he 
would not be subject to the charge of executing American POWs. The last 
two sections deal with the nature of the Court's final verdict, and an overview 
of that verdict given the nature of a total war of extermination. 
 
The Authority, Nature, Legal Issues, and Venue of the Trial  
 
Nuremberg and Subsequent Proceedings 
 
              As the war drew to a close discussions had taken place as to how to 
deal with the enemy leadership, and although Churchill was aghast at Stalin's 
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attitude of mass shooting he was, for a time, inclined to 'nothing more than a 
brief kangaroo court at which their identity could be verified' and 'then shot to 
death … without reference to higher authority'2.   His belief that the fifty to a 
hundred top men should be treated as outlaws persisted for a time, but the 
legal process of the Nuremberg Trials eventually took shape. 'The validity of 
the Nuremberg Trials has been disputed both inside and outside Germany, 
especially on the grounds that new law was formulated to cover crimes 
already committed'3. Also, as noted by the German historian Gehler, the 
Nuremberg type of trial would always be questionable 'from the legal point of 
view,' because 'corporate crimes were a matter of debate'4. An American 
perspective stated that the trials were 'the very symbol of the new 
international order, a United Nations in miniature but for all the world to see 
and take hope from'5. In reality the Allies 'had to educate themselves. They 
knew something of the conditions in the Third Reich, but their collective view 
of Germany and the Germans bordered at times on caricature'6. The trial was 
not just about the Allies educating themselves, but about what they perceived 
as justice. The 'popular conception of the proceedings, the myth, is that they 
were a model act of justice in which those in the dock received their well-
deserved fate'7. Despite such contentious views surrounding the Nuremberg 
Trial, the subsequent trials were soon identified as a cleansing process, and a 
means of educating the German people, as to what had happened in their 
name. It was often mooted, especially by the American Chief Prosecutor 
Telford Taylor, that the record of the trials 'constituted one of the most 
effective tools in the democratization of Germany'8. The British 'had a 
programme of moral rehabilitation which was targeted at youth,' and this 
concept of using trials to educate people continued into their own military 
trials, and most especially for the Americans, in what is known as the 
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Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings (SNP)9. These trials, while genuinely 
trying to exhibit justice, inevitably had political ramifications. The Americans 
held a series of trials, (the SNP) which tried, as it were, 'Issues.' There was a 
trial relating to Doctors, one for Judges, one on the High Command and one 
on Hostages which this thesis will refer to later, twelve altogether. They were 
meant to be educative and informative, and Kesselring’s did not reflect the 
American model. Kesselring, who had attended the main Nuremberg Trial as 
a witness, was taken to Venice for a British Military Trial.    
 
The Legal issues 
 
                 Kesselring's trial was based on the London Agreement, and many 
points of law were not anticipated. Amongst the first critics was Lord Hankey, 
a Civil servant who rose to Cabinet Secretary and Ministerial rank, well 
known for being opposed to War Trials and who wrote on the subject, Politics 
Trials and Errors. He thought it wrong that a designated prosecutor and judge 
should draw up the charter 'of the very court where they were to function'10. 
The subsequent trials based their legitimacy on The Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal to establish Nuremberg and had main three 
main headings: Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and the new Crimes 
against Humanity. Critics raised various objections  ranging from those who 
objected to the final decisions, those claiming that the tribunals and military 
court proceedings 'had no jurisdiction in international law, and that it applied 
ex post facto law,' and some that the 'prosecuting states had been guilty of the 
same offences'11. Despite these legal criticisms the demand for retribution was 
powerful. 
 
                 Kesselring's trial concerned the death of Italian civilians, and was 
being held in Italy by a foreign power, against defendants from another 
foreign power. Today international law is more defined in having an 
acknowledged court for this purpose, but in the postwar period this ad hoc 
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situation was more acceptable. It has also been argued from the legal 
perspective that 'troops in time of war, fighting under the fog of war, are 
likely to do horrible things' but 'is it reasonable, then, to hold commanders 
legally responsible for the illegal actions of those under their authority'12? 
This arises because some legal scholars believe that to hold 'commanders 
responsible for the conduct of their troops when commanders are powerless to 
exercise precise battlefield control over their troops, simply stretches to 
breaking point the traditional link between criminal liability and criminal 
responsibility'13. It is the same argument that a Chief Constable would not be 
expected to resign when a uniformed constable is caught breaking the law. 
Anglo-Saxon law, British and American, has always held that mens rea 
(intention) with actus reus (the deed) is necessary. However, it could be 
argued that if the commander gives the orders (intention) to kill, the 
subordinate merely becomes his weapon. 
 
                      The fundamental jurisprudential questions of the trial ranged 
around the nature of the laws governing the conduct of war, the lack of 
international agreement, the conflict of Allied views and practice, and the two 
principles of ‘nulla poena sine lege’ (no penalty without a law) and closely 
related to the principle that law cannot be enacted in retrospect, ‘nulla poena 
sine praevia lege poende.' Some of these issues were never satisfactorily 
resolved; international law was in its infancy, and the British Military Court 
lacked the depth of jurisprudence that international law required. 
 
Competency of Officials 
 
                   This lack of legal depth led to criticism regarding the quality and 
nature of the Court's officers.  The Court was presided over by Major-General 
Sir Edmund Hakewill-Smith and four Lieutenant Colonels. Colonel Richard 
Halse was the prosecutor, as he had been at Mackensen and Mälzer’s trial. 
Many wondered whether the Court was senior enough to pass judgements on 
international law; Scotland, Kesselring's London interrogator, wrote a protest 
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about the court’s constitution. A Colonel Preston Murphy, an American 
observer of the early proceedings, wrote a critique that the court consisted of a 
'Major-General, who had commanded a Division in combat, and four officers 
of the rank of Lt. Colonel …their services were on a relatively low level…I 
am of the opinion ... the officers could not envisage and properly evaluate the 
Field-Marshal's problems, actions and orders'14. This point was taken up by 
the Guardian newspaper, as well as the criticism that it was 'the British Army' 
who conducted the trial15. Since the trial raised questions of the legitimacy of 
hostages/reprisals, affidavits, and international law, it could be argued that 
such issues warranted the most senior judges. Decisions made at this Court 
could act as a precedent, influence international law or be overturned, and as 
such demanded the highest degree of legal expertise and experience. One of 
the dangers of a Military Court lacking legal depth was it permitted critics to 
raise the subject of Victor's Justice. 
 
Siegerjustiz-Victor's Justice 
 
                         For a long time this trial and other post Nuremberg military 
trials (SNP) 'were dogged by persistent criticism in Germany of being no 
more than an application of retro-active law and an exercise in double-
standard victor's justice'16. However, 'there was little effort in German society 
to defend National Socialist Criminals … having dragged the country into the 
abyss'17. Some British writers such as Hankey, Paget and Veale used victor's 
justice to attack the trials, but mainly on grounds of humanitarian principles.  
 
                  A year after Kesselring's trial an American judge, Charles 
Wennerstrum, returning to America announced to a journalist that 'the victor 
in any war is not the best judge of the war crime … the prosecution has failed 
to maintain objectivity aloof from vindictiveness'18. Many clergy were also 
active in the cause of victor's justice: 'in the immediate postwar years, the 
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most concentrated and well organised source of criticism of the American war 
crimes trials was the German clergy'19. The Vatican also requested the Allies 
to forgive and thereby forget the past, to put an end to the trials20. It was 
received with a degree of coldness, the American Zone commander pointing 
out to a Catholic Cardinal that no 'death penalty has or will be exacted except 
where the evidence clearly sustains that the offense warrants the penalty'21. 
The Pope was backed by American and British Bishops. 'A constantly 
recurring theme in public responses to the trials was that all parties to the war, 
but especially the Soviets had committed similar abuses;' this criticism of 
Russia may have an element of truth but the West was not faced by 
Vernichtungskrieg - a war of total destruction22. In the next decade the 
diatribe surrounding victor's justice continued, the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung claiming that in Korea 'the West's reputation was no more 
unblemished than the Germans'23. Most of the arguments fell into the 
categories that all sides committed crimes, the victors applied ex post facto 
law, soldiers must follow orders, and there were no war crimes. 
 
                  The question of victor's justice arose around Kesselring's trial 
mainly because Mälzer (Commandant in Rome) and General Mackensen had 
already been sentenced to death for the Ardeatine massacre24. Because death 
sentences had already been passed on Kesselring's subordinates, it gave the 
appearance of a show trial. To add to this criticism of being victor's justice it 
was widely accepted that the SS General Wolff should have been in the dock. 
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Not all Culprits charged 
 
                      Many felt that SS General Wolff was the major culprit for the 
German crimes in Italy. Research in 'US Intelligence and Selective 
Prosecution at Nuremberg' indicates that Wolff was under the protection of 
Alan Dulles during Operation Sunrise, and recently 'declassified intelligence 
documentation provides direct evidence of Dulles' interventions within the 
Nuremberg process'25. It is not surprising that in the aftermath of war many 
escaped justice. The powerful protection of the Americans meant that Wolff, 
unquestionably involved in the Ardeatine and many other massacres, avoided 
the British Military Courts. Wolff eventually died in his bed in 1984, accused 
of much, surrounded by rumours, but never indicted for the Italian crimes. 
Scotland, who interrogated Kesselring in London, and who was highly critical 
of the proceedings, pointed out in a letter after the trial, that he found it 
difficult to see how the guilty verdict could stand without a 'closer scrutiny' of 
the role played by the SS'26. His point was pertinent, but did not detract from 
Kesselring's involvement. Italy had made capital punishment illegal, and it 
was thought they wanted the British to try the case because they were 
prepared to carry out the death sentence with or without Wolff, but the 
decision to hold the trial in Italy was more complex. 
 
Trial in Italy 
 
                  Kesselring, who had always pretended he had no interest in 
politics, was now a focal point of various political forces, a feature which 
dogged him until his death. The British were conscious of the political 
instability of Italy, and were wary of the communist elements. There was a 
political consciousness of the need for better relationships between the two 
powers. The placing of the trial in Italy was received by the Italian media as 
their own 'Little Nuremberg,' described as 'Little' because they wanted major 
trials as at Nuremberg.27 However, if the Italian government had participated, 
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even in Kesselring's trial to the commission’s work, 'it would have had to 
examine and judge not only the crimes committed by the Nazis against Italian 
civilians, but also the war crimes committed by the Italians themselves against 
Allied troops, and the population of the territories occupied by the Axis in the 
period prior to September 8, 1943'28. The British remained conscious of the 
complex political situation, and its diplomatic relationships. The Deputy 
Judge Advocate General wrote: 'there is, at the moment, no doubt that a 
substantial percentage of the Italian people is hostile to such war crime trials, 
inasmuch as they also involve Italian citizens and, since the Italians have 
suffered so terribly at the hands of the Germans, presumably many months 
will have to pass before the German generals are tried. Do you think that 
adopting such a line of conduct could be a positive thing for the morale of the 
Italians'29? The British were concerned about avoiding any choice that could 
'favour even indirectly a mass mobilization, which would have been 
completely to the advantage of the most radical political alignment. It was 
certainly for this reason that the prospect of holding an Italian Nuremberg was 
definitively shelved'30.  
 
                The Italians and Allies cooperated, but the British 'did not conceal 
their mistrust of the Italian authorities, a mistrust of which the Italians were 
painfully aware'31. The British were not prepared to share documents with the 
Italians, and there was the fear of a lynching, as had been the danger in the 
trial in Rome against Mackensen and Mältzer. When it comes to an excited 
mob 'it is not always easy to distinguish a desire for revenge from a 
commitment to justice'32. The trial was held in Italy for many reasons; but 
there was the hope that the trials might improve relationships between Britain 
and Italy, in fact the Italian Peace Treaty was signed in Paris on the day the 
trial started, 17th February 1947. 
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Prosecution and Defence on the First Charge 
                            
                         The Prosecution called nine witnesses and produced 57 
exhibits. Kappler, Head of Gestapo and Secret Service in Rome, was their key 
witness. The main witness for the defence was Kesselring himself supported 
by his staff-officers Beelitz and Westphal. The adversarial nature of the Court 
proceedings was somewhat alien to both the Germans and the Italians who did 
not understand the British legal tradition, and were irritated when Halse 
addressed Laternser as ‘my learned friend,’ and that Halse was polite when 
addressing Kesselring as 'Herr Feld-Marschall'33.  
 
                Kesselring’s defence was lead by Dr Hans Laternser, an expert in 
Anglo-Saxon law, and the 'the most right wing of the defence attorneys'34. 
Laternser represented the General Staff at Nuremberg, and technically 
negated the Charge that the Wehrmacht leadership was criminal: he later 
assisted in representing Manstein, and wrote a major book on defending 
Wehrmacht commanders. Laternser was supported by Dr Frohwein, Dr 
Schütze and Professor Dr Schwinge, the last being the author of the 
German1936 military penal code35.   
 
The Charge - Ardeatine Massacre 
 
                       Kesselring faced two charges; the first was specific and related 
to the killing of 335 Italians in the Ardeatine caves. This incident is described 
in Chapter 7, but in terms of the trial it seems appropriate to relate the salient 
features of this crime. On March 23rd, and this date becomes highly 
significant, thirty-three policeman of the Bozen Regiment (not SS as is 
frequently claimed) were blown up in the Via Rasella by communist partisans 
                                                 
33    It was also rumoured that Halse gave Kesselring tobacco, and on one occasion invited    
       the defence team out to dinner. 
34    Hébert, Hitler’s,p.102. 
35    There was a general feeling that many of Kesselring's enemies wished him well. During   
       the trial the German legal team was lodged with the German Franciscan Sisters in  
       Venice, and given Church lodgings when obliged to visit Rome. All this was paid for by   
       the British Army, and the lawyers noted, according to the German historian Lingen that  
       they had the 'unconcealed sympathy of the British guards.' Lingen, Kesselring,p.107. 
 244
trying to provoke a German response, and illustrate their strength to other 
partisan groups. Kesselring was supposed to be visiting the Gustav Line on 
this date, and Hitler's demand that hostages should be shot at a ratio of fifty to 
one was reduced by Kesselring's subordinates to ten to one. The outcome was 
the massacre of 335 hostages in the catacombs known as the Ardeatine caves. 
Significantly, five more than the proposed 330 were killed, including 
prisoners and Jewish people. This incident was not the greatest barbarity 
committed in Italy, but is regarded as one of the most infamous, and still 
provokes anger. 'Street battles over the coffin of a Nazi war criminal have 
illustrated that Italy is still torn over the legacy of Fascism…' was written in 
2013 relating to the funeral of SS Captain Erich Priebke, who drew up the 
infamous list and took part in the executions36. 
 
The Alibi Defence 
 
                      Part of Kesselring's defence was that he alleged that on the 23rd 
March, the day of the incident, he could not be contacted, having flown to 
Monte Cassino. His argument was that by being out of touch he was out of the 
loop. Beelitz, in charge of Kesselring's Headquarters at the time, under cross-
examination, claimed that because of Allied air-superiority he knew that 'the 
Field-Marshal is going to return in the evening at dusk;' in his absence 
officers managed to reduce Hitler’s outburst from fifty reprisals per person, to 
a ratio of ten-to-one37. Beelitz claimed he told the OKW officer, that 
Kesselring would never tolerate a ratio of fifty-to-one38. Earlier, in September 
1941 the OKW had proposed this ratio for 50 to 100 communists 'as suitable 
atonement for one German solder's life;' in the Eastern war barbarity was 
unbounded39. The ten-to-one ratio was well broadcast, and many German 
soldiers, such as Josef Lücking, believed it was 'permitted by the Geneva 
Convention'40. The task of execution had been given directly to SS 
                                                 
36    The Times, Thursday October 17th2013, p.42. 
37     LRWC, Trial transcript for 17thMarch.  
38     LRWC, Trial transcript for 17thMarch. 
39     Hébert, Hitler’s,p.88. 
40     Steinhoff, Voices,p.269. 
 245
Obersturmbannführer Kappler, to be carried out with immediate effect41. 
Kappler phoned Kesselring informing him that he had sufficient number of 
men already sentenced to death; known as Todeswürdig42. Kesselring's 
defence was that the whole incident was nothing to do with him, that it was an 
order for the SS not the Wehrmacht, his staff had managed to reduce the ratios 
to a 'reasonable' proportion, and he had established that the victims were 
already condemned.            
               
Defence that Hitler ordered the SD  
 
              Kesselring's defence team further argued that Hitler had ordered the 
SD to carry out the executions immediately, and this order came through after 
the ratios had been reduced in the form of a second order. The Judge 
Advocate stated that in essence Kesselring’s only defence was that he never 
carried out the orders, 'all I did was to pass along the chain of communication 
a message to the SD'43. One of the problems for Kesselring's defence was the 
lack of material-evidence for this second order making the SD responsible; no 
copy has ever been found. It is curious that during the London cross-
examination Kesselring never mentioned the order, but, conveniently, claimed 
he recalled it in Rome as a witness for Mälzer and Mackensen. Kesselring's 
claim that Hitler had directly commanded the SD was supported by Westphal 
and Beelitz, and corroborated by a clerk on oath, but his testimony was 
thought to be untrustworthy. The Judge Advocate was obliged to state that 'I 
feel there is some doubt in the law, the benefit of that doubt must be given to 
the Field-Marshal'44. It was plausible that Hitler/Himmler would have ensured 
the deed was carried out by the SD, and a Count Ingelheim confirmed a 
telephone call that the reprisal had been ordered from over the head of the 
Field-Marshal, but no written evidence of the precise order has ever been 
identified. Kesselring was frequently at pains to insist that as Commander he 
was totally in charge even of the SS. He made no such claim during this part 
of the trial, and insisted that Hitler's order, if it existed, exonerated him. In his 
                                                 
41     Kappler was tried by an Italian Military Court and sentenced to life-imprisonment. 
42     Todeswürdig-German word used for such people-Raiber, Anatomy,p.54. 
43     LRWC, Vol-VIII pp.10. 
44     LRWC, Vol-VIII pp.13. 
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summing-up the Judge Advocate said if 'you feel that it is right on the 
evidence as a whole that the shooting was clearly the responsibility of the 
Security Service and that all responsibility had passed from the Wehrmacht, 
then to my mind you are bound to acquit the accused'45. 
 
Defence - Was Kesselring humane? 
 
                       Another line of Kesselring's defence which Laternser argued 
was that Kesselring deliberately omitted the word hostages in transmitting the 
order, to avoid anyone not already sentenced to death being selected. 
Kesselring argued he had simply communicated the message to the intended 
recipients, ensuring, as far as he was able, that only the ‘already condemned’ 
would die. 'Kesselring, Westphal, and Beelitz all claimed they felt relieved as 
a result of this information from Kappler, because it meant that only 
criminals, not innocent hostages as Hitler was demanding, would be 
executed'46. Since Hitler had made it clear he wanted innocent hostages killed, 
by going down the route of killing the already condemned, Kesselring was 
knowingly breaching orders, and the Judge Advocate asked Westphal: 'I am 
not criticizing. Is not the position, quite clearly, that the Field-Marshal was 
deliberately and knowingly disobeying the oath he had made to Hitler'47? The 
Judge Advocate was undoubtedly making the valid point that Kesselring 
could not stand by his oath to Hitler if he were not constant in its application. 
No one seems to have raised the question that a criminal, albeit a criminal, is 
not necessarily under a death sentence. It is extremely unlikely that Pietro 
Caruso, the head of the fascist police in Rome, who claimed he had cleared 
his gaols, held prisoners who were all under the death sentence, and the local 
German command would have known this. There had been insufficient 
prisoners to be shot, and, Pietro Caruso, offered Kappler the content of the 
jails including some Jews. As mentioned earlier there was a miscalculation, 
and the extra five who were executed still made the Ardeatine massacre a war 
crime, even if the shooting of hostages were found legally acceptable.  
                                                 
45     LRWC, Vol VIII pp.13. 
46     LRWC, Trial transcript for 26th March. 
47     LRWC, Trial transcript for 31st March. 
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                      The defence requested from the Vatican a certificated copy of 
Kesselring’s letter in which he stated that the Ardeatine killings involved only 
those already on death sentences. Such evidence would have been critical for 
mens rea as well as motive, but the request was declined, and the Vatican also 
forbade other affidavits48.  
 
                    Whether it related to Kesselring's alibi on March 23rd (which will 
be touched upon later in this chapter), or the command direct from Hitler to 
the SD to carry out the reprisal, or Kesselring's alleged assurance that he had 
checked that only the already condemned would die, Westphal, Beelitz and 
Lemelsen never deviated from the facts as outlined by Kesselring. Their main 
argument was that the responsibility was Hitler's; the orders had been 
transmitted to the SD, and were legal. It seems transparent that such was the 
degree of agreement between these witnesses it should have raised the 
possibility of complicity, but counsel never raised this likelihood. There 
seems little doubt looking back on the trial notes there had been collaboration. 
Later in this chapter the question of Kesselring's alibi will be raised again, 
when evidence will indicate that he committed perjury: as such his witnesses 
must have collaborated49.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48     There has been considerable controversy over the role of the Vatican; there are those    
        who claim that Pius XII was vilified with 'communist inspired attempts to demonise   
        him in the post-war years.'-Burleigh, Moral,p.468. Some have argued the Pope was  
        indifferent to the Jewish disaster, fearing reprisals against German Roman Catholics,     
        trying to hold the balance between the evils of fascism and communism; but 'he did little   
        for the millions of Catholics killed by the Nazis.' Davies, History,p.1021. One historian   
        accused the 'Pope of a Faustian pact.' - Katz, Fatal,p.245, in the postwar years the 'Pope  
        himself called upon former Allied leaders essentially to 'forget the past, and give the   
        Germans … the hope of a better future in the sign of love.'  Hébert, Hitler’s,p.43 
49     Pietro Caruso was executed in Rome as soon as the war finished, but ironically, at   
        Kappler’s trial the Italian judiciary accepted the orders as legal, which implies that an   
        Italian Court would have found Kesselring innocent of this charge. Obeying orders was      
        apparently acceptable to the Italian court but unacceptable to the Allies following the  
        Nuremberg decisions. 
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  Prosecution and Defence on the Second Charge 
 
Prosecution Evidence 
 
                                   The second charge related to Kesselring’s Command 
Orders inciting his forces to kill civilians as reprisals against partisan activity. 
The prosecution outlined that on '1st May 1944 Field-Marshal Keitel, as 
Commander-in-Chief of all German forces, issued an order' which gave 
Kesselring total command in the war against partisans, and it was therefore 
his responsibility50. Keitel had already issued Führer orders on partisans 
stating that since: 'this fighting has nothing to do with soldierly gallantry or 
principles of the Geneva Convention … that it is therefore not only justified, 
but is the duty of the troops to use all means without restriction even against 
women and children as long as it ensures success … any consideration for 
partisans is a crime against the German people… and no German employed 
against partisans will be held accountable for his actions … and the contents 
of this order are to be strongly impressed on all officers of subordinate 
units'51. 
                     
                      The prosecution further stated that on 17th June 1944 Kesselring 
issued a similar written order: 'the fight against the partisans must be carried 
on with all the means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I will 
protect any command who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity 
of the methods he adopts against partisans'52. All this was very similar to the 
earlier 'Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order' which urged a war without mercy, and 
leaving it in the hands of officers on the spot53. 
 
                   The prosecution also outlined that Kesselring issued a radio threat 
on the 28th June, appealing to the Italians not to respond to Alexander and 
Badoglio’s call for Italians to kill Germans at every opportunity. Kesselring 
                                                 
50    LRWC-Vol-VIII pp.10. 
51    LRWC-Document-UK-66, pp.572/582. 
52    KNA-HW1/2982 and LRWC-Document-UK-66, pp.572-582.  
53    Hébert, Hitler’s,p.117  -see Appendix 1.  
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appealed to the Italians, claiming he respected human principles, but he would 
react fiercely whenever partisans were involved in their 'despicable and 
mediaeval method of fighting'54.  These orders were circulated throughout 
Italy on public notice boards and newspapers, some commands being more 
forthright than others55.  
 
                 On July 1st Kesselring sent another order stating his radio-broadcast 
was not an empty threat, and where large numbers of partisans were operating 
then male hostages were to be taken as a warning. The prosecution cited over 
twenty instances of indiscriminate killing by Germans based on submitted 
affidavit evidence, which accounted for killings of approximately a thousand 
Italian civilians. When in London, Kesselring had given a deposition during 
the committal proceedings 'that dramatically revealed the feelings of rancour 
he had been harbouring towards the Italian army and people that had been the 
premise of his policy'56. As such the prosecution argued that Kesselring’s 
orders incited his troops to commit excesses, which he later attempted to 
avert. This occurred following Mussolini's plea for leniency on the 24th 
September, in which Kesselring said 'the Duce has furnished me with fresh 
incidents which are revolting in the manner in which they have been carried 
out and are driving even the peaceful elements of the population into the 
enemy's camp or to the partisans'57.   
 
                 The prosecution concluded this evidence with: 'I say no more than 
this is an incitement, but in the order of the 1st July the accused goes further 
and orders his troops to take reprisals, and it is not until 24th September that 
he says 'this must stop.' That is the gravamen of this charge'58. The issue on 
the second charge, as pointed out by the Judge Advocate, was whether 
Kesselring's orders were 'a definite incitement to kill Italians or just badly 
worded orders which were rather carelessly drafted'59.               
 
                                                 
54    LRWC-Vol-VIII pp.10. 
55    Typical example in Appendix 2. 
56    Battini, Missing,p.88. 
57    LRWC-Vol-VIII pp.11. 
58    LRWC-Vol-VIII pp.11. 
59    LRWC-Vol-VIII pp.12. 
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Defence -Not the Wehrmacht 
 
                  In terms of defence Kesselring claimed the orders of the 17th June 
and 1st July were legal; that he had simply instructed his soldiers to be severe, 
but not to break the law. Kesselring's claim that he would protect commanders 
from political repercussions had nothing to do with reprisals, which seems 
somewhat specious.  The defence questioned the validity of the affidavits 
taken by the British Military Police's SIB (Special Investigation Branch) long 
before the trial started, because most of the policemen could not be questioned 
as they were in England. These affidavits, given by Italians, were not always 
verifiable. It was upon these documents that the second charge indicted him 
for the death of over a thousand people, but the actual eye witness evidence of 
massacres left little room for doubt.  
 
                      When reading about the question of the responsibility for these 
massacres being the SS or Wehrmacht, it is possible to sense the emotions, 
and to this day the proceedings still invoke feelings. The attitude of the Allies 
towards the SS was one of both distaste and fear, British soldiers being told 
that 'the SS are a more carefully selected and better drilled body of thugs'60. 
However, the Italian historian Michele Battini claimed that the 'British elite' 
almost had a 'psychological necessity' to distinguish between the Wehrmacht 
and the NSDAP with its SS apparatus: 'it is an example of the desperate 
attempt to keep alive a cultural code common to the victors and the 
vanquished - of the way in which British Conservatism and Prussianism 
belonged to the same European tradition'61. This idea that the military culture 
of Prussia had a sympathetic parallel in British conservatism may have some 
element of truth, but the reality was beyond this. The SS were well known for 
being a formidable fighting force, and it suited Germans, not least Kesselring, 
to pass the blame onto the SS leaving the Wehrmacht as fighting the mythical 
'clean' war. As will be noted in the following chapters, as the Cold War 
increased during this period it came to suit the Allies to adopt this attitude, but 
at Kesselring's trial it was secondary to Kesselring's charges of massacre. 
                                                 
60    British Soldiers Book, 1944,p.13. 
61    Battini, Missing,p.41. 
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                   There was considerable evidence of major massacres, for which 
there was a tendency to look towards the SS as the perpetrators more than the 
Wehrmacht. Obersturmbannführer Ekkehardt, head of the 16th SS Panzer 
Grenadier, later claimed he was unaware of any of Kesselring orders; this may 
well have been true of much of the SS who had their own lines of command. 
Given the communication systems of the day it is probable that Kesselring's 
orders and counter-orders did not percolate to every area. Nevertheless, 
Kesselring gave orders which, for a time, evidently incited those inclined 
towards brutal behaviour, Wehrmacht and SS alike. Many massacres were 
done by Italian neo-fascist formations such as the Brigata Nera, and partisan 
elements some wearing German uniforms. There were undoubtedly many 
such crimes committed of which Kesselring would have been unaware, but he 
had authorised similar incidents through his orders, and unquestionably he 
was aware of others. Since he insisted he was in charge, and, as the 
Prosecution pointed out, Keitel had confirmed this, he must be held complicit 
in all these deeds. The whole question of legality focused on the question of 
hostages and reprisal victims, and any laws appertaining to this critical area.  
      
Defence- Legality of Hostage/Reprisal  
 
                  Kesselring never invoked the Nuremberg defence of obeying 
superior orders, which had been one of the main defence components at the 
major war trial in Nuremberg. The argument used by so many at Nuremberg 
and its subsequent trials was, that an action may have been criminal, but 
orders have to be obeyed which was declared unacceptable. Kesselring, on the 
other hand argued that his actions were legal. He may possibly have been 
aware that in 1921, a German court in Leipzig, applied the German military 
code which appeared to stipulate that even with knowledge of superior orders 
the subordinate 'ought to have known that the orders constituted crimes' and 
would therefore be guilty62. The German Military Penal Code of 1872 was 
used in the war, and declared that 'the obeying subordinate shall be punished 
                                                 
62    Hébert, Hitler’s,p.71. 
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as an accomplice to an illegal order - if he exceeded it or if he knew the order 
was criminal'63. It is ironic that these codes outlawed the appeal to senior 
orders and criminal orders, but this would hardly have applied during the 
Hitler regime64. This explains why Kesselring insisted his orders given and 
received were legal. 
 
                      Laternser argued that the use of hostage/reprisal was legal, 
albeit unpleasant, and needed a better forum of legal experience than a Court 
Martial because of the legal complexity.  There was a degree of truth in his 
argument; the problems of international law, the history of hostage/reprisal, 
demanded more than the judgement of a few British military officers.  
 
                  The defence argued it was virtually impossible to communicate 
with partisans, making the hostage/reprisal system necessary; further arguing 
there was  a pedigree of ‘hostage-taking’ dating back to the Franco-Prussian 
war. The prosecutor in Kesselring’s case had 'pointed out that whereas there 
was authority for destruction of property and incarceration of nationals of 
occupied territory as reprisals, there was no authority for the taking of human 
life'65. In short, reprisals were seen as acts of retaliation to unlawful conduct, 
and for enforcing compliance with recognised rules of warfare. The Allies had 
apparently used the similar threat; when 'the French occupied Stuttgart in 
April 1945, it was announced that hostages would be shot in the ratio or 25 to 
1 for every French soldier murdered by the German civilian population … 
when the Americans entered the Harz district, execution was threatened in the 
ratio of 200 to 1,' though this was more a threat, and no one was actually shot 
under these circumstance66.  
 
                        That hostage/reprisal was widespread and complex was 
illustrated when the American and British army regulations were tabled. A 
brief reading of the trial notes between the Judge Advocate and Colonel Halse 
                                                 
63    Hébert, Hitler’s,p.142. 
64    Müller-Hill, True,p.xviii indicates German Military judges mainly used 1872 Military  
       Penal Code and 1898 Judicial Procedure. 
65    LRWC-Vol-VIII pp.12. 
66    Veale, Advance,p.292. 
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for the prosecution clearly indicates that Laternser's placing of the American 
manual of warfare as an exhibit, took them by surprise, revealing a deep 
ignorance of the issues67. The defence quoted from the American Rules of 
Land Warfare, namely: 'Hostages taken and held for the declared purpose of 
ensuring against unlawful acts by the enemy forces or people may be 
punished or put to death if unlawful acts are nevertheless committed'68. The 
British Manual at paragraph 454 stated that 'Reprisals are an extreme measure 
because in most cases they inflict suffering upon innocent persons. In this, 
however, their coercive force exists, and they are indispensable as a last 
resort'69. In addition to this the defence team quoted from a commentary on 
German Military Law used during World War II in which the author wrote: 
'hostages are held in a kind of safe custody. They vouch with their lives for 
the lawful conduct of the opponent. According to the usages of war it must be 
announced that hostages are being taken and for what purpose… if the 
opponent continues his unlawful conduct, the hostages can be killed'70.         
 
               The Allied Army manuals appeared to give some legitimacy to the 
hostage/reprisal practice. The whole issue was confusing, and the Judge 
Advocate at the end of the trial said 'I have come to the conclusion that there 
seems to be on the part of writers a very deliberate attempt not to come out in 
the open and answer the very question that the Court wants answered and this 
is ‘can you shoot, in certain circumstances, an innocent person by way of 
reprisal71 ?’   
 
                       Kesselring's trial had raised the issue of hostage/reprisal, and it 
failed to arrive at any agreement; even the term hostage and reprisal were not 
always clearly defined. Defence Counsel used hostage as the first step 
towards inflicting reprisal, the Prosecution used hostage where only reprisal 
                                                 
67    Text of this part of trial in Appendix-6. 
68    US-Army-Field Manual-27-10/1stOctober1940-358d, Appendix-5 for text. 
69    LRWC-Volume-VIII, p.12. 
70    Waltzog, Recht der Landkriegsführung (Laws of War on Land)  
       p. 83, and LRWC, Volume-VIII, p.12. 
71    LRWC, Vol-VIII, p.12. 
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applied. 'Hostages are taken before the act of illegitimate warfare committed 
by the enemy whereas reprisals are inflicted after such an act'72.  
 
                 There was a lack of clarity in this trial which the Americans 
attempted to resolve in 'Southeast Trial' (part of the SNP based on the Balkans 
and Greece) in which the Tribunal concentrated on the law of 
hostages/reprisals73. It was eventually held that under extreme circumstances 
hostages may be taken, and as a last desperate remedy hostages may be 
sentenced to death74. This hostage tribunal ruled 'that partisans could legally 
be shot, and anyway … the Soviet partisans' particular cruelty amply justified 
the severity of the Wehrmacht's anti-partisan campaign'75. This Tribunal 
concluded there was insufficient certainty in the law of hostages/reprisals, to 
justify a ruling that the killing of hostages could be legal in certain 
circumstances, and demanded an international agreement, since there was no 
mention in The Hague Regulations. Some, including Kesselring and many 
Germans, considered it part of the Hague Convention, the problem being that 
Articles 43 and 46 of the Convention did not expressly forbid such practices. 
Many German legal scholars had defended the notion of killing hostages as a 
necessary measure in extreme circumstances, and a few English and 
American writers have expressed sympathy, mainly on the grounds that it 
would be absurd to take hostages if they cannot be executed76.   
 
                  The Allied Courts, British, and later American (SNP), failed to 
define the hostage/reprisal situation as a war crime, apparently accepting that 
killing innocent people is legal so long as it is not excessive. The manuals of 
the Allied Armies did not constitute international law. There were acts of 
barbarity on all sides, but although the British and American manuals seemed 
to support hostage and reprisal it was only used as a threat. Kesselring could, 
by some interpretation, still be viewed as legally correct by the laws of the 
                                                 
72    LRWC, Vol-VIII,p.14. 
73    'Southeast'-dealt with Southeast Europe, Greece, Balkans-Case, USA v Wilhelm List.         
74    United-Nations-War-Crimes-Commission-Vol-VIII-1949-Case-No/47. 
75    Hébert, Hitler’s,p.104. 
76    United-Nations-War-Crimes-Commission-Vol-VIII-1949-Case-No/47. 
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day, but his written orders went beyond the ruthless, and verged on crimes 
against humanity. 
 
Defence - Illegality of Partisans 
 
                 Laternser pointed out the illegality of partisans by international 
agreement; that is not wearing uniforms, no distinguishable badges, and the 
criminality of destructive activity to the rear of the occupier. This was again 
successfully raised in the SNP case on hostages.77 The OKH had agreed early 
in the war that partisans were not to be treated as 'POWs but as criminals … 
and if found guilty will be sentenced to death'78. Kesselring had been told the 
Ardeatine victims were already guilty, and in his orders he was dealing with 
partisans, ergo criminals.  
 
                  It has been argued that 'no commander in an occupied area can be 
expected to tolerate the ambushing and/or surreptitious killing of his soldiers 
or the sabotage of his industrial or military facilities behind the lines by 
civilians not in uniform'79. In Italy some of the partisan warfare was brutal, 
and some take the view that 'it is difficult to see how Kesselring could have 
avoided inflicting stern penalties,' and there is little doubt that many Allied 
commanders then, and later, sympathised with him80. Since the start of the 
European war Churchill had encouraged irregular warfare, encouraged any 
form of resistance, as noted, Alexander had openly encouraged their activities. 
The question of illegality had to be put aside, because the prosecution was the 
massacre of innocent Italians for which Kesselring was indicted. 
 
Kesselring Saviour of Italian Culture 
 
                         Laternser's defence had three headings; first, that Kesselring's 
orders had been legal, secondly, that the partisans had been immoral and 
internationally illegal in their conduct, thirdly he had always been a pro-
                                                 
77    Hébert, Hitler’s,p.144. 
78    Raiber, Anatomy,p.90. 
79    Ibid,p.91. 
80    Ibid,p.92. 
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Italian officer who had saved much of the Italian culture and many ancient 
cities/towns. 
 
               This third line of defence has attracted considerable criticism. It is 
apparent that Kesselring 'was, of course, perfectly aware of the need to protect 
buildings and works of art' and this has been acknowledged in The Rape of 
Europa, a study devoted to finding and returning stolen treasures81. 
'Considering the precarious position of the German Armies north of Naples, it 
was an extraordinary use of military effort'82. Following the Allied destruction 
of Monte Cassino a number of reputable Italians came to Kesselring's support.  
 
              The reality was never quite as straightforward as Laternser wished. In 
any total war the cultural and historical background becomes secondary to 
staying alive. In Naples vengeful German soldiers destroyed 50,000 valuable 
books in the University library for no reason at all. It was a gratuitous act of 
sheer destruction. When the Allied troops arrived 'the University now endured 
a second wave of destruction. Allied soldiers ransacked the laboratories … 
jeeps decorated with hundreds of fabulously coloured stuffed toucans … from 
the zoological collection,' and many other acts of vandalism happened83.  
 
                 Both Kesselring and the Allied commanders were faced with the 
same problems when fighting in Italy's treasure trove, and being a western 
country, and the centre of Roman Catholicism, it was more under the public 
gaze of the wider world than Eastern Europe had been. In December 1943 
Eisenhower was obliged to issue orders on the protection of monuments 
pointing out that 'the phrase 'military necessity' is sometimes used where it 
would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal 
convenience'84. Control over subordinates on the battlefield could never be 
watertight, although hundreds of notices with Kesselring’s signature were 
placed in appropriate places, it was never a guarantee.  
 
                                                 
81    Nicholas, Rape,p.239. 
82    Ibid,p.241. 
83    Ibid,p.233. 
84    Ibid,p.237. 
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                     Weizsäcker wrote 'that our troops rendered valuable services in 
preserving churches and works of art'85. Rome was declared an open city, 
which has sometimes drawn a degree of scorn from historian and Italian 
veteran Richard Lamb, who noted that the Germans remained to deploy this 
critical communication hub, but when it came to frontline action Rome was 
preserved. Kesselring claimed credit for this both during interrogations and in 
his memoirs, but 'it was Hitler who forbade Kesselring to mine the bridges 
over the Tiber' and so when the Allied forces reached Rome Kesselring's 
troops had moved north86. 
 
                 According to Kesselring he arranged the timely evacuation of Pisa, 
and in July neutralised Parma, Reggio, Modena; Bologna was declared open 
when the local Mayor and Archbishop pleaded for its preservation. Venice 
was chosen as the place for depositing all the art treasure in eastern Italy, and 
Vicenza and Padua were completely demilitarised at the request of the Bishop 
of Padua. Kesselring received a letter from the Archbishop of Chieti: 'for 
eight months we, the people of Chieti, were only seven kilometres from the 
line of operations held by the Germans. During all this time I received no 
offensive treatment from the German commanders, especially not from Field-
Marshal Kesselring or the generals under him. On the contrary, they, and 
particularly Field-Marshal Kesselring, supported and helped me in every 
conceivable way as far as the military situation permitted when the question 
arose of saving the town of Chieti and anything that could possibly be 
saved'87. However, Kesselring was a professional soldier, and military 
necessity would ultimately dictate all that he did.  
 
                      Italy was not just saved by Kesselring. According to 'one 
witness at Hitler's headquarters, he {Hitler} specifically declared that 
Florence itself was not to be a battleground,' 'and communicated this to the 
Allies through the Vatican'88. On July 29th Alexander broadcast a message to 
the people of that city to defend their city's utilities; the historical and much 
                                                 
85    Weizsäcker, Memoirs,p.291. 
86    Nicholas, Rape,p.247. 
87    Kesselring, Memoirs,p.310. 
88    Nicholas, Rape,p.257. 
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loved bridge of Santa Trinità was destroyed. 'As in the case of Monte Cassino, 
controversy as to who was to blame for these events went on for years'89. 
Laternser's argument that Kesselring was the saviour of Italy was 
understandably not given the support he had anticipated. The Court Martial 
had the advantage of being intimate with the reality of war. 
 
                    Kesselring claimed credit for the efforts of his subordinates as 
well as his superiors. The world would rather believe that Kesselring and not 
Hitler stopped the destruction of the Roman bridges making Rome an open 
city, but the order came from Hitler. From September 1943 Kesselring had 
established an 'Art Preservation Branch' set up under a Dr Hagemann, later 
called the Arts and Monuments Protection Squad, known as the Kunstschutz, 
and working without the Italians for fear of losing sight of the valuables, 
'fearing entire collections would be sold in Switzerland.'90 Kesselring was 
obliged to do this for the same reason Eisenhower had to react to monument 
destruction in the face of world criticism, but like many commanders he took 
the credit postwar making all these efforts sound personal to him. Kesselring 
pointed out the safe recovery of most of the Italian art stored in the north, but 
this was more to do with the SS General Wolff in his end of war negotiations 
with Allen Dulles; when Wolff, 'to the amazement of the OSS men, gave a list 
of almost all the Florentine works of art they had ever heard of, which Wolff 
claimed to be able to deliver them'91. It was for this reason that the depots 
were handed over directly to the Allies in 1945, rather than to the transitional 
Italian government, and not by Kesselring. 
 
                  Nevertheless, an Allied investigation report felt that Italian cultural 
treasures had ‘suffered relatively little war damage, and it attributed this 
primarily to the large scale allocation of Wehrmacht conveyances, as well as 
generous gasoline rations…German soldiers even rescued art treasures from 
buildings under fire’92. 
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                      In a world where people had suffered so much, the preservation 
of Italy’s cultural heritage did not register highly in postwar priorities. It has 
been claimed that Kesselring ‘devoted far greater attention to supervising 
measures (for saving places and treasures) than he did to, for example, 
supervising the manner in which his troops treated the Italian civilian 
population’93. Already mentioned was the fact that Kesselring authorised the 
removal or destruction of economic and industrial sites. The livelihood of 
Italy and innocent Italian lives comes a poor second to cultural treasures. 
Even to many Italians the saving of their cultural heritage was secondary to 
the brutality they had suffered, and it was Kesselring who was the 
understandable focus of their anger. Many Italians had hoped that the trial 
would give some recognisable retribution for the dead hostages. Even before 
the trial the court received a plea from the citizens of Versilia claiming 
Kesselring 'terrorized the whole Tuscany. We all the citizens of Versilia 
Town, bow reverently to the martyrs of the Ardeatine caves … what about the 
persons killed in our country … Rome suffered such a retaliation as some 
Germans had been killed by the partisans but in Versilia no German soldier 
was killed'94.The court was confronting complex legal issues, and the desire 
for retribution sought by some Italians, could not be ignored by Kesselring's 
specious claims that he had preserved Italian culture, but how he treated the 
people. 
 
Perjury 
 
              In 2000 an American historian and medical practitioner, Dr Richard 
Raiber was about to present a thesis, which demonstrated that Kesselring had 
perpetrated a major perjury during his trial. Unfortunately Dr Raiber died 
before the thesis was completed, but a friend has privately published his 
findings under his name95. Raiber suggested that Kesselring had lied about his 
whereabouts on March 23rd, the day of the via Rasella bombing. He had set up 
a complex fabrication in order to be tried for the Ardeatine massacre, rather 
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than for confirming orders for some American/Italian commandos to be 
executed, from Operation Strangle, sometimes known as the 'Ginny 
incident.'96 General Dostler, Kesselring's subordinate had already been 
executed for following Hitler's Führerbefehl and killing the Americans97. 
Kesselring realised the shooting of hostages was more in the grey area of 
international law than killing POWs. Laternser's defence had already 
underlined this point establishing that when ex-POWs had been caught with 
the partisans, they were still treated as POWs. Kesselring knew the Allied 
courts showed no leniency in matters of killing POWs. In his estimation it 
was safer to be tried for massacring 335 Italian people than fifteen American 
soldiers. 
 
Raiber's Case 
 
                          Raiber's evidence while not conclusive is persuasive. He 
found evidence that the knowledge of the raid, the Ginny mission, was 'known 
to Kesselring's HQ,' and Kesselring was with Dostler and not at Monte 
Cassino98. Dostler, a pro-Hitler general, always claimed the order to execute 
was confirmed from above, and Dostler claimed that Kesselring's HQ had 
asked whether it had been done, which conflicts with both Kesselring's and 
Westphal's testimony. Significantly an Ultra intercept from Ginny to 
Kesselring's HQ announced that the Americans had been liquidated99. A 
reserve cavalry captain, Alexander Fürst zu Dohna-Schlobitten, noted in his 
diary his refusal to shoot the POWs, observing they were regarded as 
saboteurs. In his autobiography Senger, who attended Dostler's trial, 
postulated that Dostler would have received authorisation from HQ, and 
found it strange that Dostler's chief of staff could not be located, even though 
he was a POW100. Senger also admitted to the court that Hitler 'gave out 
orders which in their way interfered with International law'101.  
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                   The written evidence remained evasive until Raiber checked 
telephone logs, and discovered Westphal noting that on the date he claimed to 
be at Cassino, Kesselring  'was still up in North Italy…complaining that the 
defences at Genoa are much too weak'102. Another document relating to 
Kesselring's itinerary shows that he arrived at an airfield north of Genoa, and 
was 'met by Dostler'103. This was further substantiated by entries in the war 
diaries of 'Sea Commandant, Italian Riviera and the German navy Command, 
Italy'104. The Ginny Americans had been moved to La Spezia at the same time 
Kesselring was there. The lack of written evidence is probably because, as 
confirmed later by several German officers, all records regarding the Ginny 
mission were destroyed, by order from Monte Soratte, Kesselring's HQ. It 
would appear from this research that Kesselring, Westphal and Beelitz were 
in cahoots, but it was not until 1997 that Beelitz 'admitted Kesselring had 
been in Liguria on 24th March 1944'105. Dostler probably kept quiet because of 
Korpsgeist, knowing he was going to die anyway. Raiber hoped there might 
be evidence in the Ultra intercepts in London, but after an examination of 
some 300 such intercepts this research found nothing. 
 
                      Raiber's work and Beelitz's later admission indicate that 
Kesselring and his officers were in cahoots at the trial, and deliberately lied 
on the grounds that they knew it would be fatal to be associated with the 
killing of American prisoners.  What Raiber never raised was the critical 
question as to the ethos of the day, that it was considered safer to be tried for 
the death of 335 innocent Italians than fifteen American soldiers. The Italians 
had initially been the enemy, but the massacre of innocent civilians could not 
be regarded as less serious than shooting POWs. It has been suggested that 
'one of the peculiarities of that postwar period that Allied officers felt an 
admiration for their German counterparts regardless of their criminal and 
unmilitary activities, so long as the victims were not British or American'106. 
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The Wehrmacht's behaviour to civilians was atrocious, but killing POWs was 
by law and attitude regarded as more serious - by both sides. 
 
Verdict in Court 
 
                         The Court in 1947, oblivious to the possibility of Kesselring's 
perjury, was disinclined to pay any attention to his defence of saving Italian 
culture; they were only interested in the two main charges. The Judge 
Advocate’s summary outlined the difficulties. He noted that international law 
was ambiguous when it came to the legality of hostages/reprisals. He admitted 
the massacre at the Ardeatine Caves did not answer the question as to whether 
the responsibility was Kesselring's, or the SD. This still left the 'raw' question 
as to whether the Ardeatine killings were, by law, admissible reprisals, or a 
war crime; if it were not a war crime then the mistaken extra five killed 
constituted a war crime. He pointed out that Kesselring’s orders were given at 
a time when feelings were running high, and added that the prosecution had 
failed to show whether the shootings were reprisals or shooting of hostages. 
The final question was whether Kesselring's orders incited the massacre of 
Italian civilians. 
                             
                        Undoubtedly there was ambiguity in the Geneva Convention, 
and, the so-called International Law, some of which (i.e. London Agreement 
1945) was retrospective, leading to Kesselring’s claim that he had considered 
himself subject to German law, and not 'some new Anglo-Saxon Law'107. The 
Manual of Military Law in Britain, article 443 regarding 'actions pursuant to 
orders from a superior - was amended in April 1944 in anticipation of the 
planned trials for German and Japanese war criminals'108. None of these 
factors made a final judgement easy to reach, and one American observer, a 
Colonel Murphy, believed the evidence had been insufficient; it was another 
American observer, Colonel Notestein who furnished Laternser with the 
American 'Rules of Land Warfare'109.  However, the British Court thought 
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otherwise, and sentenced Kesselring to death by firing squad, as some 'Italians 
there booed and cried assassin'110. 
 
Trial in long term Context 
 
 
               As a final note to this chapter it does not seem unreasonable to ask 
the question as to whether Kesselring was any different, from any other 
commander in terms of his conduct given the changing nature of this war. 
When Klemperer, a German Jew suffering in Dresden in 1941 claimed the 
'last war was such a decent business' he reflected a fundamental problem of 
World War II in Europe, that genocide was being planned111. When the 
enemy exterminates people then laws of conduct lose their priority.  
 
                   It has been said that 'we can say that while all sides committed 
war crimes in World War II, some of the combatant nations were far more 
criminal than others,' and some military leaders were more criminal than 
others, some more ruthless112. Telford Taylor, the American Chief Prosecutor 
in his account of the German trials, concluded with the statement that 'the 
laws of war do not apply only to the vanquished nations. There is no moral or 
legal basis for immunizing victorious nations from scrutiny. The laws of war 
are not a one-way street,' and crimes committed by the victorious side lend 
weight to the claim of Victor's Justice113.  In Sicily, Italian POWs were twice 
massacred in groups of about thirty by Americans. In both incidents there 
were court-martials followed by acquittals, leading one historian to claim that 
'Patton, whose military ethic mirrored that of many Nazi commanders, wrote 
that in my opinion these killings have been thoroughly justified'114. For fear of 
reprisals Eisenhower suppressed the information, but 'if Germans had been 
responsible, they would have been indicted for war crimes in 1945, and 
probably executed'115. It may have been the knowledge of such events which 
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prompted some to support Kesselring, when it came to a question of 
clemency. However, in Kesselring's case he gave the orders, Patton had not. 
Later, regarding the Malmedy case 'the commission had wanted to commute 
all the Malmedy death sentences, given that the massacre was a ‘heat of battle 
offence for which no American guilty of a similar crime would have been put 
to death'116. 
 
                 It was because of Italian partisans that Kesselring appeared in the 
dock. What made this war so different was genocide. Genocide was not just 
the Holocaust because 'the entire war against the Soviet Union was intended 
to be, and was, a genocidal campaign of colonization,' and some of the 
massacres, especially in Italy, seemed to reflect this policy117. It has been said 
that 'on the field of battle it becomes apparent that war is simply indecent and 
inhuman to the core. Brutality and insensitivity are the ways of war'118. This is 
true of the heat of battle, and probably in the immediate aftermath, but the 
systematic shooting of innocent people casts an entirely different meaning 
over war crime, transforming it into a crime against humanity. 
                       
                             It is in the overview of total war of extermination that the 
reaction of men must be viewed, in their historical context. Kesselring was a 
military man whose entire life was consumed by war and its preparation. By 
his authority and by his orders innocent men, women, children and babies had 
been slaughtered. He was rightly found guilty of issuing orders that unleashed 
sheer brutality, of being part of the command process that slaughtered the 
innocent in the Ardeatine Cave incident: because many others on all sides 'got 
away with it' does not negate Kesselring's sentence.  
 
               Laternser always claimed Kesselring was innocent, and Kesselring 
always maintained he was free of any guilt. But he secretly asked a 
'genealogist named Furics to obtain proof ' of Swiss ancestry: this fact has 
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only just come to light in this research119. The idea of fleeing to Switzerland 
in the event of defeat was undoubtedly stimulated by his fear that his conduct 
would be questioned; in the same vein Himmler in a last minute panic tried to 
conceal Holocaust crimes, 'obliterating any trace of the slaughter from 
posterity'120. After the trial the verdict was questioned time and time again, 
but his argument that he fought a clean war was nonsense to the Court, which 
grew into a myth, and expanded in the years during his imprisonment, the 
reasons for this will be developed in the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER 10 
 
PRISON (1947-1952) 
 
 Introduction 
               
                   This chapter will examine the reasons why Kesselring's death 
sentence was commuted. The argument will be that this had nothing to do 
with his innocence, but mainly a political motive which sparked the myth of a 
clean war. Secondly, it will explore Kesselring's experience as a prisoner, the 
way prison life improved for him, and illustrate that he became a pawn in a 
power struggle. Thirdly, the chapter will try to explain the politics and 
motives surrounding his release which were driven by multifarious hidden 
agendas. Kesselring became a subject of debate, because the British and 
Americans were encouraging Germany as an Ally, and holding German 
commanders in prison was counter-productive. The Cold War necessitated the 
western Allies viewing the war in a reformed light, namely that Hitler was an 
aberration, the SS committed the crimes, and the Wehrmacht fought a clean 
war. It has been suggested that this provided the main impetus for 
Kesselring's release, and this release became one of the ingredients to 
successful international relations between Germany and the West. However, 
the thesis will show that whilst not entirely disagreeing with this theory, the 
motives of those seeking Kesselring's release were more mixed than some 
historians suggest. 
 
Commutation of death sentence 
 
                  News of Kesselring's death sentence created mixed reactions. 
Generals Lemelsen and Herr wrote a petition stating that Kesselring 'was 
always guided by the purest intentions. He always promoted proper conduct 
and not evil'1. Feelings in Britain were more diverse. Alexander (then 
Governor-General of Canada) felt strongly about Kesselring, and had written 
asking for the commutation of the death sentence2. General Sir Oliver Leese 
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was quoted as saying with reference to POWs that 'Kesselring, like Rommel, 
set a very good example - a far better example than the Italians'3. Leese also 
followed Alexander's line by writing that Kesselring was 'a gallant soldier 
who fought his battles fairly'4. Churchill led the faction seeking repeal from 
the death sentence, causing some concerned War Office personnel to seek 
advice from the Foreign Office5. Churchill wrote to Attlee 'regarding 
Kesselring…in my judgement it is a question of political policy: condemning 
to death the leaders of a defeated enemy has today ceased to have the 
usefulness which it could have had in the past'6.  
 
                Time was provided by Italy's abolition of the death penalty which 
they applied to the British. The Italians indicated that even in the fascist times 
death could only be imposed for premeditated murder, which they did not 
think applied to Kesselring on the evidence of the case7. The Daily Mail, 
which operated a European and British newspaper, published an article 
entitled 'Will it Help to shoot Kesselring8?' In the same month, May 1947 the 
Guardian printed an article which claimed 'that Kesselring is guilty is certain: 
that Kesselring is more guilty than other Germans who have escaped 
punishment is not'9. Newspaper articles were varied, one in particular pointing 
out that Kesselring may have been a gallant soldier and may have the support 
of Alexander, but that did not excuse him from 'murdering' the innocents at 
Ardeatine catacombs10. 
 
                    Churchill was opposed by the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
and the Secretary of State for War, Frederick Bellenger, who were aware that 
Sir Hartley Shawcross (British Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg) held very 
strong opinions that convicted war criminals should not avoid the verdicts 
imposed on them. Churchill sought allies in the Church; he had regarded 
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George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester as a nuisance nevertheless, Churchill 
used him in this appeal11. He also had the support of his son Randolph who 
wrote a letter to the Telegraph appealing to Christian forgiveness12. Hankey, 
some military leaders, de L’Isle and Dudley were Churchill's chief supporters. 
 
                    Churchill encouraged a debate in the House of Lords on May13th 
1947 led by Viscount William de L’Isle and Dudley13. It was but a brief 
question because de L’Isle was informed the matter was 'still sub judice'14. 
His response was revealing: 'while thanking the Noble Lord for his reply, may 
I ask for an assurance that there will be an adequate interval between the 
decision of the reviewing authority, if adverse, and the execution of the 
sentence? Apart from purely judicial considerations, matters of high and 
important public policy are involved'15.  
 
                By saying that 'matters of high and important public policy' were 
involved it seems unlikely that de L’Isle, who had fought in Italy, was 
concerned about the ethical or spiritual aspects of public policy in supporting 
a death sentence for a German war criminal. In May 1947 the Cold War was 
taking shape; only a year before Churchill had publically used the well-known 
expression 'of the iron curtain descending' in his speech on Sinews of Peace; 
he was wary of the Soviets16. His animosity to the Hitler regime during the 
war was well documented, he had once announced to parliament that the 
German General Staff were a 'group of tight-lipped men who think it noble to 
use war' and 'the fewer Keitels, Kesselrings - yes, and Rommels - that are 
allowed to survive this war, the more secure'17. The war was finished and 
Churchill and others were alarmed at the perceived Soviet threat, and the need 
to keep Germany within the Allied fold was critical. It was probably the 
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ramifications of the Cold War that prompted William de L’Isle to use the 
expression 'matters of high and important public policy are involved'18. 
 
                  'The repeal of Kesselring's death sentence was solely due to 
domestic pressure exerted in the UK'19. It was commuted to imprisonment and 
this 'laid the foundation for the myth of the innocent Field Marshal 
Kesselring, who was unjustly condemned, a myth that quickly gained 
currency in the Anglo-Saxon world'20. This was one of the ingredients for the 
popular myth that the SS was the evil component, and the Wehrmacht leaders, 
like Kesselring fought a clean war. The SS provided an alibi for the vast 
majority of German men who were not members, and that myth continued in 
Germany until 1995, and is still popular. This process of myth-building has 
some of its genesis in the Kesselring debate because of the timing in 1947. 
His rank and where he fought made him prominent in Western eyes, very 
much as Rommel would have been, had he survived. The Eastern European 
War was a Soviet matter and was notorious for its barbarity, whereas the 
barbarity in Italy was not against the British and Americans. The only strong 
protests concerning Kesselring's release from the death sentence came from 
the Italian National Partisan’s Association. It suited Kesselring to have fought 
a 'clean war' and he undoubtedly believed he had; it suited most Germans to 
view it as chivalrous, and now it was suiting the British and Americans. The 
politics of the new world order of Soviet and Western Blocs meant adjusting 
some views of recent events, even if it offended some Italians, and needed 
some adjustment of memory.  
 
Life in Prison 
 
                       In October 1947 Kesselring was transferred to the prison at 
Werl, a British Military prison in Westphalia, where he was treated as a felon. 
According to a Guardian newspaper article he had a standard cell, 'containing 
bed table and a couple of stools', he had to rise at '5.30, breakfast and going to 
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work at seven;' and they were 'not forced to do work which they dislike, but 
they had a limited range'21. 
 
                   Prison life was intended to be dreary, and Kesselring’s work was 
gumming paper-bags. He never mentions his faith in his memoirs, but 
attended Mass regularly. At one time the prison Chaplain, a Father Victor 
Kleyer secreted in newspapers, and acted as courier for Laternser and 
Scotland; these were unquestionably papers relating to Laternser's efforts for 
his release22. By the end of 1948 gluing paper-bags finished, and more 
comfort and personal freedom was granted; as in many prisons the early days 
were always made the hardest.  Many times Kesselring made requests to the 
prison governor for seven day's leave to visit his family in Bad Wiessee 
where, he claimed, they were aging and destitute23. He referred to one sister 
suffering from mental-illness, and said he was willing to have an escort. 
According to the memo the governor felt he was in no position to acquiesce, 
even though the family lived in the American sector24. A newspaper stated he 
was later given parole to 'visit a sick relative,' but there is no evidence of this 
in the prison files25. Other people tried to visit Kesselring, a mysterious 
Hildegard Kastner for example, but were turned down to protect Kesselring's 
wife, since he was only permitted one visitor every six weeks26. Although 
Kesselring knew his death sentence had been repealed, it was not until 
February 1950 that his case review occurred, commuting his sentence to 21 
years 'with effect from 6th May1947'27. 
 
                          At an American request Kesselring assisted the American 
Historical Division, which gave him access to other senior German officers, 
better food and pay, and probably improved self-esteem. The Americans 
wanted German military opinion, and his work provided a German view of 
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the campaigns; his observations on Partisan warfare remained restricted for a 
time, perhaps indicating his views were of interest28.  
 
                     The American SNP and the British Courts were intended to be 
didactic, a process towards democratization by a cleansing of the past. Telford 
Taylor had written that 'nowhere can these records be put to more immediate 
or better use than in German schools and universities, and in German books 
and magazines. But the least we can do is to insure that the documents which 
expose the true nature of the Third Reich are circulated throughout 
Germany'29.  Some considered Kesselring did not need this education, and 
suggested him as a potential leader. Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt, (one time 
Peace Movement Chairman during Weimar Republic, then Secretary General 
to German League of Human Rights; fled to England where he edited a 
Refugee newsletter, returning to Germany in 1951) although opposed to 
Kesselring, thought he might be the person selected to become the new 
Chancellor of the Federal Republic30.  When the American/German 
investigator Hans Speier asked General Toppe about potential leaders in 
December 1951, he mentioned Kesselring31. It appears that despite the court's 
verdict Kesselring retained some respect in Germany, which indicates some of 
the cynicism about the trials. In Werl prison Kesselring, as with all prisoners, 
was forbidden to give interviews; his wife was also barred because she had 
once divulged his opinions. When he was later released from prison it was 
clear, as will be illustrated later in the next chapter, that prison had not 
changed him.  
 
The Politics of Release - Introduction 
         
                 During incarceration Kesselring was forever in the public eye, not 
so much because of who he was, but more what he was. A well-known and 
famous German Field-Marshal in a British prison, frequently linked with 
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Manstein, he became the centre of a political storm and the possible re-writing 
of history. It has been persuasively argued that the western powers needed 
Germany rearmed against the Soviet threat, and for German public opinion it 
became necessary to release high profile military leaders, of which Kesselring 
became the prime example. The Italian historian Michele Battini wrote that 
'the Allies' aim was to bury the legal proceedings against the members of the 
Nazi troops that would have provoked reactions in German public opinion, 
putting at risk the process of reintegrating West Germany into the European 
community'32. The French Canadian historian Valerie Hébert wrote that 
German arms were again required, and 'despite the immediate postwar Allied 
injunction against Germany ever again possessing arms, the mounting fear of 
and hostility against the Soviets convinced Western powers of the Federal 
Republic's strategic importance as a military force'33. The German historian 
Lingen wrote that the debate surrounding Kesselring's eventual release 
'illustrated the manner in which the treatment of the war criminals was 
distorted by the debates surrounding German rearmament and integration into 
the Western Alliance'34. Kesselring, one time Field Marshal, was a mere pawn 
in these politics, but he benefitted from the Western powers needing German 
rearmament. The main thrust of the campaign for freeing Kesselring revolved 
around the myth started in his trial that he had fought a clean war, and some 
believed that the commutation of his death sentence was an indicator of this 
alleged fact. There was a distinct 'distancing of the "people's army" 
(Wehrmacht) from the undeniably criminal agencies of the Nazi state such as 
the Party, the SS, and SD' … exonerating the soldiers and provided an alibi 
for almost the entire nation'35. Kesselring as a Field-Marshal of the 
Wehrmacht became something of a figurehead in this debate, perhaps even 
more so than Manstein, who had been known to award Iron Crosses to 
Einsatzgruppen men and had acknowledged that he knew something of the 
genocide36. Kesselring had always denied knowledge of such events, and the 
British associated him mainly with the campaign in North Africa and Italy; 
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few associated his name with the Luftwaffe, and fewer still showed any 
interest in the fate of Italian partisans.  
 
               In order to understand this complex situation it will be necessary to 
examine de-Nazification which almost exonerated Kesselring, then Laternser's 
plans, the situation within the German political structure, the responses of 
good-will people like the Churches, the mixed British attitudes, and the reality 
of the political necessity to keep Germany in the west. Despite the emphasis 
placed on the political issues surrounding Kesselring by historians such as 
Lingen, Battini and Hébert supra, it ought to be noted that because Kesselring 
was a British prisoner his release depended largely upon the British, and their 
motives, which, as will be illustrated, were mixed.  
 
Entnazifizierung, de-Nazification 
 
                 It is important to note that part of Kesselring's so-called 
rehabilitation started through the process called Entnazifizierung, namely de-
Nazification, based on Eisenhower’s demand that German administration be 
cleansed of NSDAP influence37. The Allies had early on announced their 
intention to destroy German militarism and their plans involved the 'four Ds' 
of demilitarization, denazification, decartelization, and decentralization' and 
there were to be panels to establish a person's past in terms of the NSDAP.38 
Entnazifizierung was the 'eradication of the Nazi Party, the overturning of 
Nazi philosophy, laws and decrees, the abolition of Nazi symbols, street 
names and monuments,' and was meant to be a complete reversal of the Hitler 
period.39 It was a broad spectrum, and originally these tribunals 'were 
accompanied by initiatives for democratic re-education, ranging from film 
screenings on such issues as wartime atrocities or the Holocaust'40. It created 
an immediate problem because of the sheer numbers involved, 'speed seemed 
necessary to ensure a clean break with the past, but, on the other hand, a 
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slower process might be more thorough'41. As one British administrator wrote 
'amongst those returning evacuees were many official, lawyers, policeman, 
teachers, whom we needed urgently for the restoration of normal life'42. At the 
local level Entnazifizierung ran into problems because 'it denuded German 
local and provincial administration of personnel … and impeded even the low 
level of reconstruction permitted by the Allied Control Council'43. It was 
carried out with a great sense of haste, according to the American commander 
Lucius Clay 'in excess of 100,000 cases being settled monthly'44. 
 
                      By the time Kesselring was being processed the 'conflict 
between denazification and reconstruction, and the Cold War conflict between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, meant that denazification in both the 
East and West became not an end in itself but a piece to be played in other 
more pressing games'45. Long before Kesselring's case started in the process 
of denazification, the process itself had been reduced to a 'matter of individual 
self-justification, and was essentially wound up with few long-term effects by 
the early 1950s'46. The Nazi past was not so much being forgotten or forgiven, 
but repressed. 
 
                  The Munich Court in Kesselring's case argued major culpability, 
but withdrew because the affidavits exonerated Kesselring47. By 1951 'the fact 
was, Germanised denazification rapidly descended into a farce … Nazis, often 
comfortably situated and able to hire clever lawyers to represent them at 
hearings, ran rings around the untrained and often relatively uneducated 
members of the tribunals'48.  Denazification certificates were seen as valueless 
and called Persilscheine, because they naturally washed white49. Kesselring 
had been a senior military commander within Hitler's regime, he must have 
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been privy to Hitler's designs, and unquestionably aware of the regime's 
brutality, and yet was exonerated; this illustrates how insipid the 
denazification tribunals had become.  
 
Kesselring's Lobby Group 
                   
                 His lawyer, Laternser, was prolific in producing new arguments, 
new evidence, eliciting supporters and keeping the issues alive. Laternser 
made a name for himself in the postwar years, and his fees probably came 
from the Stahlhelms who raised funds in support of imprisoned comrades. 
 
             Kesselring’s Officers Beelitz and Westphal were active, but if, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, they had committed perjury with 
Kesselring they were in a sense bound together. The list of personal 
supporters grew, and it included Generals Lemelsen and Herr, Field-Marshal 
von Leeb, Generaloberst Blaskowitz.  
 
Kesselring's British Lobby Group 
 
              Kesselring was a British prisoner and British support was necessary. 
There was an influential group who had opposed the continuation of the trials, 
and in reality their motives for freeing Kesselring were mixed, but viewed by 
some historians as always politically driven. Battini wrote that 'the strength of 
the interventions opposed to the holding of Field Marshal Kesselring's trial 
and to his conviction - Headlan, Churchill, General Alexander, Lord de I'Isle, 
Lord Hankley (sic) Stokes of the Labour Party, Archbishop (sic) G Bell and 
the writer T.S.Eliot - bears out how widely held, by then, was the intention of 
distinguishing clearly between the actions of the army and the responsibilities 
of the SS. Of course, all this demonstrates the complete lack of understanding 
of the nature of the total war put into practice … and of the war waged against 
Italian civilians'50. There are elements of truth in his claim, but the thesis will 
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show the motives were mixed. Bishop Bell of Chichester was not seeking to 
define areas of responsibility, but seeking peace. 
 
            The key to this group was Lord Hankey and Manstein's defence 
lawyer, Paget. Hankey tended to stay in the back ground, but Paget had 
published a book attacking the war crime trials, and referring to the British 
trials as unjust; Lord Hankey wrote the preface51. In 1950 Hankey also wrote 
a book condemning not only Roosevelt's unconditional surrender, but the 
trials in general52. This was the core of the Hankey Group, a lobby for a 
reconciliatory pro-German policy led by Lord Hankey and backed by Paget53. 
The result was a continuous discussion in the press with the Manchester 
Guardian often striking a positive note for the war-criminals54. When German 
newspapers demanded there could be no German rearmament without the 
release of Kesselring and Manstein, Mr Paget responded in a 1950 
Parliamentary debate arguing that the West needed 'the right sort of German 
in our defence forces' and then mentioned Kesselring and Manstein, claiming 
we will not get such men if we imprison 'their most honoured commanders;' 
in the same debate he argued that the Wehrmacht was not the SS, and despite 
Russian claims 'fought as decent soldiers'55.  
 
                  It was not always political and Cold War motivated; Hankey was 
seeking reconciliation, and amongst his group of associates was Kesselring’s 
London interrogator, Scotland, who had remained in constant touch advising 
Laternser when possible. Scotland's involvement with Kesselring had little to 
do with placating the Germans; it was a friendship which developed during 
the London interrogations. Scotland later wrote that 'I count it a privilege to 
have played some part in gaining him his freedom'56. Scotland and Kesselring 
had developed a friendship which lasted until Kesselring's death. During his 
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interrogation he was one of the few German imprisoned officers allowed to 
see the sights of London, and Scotland admitted 'I liked "Kessies's personality 
from the start'57. Scotland remained convinced that Kesselring was 
fundamentally innocent, and assisted Laternser on grounds of personal 
friendship. Quite why Scotland found a friendship with Kesselring so easy is 
curious; Scotland 'had played a decisive role in the committal proceedings' 
both in terms of the orders and he had documented that Keitel had given 
Kesselring full authority58. Kesselring could be a charming and easy going 
personality when he chose. 
 
             Another influential member of Hankey's pressure group was Basil 
Liddell Hart, who was sympathetic towards the German prisoners. Liddell 
Hart was ex-military, had written a book on military strategy and was a 
historian59. He had a natural sympathy for men like Kesselring, and was 
outspoken on preparing for another war. He believed in German rearmament 
because they would be useful in a conflict with the Soviet powers60. Liddell 
Hart had written an influential book called The Other Side of the Hill which 
gave a favourable image of the Wehrmacht leadership. That some felt this 
admiration for the Wehrmacht, came clear in a parliamentary debate on 
military training methods. In the light of Korea, one MP suggested that 'the 
Germans produced a pretty good army… that if the advice and experience of 
General Westphal who was Chief-of-Staff to Kesselring could be obtained, it 
would be invaluable'61. In this book Liddell Hart found it remarkable the way 
the German generals maintained 'a code of decency' and that the general 
behaviour of the occupying army - as distinct from the SS - was better than 
that of the Allied Armies which came to liberate them'62. 
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                There were some who were deeply concerned with the 
jurisprudential issues. A Professor Smith who had recently retired from the 
chair of international law at the University of London, and had been a chief 
defending counsel at the Belsen trial (1945-6) expressed concern 'not to 
minimise the heinousness of the crimes committed at Belsen, but to 
demonstrate the illegality and therefore the injustice of such trials'63. There 
were many who held this view, most notably FJP Veale, solicitor, writer and 
friend of Hankey. 
 
                    Closer to Hankey's more altruistic reconciliation views was 
Bishop Bell of Chichester. Bell and Hankey 'joined forces and so began a 
collaboration and personal friendship that produced valuable results'64. In fact 
Bell had written to Hankey as early as January 1943 over concerns in the 
conduct of the war65. In 1944 he was apprehensive about what would happen 
at the end of the war, especially after a speech by Vansittart. In a letter from 
Lord Halifax, Bell found support for the Archbishop's plea that there was a 
'distinction between revenge and just retribution'66. Bell had argued that a 
politician like Vansittart disclosed a vested interest in showing all Germans 
were tainted by Nazism. It could be asked of Bell whether 'he himself was 
guilty of turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to credible accusations of guilt, 
simply to maintain his own argument that Nazis and Germans could be 
distinguished'67. Bishop Bell had his critics then and since, Dr Lawson, in his 
book, 'The Church of England and the Holocaust' attacks Bell and others for 
their Nuremberg interventions68. Nevertheless, Bell, in the House of Lords, 
reminded everyone 'that the trials raised issues of justice, humanity, and 
political wisdom.'69 Bell was particularly concerned about 'the conditions 
under which many war criminals were imprisoned,' and about the length of 
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sentences and the long wait prior to being tried70. 'Bell's actions were 
controlled by principle' and his involvement in politics was seen by most as 
based purely on his Christian principles, as he had done so in his opposition to 
strategic bombing71. Bell, right or wrong was convinced that Christianity 
could bring the nations together, and that the 'fundamental menace to our 
civilisations was 'Nihilism' - the attitude of destruction and negation which 
calls evil good and good evil'72.                
 
                Hankey and Bell were seeking reconciliation, Liddell Hart had a 
natural sympathy for the German commanders, but was also concerned about 
another war, Paget as a defence lawyer used both reconciliation and the fear 
of another war in argument, Scotland's efforts were based on personal 
friendship, and Churchill was possibly both reconciliatory and pragmatic 
about the Cold War dangers. The pressure group operated from a complete 
mix of motives, and was sufficiently demanding to make the issue a political 
matter. 
 
German Reaction 
 
                The German public had not accepted that the military leaders were 
guilty, it 'had simply not penetrated public consciousness, and careful 
explanation and education were now seen to be pointless'73. Chancellor 
Adenauer and the Bonn government were becoming significant, giving 
Kesselring some hope; Adenauer always raised POWs whenever possible. On 
a trip to America Adenauer wrote that 'I then turned to the subject of war 
criminals and commented that it was largely a psychological problem. The 
American occupation authorities had released the sentenced men in their 
custody more slowly and hesitantly then the British and French'74. Shortly 
after the foundation of West Germany, 'the Adenauer Government announced 
its goal to request a general amnesty for persons sentenced by occupation 
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government courts'75.  Adenauer pursued this issue with vigour because it was 
a vote catcher. In September 1949 when the Bundestag elected the Federal 
Chancellor, Adenauer was elected with the smallest majority 'of one vote (his 
own) to become first head of government'76. Winning freedom for German 
prisoners was a political issue77.  Adenauer took the opportunity to visit the 
British prison in Werl to investigate the conditions78. Adenauer's German 
biographer noted that he followed this prison visit by laying a wreath at 
Bismarck's grave: this was greeted with severe displeasure by the French 
President79. It ought to be noted that this biographer, whose work appeared as 
late as 1991, stated that Kesselring 'had been locked away by the British as an 
alleged war criminal'80. Nearly half a century after the guilty verdict a modern 
German writer was still referring to Kesselring's crimes as merely 'alleged.' 
As will be noted in the next chapter, German politicians seeking restoration 
turned to the device of treating themselves as the victims. They chose to see 
themselves as victims of the Hitler aberration, of strategic bombing, of the 
barbaric Russian invasion, of imprisoning innocent POWs; any blame for war 
horrors could be placed on the Nazi apparatus such as the SS, and this was 
their method of reconstructing memory to cope with the future. The issue of 
Kesselring and other POWs was part of this reconstruction: all victims 
together. 
 
                    Kesselring's imprisonment attracted journalists during elections; 
the Free Democratic Party regarded itself as the prisoners' spokesmen, 
particularly a Dr Mende, who, under the headlines 'German Agitation for 
Release of War Criminals' told one correspondent that 'he wishes to acquaint 
himself with conditions {in the prison} and hear the personal views of ex-
Marshal Kesselring'81. Also active was the 'violently right-wing Socialist 
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Reich party of ex-General Remer and Dr Dorls' who 'appointed an action 
committee' for the release of those in Werl in the British zone82.  
 
                  Many Churchmen, including prominent German Church leaders 
had taken on the issue of victor's justice, and continued to agitate for POWs 
and especially Kesselring. Originally their efforts were based on humanitarian 
grounds, and they had made direct contact with Laternser's defence team83.  
'Even the American secret service had noticed the interplay between 
churchmen and the war criminals' defence teams'84. Bishop Bell through the 
World Council of Churches had established relationships with many German 
clergy leaders: including Bishop Otto Dibelius and Consistory President 
Martin Niemöller85. Unlike Britain these senior churchmen took an active part 
in politics, and could influence votes as much as their Roman Catholic 
counterparts, of which Adenauer was well aware86. All the German 
denominations came to the support of German war criminals, 'prompting one 
historian to declare the German Churches were the most effective helpers of 
National Socialist war criminals,' which was probably somewhat harsh given 
their Christian intentions87. The Pope had tried to set the Christian tone as 
early as his Christmas Eve broadcast in 1945 saying: 'those who exact today 
the expiation of crimes and the just punishment of criminals for their 
misdeeds should take good care not to do to themselves what they denounce 
in others'88. More often than not the Christian churches were, as Bishop Bell 
in Britain, trying to present a Christian perspective of reconciliation. 
 
The Political Forum 
 
                It was a British Military Court that had condemned Kesselring, 
Werl was a British prison, and British attitudes were mixed towards 
Kesselring. As noted, those seeking his release did so for a variety of reasons, 
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but not all wanted him freed. There was tension between wanting Germany in 
alliance, and others upholding the courts' decisions. On the one hand the 
Berlin blockade had embodied the deteriorating relationships between East 
and West, and there was genuine concern about the Cold War89. Korea was 
making many nervous and the French President, André Pleven had proposed a 
European Defence Community, and NATO, which began in 1949, was also 
looking towards a rearmed Germany. On the other hand men like Sir Hartley 
Shawcross and others were insistent that the courts should not be overruled. 
The disagreement was open, and later in parliament Mr Hamilton MP hoped 
that 'the release of all other German prisoners' is not 'a condition of German 
participation in a European Army;' there was no direct answer recorded90.  
There was a fear that men like Kesselring may be reliable soldiers but too 
aggressive; in 1948 Kesselring had been quoted in parliament as claiming that 
'Russian aggression' was 'the only military danger that at present threatens 
Europe'91. A similar debate in the House of Lords was repeated with the same 
arguments, and using 'von Kesselring' (sic) as evidence in the Commons a 
year later92. Despite pressure from Adenauer and the Bonn government there 
was a mistrust of men like Kesselring and reluctance to release him. The 
evidence seems to run contrary to the theory that the British were very keen to 
find an excuse to release Kesselring to encourage German rearmament. 
Lingen, Battini and Hébert make valid points, but the British reaction was 
much more mixed and sluggish than they suggest. 
 
                    The pressure group, with its mixture of motives brought the 
debate into the political forum. It involved both British and German political 
alliances: the Labour MP Richard Stokes was contacted by Kurt Schumacher 
chairman of the SPD, and together they submitted a three page petition for 
Kesselring’s release93. Adenauer and many politicians realised that the 
question of locked up German officers and POWs was vote catching. The 
reluctance on the part of the British continued, the Cabinet Minutes of 19th 
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Dec1951 illustrated the problem; the concern was expressed that the release of 
prisoners 'would be unpopular' and the idea developed to shift the 
responsibility to a tribunal of one German, one Allied member and one 
neutral, 'Swiss rather than a Swede,' and that such a tribunal should be 'based 
solely on grounds of clemency'94. The debate held no sign of immediate 
resolution, and the idea of a tribunal was unquestionably an effort to try and 
shift the responsibility away from the British political scene. There was a 
developing pressure for Kesselring's release. 
 
Cold War and Politics of Memory 
 
                   The British viewpoint varied between those who saw the trials as 
valid, a few wanting to exercise compassion, and those who perceived the 
dangers of the Cold War escalating. Kesselring was one of the better known 
pivots for focusing the debate. Cold War politics needed German rearmament, 
and it has been cogently argued that the 'interests of justice' were being 
'cynically subordinated to political goals'95. Although a major causation 
behind the interest in Kesselring, it was not publically presented this way. The 
British motives for his release were mixed, not everyone wanted Kesselring 
and other war criminals set free, but there was a political belief that German 
rearmament was necessary.  
 
                   Lingen argued in her thesis that the need for German re-armament 
in the Cold War was the major factor in sanitising people like Kesselring and 
the Wehrmacht96. Lingen argues it was all to do with the politics of memory, 
or to clarify this expression for this research, current day political pressures 
need us to review past-events in a particular light. Politicians could not say we 
are going to change our views of what happened in the war in order to win 
German alliance. It happened like a corporate public consciousness slowly 
evolving a new account of the past. As noted, Liddell Hart's book The Other 
Side of the Hill had been published in April 1948, and was widely read, being 
                                                 
94   KNA-CAB128/23/18. 
95   Priemel, Reassessing,p.289. 
96   Lingen, Kesselring. 
 284
reprinted in November and revised and enlarged in 1951. In this book Liddell 
Hart paints the Wehrmacht in almost glowing terms, criticising the blind eye 
they turned to Hitler, but adding that 'I doubt whether generals of other 
countries, in similar circumstances, would have done more to overthrow such 
a regime'97. Naturally he is critical of the Nazi regime, but paints a picture of 
an extremely efficient Wehrmacht which, on the whole, fought a clean war. 
The very argument used by Kesselring. The popularity of this book, 
demonstrated by its reprints, along with the developing belief that the SS had 
committed the atrocities, a forgetfulness of what had happened to Italian 
citizens, and the natural human need for reconciliation were a few of the 
many factors that helped changed the view of the past. This politics of 
memory put Kesselring into a different light; it was a gradual process, but it 
happened.   
 
                It was not just a British phenomenon, as will be explored in the next 
chapter; the German consciousness was self-evolving into that of the victim 
rather than the perpetrator. In America a change of view was happening as in 
Britain. Eisenhower, who had been highly condemnatory of the German 
commanders, and now viewing the world from political necessity, quite 
deliberately changed his view of the Wehrmacht and its officers. Adenauer 
had met with senior Wehrmacht officers in the monastery of Himmerode in 
the Eiffel, and produced a document which demanded that the 'western 
powers had issued a formal declaration rehabilitating the soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht' and demanding the release of prisoners98. The 'Himmerode 
Memorandum', came to light in 1951 in Eisenhower's visit to Germany, when 
he signed a document declaring previous denunciations of the Wehrmacht as 
an error. This was the politics of memory, a self-conscious effort to keep 
Germany onside, because history is rewritten according to the needs of 
‘today’. The American Chief Prosecutor Telford Taylor, like his British 
counterpart Shawcross, was cynical about the changing attitudes; he wrote 
that 'I recommended that the important portions of the Nuernberg proceedings 
be published in both German and English. I pointed out therein that 'the 
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United States Government has made a heavy moral investment in these trials, 
and this investment will not show a favorable rate of return if the records are 
left in the dust on the top shelf out of reach'99. The trials were never translated 
into German, and effectively thereby put on the top shelf. The Americans and 
British were sanitising the past to keep Germany within their fold but the 
motives remained mixed. Some members of the British public wrote asking 
for an end to the imprisonment, simply on grounds of finding a 'new and 
friendly Europe;' but others wanted Kesselring out of prison to encourage the 
Germans to oppose Soviet communism, even if it meant painting a different 
picture of the recent war100. The British response was more complex than 
some historians suggest; the Cold War was very much in the background, but 
other factors of a humanitarian nature were involved.   
 
Resolution 
 
                    Clemency seemed the only way to release Kesselring legitimately 
and without too much dissent. There was further debate in the Lords just after 
George VI’s funeral, with more discussion on the yet unresolved issue of 
blind obedience to orders101. Eden was opposed to clemency, but Churchill 
remained outspoken, claiming that 'the so-called war criminals, especially the 
people in High Command who had no more to do with many of the atrocities 
than President Truman with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki'102. Adenauer, Churchill, Hankey, Liddell-Hart, Alexander, Bishop 
George Bell continued to plead for Kesselring; no one, it was argued, wanted 
the prisoners to die in prison. On July 16th 1952 Kesselring had been admitted 
for a throat cancer at the Bochum Hospital, Bergmannsheil: an operation was 
carried out by Kesselring’s doctor, Bürkle de al Camp. The British expressed 
suspicion when Bürkle, having said Kesselring was recovering, was 'unfit for 
prison103. On October 22nd 1952 Queen Elizabeth II under government 
direction, pardoned Kesselring. The French were somewhat underwhelmed, 
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and there was a hostile reaction in Italy, but parliament was informed that 'no 
protest has been received by Her Majesty's Government from the Italian 
Government'104. Partisan associations, victim groups protested loudly, but not 
all the Italian press was anti-Kesselring’s freedom. Il Messaggero, wrote that 
Kesselring’s release would trigger trouble, but it was a gesture towards a sick 
man, and commented that Kesselring was neither a 'Nazi nor a cannibal,' but 
was an honourable man, who whilst guilty in the literal sense was, compared 
to other war criminals, innocent and not guilty of inciting troops to commit 
violence105. It ought to be noted that the same paper had appeared for 
Kesselring's defence saying Kesselring had properly warned the population106. 
The Italians, who had suffered most from Kesselring's command were as 
various in their views as the British. The British Legion wrote to the Under-
Secretary of State deploring 'the premature release of war criminals'107. The 
Neue Zeitung (American supported newspaper) wrote it was 'not possible to 
prove that Kesselring had personally prompted, and could not be held 
responsible for the shooting of hostages and excesses relating to the anti-
partisan war in Italy,' whilst Der Mittag claimed it to be a 'moral acquittal'108. 
The reactions to the release varied from country to country.  
 
                  If the reactions were varied, the motives for the release were even 
more so.  Laternser, quite cynically, had used the humanitarian arguments of 
the churches, but he also recognised that the British were the key to the 
outcome he sought. The Hankey group, with disparate members ranging from 
Bishop Bell to Liddell Hart, raised the issue so that press and parliament 
became involved. Lingen's argument that the Cold War necessitated a 
cleansing of history in order to release Wehrmacht leaders like Kesselring was 
undoubtedly correct; this must have influenced many politicians who wanted 
Germany rearmed. However, Kesselring's release was never straightforward; 
even though he was suffering from cancer some British questioned his 
liberation. How far the government's recommendation for the Queen's pardon 
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rested on 'genuine humanitarian reasons' or Cold War pragmatism can only be 
a speculation109. This research thinks the various motives for Kesselring's 
release were a tangled mixture of immense complexity which reflected British 
thinking at that time. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
POST PRISON POLITICS (1952-1960) 
 
Introduction 
 
                 While Kesselring was in prison what he was, had become more 
important than who he was. Once out of prison the man Kesselring became 
part of the limelight because of who he was; Field-Marshal Kesselring. 
According to his son Rainer, Kesselring was a shadow of the man he had 
been1. This is understandable given his health, age, and seven years 
imprisonment, the first part of which was harsh, plus the psychological blow 
of falling from being a highly respected Field-Marshal to a common-criminal. 
  
                      The Americans, whom Kesselring had helped in mapping out 
the German campaigns, provided him with an apartment in Bad Wiessee2.  
'His return to freedom was, in its day, a sensation that thrust him into the 
forefront of public notice … at the very moment when moves to restore 
Germany's armed forces were well advanced'3.  He was joined by family; his 
wife helped Kesselring in receiving thousands of telegrams and 
congratulations, and requests for his appearance; he had become a celebrity at 
a time when his energies were low. 'None of the High Command case 
convicts expressed any remorse or contrition,' and Kesselring was no 
different4. On his release from Bochum hospital, he had informed a press 
conference he would have preferred to be released on grounds of justice rather 
than clemency. The reasons for his release were a matter of widespread 
speculation, even in Parliament a Mr. Anthony Greenwood, an important 
Labour Politician (later Baron Greenwood of Rossendale PC) asked whether 
'the hon. Gentleman assure the House that Her Majesty's Government have no 
intention of paying compensation to Kesselring for inconvenience or loss.'5 
                                                 
1    Macksey, Kesselring,p.243     
2    Popular spa and scene of infamous 'Night of the Long Knives'. 
3    Macksey, Kesselring,p.243. 
4    Priemel, Reassessing,p.204. 
5    HC Debate, 24thNov 1952,Vol508/cc15-615. 
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This was sheer nonsense, but illustrates the considerable confusion even in 
Parliament, which itself had requested the Queen to release Kesselring on 
compassionate grounds; it was clemency. 
 
               This chapter will show why and how Kesselring's initial popularity 
on release dissipated through the 1950s until his funeral in 1960, by which 
time he was almost an embarrassment. First it will be necessary to outline the 
salient features of the new West Germany into which he was released, and the 
perceived need for rearmament. The chapter will explore Kesselring's 
relationship with the veteran associations, some incidents of how he misread 
the times, and finally, how he alienated himself both at home and abroad, by 
his insistence on supporting returning war criminals.  
                    
Germany post-1945 
 
                  By the end of 1945 Germany was almost totally destroyed, huge 
areas lost, and the State of Prussia formally abolished: 'The Prussian State 
which from early days has been a bearer of militarism and reaction in 
Germany has de facto ceased to exist'6. The Military government regulations 
banned young people from aviation, parachuting, gliding, fencing, military or 
para-military drill or display, shooting with firearms7. Some historians have 
seen in these postwar years 'Western planning for vengeance against Germans 
and for the destruction of Germany' which 'began in England in August 1944, 
with its chief architects Morgenthau and Dwight D Eisenhower'8. It appeared 
to be a time of retribution, not only is it claimed that POWs were badly 
treated but there may have been 'atrocities against POWs'9. The American 
Commander noted that he might have to sign papers for the killing of over 
500 POWs which he thought looked too much like 'a mass execution'10. He 
was relieved later to discover the figure was only 15011. It has been suggested 
                                                 
6    USDS, Control Council Law no 46,p.151. 
7    USDS, Military Government  Regulations,p.585. 
8    Bacque James, Crimes and Mercies, The fate of German Civilians Under     
     Allied Occupation, 1944-50 (London: Little, Brown, 1997)p.25. 
9    Ibid, p.63. 
10   Clay, Papers,p.658. 
11   Ibid,p.661. 
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that 'the dominant policy was vengeance through imposed starvation'12. There 
was an immediate reaction to the discovery of the concentration camps, even 
long term POWs already in America, had their rations reduced, and 
Eisenhower on 8th May 1945 issued the command … 'making it a crime 
punishable by death for German civilians to feed prisoners'13. Yet, within a 
few years (2nd March 1948) Lucius Clay insisted Germany must be restored 'if 
there is to be a stable Europe'14. During the period Kesselring was on trial, 
Germany was in an abyss, and suffering considerable moral and intellectual 
confusion.  
  
              By the time Kesselring's trial concluded Germany was changing 
rapidly. The emerging Cold War was formulating a new political shape in 
Germany. The experience of 'war and defeat led to the construction of 
different historical and political narratives, pushing some political alternatives 
(nationalism and revanchism, for example) off the agenda'15.The new 
Germany was deeply suspicious of extremes, especially communism; the 
Berlin Blockade had served as a 'marker of the division of the world by the 
Cold War'16. From the time of the blockade Britain, and especially America 
started to see the need for the reconstructing of Germany; the Cold War 
started to dominate the Allies' attitude and also that of most Germans. This 
Soviet threat represented 'a psychological and political opportunity for 
Germany to be counted among the free world against the communist threat'17. 
It is possible to trace 'a shift from hostility to the Germans as authors of the 
war and as criminals, to an emphasis on creating the conditions for recovery 
and stability'18.  
 
                       Whilst Kesselring may have felt comfortable with the new 
Germany's attitude towards communism, there had been a distinctive 
                                                 
12    Bacque, Crimes,p.89. 
13    Ibid,p.41. 
14    Clay, Papers,p.563. 
15    Fulbrook, Twentieth,p.179. 
16    Tipton, History,p505. 
17    Fulbrook, Twentieth,p.180. 
18    Tipton, History,pp.503/4. 
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'marginalisation of nationalism' which was undoubtedly alien to him19. 
However, 'Adenauer's Germany was prepared to let Nazis in on the power 
structure of the Bonn Republic, so long as they behaved themselves and acted 
as if they were prepared to become democrats'20. Many of the old military 
commanders were also reactivated, but this was not to be the case with 
Kesselring. 
 
                They were reactivated because rearmament had become a serious 
issue from the perceived threat from the Soviets. Initially West Germany had 
not been allowed its own armed forces, but the Cold War was principally 
influential in this respect. There was opposition to rearmament in several 
European countries, and even in Germany itself, but America was beginning 
to see it as essential. The French had suggested a European army but then 
turned against it. Germany was invited into NATO in 1955 and 'with its 
membership came the return to near full sovereignty'21. 
 
                      By the time Kesselring was released West Germany had 
'successfully absorbed most of the 12 million expellees from the lost eastern 
provinces and non-German central Europe'22. The return to economic power 
was underway despite objections from the French. Koenig, the French 
representative had told the Americans 'that Germany, and particularly the 
Ruhr, was being allowed to come back too rapidly'23.  The clue to economic 
recovery was the Marshall Plan which was 'supported by US anti-communist 
propaganda and was above all psychologically valuable for the growing self-
confidence of Germans'24. It was agreed at the Washington Three-Power 
Meeting (April 8th 1949) that the Federal Republic 'should participate as a full 
member in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, thus 
becoming a responsible partner in the European Recovery Programme'25. 
 
                                                 
19     Fulbrook, Twentieth,p.186. 
20     Taylor, Exorcising,p.358. 
21     Fulbrook, Twentieth,p.184. 
22     Hagen, German,p.365. 
23     Clay, Papers,p.914. 
24     Gehler, Three,p.39. 
25     USDS, Washington Three-Power Meeting, p.89. 
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                    During the 1950s there was sustained economic growth, and 'by 
1951, West Germany had regained prewar levels of output'26. Incredibly, 
'between 1949 and 1953' 3 million housing units were constructed27. The 
revaluation of the currency (the change from the Reichsmark to the Deutsche 
Mark) was an 'American precondition for the participation of the Western 
zones of Germany into the ERP (European recovery programme)'28. 'West 
Germany rapidly attained a secure place within the western club' - the 
formation of the European Coal and Steel Commission by the Paris Treaty of 
195129. This was all part of the process of economic cooperation which 
eventually led to the formation of the European Economic Community in 
1957. The growth of West Germany encouraged 'German leadership in 
economic recovery,' which meant 'facilitating German political 
responsibility'30. By the time Kesselring was free the economic rise of 
Germany was apparent, and 'the main cement of the Federal Republic's social 
fabric' was this extraordinary and sustained economic growth'31. 
 
                      Kesselring had been moulded in the Wilhelmine period which 
held military status as important, and two World Wars had left him with a 
significant social status. However, by the 1950s 'the old military elite had 
disappeared'32. Germany was acutely aware that the outside world was deeply 
distrustful and watching the political pulse of Germany for fear of the rise of a 
new right wing. Adenauer's stand against Communism 'meant automatic 
support for United States policies'33. Politics was almost a dirty word, and it 
became important for Germany's leaders to make sure that whatever young 
Germans were doing 'it should not be political'34.  
 
                 The main question in terms of Kesselring's life was not Germany's 
return to economic wealth, but how the Germans dealt with their past. First it 
                                                 
26    Tipton, History,p.513. 
27    Ibid,p.529. 
28    Gehler, Three,p.43. 
29    Fulbrook, Twentieth,p.183. 
30    Flenley, Modern,p.442. 
31    Fulbrook, Twentieth,p.185. 
32    Tipton, History,p.540. 
33    Ibid,p.542. 
34    Ibid,p.539. 
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ought to be recorded that 'no single position dominates the politics of memory 
in contemporary Germany'35. However, perhaps one of the most salient 
features of German recovery was their corporate psychological adjustment to 
the immediate past. The most horrific feature of the previous years had been 
the massacres, and in particular the industrialised Holocaust, but 'there was 
very little inclination among ordinary Gentile Germans to reflect on or ponder 
the meaning of the Holocaust'36.  For a long time the question has been asked 
as to  how aware the German people were about what was happening, but 
there was a group consciousness that thought there were many things 'it was 
best not to talk about and not to remember'37. It has been said that the 'soldier, 
whose deeds had appeared heroic during Nazi Germany's expansion, now 
needed to conceal what he had done'38. There is no doubt that there was 
considerable obfuscation of the past, denial of involvement, 'indeed a 
conspiracy not to mention it. Most German people were unwilling to confront 
their role in Germany's crimes'39. The Germans managed to refocus away 
from the memory of their victims and 'dealt with the legacy of Nazism at 
home by focusing on communism abroad'40.  
 
              Within months of the war finishing, there was a conscious need for 
self-justification by their desire to reverse roles; the Germans became the 
victims not the perpetrators. Walter Ulbricht, as early as 31st December 1945, 
had said 'what unspeakable suffering has been brought upon our German 
homeland by nazism'41. This idea developed rapidly, and 'Germans now 
perceived themselves as victims of the "Nazis," now stylized as a fanatical 
minority42. German leaders of all persuasions reversed the poles of 
responsibility; 'Germans were not guilty'43. They were the victims of Hitler, 
his rise to power was the fault of the Western countries, they shared the 
                                                 
35   Bartov, Crimes,p.190. 
36   Tipton, History,p.521. 
37   Ibid,p.548. 
38   Ibid,p.550. 
39   Fulbrook, Twentieth,p.187 
40   Bartov, Crimes,p.xxxi. 
41   Ulbricht Walter, Whither Germany, Speeches and Essays (Dresden: Zeit im Bild,   
      1960)p.127. 
42   Bartov, Crimes,p.136. 
43   Tipton, History,p.548. 
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depression, and now Germany was occupied by those same powers… 'both 
Adenauer (CDU) and SPD leader Schumacher refused to accept German 
responsibility for the war or for its outcome'44. 'In their own memories of 
World War II Germans preferred to count themselves among the victims 
rather than among the perpetrators'45.  While he was in prison Kesselring 
could be viewed as a victim which suited this readjustment of the past, but 
once he was released this changed. In his memoirs, and in his interrogations, 
Kesselring never criticised or turned against Hitler as did the vast majority of 
commanders. His stubborn loyalty was probably based on his insistence that 
Hitler was the legitimate government of the day. This was not helpful in a 
Germany rising from the ashes, and trying to forget the past. The problem for 
Kesselring was as a Field-Marshal he personified what had happened, which 
was embarrassing for those who wanted to forget, and provocative for those 
who still felt an inclination that the past had not all been wrong. As will be 
illustrated later in this chapter, Kesselring needed to dwell on the past, trying 
to justify or explain his actions. 
 
Rearmament Issue 
 
                            One of the reasons behind Kesselring's release had been the 
need to appease Germans in order to encourage the rearmament of Germany, 
and its eventual merger into a defence force. This was typified by an article in 
the Guardian newspaper in December 1952, the year of Kesselring's release, 
in which the focus was on the developing relationship between West Germany 
and the Western powers, claiming that 'the most acute and superficially most 
dangerous of these is the question of German war criminals … why should 
they {the Germans} be asked to take up arms when some of their own 
countrymen, condemned by courts which were based on no legal precedents, 
continue to sit in Allied administered gaols on German soil'46. This issue 
dominated the early 1950s, and some senior officers of the old military 
command became part of West Germany's military, and although 'Adenauer's 
                                                 
44    Tipton, History,p.548 
45    Bartov, Crimes,p.xix 
46    Guardian Newspaper, Dec30th 1952 article-T Prittie, Journalist and author on   
       German/Israeli Histories. 
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Germany was prepared to 'let Nazis in on the power structure of the Bonn 
Republic,' Kesselring was never considered47. His only official appointment 
was to the Medals Commission, and even this was challenged48. His role 
under the Hitler regime had been high profile; he was a Field-Marshal and had 
been far too prominent; he was also prone to making gaffes. Several times in 
public he demanded that all prisoners be released whether they had committed 
crimes or not, arguing that this would be a small injustice compared to 
imprisoning innocent men 'for acts which they did not commit'49. He appeared 
to refuse to let go of the past, frequently broadcasting that the term 
Wehrmacht was preferable to Bundeswehr; this started to tarnish any chance 
that might have existed for him to participate in the recovering Germany. On 
one occasion when there was a clash between the Stahlhelms and the 
communists in Bonn, on June 13th 1955,  and Kesselring was not even there, 
the chanting was ‘down with Kesselring’ even though the main issue was the 
communist party’s concern with possible German rearmament50. Kesselring 
was associated with rearmament because of who he was, or had been, even 
though he was never part of the official West Government agenda for 
rearmament. 
 
Veteran Associations 
 
                Poor publicity encapsulated a problem which was to be a feature for 
the rest of Kesselring's life; he was quite insensitive to the changing world. 
Politicians like Adenauer needed men like Kesselring when they were in 
prison to make an issue of their continued imprisonment; POWs were a vote 
catcher, but once they had been freed some made their presence in public was 
unwelcomed because they reminded others of a past they were trying to 
forget. On December 12th 1952 Adenauer gave Kesselring a half-hour 
audience during which Kesselring raised the subject of POWs, a topic related 
to the question of 'soldier-hood and the issue of those convicted in connection 
                                                 
47    Taylor, Exorcising,p.358. 
48    Denazification outlawed the NSDAP symbols including the swastika which Kesselring   
       wanted on the medals. 
49    Manchester Guardian, 26thOctober 1952, Kesselring demands release of Comrades. 
50    Guardian, June13th1955. 
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with the war'51. Adenauer gained good publicity through his constant 
campaigning for the release of men like Kesselring, but at the press 
conference, after this meeting, some government representatives 'made it clear 
that they were shocked at Kesselring's naïveté, and they suggested that he 
should exercise considerable restraint in the future'52. More outspoken than 
Kesselring was General Ramcke who supported the extreme right-wing 
movement the Naumann-Kreis, and told a group of former SS that they should 
be proud to be blacklisted53. This was far more extreme than Kesselring, but 
along with Ramcke there was concern in England where it was noted that 
'Kesselring was less obnoxious, but nevertheless, political'54. The German 
public was beginning to believe in the future of economic growth, and did not 
appreciate extremists, or reminding of their past: during the rest of his life 
Kesselring failed to understand the major changes in Germany since the 
defeat. 
 
                 Kesselring's relationship with the veteran associations was prolific 
and complex. The Chairman of the Verband deutscher Soldaten (VdS), 
Gottfried Hansen, had made many public announcements on Kesselring's 
behalf when he was in prison, had approached Adenauer and made contact 
with Hankey55. Kesselring felt a loyalty towards the Veterans because they 
reflected the past, and respected him. During1952 he accepted honorary 
positions in various ex-military associations, the honorary chairmanship of the 
Luftwaffenring, then the Stahlhelm followed by the Verband Deutsches 
Afrikakorps. He was also inducted into the Ordensgemeinschaft der 
Ritterkreuzträger des Eisernen Kreuzes, Order of the Knight’s Cross. There is 
no record of Kesselring's personal views, but his inbuilt sense of soldierly 
loyalty was unquestionably his motivation. 
 
                  It was the Stahlhelm which would cause Kesselring adverse 
publicity; the Stahlhelms (Steel Helmets) were traditionally right-wing, and 
                                                 
51     Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15thDec 1952. 
52     Searle, Very,p.168. 
53     Lingen, Kesselring,p.262. 
54     Guardian Newspaper, May8th1953. 
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most Germans were trying to distance themselves from this extreme. The 
Stahlhelms were originally a paramilitary organisation which supported Hitler 
in the early 1930s. Franz Seldte, their 1933 leader, was a member of the 
government cabinet who had 'joined the Nazi Party and offered the headship 
to Hitler'56. The Stahlhelms had supported Kesselring in prison, and according 
to his first biographer this explains why Kesselring accepted their offer of 
being president. By July 1952 ten veteran associations had signed a joint 
manifesto demanding the release of the so-called war criminals. This was an 
agenda with which Kesselring easily associated, and which for a time was 
popular because it was part of that memory adjustment that made some feel 
the victims in the new world: POWs were victims.  
 
                  The VdS was divided on many issues, and Generalleutnant Heinz 
Trettner, who served in Italy under Kesselring, attempted to persuade him to 
act as a spokesman for all the veteran associations, but he was obliged to 
refuse because he had accepted the presidency of the Stahlhelms which 
precluded similar appointments.  However, he was often their unofficial 
spokesman, and in this capacity during February 1953, spent time with John 
Foster Dulles the American Secretary-of-State57. As representing the VdS he 
was invited to visit an American airbase at Fürstenfeldbruck in 1954, viewing 
American jets from a helicopter. These social unions were not always 
welcome in the wider world. Earlier in 1953, in Hanover, he had attended a 
football match between former members of the Afrika Korps and the British 
7th Armoured Division58. This sort of appearance always raised interest which 
was often sceptical; as late as 1956 Mr F Maclean, Secretary of State for War, 
was asked if he were aware that 'senior serving British officers fraternised 
with and publicly eulogised convicted German war criminals at the Afrika 
Korps reunion on 29th Sept;' he replied that Kesselring was present and 'it 
would not be in the interests of Anglo-German relations for officers to boycott 
these reunions'59. Kesselring had always managed to establish easy going 
                                                 
56    Tipton, History,p.426 
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59    HC Debate 30thOct 1956, Vol558/c129W. 
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relations with the Americans, but his association with the British was never 
quite as straightforward. 
                 
                  In England, ex-service men from 27 nations gathered for the third 
general assembly of the Veteran Associations60. Mr Newcomb, the Secretary-
General spoke of those national veteran associations which pledged allegiance 
to such political systems as the Soviet Union, and referring to Ramcke and 
Kesselring, warned about the ‘dangers of false nationalism’61. The need to 
avoid political extremism was prevalent in Germany, but it was also on the 
agenda of most veteran associations. Kesselring was still regarded as the old 
regime, and appeared to confirm this at the Stahlhelm Nuremberg convention 
when he appeared in a Stahlhelm uniform, complete with medals demanding 
social justice for all old soldiers. Kesselring was causing concern amongst the 
emerging leaders of West Germany, beginning with the medals commission 
when Kesselring argued that veterans should be allowed to wear their original 
medals with the swastika62. He argued that the swastika was a national not a 
political symbol which went someway to underline the fact that Kesselring 
had lost his way in the new world. In Der Stahlhelm paper of October 1956 he 
had argued that the new Bundeswehr uniform was too removed from the old 
Wehrmacht, stating that 'give our young soldiers a uniform in which they feel 
comfortable and of which they can be proud'63. Kesselring had no grasp of the 
socially changing scene; the Stahlhelms were marginalising him; some 
members of the public and government were outraged, many wanting 
uniforms banned. 
 
                Yet at an earlier Stahlhelm convention (1953) Kesselring had 
appeared more accommodating to the new Germany, when he proposed ideas 
of reforming the association, advising replacing the black white and red of the 
swastika flag with the Federal black red and gold. He suggested the Stahlhelm 
greeting of ‘Front heil’ be abolished, and that SPD members admitted, thus 
giving up the so-called fight against Marxism.  
                                                 
60    Church House, London, 1952. 
61    Guardian, Governments Must Help Heal Wounds of War, Dec 9th1952. 
62    Lingen, Kesselring,p.269. 
63    Der Stahlhelm, October 1956 also quoted in Lingen, Kesselring,p.409.   
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             Attitudes were changing rapidly in Germany, many veterans wanted 
to forget the past, and they split into two factions; the old Stahlhelms and the 
Traditionsgemeinschaft der Stahlhelm-(Association of frontline-soldiers) both 
factions sinking into political obscurity. Kesselring was eventually side-lined 
within the Stahlhelms, which itself was becoming marginalised in the new 
Germany. The Stahlhelms belonged to the past, as did Kesselring who made 
too many gaffs. Economic progress was affecting everyone, and a growing 
stability within Germany side-lined some of the issues the Veteran 
associations considered important.  
 
Kesselring misjudges the times 
 
                     On March 20th 1954 (virtually the 10th anniversary of via 
Rasella) Kesselring and his wife went on holiday to Austria, and visited 
veteran associations and charitable organisations looking after ex-servicemen. 
Kesselring had been asked to avoid such visits, to stay purely private, and to 
tread carefully over matters regarding the communists, who had, only a few 
months before, speculated publically that Germany could still threaten 
Austrian Independence64. There was a degree of nervousness about a German 
ex-Field-Marshal arriving in independent Austria. Against advice, Kesselring 
persisted with a meeting with the organisation caring for relatives of those 
held in Soviet prisons. He appeared determined to publicise the state of ex-
servicemen which caused uproar. In Salzburg he held a public meeting with 
the president of the Austrian association that looked after Wehrmacht soldiers. 
The left-wing press and the Soviet-backed press reacted with articles entitled 
‘What does Kesselring want in Austria65?’ The same newspaper claimed he 
was met with ‘flowers and marching tunes’ wherever he travelled; this was 
untrue, but Kesselring had supplied sufficient grist for their mill66. The 
Austrian government wanted him to leave, and the local police chief asked 
                                                 
64    Soviet Foreign Minister speaking at Berlin Conference, Jan 1954. 
65    Frankfurter Rundschau, 30thMarch 1954. 
66    Ibid. 
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him on behalf of the government to exit the country67. The visit provoked 
debate in the papers at home and abroad, the Austrian government claiming 
he had conducted political talks which was hotly denied68. The German 
government was approached by both Soviet and Austrian representation, but 
Kesselring persisted in being photographed at various memorials for fallen 
soldiers, provoking the headline, 'Kesselring Visit Unwanted'69. 
 
                 There were many who welcomed his attention and the press he 
brought with him. It was difficult to ignore Kesselring; he only had to speak 
and it was instantly in print for analysis and comment. This was the hub of the 
problem; the ex-Field-Marshal had lost the ability of diplomatic caution for 
which he had once been known. He tended to say what he was thinking, and 
he appeared completely lost in the new developing West Germany.  
 
                  A further gaffe occurred later that year when during a BBC 
interview Kesselring expressed the opinion that the invasion of Britain failed, 
because the Germans had not planned it well enough in advance, not as a 
result of the willingness of the British to defend their country.  He said 'that 
had the invasion succeeded, as I hoped, the war would have been over much 
sooner, which after all would have been a good thing for all of us'70. It was 
insensitive and smacked of Wehrmacht arrogance. He was to repeat these 
claims in an American interview on August 30th 1955, adding that the failure 
to invade England had been one of the four major errors that lost Germany the 
war71. Discussing such issues postwar indicated insensitivity. Had he been 
more tactful he would not have shared his views with the BBC, but he had 
lost the diplomatic touch, and probably enjoyed irritating the British whom he 
blamed for what he perceived as his unjust imprisonment. It led one German 
newspaper to write: 'Kesselring did not pass up the opportunity to display a 
lack of political tact.'72 It is apparent in his trip to Austria and his interviews 
he was not simply out of touch in Germany, but also on the world stage; he 
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was becoming an embarrassment, which with his insistence on the POW issue 
would soon turn to serious public discomfiture, if not mortification. 
 
Returning Criminal POWs 
 
                  Whenever there was reference to POWs Kesselring’s name was 
frequently involved in any newspaper report. This was to be expected from a 
senior commander concerned for his men. It also, for a time suited the 
German self-image because POWs became part of the developing need to be 
victims. The weekly publication, the Heimkehrer, which claimed to represent 
those who fought in the war, frequently alleged that the British were keeping 
innocent German soldiers locked up. A Guardian newspaper report indicated 
that Kesselring, who the paper claimed was being considered as a candidate 
for the Presidency of the Federal Republic after Professor Heuss, had been 
making too many statements regarding these issues73. Partly through such 
reports, Kesselring was seen as a man with a mission. At first Kesselring had 
concerned himself only with his old prison of Werl and its conditions, writing 
to Alexander and Eden out of what he called 'a feeling of moral obligation to 
assist those sharing my fate in their need and to make some contribution 
towards a more far reaching and more deeper understanding between our 
peoples'74. This led to a letter exchange in the Abendpost by Herbert Koestlin 
and Sir Ivan Kirkpatrick over the Werl prisoners being 'innocent or 
murderers'75. In the Foreign Office, a Mr Andrew wrote that 'I think that 
Kesselring, unlike Ramcke, is a reasonable being whom it would pay us to 
placate'76. The response from the Secretary of State was immediate that he 
'saw no reason to 'placate' FM Kesselring, who has behaved foolishly'77. The 
foolishness undoubtedly related to Kesselring's outspoken and persistent 
criticism of the policy of holding some prisoners. 
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                  During the 1950s a series of Kameradenschinder trials started, 
indicting those who had brutalised their comrades while in Soviet POW 
camps. 'They were inextricably linked to West German efforts during the 
1950s to come to terms with the past' … shaped by the 'ideological parameters 
of the emerging Cold War'78.  'It was easier for the West Germany public and 
the judiciary to address these issues with reference to a foreign, Communist 
dictatorship rather than to an indigenous Nazi dictatorship'79. Kesselring 
started taking an interest in another type of trial, namely those of returning 
officers who during the closing months of the war had committed crimes 
against their own population. His unpopularity arose from his persistence in 
defending such soldiers who were regarded as war criminals even by most old 
comrades, mainly because they had ordered the death of Germans. There were 
many cases, but Colonel Berthold Ohm, General Tolsdorff and Field-Marshal 
Schörner were cases in which Kesselring became deeply immersed, losing 
him what popularity he had managed to retain. It was more than mere 
stubbornness, and there is little question that Kesselring would have approved 
of their actions. His obsession with freeing all prisoners, regardless of what 
they had done, dragged him into deeply hostile territory. 
 
              Kesselring became headlines when he acted as a witness in the case 
of a Colonel Berthold Ohm. This man had executed seven citizens of the town 
of Penzberg because they wanted to save their town from further destruction, 
by letting the Americans enter. These citizens realised the war was finished, 
and could see no reason for more death and destruction; in shooting these 
Pensberg citizens Ohm committed a serious crime, killing the very people he 
was supposed to defend. Kesselring argued that Ohm's decision was necessary 
for a proper retreat80. 
 
                  In the witness stand Kesselring made the error of coupling this 
issue with the new rearmament programme, asking who would join the 
Bundeswehr if years later they were to be prosecuted for following orders; he 
                                                 
78    Bartov, Crimes,p.140. 
79    Ibid,p.143. 
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was well known for his persistency on this theme. As early as 1950 he had 
been quoted in the Guardian, in a column entitled ‘Sayings of the Week,’ that 
'next time there is a war they won’t be able to have soldiers in command. 
They will have to have lawyers'81. The press attacked Kesselring, the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung writing 'that one cannot simply kill people with impunity 
as here'82. Kesselring probably felt it his duty to defend a man who had 
carried out similar orders to those issued by him in the closing months of the 
war. This serious anti-Kesselring backlash in the press continued, and it was 
probably this incident, more than any other, which ruled out any official 
postwar role for Kesselring. In 1952 he had been popular because he was a 
released prisoner, but each year his inability to come to terms with the new 
Germany made him less so.  
 
                 Kesselring learned nothing from the public response to the Ohm 
trial, and in 1954 immediately became involved in another trial supporting a 
General Tolsdorff. Tolsdorff was being prosecuted for the execution of a sixty 
year old Captain Holzey on May 3rd 1945, whom he claimed had surrendered 
a village, when it was argued that all the Captain had done was put Red Cross 
flags out to protect the hospital. General Tolsdorff was not the sort of criminal 
that Ohm had been, but Kesselring again caused a stir by stating that it had 
been essential 'to fight to the end because it had been vital for the war'83. This 
line of argument again ran counter to what Germans wanted to hear in the 
mid-1950s. The press attacked Kesselring again; no one wanted to be 
reminded of those closing days of the war in May 1945 when Germans killed 
Germans. Kesselring failed to understand the new world in which he lived, 
and added to this failure by ignoring public opinion. 
 
                  In the same year (1957) his wife died, Kesselring was still busy as 
an expert witness, this time supporting Field-Marshal Schörner who had been 
released by the Soviets, and was promptly arrested and charged with the 
killing of those German soldiers, who in the last days had allegedly deserted. 
                                                 
81   Guardian, June 18th1950. 
82   Süddeutsche Zeitung,  21stNovember 1953. 
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This was a well-publicized case because Minister Franz-Josef Strauss 
(chairman of the Christian Social Union, member of the Federal Cabinet in 
different positions and later long term president of Bavaria) used the negative 
public response 'to launch a general attack on the old Wehrmacht elite' which 
reflected similar attacks he had already made on Kesselring84. The public was 
interested because it revisited the national trauma of being victims, victims of 
the old regime so critical to the German corporate psychology. Even the VdS 
allowed members to testify against Schörner85.    
 
                Schörner was not popular, and nor was Kesselring by being 
supportive; the West German press was clearly indicating the feelings of the 
nation, which was a wish to distance itself from the old generals. By 1957/8 
the destruction of war still blighted Europe, and especially Germany, but there 
was a growing desire to move away and look to the future. 
 
Kesselring's Failure 
 
                    Kesselring turned the public against him, the Soviets enjoyed the 
propaganda potential, and the West remained suspicious of the Field-Marshal 
who would not change. Earlier, in a British parliamentary debate following a 
Foreign  Ministers' Conference in Berlin, Mr Hughes MP expressed concern 
that if the Germans joined NATO 'they will, in five years dominate the whole 
show … the militarists are in evidence there already … they have been 
standing as parliamentary candidates … Kesselring is one of the leaders of the 
new regime'86. No one questioned this even though there was no truth in the 
allegation; there was the assumption that Kesselring was a right-wing leader 
of the old school, and to be feared - but the German people had rejected 
Kesselring. Lord Russell of Liverpool referred to the reunions which 
Kesselring had 'been holding all over Germany, in which the speaker said 
this: we want to bring back to Germany the old spirit of the Prussians. All this 
talk of a democratic army is nonsense … if the world wants our soldiers it 
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must let us train them our own way'87. German opinion was against such 
views: it tended to lean towards the idea of making a military contribution 
with other European nations, but, as ex-General Crüwell told some cheering 
Afrika Korps veterans, 'we shall never again be Hessian mercenaries'88. A 
report in the Guardian illustrated how East Germany used the Kesselring 
image to attack the right wing stance of West Germany, asking 'What has this 
man been doing in West Germany since the last war89?' Kesselring had 
become an embarrassment. Modern Germany wanted no reminder of its past, 
and Kesselring, the so-called non-party member, remained to the end the 
right-wing nationalistic military man he had always been. He died on 
Wednesday 20th July 1960 in the sanatorium in Bad Nauheim. The Stahlhelms 
fired a volley over his grave, though he was not given a military funeral. 
General Kammhüber spoke about Kesselring’s leadership, but distanced 
himself from Kesselring’s more recent activities. Westphal spoke of 
Kesselring’s strength of character and the care he had shown for men of all 
ranks. The funeral closed in a heavy rain storm. The obituary in the Guardian 
mentioned that after prison 'Kesselring showed how irreconcilable and un-
teachable he was' which was both perceptive and reflected the opinion of 
many Germans.90At the time of his death he was both the last created and the 
last living German Field-Marshal, having outlived Manstein by twenty-three 
days. No Field-Marshals have been created since.                      
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Introduction 
 
             Kesselring’s latest biographer describes him as one of the most 
notable commanders of World War II, his first biographer as a master 
strategist and a patrician. As noted in the thesis many Allied commanders 
such as Bradley appeared to admire his military expertise, and Alexander 
approved the way he conducted his war. Many historians have referred to him 
as one of the best generals of the war and a master of defence. He was 
admired by many for his Luftwaffe strategy, and later viewed himself, as did 
the Allies, as the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean. He always saw 
himself as being innocent, not preparing for an aggressive war, not being 
involved in war crimes, and being non-political and ignorant of the bestiality 
of his political masters. After the war some saw him as a potential president of 
the new Germany, and a person who cared for his old soldiers still in prison. 
More recently some historians have started to review certain aspects of 
Kesselring’s life in a different light, and this thesis has reappraised much of 
what has been written about Germany’s last Field Marshal.   
 
                    It is Primo Levi's words that 'grey men, blind first and criminal 
later, frenziedly divided among themselves the tatters of an iniquitous and 
moribund authority,' could be applied to Kesselring in 19451. This thesis has 
argued that Kesselring belonged to a national caste that saw war as a 
profession; that he knowingly prepared for an aggressive war, pretended to 
have no political leanings, and blindly served an iniquitous regime. His 
reputation as being a great commander is questioned, but his adherence to a 
moribund authority led him into a criminal court, surviving only because 
postwar politics needed him pro-tem, but not for long. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1    Levi, Drowned,p.49. 
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Kesselring, a National Product 
 
                   Military leaders frequently reflect their environment. Zhukov 
reflected Stalinism, Alexander upper-class England, Bradley middle-America, 
Kesselring reflected the German military class born at the end of the 
nineteenth century; he was a typical product of his background. Even 
Kesselring's birthplace Bavaria proved a fertile place for the growth of the 
NSDAP. Anti-Semitism was endemic throughout Europe, but growing rapidly 
in military Germany. The influence of right-wing nationalism which fed off 
the growing anti-Semitism was part of Kesselring's DNA.  The militaristic 
Wilhelmine period cast Kesselring in a mould he never questioned. Not all 
historians would agree, but there is little doubt that in the Wilhelmine period 
military professionalism was too highly regarded, and because of the Kaiser's 
dysfunctional personality the military was a belligerent rather than a defensive 
force. During this time there was 'little understanding of democracy, and 
{soldiers} were bound to an institutional cult of obedience'2. This context was 
determinate in the moulding of Kesselring, a moulding he accepted and never 
questioned.  
 
            The Great War was also a major contributory factor in the context of 
his development as a professional soldier. Following his meeting with the 
communists at the Düna, Kesselring developed a life-long hatred of 
communism. By the end of the Great War Kesselring had become a typical 
product of the German General Staff, anti-communist, undoubtedly anti-
Semitic, a right-wing nationalist who saw war as a profession; the slaughter in 
the trenches received no attention in his memoirs; an early warning of his 
ruthlessness.  
 
                 Kesselring's reaction to the Versailles Treaty was typical: the shock 
waves of defeat, revolutions and anarchy were a major context which shaped 
him. His right-wing nationalism was given full vent in the Freikorps activities 
during the period of the Nachkrieg, which nearly ruined him. As a 
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consequence he developed the lifelong facade that he had no interest in 
politics, just compliance. This made him a willing tool for Hitler, to whom he 
retained a blind obedience. Kesselring concealed his politics, but they were an 
intrinsic part of his nature.   
 
                 His enemies referred to him as Smiling Albert, held him in regard, 
and many historians, including his first biographer, place him on a pedestal, 
believing him to be non-political, and neglecting to note that his background 
and subsequent behaviour indicate that he was a prejudiced right-wing 
nationalist, with an uncompromising hatred of communists, undoubtedly anti-
Semitic, and as a professional soldier, ruthless.  By 1922 Kesselring's 
personality had taken shape which, for a time would elevate him, but would 
eventually destroy him.  
 
Kesselring prepared for war   
        
                          Despite the agreed terms of Versailles Kesselring worked 
throughout the inter-bellum years in the clandestine rebuilding of an 
aggressive war-machine, never questioning its morality or legality. It 
necessitated a cynical co-operation with the hated Communists, and German 
pilots were trained at Smolensk, and Lipetsk, disguised as Red Army officers. 
The same clandestine exercise was repeated with Italy, but this time disguised 
as South Tyrolean soldiers with the Regia Aeronautica. The use of the Soviets 
underlined the morally bankrupt nature of men like Kesselring, and his 
mentor Seeckt. Seeckt’s insistence on surprise and speed combined with air 
power, and the harnessing of modern technology was a critical influence on 
men like Kesselring. His various appointments involved him at every level of 
military re-organisation and expansion; the military historian, Carlo D’Este, 
justifiably saw Kesselring as one of the originators of the blitzkrieg, and as 
one of the architects of the Luftwaffe3. Kesselring's introduction of aggressive 
parachute regiments; his initial support of strategic bombing; his insistence on 
night-fighters; training bombers and navigators for long distance navigation, 
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and his concept of mobile control areas for the various Air Fleets are clearly 
indicative that Kesselring was preparing for aggressive war.  This was a 
period of determined war preparation, and Kesselring's military generation 
accepted the NSDAP aspirations in the 1930s.  During this period Hitler was 
of little significance, but the military machine prepared by men like 
Kesselring undermined the democratic Weimar state, and gave Hitler the tools 
for war. 
 
Kesselring supported an Iniquitous Regime  
 
               Emulating Seeckt and most officers Kesselring never joined any 
political party, allowing him to pretend he had no interest in politics. By the 
time Hitler came to power Kesselring and his colleagues had prepared the 
military tools, and were willing servants. Kesselring remained loyal to Hitler 
to the bitter end, fighting on to the detriment of the German people. Unlike 
most senior officers, Kesselring never denied Hitler, never pretended he 
opposed him, and to the end of his days said nothing against the man who 
brought European devastation. Kesselring was Hitler's natural disciple, even if 
he did not sign the Party's membership book.  
 
                The Hitler oath of 1934 had strong precedents in European history 
and America, but was used by men like Kesselring as a reason to follow 
orders, and sublimate their personal will to authority. It enabled the process of 
sanitization by claiming, with Pontius Pilate, that they could wash away the 
blood; allowing Kesselring in his memoirs to pose the rhetorical question 
'what else was the meaning of an oath4?’  
 
                 Hitler gave Kesselring a personnel gift of some 6,000 RM, which 
indebted him to the regime; he would have been aware of the implicit 
embryonic bribery. This was one of many 'blind eyes' that Kesselring 
developed as Hitler rose to power. During the formative years of the 
Luftwaffe, Kesselring must have known about Hugo Junkers being forced into 
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partnership with Anthony Fokker, and the theft of Junkers’ patents, and 
company. When questioned about Jewish officers being excluded from the 
army, his reply that 'Jewish officers did not exist' reflected an arrogance 
making him complicit5. Hitler's regime gave Kesselring all he needed, 
especially the restoration of military power, of 'drum and trumpet … resulting 
in what the satirist Karl Kraus called cerebral concussion'6. The intense 
loyalty remained to the very last hours of the war in Europe where his ruthless 
streak, for some reason a point of admiration amongst many historians, 
became lethal, and 'he acted like a brute'7. 
 
Kesselring knew War was planned 
 
                     Kesselring's prepared an aggressive war-machine, and his 
expertise was behind the concept of blitzkrieg. The nature of German military 
activity, along with Hitler's political views, made it clear to an Australian 
academic in 1937, and some 12,000 miles away, that a major war was being 
planned8. Kesselring was involved in the preparation, and was senior enough 
to know what was happening. The 1938 Luftwaffe target maps discovered 
after the war, held tactical details of London and Hull indicating that 
Kesselring's plans were more than war-games9. 
 
                   Kesselring was intelligent and informed, and it defies common 
sense that his cries of ignorance deserve the credibility they have frequently 
been given. He knew that Sudetenland's fate would be followed by the rest of 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. Kesselring would also have been aware of the 
international outlawing of aggressive war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact signed 
by Germany. He knew war was planned: he had prepared the war-machine for 
aggression, worked on Blitzkrieg and planned the attacks: the only aspect over 
which he probably had late knowledge was the precise timing.   
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8    Roberts, House,p.363. 
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Kesselring's ruthless tactical bombing 
 
            For a long time the Nuremberg claim that bombing Rotterdam was 'the 
first act of terrorism of the German Army in the West' soon became, along 
with Warsaw and London something of a myth, in order to justify the massive 
Allied strategic bombing of later years. The project of the Ural-bomber was 
shelved, and Kesselring produced the Luftwaffe-Manual/16, to bomb military 
targets, tactical bombing. As noted in a recent study, 'German air strategy was 
linked closely to the ground campaign'10. The Luftwaffe was to operate in 
short-range operations for the army which was entirely Kesselring's thinking. 
There were no long range strategic plans. 
 
              The bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam were for tactical reasons, 
both intended to break resistance on the ground. Bombing in London was 
aimed at the docks, and it was not until later in the war some cities became 
direct targets. However, as the Allies were to discover, accuracy was 
impossible which meant indiscriminate bombing. Williamson Murray wrote, 
‘in these raids the Germans were not adverse to any collateral damage 
inflicted on the civilian population’11. Tactical bombing was not made from 
any moral considerations; Kesselring frequently stated that he considered high 
level bombing imprecise, and saw the tactic as wasteful. The Condor Legion 
in Spain had caused considerable loss of civilian life without regret by the 
perpetrators; it was simply Kesselring's belief that the Luftwaffe was best 
used as a support for the ground war.            
                 
Kesselring as Luftwaffe Commander 
 
                  Kesselring used the Luftwaffe in Blitzkrieg style, assisting ground 
forces, in Poland and again in France and later in Barbarossa. These attacks 
were successful in Poland, although myths emanated about the Polish air-
force being instantly destroyed. The initial success in Poland, and earlier in 
Spain, created a sense of nervousness in France, but again the reality was 
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often different from the myth. The Luftwaffe lost a vast number of aircraft, 
and Kesselring's Luftflotte-II was exhausted and seriously diminished, losing 
250 aircraft alone over Dunkirk: it was their image that remained a threat. The 
initial success in Barbarossa was because of surprise, but the sheer size of 
Russia was the termination of Blitzkrieg.  
 
                In the battle of Britain, for all his efficiency Kesselring was poorly 
served by his Intelligence Services. He believed the RAF had too few aircraft, 
encouraging the myth of the few against the many. Even at the height of the 
battle for France 1,200 RAF airplanes were retained in England for defence. 
His greatest intelligence error was underestimating the size of Fighter 
Command and its capacity to reinforce. With incredible arrogance he 
underestimated British radar, fighter planes and many other scientific 
advances. The British economy was smaller than Germany, but out produced 
Germany, and 'was ahead in aircraft from 1940 and in tanks in 1941-2'12. 
Kesselring's constant reference to chivalry in his memoirs during this period 
indicates his attitude of seeing war as a national game, part of the Wilhelmine 
mentality. The British and its RAF did not share this view. He was shocked at 
the RAF pursuing Red Cross rescue aircraft and bombing on Christmas Day, 
and was forced to concede the British fighter-planes were superior. Hitler's 
claim that the British were 'realists, devoid of any scruple, cold as ice,' was a 
lesson Kesselring did not learn13.  Kesselring was defeated by a larger, better 
equipped force which was ruthless in its determination to win.  
 
 
 Kesselring as Commander in Chief, South 
                  
                   Hitler needed to stabilize Italy and appointed Kesselring 
Oberbefehlshaber-Süd; a totally misleading title. Hitler regarded Kesselring 
as in charge, as did the Allies who gave him the code name The Emperor, but 
not the Italians who read the original Order, and saw him as a liaison officer14. 
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Kesselring was subordinate to Mussolini, and obliged to tread with caution 
with the Monarchy, the Fascist Council, the Supremo Commando, and even 
the Vatican; he also had to report to Hitler and the OKW. After the surrender 
of Italy some of these complications disappeared, but were immediately 
replaced by Himmler's SS which had its own command structures, and 
reported directly to Berlin. Keitel was obliged to send a signal making 
Kesselring the highest authority because the partisan war was directed by SS 
Obergruppenführer Wolff, but it was only for military appearances. When SS 
troops massacred women following the Rome bread riots, and the Pontine 
Marshes were infected with malaria, it all happened on Kesselring's watch in 
a system with disorientated leadership. Kesselring was constantly hampered 
by Hitler's intrusions, minor ones about demanding particular troops be 
evacuated from Sicily, and many major ones, especially at Anzio where 
Hitler's interference gave the initiative to the Allies.            
 
                As noted in the thesis, Kesselring has, even recently in the Quantico 
Command and Staff College, been given considerable credit for his command 
in the South. His observations of Italians are morally redundant and 
misconstrued. Finding them unmilitary and angry at their surrendering, it 
never crossed his mind either in his memoirs or interrogations, that many 
Italians were uninspired by the war or even opposed to it, and that the inept 
leadership of Mussolini had left his troops badly equipped, poorly resourced 
and with weak leadership. As Oberbefehlshaber-Süd he failed to understand 
that, as Ciano had said, 'our people have no faith in the war, or in our leaders 
…they have lost their will to win'15. When he heard that Augusta Fortress had 
surrendered to the British without a fight, it must have dawned on him that his 
optimism was misplaced as Hitler had often said. Beleaguered by poor 
Intelligence, not realising the effectiveness of British Intelligence, and the 
arrogance of not believing the Enigma code could be broken, he frequently 
blamed the Italians. He was taken by total surprise at Mussolini's downfall 
and became instantly ruthless. First he pretended to love Italians, but his 
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ruthless orders issued in Rome showed his love had become contempt16. 
Oberbefehlshaber-Süd sounded grand, but it was more fiction, and was 
further hampered by Kesselring's inability to understand the Italian people. 
 
Kesselring's failure with Rommel and Malta 
 
                Rommel and Kesselring have always been held in esteem even by 
the Allies, who during and after the war almost deified Rommel. They were 
both contemptuous of the Italian military, but Kesselring was more 
diplomatic. As Rommel's star faded Kesselring became more prominent; 
some historians claiming Kesselring was more able than Rommel, 'shrewd 
both tactically and strategically'17. Kesselring's understandable failure to 
supply Rommel was one of the main causes of friction, as was Ciano's point 
that 'Kesselring {was} running to Berlin to complain of Rommel'18. In Italy 
there had been the serious contention of Rommel's proposal that after the 
Italian capitulation that they should fight from the north, whereas Kesselring 
wanted to fight up the peninsular from the south. The relationship between 
Kesselring and Rommel is difficult to ascertain, there was some mutual 
respect, and much professional jealousy, the most contentious points being 
Malta and supply lines.  
 
                 Kesselring complained during interrogation that Rommel vacillated 
about Malta19. On the other hand Rommel thought 'Malta should have been 
taken instead of Crete'20. To Hitler it was inconsequential since Russia 
preoccupied him. However, Malta was like a port in the sea, and the proposed 
Hercules Operation was eventually given the go ahead21. It never occurred 
because the Italians could not agree on timing, and Rommel suddenly made 
his move towards Egypt. Kesselring failed to carry out the invasion and failed 
through the heaviest bombing of the war to destroy the port; as Montgomery 
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17    Holland, Italy,p.37. 
18    Young, Rommel,p.168. 
19    USAH Division, 007718. 
20    Liddell-Hart, Rommel,p.120. 
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wrote, 'El Alamein could not have taken place if Malta had fallen'22. 
Kesselring's problem was that as a senior commander he could not convince 
Hitler, and could not keep Rommel under control. Although Rommel was 
promoted to Field-Marshal, Kesselring remained senior.  
 
            On Rommel's advice Kesselring was refused a single division from 
North Italy, and some historians argue that had Rommel sent troops 'events 
might have been very different in Italy,' and 'if Rommel had sent his eight 
divisions in the North of Italy to join Kesselring's in the south the beachhead 
would not have survived'23. 
 
Kesselring's failure in North Africa  
 
                Kesselring and Halder agreed that Rommel overreached himself, 
and supply lines stretched too far because the RAF controlled the skies; 
Kesselring was blamed for the failure of supplies. Kesselring failed to 
understand the powerful logistic build-up by the Americans, and the 
ramifications of Torch. He realised it too late as he recognised he had no 
counter-attack against four-engine bombers at a ceiling of 30,000 feet. The 
German inability to understand Vichy France, and their lack of perception of 
French attitude caused serious problems, especially regarding the use of 
French airfields and ports. Although a thousand US soldiers died from French 
fire near Casablanca, it was a brief time before they switched sides. As a well 
trained professional officer Kesselring was able to establish the Mareth 
defence line, but Arnim and Rommel had mutual difficulties, and clashed with 
Kesselring, undermining the myth that the German command always worked 
like a machine. The sheer logistics of overwhelming power, control of the 
skies and sea lanes meant failure, and although the Allies suffered 76,000 
casualties they also captured 238,000 prisoners of war, a greater number than 
those who surrendered at Stalingrad, and yet Kesselring retained his 
reputation as a great master of defence. 
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Kesselring the Master of Defence 
 
                        Kesselring's reputation as a master commander of defence 
evolved in Italy, but it had its origins in Africa, despite the campaign 
concluding in defeat. Montgomery's caution in pursuing the remnants of the 
Panzerarmee along the coast is well documented, allowing Kesselring time. 
The Kasserine Pass disaster must be shared by Anderson, Eisenhower and 
Fredendall, and led to the humiliating spectacle of some 4,000 Allied POWs 
being marched through Rome. Excessive caution, inexperience and ineptitude 
characterised the Allied leadership in North Africa, and it was expedient to 
praise the expertise of the enemy. This had happened earlier by elevating 
Rommel as the Desert Fox, and now Kesselring was receiving similar 
accolades. Even the Guardian newspaper referred to Kesselring as 'one of the 
most stubborn and least advertised of German generals'24. 
 
              The inexperience and ineptitude of Allied leadership persisted in 
Sicily and later Italy with, as Bradley and Montgomery both acknowledged, a 
serious lack of planning. The egocentric and dysfunctional personalities of 
Patton and Montgomery, and the inability of Alexander to control his 
subordinates allowed Kesselring's evacuation at Messina to look 
uncomfortably like a Dunkirk victory. Both Clark and Patton were extreme 
Anglophobes, and Clark's near failure and behaviour at Salerno all made the 
German military, and Kesselring in particular, look superior. From Brooke, 
Eisenhower, Alexander, Clark, Patton, Montgomery right through the chain of 
command the leadership was mutually suspicious of one another, but the most 
serious defects were between Clark and Alexander. Having stowed gas-bombs 
in a ship at a highly illuminated Bari Port was incompetent, but the Monte 
Cassino bombing debacle resulted in worldwide condemnation, and created a 
defence structure for the German defence. The landing at Anzio was a near 
disaster because of inexperience and timidity, and when Clark ignored 
Alexander's orders by taking Rome he allowed the escaping Germans to 
regroup and fight to the end of the war. In addition to facing inexperienced 
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military commanders, Kesselring's efficiency in organising defence-lines 
across a landscape, which by nature was easier to defend than attack, meant 
the Italian war only concluded as Germany collapsed. It remains clear that the 
Allies had paid little attention to Italy's terrain and weather. Kesselring was 
acclaimed a genius of defence, but this praise helped cover up the 
inexperience and frequently inept Allied leadership, who used his so-called 
genius to account for their failings. It is always easier to praise the enemy than 
blame our own leaders. Kesselring was just a solid professional German 
officer who frequently faced an enemy which was lost and at odds with itself; 
he was no genius. 
 
Kesselring was Ruthless 
 
             It could be expected that Kesselring, as a product of the German 
General Staff, would have been ruthless in times of war: this was his 
reputation, and it is frequently described with admiration. Kesselring also 
tried to enhance his image by being seen as the saviour of Italian culture, but 
his purloining of Italian industry and destruction of Italian agriculture during 
the retreat, puts a bitter perspective on such claims. 
 
             The thesis illustrates that Kesselring's ruthlessness finally descended 
to sheer brutality, which brought him within the ambit of war crimes and 
verging on crimes against humanity. As noted in the final chapters, postwar 
politics concealed the truth for the same reason that the Wehrmacht was seen 
in a different light from the SS. Kesselring's brutal reaction to the Italian 
partisan war condemned him. International law regarding the legitimacy of 
partisans, and hostages/reprisals remained a legal problem for some time. The 
Allies had supported the partisans to tie down Germans, but had failed to 
control them, and Kesselring viewed it as his 'struggle against gangs with 
most severe measures'25, The Communists planned to provoke German 
reaction, such as the massacre of the so-called SS in via Rosella, and the 
subsequent Ardeatine reprisal. 
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               The massacre at Marzabotto was ten times the size of Lidice, and yet 
Kesselring dismissed it as a mere war operation. The SS were barbaric, but 
Kesselring stated that 'anti-guerrilla warfare must in large measure be carried 
out by the army,' and he was in charge26. This research shows that many Ultra 
intercepts from Kesselring confirm his involvement - 'many guerrillas killed, 
village burnt down' on the grounds that the guerrillas were 'in w/t contact with 
the British'27. It was a vicious circle; the partisans inflamed the Wehrmacht 
whose brutal reaction swelled the ranks of the partisans. Kesselring's orders 
reveal that he was not only cognisant, but the originator of some actions that 
could be classed as crimes against humanity, because in the words of the 
Italian historian Battini he acted 'as if the existence of the Partisan movement 
were the fault of the civilian population'28. He probably committed perjury at 
this trial in collaboration with his staff-officers in the cynical knowledge that 
he might get away with killing civilians, but not American POWs. His 
investigation into possible Swiss citizenship is indicative that he was well 
aware as to how his actions would be viewed in the wider world. 
 
                  His ruthlessness was not confined to Italy, although he joked that 
he was 'the new wonder weapon' he pursued the drumhead courts in Western 
Europe, proposed by Hitler29. He even complained about not seeing hanged 
deserters, regarding it as 'ineffective military leadership'30. After his release 
from prison he pro-actively defended German officers accused of killing their 
own countrymen in defence of the homeland. 
 
Kesselring becomes Politics 
 
                  It has been tempting for many historians to suggest that because 
Churchill and Alexander appealed against Kesselring's death sentence he must 
have been 'decent.' Churchill was the driving force, and his motives were 
                                                 
26    KNA, HW5/474. 
27    KNA, HW1/3017. 
28    Battini, Missing, p.38. 
29    Battistelli, Kesselring,p.5 
30    Fest Joachim, Plotting Hitler's Death (London: Phoenix, 1997)p.335 
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partially politically based. The West needed Adenauer's Germany on side, and 
Adenauer needed to win the German POW argument as part of the means to 
retain power. The SS had provided the alibi for the majority, and the 
Wehrmacht's clean war myth started with Kesselring. The commutation of his 
death sentence and eventual release was partially motivated by Cold War 
politics. The word ‘partially’ is important because Kesselring was a British 
prisoner, and the British motives for his release were much more mixed than 
historians such as Battini, von Lingen and Hébert suggest. Cold War politics 
and the readjustment of memory were critical, but men like Bishop Bell, 
Hankey and Paget also argued from genuine humanitarian grounds, in seeking 
to heal the wounds of the past. Although he went through the denazification 
process parodied as Persilscheine, he never changed. The politics of memory, 
the need for German re-armament in the Cold War were a major factor in 
sanitising people like Kesselring and the Wehrmacht. Laternser's book, 
Verteidigung Deutscher Soldaten, added fuel to the fire of victor's justice, but 
the 'Himmerode Memorandum' and all it represented was the real truth31. 
 
               A few had once considered Kesselring as a potential candidate for 
the German presidency, but Kesselring never changed or adapted. Between 
his surrender in 1945 and his eventual release in 1952, Germany and its 
aspirations had changed dramatically in nearly every aspect of national life, 
and Kesselring was almost like a time-warped alien. His association with the 
Stahlhelms was not just poor judgment, but as with his ill-advised trip to 
Austria and his defence of Ohm, Tolsdorff and Schörner clearly indicate he 
was incapable of adapting to the new West Germany.  
 
                  Kesselring, charming but ruthless, was a militaristic Wilhelmine 
product who eagerly served an evil regime, and who always turned a blind 
eye to serve his master’s purpose. As Primo Levi wrote 'blind first and 
criminal later,' Kesselring died having failed to understand the new Germany 
who had rejected all he stood for and represented32. 
      
                                                 
31    Defending German Soldiers. 
32    Levi, Drowned,p.49. 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
 
 
Kesselring’s ‘Most Secret’ orders dated 17th June 1944 to GHQ Staff, 10th 
Army; GHQ Staff, 14th Army; Army Group, V Zangen; General 
Plenipotentiary German Armed Forces in Italy; HQ Luftflotte 2; German 
Naval High Command, Italy; Supreme Head of SS and Police, Italy; General 
i/c CTPT Italy; Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich with the Italian 
Government, Ambassador Rahn:   
 
Concerning: New Measures in connection with operations against Partisans. 
 
1. The partisan situation in the Italian theatre, particularly in Central Italy, 
has recently deteriorated to such an extent, that it constitutes a serious danger 
to the fighting troops and supply lines as well as to the war industry and 
economic potential. 
 
The fight against the partisans must be carried on with all the means at our 
disposal and with the utmost severity. I will protect any command who 
exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity of the methods he adopts 
against partisans. In this connection the old principle holds good, that a 
mistake in the choice of methods in executing one’s orders, is better than 
failure or neglect to act. Only the most prompt and severe handling is good 
enough as punitive and deterrent measures to nip in the bud other outrages on 
a greater scale. All civilians implicated in anti-partisan operations who are 
apprehended in the course of reprisals, are to be brought up the Assembly 
Camps which are being erected for this purpose by the Quartermaster 
General C in C South West for ultimate despatch to the Reich as workers. 
 
2. The combat against partisans consists of passive and active operations with 
centre of gravity on the latter. The passive combat consists of protection of 
important buildings of historic or artistic value, railways, and roads, as well as 
essential installations such as power stations, factories etc.  
 
Even these passive operations must be conducted within the local boundaries 
for example, Recce Troops will constantly guard the foreground of an 
installation to be protected.  
 
Active operations will be conducted especially in Partisan overrun districts 
where it is vital to maintain the lifeline of the Armed Forces. These partisans 
will have to be attacked and wiped out. Propaganda among partisans (as well 
as use of agents) is of utmost importance. 
 
3. The responsibility for the entire operations against partisans in the Italian 
theatre and the fundamental instructions for same continue to be valid with 
the following amendments: GHQ 10 and 14 Armies are responsible for all 
operations against partisans within their Army Sectors and Army Group V 
                                                 
1 BA-MA N 432/931 & N 422/15 pp42ff. 
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Zangen within the coastal belt to a depth of 30 kms.  The task entrusted the 
GOC in C Operational Zone Adriatic Coast in connection with coastal 
defence (in accordance with Fuehrer Instruction No. 40) are not affected by 
this ruling. In the remainder of the Italian Theatre the Supreme Head of the SS 
and Police conducts the operations against Partisans on his response- bility, in 
accordance with my instructions. Details in connection with delineation of the 
30 km wide strip along the coastal zones are to be settled direct between the 
Supreme Head of the SS and Police and Army Group V Zangen. The 
boundary between 14th Army, 10th Army and Army Group V Zangen 
Quercianella (North of Rosignano)-Certaldo-Figline-Sansepolora from there 
along road 73 to Fano (Road incl. to 10th Army)  
 
4. Armed Forces for Operations against Partisans: Here one has to 
differentiate between:  
 
(a) Military units (Police forces, Govt. Troops Bohemia and Moravia etc.) 
who are exclusively employed for active and passive operations against 
Partisans. These are subordinated to the Supreme Head of the SS and Police 
Italy. 
  
(b) Task Forces and guard detachments: For this purpose Task forces are to be 
formed, armed and trained by withdrawn formations, staffs and units and 
these should be placed upon demand without any reservations, at the disposal 
of the local staff HQ, local Headquarters, combat commander, SS unit. 
Outside the Army sectors and the 30 km. wide coastal strip upon the re- quest 
of the Supreme Head of the SS and Police, they are to be utilized to the fullest 
extent for operations against Partisans in so far as the position and their other 
tasks permit.  
 
The local command of operations, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Head of the SS and Police, where units of the Wehrmacht are utilized as well, 
depends upon the proportionate strength of the Wehrmacht and Police forces 
employed. The responsibility for the general conduct itself rests with the 
Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy.  
 
(c) Each local Commandant is responsible for the safeguarding of his locality 
and immediate surroundings and this applies as well to operations against 
Partisans. The military local HQ areas are to be subdivided into security 
sectors, to be placed under the order of the leader of the Armed Forces, SS or 
Police, which- ever is the most suitable for the task. He is fully responsible for 
the security within his sector. All shock troops, task forces etc. are at his 
disposal upon request from the local Heads. Rapid action guarantees surprise 
and success. Such security Commandants are especially to be appointed along 
the main reinforcement routes within the Army Sectors and the 30 km. wide 
coastal strip by the Armies or Army Group V Zangen with definite tasks allot- 
ted to them. Within the rest of the area, the security command- ers are to be 
allocated by the Supreme Head of the SS and Police in collaboration with 
Army Group V Zangen and the Plenipotentiary General. They will take their 
orders in this district from the Supreme Head of the SS and Police, 
notwithstanding their belonging to part of the Armed Forces.  
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(d) Operations against Paratroopers will be undertaken in addition to 
operations against Partisans.  
 
5. The protection of the following lines of communication is of primary 
importance: 
  
(a) Railway Sections (South of the PO)  (b) Roads 
 
 
Roads of No. 2 Priority Importance.  
 
The relative needs of the various installations and buildings of artistic and 
cultural value to be guarded along the railway lines is to be agreed upon on 
the one hand by the Armies, Amy Group V Zangen, the Supreme Head of the 
SS and Police and on the other hand by the General i/c Transportation, in 
direct consultations. The safeguarding of the buildings of artistic and cultural 
value along the roads within the Army Sectors and the coastal strip are the 
responsibility of the Armies or Army Group V Zangen, outside these limits 
the Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy assumes responsibility. In this 
connection he is to be in close contact with the G.O.C. in C. South 
West/General i/c Pioneers. 
  
6. So far as security of essential installations is concerned (Power Stations, 
Pumping Stations, Industrial undertakings etc.) G.O.C. Tech. Troops and the 
Staffs R.u.K. is to have liaison directly with the Supreme Head of the SS and 
Police Italy or the Armies or Army Group V Zangen.  
 
7. To further security of the Appenines the Armies are to post, commencing 
forthwith, reinforced units, Field units, road blocks, etc. in accordance with 
operational instructions "Alarich". These are to be located along the main 
passes and principal lines of reinforcement.  
The Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy is requested to submit by 25th 
June to G.O.C. in C South-West, a map (scale 1:500,000) with markings 
showing location of his security sectors, security troops, local security sectors, 
Local Commandants (Operations against Partisans) etc.  
 
Signed :Kesselring  
 
G.O.C. in C. SOUTH-WEST Ia T. No. 
0402/44 
MOST SECRET 
 
(Signed) [?I Oberstleutnant 
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                                        APPENDIX 2 
 
TOP SECRET.  
 
 
KR WAAJ/C 00104/06 1/7 1210 To: Leitkommandantur, Bologna. 
SUBJECT: Combating of Partisans. SOURCE: Telepring Ia Nr. 12099/44 
SECRET  
 
(After receipt to be treated as Top Secret) from 20. 6. 44.  
 
In my appeal to the Italians I announced that severe measures are to be taken 
against the Partisans. This announcement must not represent an empty threat. 
It is the duty of all troops and police in my command to adopt the severest 
measures. Every act of violence committed by partisans must be punished 
immediately. Reports submitted must also give details of counter measures 
taken. Wherever there is evidence of considerable numbers of partisans 
groups, a proportion of the male population of the area mill be arrested and in 
the event of an act of violence being committed, these men will be shot. The 
population must be in- formed of this. Should troops etc. be fired at from any 
village, the village will be burnt down. Perpetrators or the ring leaders will be 
hanged in public. Nearby villages to be held responsible for any sabotage to 
cables and damage inflicted to tyres. The most effective counter measure is to 
recruit local patrols. Members of the Fascist party will not be included in any 
of the reprisals. Suspects will be handed over to the prefects and a report sent 
to me. Every soldier will protect himself outside villages by carrying a fire-
arm. District Commanders will decide in which towns it will also be 
necessary to carry fire arms. Every type of plunder is forbidden and will be 
punished severely. All counter measures must be hard but just. The dignity of 
the German soldier demands it.  
 
 
 
-KESSELRING- 
Bologna, 14. 7. 44.  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
Area HQ Covolo 
 
 
 
The Commander of the district of Covolo announces the following:  
For every member of the German Armed Forces, whether military or civilian, 
who is wounded, Fifty men, taken from the place where the deed was 
committed, will be shot.  
For every soldier or civilian killed, One Hundred men also taken from the 
locality of the crime, will be shot.  
In the event of more than one soldier or civilian being killed or wounded, All 
the Men of the District Will Be Shot, the Houses Set On Fire, the Women 
Interned and the Cattle Confiscated, immediately.  
 
 
            THE COMMANDER:  Cap DENDA.  Covolo. 
11.Jul. 44. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
 
RULES OF LAND WARFARE - FM 27-10 - 1st October 1940 
US Government Printing Office, Washington 
 
 
 
1. Reprisals.-a. Definition~.-Reprisals are acts of retaliation resorted to by 
one belligerent against the enemy individuals or property for illegal acts of 
warfare committed by the other belligerent, for the purpose of enforcing 
future compliance with the recognized rules of civilized warfare.  
 
b. When and how employed.-Reprisals are never adopted merely for revenge, 
but only as an unavoidable last resort to induce the enemy to desist from 
illegitimate practices. They should never be employed by individual soldiers 
except by direct orders of a commander, and the latter should give such orders 
only after careful inquiry into the alleged offense. The highest accessible 
military authority should be consulted unless immediate action is demanded 
as a matter of military necessity, but in the latter event a subordinate 
commander may order appropriate reprisals upon his own initiative. Hasty or 
ill-considered action may subsequently be found to have been wholly 
unjustified, subject the responsible officer himself to punishment as for a 
violation of the laws of war, and seriously damage his cause. On the other 
hand, commanding officers must assume responsibility for retaliative 
measures when an unscrupulous enemy leaves no other recourse against the 
repetition of barbarous outrages.  
c. Who-may commit acts justifying reprisals.-Illegal acts of warfare 
justifying reprisals may be committed by a government, by its military 
commanders, or by a community or individuals thereof, whom it is impossible 
to apprehend, try, and punish.  
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d. Subjects of reprisals.-The offending forces or populations generally may 
lawfully be subjected to appropriate reprisals. Hostages taken and held for 
the declared purpose of insuring against unlawful acts by the enemy 
forces or people may be punished or put to death if the unlawful acts are 
nevertheless committed. Reprisals against prisoners of war are expressly 
forbidden by the Geneva convention of 1929.  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Part of trial script relating to hostage/reprisal situation 
 
 
Dr Laternser:   
 
Before I continue with the evidence of this witness, I would like to put in a 
document to the Court. The Court might remember that, arising out of a 
question of the Court, the theme was touched when it was allowed that the life 
of a person can be taken as a reprisal measure and the Field-Marshal gave his 
opinion about it. Through the kindness of the American Observer, I got into 
the possession of a booklet "Rules of Land Warfare" in the American army 
and, in these rules, almost the same case is being dealt with, and I would like 
to put into evidence its paragraph 358, as an exhibit to the Court. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
(Interrupting) Is there any dispute between the prosecution and the defence as 
to what the law is? 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
Quite frankly, as I understand it - my point is quite clear - you are entitled to 
take reprisals, but you are not entitled to take the lives of innocent people. 
That is my very short point. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
But, surely, Mr Prosecutor, you are not arguing, are you, that in a case of 
reprisal it is not permissible to take the life of perfectly innocent people? 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
I do not quite follow that: I am sorry. 
 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
I want you to consider only reprisals. Is it not permissible in international law, 
as a reprisal, to take the lives of perfectly innocent people, that is to say, 
people who have had nothing to do with any particular crime at all? 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
I say not, it is not legal; quite definitely it is not legal to take the lives of any 
innocent people. 
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Dr. Laternser: 
 
(Interjecting) And I say it is legal. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
Then I am quite wrong. There is a fundamental difference between the 
prosecution and the defence. 
 
Dr. Laternser: 
 
Well, to help my own case in this question of fundamental disagreement 
between the defence and the prosecution, I must apply again to be allowed to 
put this paragraph of American law with regard to land warfare, which says 
quite clearly that, in a reprisal, you are entitled to take the lives of innocent 
people, and I would like to emphasise that the conditions under which you are 
entitled to take the lives of innocent people are exactly the same which the 
Field-Marshal laid down in his order(relating to charge II); they are the same 
here in this booklet concerning American laws of land warfare.  
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
Mr Prosecutor, where do you get your authority for the statement that, 
supposing you cannot find the actual perpetrator of the offence, you cannot 
take a reprisal against innocent people? It is quite clear you can take a reprisal 
against innocent people in some way, is it not?  Surely you agree that a 
reprisal can be taken against a perfectly innocent person. 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
I entirely agree. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
Are you drawing the distinction that the reprisal cannot take the form of an 
execution? 
 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
Yes; there are certain circumstances, I agree, when possibly - I say "possibly" 
- an innocent life might be taken as a reprisal. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
But you have just said the very contrary. 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
But I say as a rule an innocent life cannot be taken as a reprisal. 
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Judge Advocate: 
 
I put to you quite clearly that there was a fundamental difference between you 
and the defence and you agreed, and that the defence's contention was that, in 
a proper case, a reprisal could extend to the killing of an innocent person. I 
thought you said your view was quite the contrary, and that you could not kill 
innocent people by way of reprisal. 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
That I what I said. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
I thought you were weakening from that and saying in some cases you agree. 
 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
I am sorry if you misunderstood me. My case is that you cannot take the lives 
of innocent people as a reprisal. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
Are you prepared later on to give the court some legal authority on this? 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
I am prepared to argue that ccase, yes. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
But you will agree that there can be no question at all that you can have a 
reprisal, a sort of execution, against innocent persons? 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
It is quite clear that there can be reprisals take which would affect innocent 
people, burning of houses and so and so forth, and during such a reprisal an 
innocent person might lose his life, but I say it is quite illegal, during a 
reprisal, by execution to kill an innocent person. I make the distinction 
between a reprisal being taken against an area, such as bombing from the air 
where undoubtedly innocent people - it must be after a warning - where 
undoubtedly innocent people might lose their lives, and the deliberate 
execution of innocent people. I say the former may be legal, the latter 
certainly is not. 
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Judge Advocate: 
 
I thought, Mr Prosecutor, the point you were directing us to was whether, 
when a reprisal was taken by way of execution, the number of people killed, 
for instance, was appropriate and not excessive in the sense of being an abuse 
of international law; I thought that was going to be your point. 
 
Colonel Halse: 
 
Well, that is another point. That is another part of my argument, that the 
reprisals, if taken, must be proportionate to what the enemy suffered, and I 
still say, and my argument is going to be, that you cannot take the lives of 
innocent people deliberately. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
There is undoubtedly a fundamental difference between the prosecution and 
the defence as to the law, and of course the court will remember that, in the 
long run, the responsibility of telling you what is the law is mine. You, of 
course, are the judges and will form own views as to what the law is, and 
yours will be the responsibility of deciding that, but when it comes to being 
advised that the law is, you will get that from me, and then you will consider 
it in the light of the arguments by the prosecution and by the defence. Now I 
see no point in having a legal argument at this stage of the case, and if you 
feel you would like to see Dr. Laternser's document, I suggest now you leave 
these arguments until after we have heard all the evidence. 
 
(The court confers) -the President feels that he would like this document put 
in as an exhibit. 
 
Dr. Laternser: 
 
I shall of course provide the prosecution with this book. They are the laws of 
land warfare published in Washington in 1940, and the extract will be put in 
as an exhibit, and the original is shown to the prosecution. 
 
The President: 
 
No, the original will be put in as an exhibit. 
 
Dr. Laternser: 
 
I must ask the American observer, because it is not my own, whether he 
agrees to part with this document. 
 
Judge Advocate: 
 
Have you an objection? 
 
Colonel Notestein (American Observer):  - Not at all. 
12 
 
APPENDIX 6 
 
Raid on Bari 
 
               Kesselring was fighting a retreating defence with some skill, and 
some historians have made the claim that 'Kesselring was one of the 
outstanding commanders of the war'.2 Logistically the Allies were far better 
resourced than the German occupying forces. The Allies had air-superiority, 
their landing operations were protected by overwhelming naval guns, and 
American supplies seemed endless. Naples had been the main port for 
supplies, but Bari on the east coast of Italy was the main supply for both the 
air force and army battering away at the Gustav line.  
 
               In late November 1943 Kesselring had held a conference at his HQ 
in Frascati with von Richthofen, Dietrich Pelz, Baumbach and all his 
Luftwaffe senior officers. The discussion was how to slow down the 
inexorable Allied advance and the Foggia airfields were seen as the most 
viable option. However, von Richthofen argued for Bari because of the huge 
number of supplies passing through the port, and Kesselring agreed. Sir 
Arthur Coningham had claimed the Luftwaffe was finished, stating that 'I 
would regard it as a personal affront and insult if the Luftwaffe would attempt 
any significant action in this area.'3 Richthofen claimed that his spies 
informed him that such was the confidence of the Allies that Bari port was 
unloading at night with all the lights on. When the raid took place on 
December 2nd the complacency of the Allies was self-evident, and the port 
and town were so bright it was easy to see from above for the attack. 
 
              The Luftwaffe carried out a raid on the port so successfully it became 
known as the 'Little Pearl Harbour' or 'Second Pearl Harbour.' The Luftwaffe 
managed to sink seventeen ships, and damage many others, along with the 
dockyards.4 Amongst these vessels was a Liberty ship called the SS John 
                                                 
2    Carlo D'Este, Fatal. 
3    Infield, Disaster,pp.29/30 
4    5 American, 5 British, 3 Norwegian, 2 Italian, 2 Polish and 7 more seriously damaged. 
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Harvey, captained by Elwin Knowles; this ship was carrying mustard gas 
bombs.5 The port of Bari had been in a busy state of unloading, but Captain 
Elwin Knowles could not ask for priority because of the secrecy of what he 
was carrying. He was to die with his entire crew. Many of the crew had 
guessed of the vessel's contents because of the presence of an officer called 
Beckstrom who, with his men, were trained in the handling of such weapons. 
At least they was aware of the dangerous cargo, in Husky, the invasion of 
Sicily, ordnance officers mistakenly sent poisonous mustard gas to the 
Mediterranean and 'no one knew precisely where - in the holds of one or more 
ships bound for Sicily' they lay.6  Again at the battle for the Rapido American 
troops had 'to check shells for some gas ones had been issued by mistake.'7 
 
               This particular vessel's manifesto remained a secret for many years 
because she was carrying 2,000 M47A1 mustard bombs from Oran in Algeria; 
it is claimed that they were sent into a theatre of operation in case the 
Germans resorted to chemical warfare.8 It had been authorised by President 
Roosevelt even though the use of chemical weapons had been outlawed by the 
1925 Geneva Protocol, though, ironically there was no ban on their 
manufacture and transportation until 1972. 'Ominous reports had begun to 
reach Washington and London that indicated Adolf Hitler … was planning to 
resort to the use of poison gas.'9 It had also been rumoured that the Germans 
were storing up a quarter of a million tons of toxic munitions including a new 
colourless and almost odourless gas called Tabun, possibly of Italian 
manufacture. Roosevelt had stated that 'we shall under no circumstances 
resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.'10 
Eisenhower was aware of the presence but not the whereabouts of the gas 
bombs/shells, knowing that they would only be used as reprisal. In a total war 
one must suspect the enemy of any ploy, but hitherto there had been no reason 
to believe the Germans would do so for their own safety. The Axis had not 
used any toxic agents in any military theatre of war; the Americans had 
                                                 
5    Built in North Carolina and launched on 9th January 1943. 
6    Atkinson, Day,p.34. 
7    Ibid,p.340. 
8    Each bomb held up to 100 lbs of mustard gas - a toxin known as dichlorethyl sulphide. 
9    Infield, Disaster,p.14. 
10   Ibid. 
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trained their combatants in their use but 'few of the trainees took the schooling 
very seriously.'11 It was generally believed by chemical experts that Hitler 
would not authorise its use because he had a personal antipathy to gas 
warfare, they were also aware that the Wehrmacht military training did not 
include toxic warfare, and it was believed that the German High Command 
would not want to outrage world opinion.12 The Germans did hold toxic 
weapons, and it was particularly feared they had 'spitzen K-stoff ' which an 
officer noted 'presumably {meant} some especially important or virulent form 
of gas.'13 In mid-April 1945 ultra revealed that Hitler was retaining the right to 
order their destruction or removal to a safer place like the coast.14 
 
              When the SS John Harvey exploded the mustard-gas infiltrated both 
the water and air and the oil which soaked many fighting for their lives in the 
harbour area. In the Great War gas had been breathed in as vapour; this time 
much of it was mixed with oil and water: the effects had not been seen before. 
Many had commented on the strange smell of garlic, but there was total 
confusion over how to treat the victims. Many were left in their original 
contaminated clothes so they continued to breathe in dangerous fumes; those 
who stripped and washed increased their survival chances. A Captain 
Denfield, a medical doctor, was suspicious but came upon a brick wall of 
silence until a stevedore Sergeant told him that chemicals were sometimes in 
the holds. A Lt Col Stewart Alexander flew in and confirmed it was gas: 
Alexander was an expert from Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland; its equivalent 
in Britain was Porton. It still took medical teams a considerable time to realise 
what the main problem was with men going blind and in extreme pain. Some 
historians claim that over a thousand soldiers and sailors died as well as many 
Italians from the mustard-gas.15 Other sources are a more conservative, but 
even at the lowest end of speculated deaths it has been claimed there were 628 
military victims, 83 fatal and many more civilian deaths from the gas-vapour 
that infiltrated the town. The HMS Bicester rescued some 30 survivors, but 
                                                 
11   Infield, Disaster,p.135. 
12   Hitler had been temporarily blinded by British gas.  
13   KNA-HW/1/3715-p.3. 
14   KNA-18/4/1945-HW/1/3715-pp.1-2. 
15   Beevor, Second,p.534. 
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had to be towed to Taranto because of damage caused in the attack; in Taranto 
they found that many of the crew were suffering from chemical burns and 
blindness.  
 
               In the early stages it was mooted that the Germans had dropped 
mustard gas bombs; they had, it was argued, first used in the Great War.16 It 
was not until a damaged M47A1 shell was found that it was realised the root 
of the problem was an Allied one. Some of the Allied commanders had 
worried that a 'retaliatory raid might be made by mistake before the rumour 
was discounted.'17 There is no doubt that for several hours the military 
situation was precariously balanced. The British port authorities at first 
refused to acknowledge its existence and Churchill also refused, claiming that 
the symptoms were not the same, and finally demanding that the causes of the 
protracted deaths be put down as NYD dermatitis, or burns caused by the 
enemy.18 Unquestionably Churchill was concerned about public opinion, and 
not letting the enemy know of the existence of such toxic weapons, but the 
spy work was efficient and soon Axis Sally, sometimes known as the Berlin 
Bitch was broadcasting 'I see you boys are getting gassed by your own poison 
gas.'19 Sadly the statistics were appalling, 'of the 70,752 men hospitalised for 
gas in World War 1 only 2% died, as against 13% in Bari.'20 Ironically, as a 
result of pathological tests carried out post-war on the many who died, 
medical research found in these toxins a help towards curing some forms of 
Hodgkin's disease and various leukaemia.  
 
                   The port was out of action for many months, and the disaster was 
not given any publicity because of the censors. The event was well-known by 
those who were there, but it was kept out of the public eye in America and 
was only de-restricted in 1959 as it was a disaster and a major embarrassment. 
The secrecy cost Italian lives because the civilian hospitals were kept in the 
dark. The Washington Post mentioned the attack, but did not mention gas or 
                                                 
16   22nd April 1915. 
17   Infield, Diaster,p.194. 
18   NYD - Not Yet Diagnosed. 
19   Infield, Disaster,p.207 
20   Ibid,p.205. 
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the amount of damage for fear of stirring up opinions as to how the 
government was running the war. Eisenhower in his postwar memoirs wrote 
that 'fortunately the wind was offshore and the escaping gas caused no 
casualties. Had the wind been in the opposite direction, however, great 
disaster could well have resulted.'21 Churchill also had the records purged and 
the whole incident remained obscure until the late 1960s. As recently as 1986 
the Times reported that some 600 contaminated British seamen would receive 
back-dated war pensions.  
 
                          The Luftwaffe air raid put the port of Bari out of commission 
for a long period of time; it was the second greatest shipping disaster for the 
Allies during World War II, and Kesselring's raid had some serious effects on 
the Allied campaign. Not least amongst the problems was lack of supplies to 
the 15th Air Force at Foggia which had been dependent upon Bari's imports. It 
'prevented Mediterranean Allied Air Forces from attacking German airfields 
prior to the amphibious landing at Anzio.'22 From Kesselring's point of view it 
was an outstanding success, but it succeeded because the Allied air command 
was over confident and mistakenly thought the Luftwaffe was finished. 
Allowing the lights to stay on when just a few miles from the enemy lines is 
almost beyond belief, especially with so many valuable merchant vessels 
parked side by side. Some historians believe the ramifications of the Bari raid 
stretched as far as Normandy.23 This may be putting too much weight on the 
German success, but it did cause serious problems for the Allied campaign 
and cost far too much life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21   Eisenhower, Crusade,p.226. 
22   Infield, Disaster,p.237. 
23   Glen Infield, Disaster. 
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                                        APPENDIX 7 
 
Perceptive Versailles Cartoon (15th May 1919) …crying child is 1940 a 
conscript. 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
THE TEXT OF THE FÜHRERBEFEHL AS PRODUCED IN THE 
TRIAL24 
 
The Führerbefehl of 18th October, 1942 
1. Recently our adversaries have employed methods of warfare contrary to the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention. The attitude of the so-called 
commandos, who are recruited in part among common criminals released 
from prison, is particularly brutal and underhanded. From captured documents 
it has been learned that they have orders not only to bind prisoners but to kill 
them without hesitation should they become an encumbrance or p.34 
constitute an obstacle to the completion of their mission. Finally, we have 
captured orders which advocate putting prisoners to death as a matter of 
principle,  
2. For this reason, an addition to the communiqué of the Wehrmacht of 7th 
October, 1942, is announced that, in the future, Germany will resort to the 
same methods in regard to these groups of British saboteurs and their 
accomplices-that is to say that German troops will exterminate them without 
mercy wherever they find them. 
3. Therefore, I command that : Henceforth all enemy troops encountered by 
German troops during so-called commando operations, in Europe or in Africa, 
though they appear to be soldiers in uniform or demolition groups, armed or 
unarmed, are to be exterminated to the last man, either in combat or in pursuit. 
It matters not in the least whether they have been landed by ships or planes or 
dropped by parachute. If such men appear to be about to surrender, no quarter 
should be given them on general principle. A detailed report on this point is to 
be addressed in each case to the OKW for inclusion in the Wehrmacht 
communiqué. 
4. If members of such commando units, acting as agents, saboteurs, etc., fall 
into the hands of the Wehrmacht through different channels (for example, 
through the police in occupied territories), they are to be handed over to the 
Sicherheitsdienst without delay. It is formally forbidden to keep them, even 
temporarily, under military supervision (for example, in P/W camps, etc.). 
5. These provisions do not apply to enemy soldiers who surrender or are 
captured in actual combat within the limits of normal combat activities 
(offensives, large-scale air or seaborne landings). Nor do they apply to enemy 
                                                 
24 http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/dostler.htm; 
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troops captured during naval engagements, nor to aviators who, have baled 
out to save lives, during aerial combat. 
6. I will summon before the tribunal of war all leaders and officers who fail to 
carry out these instructions-either by failure to inform their men or by their 
disobedience of this order in action. 
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                                                   Appendix 9 
 
 
Kesselring’s initial Instructions in Italy 
 
 
Führer Directive No. 38 – 2nd December 1941 
 
 
 
I charge Field Marshal Kesselring with the command of all forces to be 
employed in the task of expanding and protecting Germany’s position in the 
central Mediterranean, and herewith appoint him Commanding General 
Armed Forces, South. His tasks will be as follows: 
a) To obtain sea and air supremacy in the area between southern Italy 
and North Africa in order to establish safe shipping routes to Libya 
and Cyrenaica. It is particularly important to suppress Malta. 
b) To cooperate with the German forces and those of her allies which are 
deployed in North Africa. 
c) To paralyze enemy shipping traffic passing the Mediterranean as well 
as the transport of British supplies to Tobruk and Malta, in close 
cooperation with the German and Italian naval forces available for the 
task. 
 
The Commanding General, Armed Forces South will be under the command 
of Il Duce and will receive his general instructions through the Italian High 
Command. As for matter pertaining to the Air Force, the Commander in 
Chief, Air will deal directly with the Commanding General Armed Forces, 
South; concerning matters of importance the Armed Forces High Command is 
to be informed at the same time.  
 
The following will be subordinate to the Commanding General, Armed 
Forces, South: 
1. All forces of the German Air Force which are deployed in the 
Mediterranean and in North Africa. 
2. All Italian plane and anti-aircraft units which the Italian Armed Forces 
may place at his disposal in support of operations directed by him. 
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